Introduction
Sudan occupies a pivotal position in the geopolitics of Africa and the Middle East. Located on the western shore of the Red Sea, it connects North Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, making it a strategic bridge between Africa’s interior and one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors. Beyond its geostrategic location, Sudan possesses significant natural resources, including gold, fertile agricultural land and valuable export commodities such as gum arabic and sesame, further enhancing its strategic importance (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2005; Hussein & Ali, 2025).
These characteristics have made Sudan one of the principal arenas where domestic conflict, regional rivalries and great-power competition increasingly intersect. Regional and global powers, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran, the United States (US), China and Russia, have pursued competing military, economic and geopolitical interests in Sudan (Assefa, 2025). Consequently, developments in Sudan increasingly extend beyond the country’s borders, influencing security dynamics across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Among these external actors, Russia occupies a distinctive position. Unlike many of its competitors, Moscow combines military cooperation, diplomatic engagement, security partnerships, economic interests and ambitions for a long-term maritime presence within a broader strategy aimed at expanding its influence across Africa and the Red Sea region.
This bulletin asks why Sudan has become strategically important to Russia. It argues that Moscow’s engagement extends far beyond the proposed naval facility at Port Sudan and reflects a broader strategy of strengthening Russia’s political, military and economic influence across the Red Sea and Africa. At the same time, Russia’s engagement has unfolded within Sudan’s fragmented political landscape, requiring Moscow to adapt its strategy to competing centres of power rather than a unified Sudanese state. The bulletin demonstrates that Sudan’s importance to Russia lies not only in its geographic position or natural resources, but in its role as a strategic gateway through which Moscow seeks to project influence across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the wider African continent.
Historical Context
Russia’s relationship with Sudan predates current debates over Port Sudan and Russia’s renewed engagement in Africa. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the newly independent Republic of Sudan were established on 5 January 1956, shortly after Sudan gained independence (Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Sudan, 2026). From the outset, however, Sudan’s importance to Moscow extended beyond bilateral diplomacy. During the Cold War, Sudan occupied a strategically significant position on the western shore of the Red Sea. For both the Soviet Union and US, the Red Sea constituted one of the world’s most important maritime corridors, making control of, or access to, its coastline a central element of broader geopolitical competition.
Soviet interest in Sudan should therefore be understood within Moscow’s wider regional strategy rather than as an isolated bilateral relationship. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union cultivated a network of political and military partnerships across the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean. Soviet naval forces operated from Berbera in Somalia until 1977 (Mohammed, 2026), while South Yemen became Moscow’s closest regional ally, with the port of Aden and the island of Socotra serving as key logistical hubs for Soviet naval deployments in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Ramani, 2018). Following the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, Ethiopia also emerged as one of the Soviet Union’s principal strategic partners in Africa, receiving extensive military, political and economic assistance (Kingston-Cox, 2022). Although Moscow never secured a permanent military facility in Sudan, the country remained part of the Soviet Union’s broader network of political and security partnerships across the Red Sea region.
Sudan, however, approached its foreign policy from a markedly different perspective. As Harry Cross argues, successive Sudanese governments rarely aligned permanently with any external power on ideological grounds. Instead, Sudan consistently adjusted its external partnerships according to domestic political priorities and economic necessity, with foreign policy closely linked to access to military assistance, investment and political support rather than fixed ideological commitments (Cross, 2025). This pragmatic approach would become one of the defining characteristics of Sudan’s external relations throughout the Cold War and beyond.
The first sustained period of Soviet-Sudanese strategic cooperation emerged after Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri seized power in 1969. Sudan initially strengthened military and political cooperation with Moscow, receiving arms, military training and technical assistance. However, following the failed communist coup of 1971, Nimeiri gradually reoriented Sudan’s foreign policy towards Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United States. This shift reflected political survival and economic necessity rather than ideological transformation. Facing mounting financial pressures and growing dependence on external assistance, Khartoum increasingly sought support from whichever external partners could provide political, military and economic support (Cross, 2025).
The decline of Soviet influence in Sudan coincided with the broader weakening of Soviet engagement across Africa during the final years of the Cold War. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia substantially reduced its diplomatic, military and economic presence on the African continent while concentrating on domestic political and economic transformation. Nevertheless, this represented a temporary interruption rather than the abandonment of Russia’s long-term strategic interest in the Red Sea region.
Russia’s renewed engagement with Sudan should therefore be understood within the broader context of Moscow’s return to Africa under President Vladimir Putin. Beginning in the early 2000s, Russia sought to restore part of the international influence lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union by expanding its diplomatic, military and economic engagement across Africa while seeking greater access to strategic maritime routes and natural resources.
Unlike Soviet engagement, which was largely framed by ideological competition during the Cold War, Russia’s contemporary Africa policy has been guided primarily by geopolitical and economic considerations, emphasising sovereignty, non-interference and mutually beneficial cooperation (Kostelyanets, 2019). Within this broader strategy, Sudan emerged as one of Russia’s most important partners.
Sudan’s growing international isolation also encouraged closer engagement with Russia. Following Sudan’s designation as a United States State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993 and the imposition of comprehensive US sanctions in 1997, Khartoum encountered increasing difficulties accessing Western finance, technology and investment. The central role of the United States within the international financial system meant that these sanctions extended well beyond bilateral relations, discouraging multinational companies and commercial banks from operating in Sudan (Cross, 2025). Consequently, Sudan increasingly diversified its external partnerships towards China, the Gulf states and Russia, whose engagement generally imposed fewer political conditions relating to governance, democratisation and human rights.
Against this background, Russia-Sudan relations gradually evolved beyond conventional diplomacy into a broader partnership. Russia became one of Sudan’s principal arms suppliers, expanded cooperation in the mining sector, particularly in gold extraction, strengthened diplomatic coordination in international forums and initiated negotiations over a naval logistics facility at Port Sudan. These developments reflected Moscow’s broader objective of securing a long-term strategic presence on the western shore of the Red Sea. Access to Port Sudan would significantly enhance Russia’s ability to project naval power between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean while reinforcing its geopolitical position within the Red Sea region (Cafiero, 2021).
Viewed from this longer historical perspective, Russia’s contemporary engagement in Sudan represents less a new foreign policy direction than the adaptation of enduring strategic interests to changing international conditions. Likewise, successive Sudanese governments and, more recently, competing political and military authorities have continued a longstanding pattern of pursuing external partnerships according to regime survival, economic necessity and strategic autonomy rather than ideological alignment. These parallel historical trajectories help explain why Sudan continues to occupy a central place in Russia’s contemporary Africa strategy.
Why Sudan Matters to Russia
Port Sudan is strategically important not only because it is Sudan’s principal commercial port, but also because it connects the economies of Sudan and landlocked South Sudan to international markets. South Sudan’s crude oil is transported through pipelines crossing Sudan to export terminals on the Red Sea, making Port Sudan essential to Juba’s principal source of state revenue as well as to Khartoum’s transit income. Its location on the western shore of the Red Sea also places it along the maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal with the Indian Ocean through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which an estimated 12-15 per cent of global seaborne trade passes (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], 2026).
Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2023, Port Sudan has also become the de facto administrative and diplomatic centre of Sudan. As fighting engulfed Khartoum, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Sovereignty Council, government ministries, foreign embassies and many international organisations relocated key operations to Port Sudan, further increasing the city’s political and strategic importance. Consequently, control of Port Sudan now provides not only access to Sudan’s principal maritime gateway but also to the country’s wartime political leadership.
For Russia, the proposed naval logistics facility at Port Sudan would fill a significant gap in its maritime network. Moscow currently lacks a permanent military foothold in the Red Sea, while its navy faces limited overseas maintenance, refuelling and replenishment capacity. A facility capable of hosting up to 300 personnel and four vessels including nuclear-powered vessels (Al Jazeera, 2020), would therefore support longer naval deployments, maritime surveillance and logistical operations between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean. It could also strengthen supply networks supporting Russian security activities elsewhere in Africa, particularly in Libya, the Sahel and the Central African Republic (Battaglini, 2026). Beyond logistics, the facility would strengthen Russia’s operational presence in the Red Sea and improve coordination with its military and security activities elsewhere in Africa (Ramani, 2020).
The project has acquired additional importance following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, which created uncertainty over Russia’s continued access to its naval facility at Tartus and the Hmeimim air base (Reuters, 2025). Although Port Sudan could not fully replace Tartus because it remains separated from the Mediterranean by the Suez Canal and would face its own logistical and political constraints, it would diversify Russia’s overseas military access and reduce Moscow’s reliance on a single regional hub (Battaglini, 2026; Cafiero, 2021).
Russia’s interest in Port Sudan becomes clearer when compared with the strategic positions of other external powers. The US, China, France, Japan and Italy already maintain military facilities in Djibouti. Although China maintains substantial economic interests in South Sudan’s oil industry and depends on export infrastructure running through Sudan to Port Sudan, its existing military base in Djibouti reduces the strategic necessity of acquiring another permanent military facility on the Red Sea (U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2019). Türkiye maintains its largest overseas military base in Somalia and, under Omar al-Bashir, obtained rights to redevelop Suakin Island in Sudan, although the project never evolved into an operational military base (Mashamoun, 2022). Similarly, the UAE has developed an extensive commercial and logistical network across the Horn of Africa, particularly through Berbera in Somaliland. Recent infrastructure expansion around Berbera Airport has also been linked to a future military facility serving Emirati, US and Israeli strategic interests near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Hochet-Bodin et al., 2026). Saudi Arabia and Egypt, meanwhile, possess their own Red Sea coastlines and established naval capabilities. Russia, by contrast, has repeatedly sought, but failed, to secure a permanent military foothold elsewhere in the Red Sea. Earlier discussions over naval or logistical facilities in Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea failed to materialise, making Sudan the most viable opportunity to establish a long-term presence in the region (Ramani, 2020). Consequently, Port Sudan represents Moscow’s principal opportunity to establish a permanent logistical foothold on the western shore of the Red Sea and strengthen its long-term maritime presence.
On Sudan’s side, The SAF-led authorities have also used this Russian interest as leverage. Negotiations initiated under Omar al-Bashir produced a preliminary 25-year framework, but political change and repeated reviews have prevented implementation (Reuters, 2025). Rather than indicating a simple rejection of Russia, these delays reflect Sudan’s broader practice of preserving flexibility among competing external partners. By keeping negotiations over the proposed naval facility open, the SAF-led authorities have preserved room to negotiate military assistance and broader political support from Moscow without immediately committing to a permanent Russian military presence. More broadly, successive Sudanese governments have generally pursued pragmatic relationships with multiple external partners, seeking support according to changing political and security needs rather than exclusive alignment with any single power (Reuters, 2025).
At the same time, Sudan should not be viewed as a single, unified actor. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2023, political authority has become fragmented between competing military, political and economic actors, each maintaining different external relationships. Consequently, Sudan’s engagement with Russia is shaped not only by bilateral diplomacy but also by the internal balance of power, particularly the interests of the SAF-led authorities based in Port Sudan. Despite these constraints, the SAF has continued Sudan’s longstanding strategy of pragmatic partnerships, engaging simultaneously with Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, China and other partners to secure military assistance, diplomatic support and economic resources while avoiding excessive dependence on any single external actor.
Following the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the loss of most of its oil reserves, gold became Sudan’s largest export commodity and one of the country’s principal sources of state revenue. At the same time, the largely informal nature of Sudan’s mining sector created opportunities for external actors to participate in extraction, trade and export networks beyond effective state regulation. According to SWISSAID, Sudan currently produces between 70 and 90 tonnes of gold annually, making it one of Africa’s largest gold producers, while between 50 and 70 per cent of production is smuggled abroad through informal channels (SWISSAID, 2025a).
Gold has simultaneously become a central component of Sudan’s war economy. Revenues from gold production and trade constitute one of the principal sources of financing for both the SAF and the RSF, linking the conflict to cross-border networks of miners, smugglers, armed groups and foreign governments (Soliman & Baldo, 2025). Gold flows through regional smuggling routes extending across Egypt, Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic and South Sudan before frequently reaching markets in the UAE, demonstrating that Sudan’s conflict economy has become embedded within wider regional supply chains (SWISSAID, 2025a).
For Russia, Sudan’s gold offers more than commercial profit. It provides access to a strategic commodity that can be monetised through trading networks outside the Western financial system, thereby contributing to Russia’s sanctions resilience following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2026). Investigations have linked Russian entities associated with the Wagner Group, including Meroe Gold, to gold extraction, processing facilities and export networks in Sudan (Elbagir et al., 2022). Although the precise volume of Sudanese gold ultimately reaching Russia remains difficult to verify because illicit flows rarely appear in official trade statistics, available evidence indicates that Sudan has formed part of Moscow’s broader strategy of securing access to critical mineral resources while mitigating the impact of international financial restrictions (SWISSAID, 2025a).
The outbreak of civil war did not increase Russia’s access to Sudanese gold; in the short term, it disrupted it. Official production and exports declined sharply during 2023 as fighting affected mining areas and transport routes. At the same time, international sanctions against Meroe Gold, together with the dismantling of Wagner’s formal commercial structures reduced the visibility of Russian operations. Rather than ending Russian involvement, however, these developments appear to have pushed activity towards less transparent networks operating through neighbouring states and Gulf markets, particularly the UAE, where the origin of Sudanese gold is increasingly difficult to trace (SWISSAID, 2025a).
Taken together, Port Sudan and Sudan’s gold sector illustrate the multidimensional nature of Russia’s engagement with Sudan. While Port Sudan serves Moscow’s geopolitical and maritime ambitions by providing a potential long-term military foothold on the Red Sea, Sudan’s gold sector offers important economic opportunities and contributes to Russia’s sanctions resilience.
Military cooperation has also remained a central pillar of the bilateral relationship. Russia has been one of Sudan’s principal suppliers of military equipment for decades, providing combat aircraft, helicopters, armoured vehicles and air-defence systems. Beyond their commercial value, these defence exports have strengthened institutional ties between Russian and Sudanese military elites while reinforcing Moscow’s long-term political influence within Sudan’s security sector (Kostelyanets, 2019). Since the outbreak of the civil war, reports indicate that Russia has continued supplying military equipment and fuel to the SAF, while linking expanded military assistance to negotiations over a naval facility at Port Sudan (African Defense Forum, 2025; Amnesty International, 2024).
Russia’s military engagement has not relied solely on official state-to-state cooperation. During Omar al-Bashir’s presidency, the Wagner Group became an important instrument of Russian influence, combining security assistance with commercial interests, particularly in the gold sector. Wagner personnel reportedly trained security forces, protected mining operations and facilitated Russian access to Sudan’s natural resources. Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, many of these activities were gradually absorbed into the Russian Ministry of Defence’s Africa Corps, illustrating institutional continuity rather than a fundamental change in Russia’s objectives.
The outbreak of Sudan’s civil war in 2023 prompted an adjustment in Russia’s approach rather than a fundamental change in its objectives. Prior to the conflict, Russia maintained relations with both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), enabling it to safeguard both its official state interests and its commercial networks. As the war progressed, however, Russia increasingly aligned itself with the SAF. This shift reflected pragmatic strategic considerations rather than ideological preference. The SAF retained international recognition, controlled Port Sudan and possessed the legal authority to negotiate the proposed Russian naval logistics facility. At the same time, the restructuring of the Wagner Group under the Africa Corps brought Russia’s security activities in Sudan more directly under state control. Nevertheless, Moscow avoided severing ties with the RSF, which continued to control important gold-producing areas in western Sudan. Russia’s closer alignment with the SAF also coincided with reports of Ukrainian military assistance to Burhan’s forces, including drone capabilities and training support, reinforcing Moscow’s interest in limiting Kyiv’s influence in Sudan’s security sector (McGregor, 2024). Rather than representing a policy reversal, Russia’s approach illustrates its continued preference for strategic flexibility while prioritising the actor best positioned to advance its long-term political, economic and maritime interests.
Sudan also carries diplomatic value for Moscow as part of Russia’s broader engagement with African states. Russia has consistently framed its relationship with Khartoum around the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, presenting itself as an alternative to Western partnerships that often attach political conditions to security and economic cooperation (Kostelyanets, 2019; Cafiero, 2021). Although Sudan represents only one vote in the United Nations, maintaining close relations with Khartoum contributes to Russia’s wider effort to build diplomatic support across Africa and counter Western initiatives in multilateral institutions. This was illustrated when Sudan voted alongside Russia against the 2026 UN General Assembly resolution reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Farge, 2026).
Future Trajectories
The future of Russia’s engagement in Sudan will depend on two interconnected factors: the outcome of Sudan’s civil war and the evolving geopolitical competition in the Red Sea. While Moscow’s long-term strategic objectives have remained relatively consistent, the instruments through which they are pursued are likely to continue adapting to changing political and security conditions. Rather than pointing towards a single outcome, current developments suggest several plausible trajectories.
One possibility is that Russia ultimately secures a permanent logistics facility at Port Sudan. Such an outcome would represent the culmination of a strategic objective pursued for more than a decade and would establish Russia as a permanent military actor on the western shore of the Red Sea. Beyond supporting naval deployments, the facility would strengthen Moscow’s ability to connect its activities across North Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel while reducing its dependence on other overseas facilities. It would also reinforce Russia’s position as an increasingly important participant in regional security affairs, particularly as competition over the Red Sea continues to intensify.
An alternative development, however, is that the agreement remains delayed or is never fully implemented. Sudan’s fragmented political landscape, the absence of stable state institutions and the uncertain outcome of the civil war continue to create significant obstacles to long-term strategic agreements. Since negotiations over the Russian facility have already been postponed several times under different governments, further delays would not necessarily represent a failure of Russian policy (Chapman et al., 2025). Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to adapt its approach, maintaining influence through diplomatic engagement, military cooperation, economic networks and security partnerships even without a permanent naval presence.
On the other hand, Russia’s ability to sustain its expanding engagement also remains uncertain. The war in Ukraine, international sanctions and growing military commitments across multiple theatres place increasing pressure on Russian financial and logistical resources (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2026).
Regardless of whether the proposed naval facility is ultimately established, competition in the Red Sea is unlikely to diminish. Instead, the region is expected to become increasingly characterised by overlapping military partnerships, strategic infrastructure projects and political competition among global and regional powers. Rather than seeking exclusive influence, external actors are likely to continue pursuing flexible partnerships that allow them to secure access to ports, maritime routes, natural resources and political allies.
For Sudan, these developments present both opportunities and challenges. Continued interest from multiple external powers may provide greater diplomatic leverage and access to economic and military assistance. At the same time, maintaining strategic autonomy will become increasingly difficult if external competition deepens. The country’s long-term foreign policy is therefore likely to depend on its ability to balance relationships with competing partners while avoiding excessive dependence on any single external actor. Whether future governments continue to pursue this pragmatic balancing strategy may ultimately prove as important as Russia’s own regional ambitions.
Ultimately, Russia’s future role in Sudan should not be assessed solely through the question of whether a naval base is constructed. More significant is whether Moscow succeeds in consolidating a durable political, economic and security partnership capable of surviving changes in Sudan’s domestic politics. Likewise, the future of the Red Sea will not be determined by any single external actor, but by the interaction of multiple powers competing within an increasingly interconnected geopolitical environment. In this sense, Sudan is likely to remain not merely a site of conflict, but one of the principal arenas through which the future regional order of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa will be negotiated.
Conclusion
Sudan’s importance to Russia extends well beyond the country’s ongoing civil war or the proposed naval facility at Port Sudan. Rather, Sudan occupies a strategic position at the intersection of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the wider African continent, allowing Russia to pursue multiple geopolitical, military, economic and diplomatic objectives through a single regional partnership. The case of Sudan therefore illustrates how Moscow’s contemporary Africa policy is driven less by ideological alignment than by long-term strategic positioning and the pursuit of flexible partnerships capable of advancing broader regional ambitions.
The bulletin has also shown that the Russia-Sudan relationship is neither static nor one-sided. Rather than relying on a single instrument of influence, Russia has combined official diplomacy, military cooperation, security partnerships and economic engagement while adapting its approach to changing political circumstances. At the same time, Sudan has not simply been an object of external competition. Despite the fragmentation of political authority since 2023, Sudanese actors have continued a long-standing tradition of balancing competing external partners in pursuit of military assistance, diplomatic support and economic opportunities, demonstrating that smaller states retain agency even amid intense geopolitical rivalry.
More broadly, developments in Sudan reflect a wider transformation of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa into an increasingly contested geopolitical space. Competition in the region is no longer defined solely by territorial control or ideological rivalry, but increasingly by access to strategic infrastructure, maritime routes, critical resources and political partnerships. Russia’s engagement in Sudan is therefore not an isolated case, but part of a broader reconfiguration of regional power dynamics in which global and regional actors seek to expand their influence through long-term strategic presence rather than direct territorial control.
Ultimately, Sudan matters to Russia not simply because of what it possesses, but because of what it enables. Whether or not Moscow ultimately secures a permanent naval facility at Port Sudan, Sudan has already become a strategic gateway through which Russia seeks to project influence across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and Africa more broadly. As geopolitical competition in these interconnected regions continues to intensify, Sudan is likely to remain one of the principal arenas through which the future regional balance of power will be negotiated.
References
African Defense Forum. (2025, February 4). Weapons, fuel deliveries from Russia, Iran inflame Sudan’s civil war. https://adf-magazine.com/2025/02/weapons-fuel-deliveries-from-russia-iran-inflame-sudans-civil-war/
Al Jazeera. (2020, November 13). Russia plans naval base in Sudan. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/russia-plans-naval-base-in-sudan
Amnesty International. (2024b, July 25). Sudan: Constant flow of arms fuelling relentless civilian suffering in conflict – New investigation. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/sudan-constant-flow-of-arms-fuelling-relentless-civilian-suffering-in-conflict-new-investigation/
Assefa, M. (2025, December 13). Regional and international actors in Sudan’s current conflict. Atlas Institute for International Affairs. https://atlasinstitute.org/regional-and-international-actors-in-sudans-current-conflict/
Cafiero, G. (2021, June 1). Sudan: A key area in US–Russia competition? Middle East Institute. https://mei.edu/ar/publication/sudan-key-area-us-russia-competition/
Central Intelligence Agency. (2005). The World Factbook: Sudan. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/
Cross, H. (2025). Undoing a revolution: Sudan and the politics of debt. Oxford University Press.
Chapman, B., Word, C., Coffey, S., O’Brien, S., & Nguyen, K. (2025). Russia: Planned naval base near Port Sudan on hold. Tearline, The University of Texas at Austin Intelligence Studies Project. https://www.tearline.mil/snapshot/russia-planned-naval-base-near-port-sudan-on-hold
Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, June 24). Another Hormuz? The Red Sea’s threat to the global economy. https://www.cfr.org/articles/another-hormuz-the-red-seas-threat-to-the-global-economy
Elbagir, N., Arvanitidis, B., Qiblawi, T., Mezzofiore, G., Abo Al Gheit, M., & Tarasova, D. (2022, July 29). Russia is plundering gold in Sudan to boost Putin’s war effort in Ukraine. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl
Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of the Sudan. (2026). Russian–Sudanese relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://sudan.mid.ru/en/dvustoronnie_otnosheniya/
Farge, E. (2026, February 24). On invasion anniversary, UN says Ukraine cannot be divided. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/states-condemn-russian-violations-un-meeting-ukraine-2026-02-24/
Hochet-Bodin, N., Fattori, F., & Mas, L. (2026, July 6). UAE discreetly builds military base in Somaliland for US and Israel. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2026/07/06/uae-discreetly-builds-military-base-in-somaliland-for-us-and-israel_6755184_124.html
Hussein, M., & Ali, M. (2025, November 20). Sudan has vast oil, gold and agricultural resources. Who controls them? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/20/sudan-has-vast-oil-gold-and-agricultural-resources-who-controls-them
Kiel Institute for the World Economy. (2026, June). Endgame: Russia’s war economy hits its limits. https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/news/endgame-russias-war-economy-hits-its-limits/
Kingston-Cox, W. (2022, July 4). How important was Soviet support for Ethiopia’s Derg regime? Kleio Historical Journal. https://www.kleiohistoricaljournal.com/post/how-important-was-soviet-support-for-ethiopia-s-derg-regime
Kostelyanets, S. V. (2019). Russia–Sudan relations in the early 21st century: A lost opportunity or the foundation for a new strategic partnership? Asia and Africa Today, 9, 56–62. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336844745_Russia-Sudan_Relations_in_the_Early_21st_Century_A_Lost_Opportunity_or_the_Foundation_for_a_New_Beginning
Mashamoun, J. (2022, July 20). Turkey and Sudan: An enduring relationship? Middle East Institute. https://mei.edu/publication/turkey-and-sudan-enduring-relationship/
McGregor, A. (2024, July 8). Russia switches sides in Sudan war. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21(102). Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/russia-switches-sides-in-sudan-war/
Mohammed, S. (2026, January 13). Berbera’s fate: An unwritten chapter at the catena of recognition, rivalry, and Red Sea security. Horn Review. https://hornreview.org/2026/01/13/berberas-fate-an-unwritten-chapter-at-the-catena-of-recognition-rivalry-and-red-sea-security/
Ramani, S. (2020, December 7). Russia’s Port Sudan naval base: A power play on the Red Sea. Royal United Services Institute. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-port-sudan-naval-base-power-play-red-sea
Ramani, S. (2018, December 24). Russia and South Yemen. Russian International Affairs Council. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/samuel-ramani-en/russia-and-south-yemen/
Reuters. (2025, January 6). Sudan lifts force majeure on oil to Port Sudan. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-lifts-force-majeure-oil-port-sudan-2025-01-06/#:~:text=JUBA%2C%20Jan%206%20(Reuters),seen%20by%20Reuters%20on%20Monday.
Reuters. (2025, January 29). Russia, seeking to keep bases in Syria, says it held ‘frank’ talks with new authorities. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-syria-hold-further-talks-russian-military-bases-syria-tass-reports-2025-01-29/
Reuters. (2025, January 28). Russian delegation in first Syria visit since Assad fall, TASS reports. https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-government-delegation-arrives-syria-talks-tass-reports-2025-01-28/
Reuters. (2025, February 12). Russian Red Sea base deal still on the table, Sudanese FM says. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-red-sea-base-deal-still-table-sudanese-fm-says-2025-02-12/
Soliman, A., & Baldo, S. (2025). Gold and the war in Sudan: How regional solutions can support an end to conflict. Chatham House.
SWISSAID. (2025a). Sudan – African Gold Report. African Gold Report. https://www.africangoldreport.org/sudan
UNHCR. (2025). Sudan emergency. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2019, November 7). Background reference: Sudan and South Sudan. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/SDN/background
