Introduction
The Horn of Africa has re-emerged as one of the most strategically contested regions in contemporary international politics. Located at the crossroads of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, it constitutes a critical maritime nexus linking Europe, Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Asia. Over the past decade, the region has attracted an unprecedented level of external engagement, as Gulf States, Turkey, China, and Western actors seek to secure influence over vital maritime routes, energy corridors, and political alignments (Donelli & Cannon, 2021). This development reflects not only a regional shift, but also a broader transformation in the nature of geopolitical competition. Increasingly, rivalry unfolds below the threshold of direct military confrontation, taking the form of hybrid strategies that combine political, economic, security, and informational instruments to achieve strategic objectives indirectly. As such, the Horn of Africa provides a particularly salient setting through which to analyse the evolving modalities of power projection in a changing global order.
Within this regional context, Somalia occupies a uniquely revealing yet underexplored position. Despite its geostrategic relevance, the country remains insufficiently integrated into scholarly debates on hybrid warfare and subregional power projection. At the same time, Somalia represents one of the most illustrative cases of fragile statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa and the wider Middle Eastern–African interface: a political system characterized by fragmented authority, competing elite networks, and multiple entry points for external influence (Menkhaus, 2014). These structural conditions not only heighten Somalia’s vulnerability to external intervention but also render it particularly susceptible to indirect and network-based forms of influence. Foreign hybrid engagement in Somalia,conducted by actors such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey, and China,demonstrates how external powers capitalize on structural fragility to entrench long-term strategic positions (Vertin, 2019). Yet, despite the growing relevance of these dynamics, a systematic analytical interpretation within the framework of hybrid warfare remains insufficiently developed. This gap is particularly striking given the increasing policy attention devoted to the Horn of Africa as a theatre of geopolitical competition.
Addressing this lacuna requires an integrative theoretical perspective. This article therefore builds on the conceptual foundations of hybrid and proxy warfare, as well as insights from small-state foreign policy and power projection theory. Drawing on the literature on proxy warfare and hybrid strategies, it conceptualizes indirect influence as a process mediated through local actors, institutional fragmentation, and informal governance structures (Bartosh, 2018; Mumford, 2013). At the same time, scholarship on small-state influence strategies highlights how non-great powers combine conventional and non-conventional instruments to maximize strategic leverage (Long, 2016). By synthesizing these approaches, the article develops a framework that captures the strategic logic underlying multi-domain, predominantly non-kinetic forms of power projection, particularly as employed by regional middle powers in fragile political environments. By analysing Somalia as a case of hybrid regional power entrenchment, this article contributes to ongoing debates on the reconfiguration of geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa and beyond. It not only elucidates the mechanisms of indirect influence but also highlights their broader implications for sovereignty, governance, and regional order. In doing so, it speaks to both academic debates and pressing policy concerns regarding the future of fragile states in an increasingly competitive international environment.
What Makes Warfare Hybrid? A Multi-Dimensional Perspective
Hybrid warfare can be conceptualized as a mode of indirect power projection that systematically integrates military and non-military instruments in order to reshape political environments below the threshold of open warfare. Rather than constituting a fundamentally novel form of conflict, hybrid warfare reflects a strategic logic of integration: the deliberate synchronization of conventional force, proxy relationships, economic leverage, and informational influence into a coherent campaign architecture (Hoffman, 2007). Its analytical distinctiveness lies not in the individual instruments employed, but in their coordinated and mutually reinforcing deployment, designed to generate cumulative and often non-linear effects across multiple domains of political order.
At its core, hybrid warfare builds upon the logic of proxy warfare, yet extends it in both scope and function. As Mumford (2013) demonstrates, proxy relationships enable states to pursue strategic objectives indirectly while reducing the risks of escalation and preserving plausible deniability. However, contemporary hybrid strategies transcend the classical military dimension of proxy engagement. They embed proxy relations within a broader ecosystem of influence that includes economic interdependencies, political sponsorship, and institutional linkages. In this expanded form, proxies do not merely serve as instruments of coercion, but as nodes within a wider network of influence through which external actors can shape governance structures, redistribute power among domestic actors, and anchor their presence within local political economies. The strategic objective thereby shifts from short-term battlefield gains to long-term positional advantage within the target state.
To explain why such strategies are particularly attractive to non-great powers, this article integrates insights from small-state foreign policy literature. Long (2017) demonstrates that small and medium-sized states can exercise disproportionate geopolitical leverage through forms of transactional “niche diplomacy,” especially by exploiting strategic geography, infrastructure control, and access to critical nodes of connectivity. These strategies are typically not embedded in formalized multilateral frameworks, but rather operate through flexible, often personalized arrangements with key domestic actors. In parallel, Nye’s (2009) concept of “smart power[tK1] ” provides the theoretical underpinning for understanding the fusion of coercive and attractive instruments. Hybrid strategies operationalize this fusion by combining security-related tools, such as training missions, military assistance, or proxy alignment, with instruments traditionally associated with soft power, including development aid, education initiatives, and symbolic diplomacy. The resulting form of influence is neither purely coercive nor purely persuasive, but structurally embedded and relationally sustained.
The effectiveness of hybrid power projection is closely linked to the structural characteristics of the target environment. Politically fragmented settings, ,marked by elite competition, contested legitimacy, and weak institutional consolidation, and limited territorial control, offer particularly conducive conditions for multi-layered external engagement (United Nations & World Bank, 2017). In such contexts, hybrid strategies do not primarily generate instability; rather, they selectively engage with and reconfigure pre-existing patterns of fragmentation. External actors can align with specific elite factions, insert themselves into institutional vacuums, and exploit governance gaps in ways that incrementally reshape domestic power equilibria. Hybrid warfare, in this sense, operates less as a disruptive force and more as a mechanism of adaptive insertion into fluid political orders.
Building on these considerations, hybrid warfare is conceptualized in this study as a four-dimensional strategy of indirect influence, encompassing distinct but interrelated spheres of action. The first dimension, political patronage and elite sponsorship, refers to the cultivation of privileged relationships with key decision-makers, political factions, or informal power brokers (Menkhaus, 2014). Through financial support, diplomatic backing, or personalized networks, external actors gain access to domestic decision-making processes and can influence political alignments from within (Cooley, 2012; Chandler, 2007).
The second dimension, security sector embedding and proxy alignment captures the integration of external actors into the coercive apparatus of the target state. This includes the provision of training, equipment, and operational support to selected security forces, as well as the establishment of partnerships with non-state armed actors. Such engagement enables external actors to shape the distribution of coercive capacity while maintaining indirect control and deniability (Mumford, 2013). The third dimension, geo-economic entrenchment, refers to the strategic use of infrastructure investments, trade relations, and financial flows to create long-term dependencies. By securing control over critical assets,such as ports, logistics hubs, or energy infrastructure, ,external actors embed themselves within the economic foundations of the target state, thereby translating economic presence into political leverage (Blackwill & Harris, 2016). The fourth dimension, narrative and symbolic power projection, encompasses the construction and dissemination of legitimizing narratives, as well as the use of cultural, educational, and diplomatic instruments to shape perceptions of legitimacy and partnership. Through media engagement, humanitarian initiatives, and symbolic acts of recognition, external actors seek to normalize their presence and frame their involvement as beneficial, necessary, or even indispensable (Nye, 2009; Miskimmon & Loughlin, 2015).
These dimensions do not operate in isolation. Their strategic effectiveness derives from their cumulative interaction, as influence generated in one domain reinforces and stabilizes engagement in others. The overarching aim is not territorial control or immediate domination, but the gradual normalization of the external actor as an embedded and structurally relevant participant within the target state’s political, economic, and security architecture. Hybrid warfare, as conceptualized here, thus represents a form of strategic entrenchment rather than overt confrontation.
Somalia as a Laboratory of Hybrid Warfare
Somalia occupies a geo-strategically pivotal position along one of the world’s most important maritime corridors, linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and, indirectly, to European and Asian trade routes (Notteboom et al., 2024). At the same time, the country exhibits structural features commonly associated with fragile statehood, including limited institutional consolidation, fragmented authority structures, and contested political legitimacy. From the perspective developed in the previous section, this constellation is analytically significant not as background context, but as a structural configuration that enables and shapes the operation of hybrid power projection. The coexistence of strategic value and political fragmentation renders Somalia a particularly suitable case for examining how external actors deploy multi-dimensional influence strategies in practice.
Building on the theoretical framework, Somalia can thus be conceptualized as an “entry-point arena” in which hybrid strategies are operationalized through the selective engagement with existing political fault lines. These fault lines, such as tensions between federal and regional authorities, clan-based patronage structures, ideological divisions, and asymmetric security constellations, do not merely constitute constraints, but function as strategic access points. Hybrid power projection, in this sense, operates through a logic of adaptive insertion: external actors identify, align with, and recalibrate these internal divisions in ways that allow for indirect yet durable influence.
This dynamic becomes visible when disaggregating external engagement along the four analytical dimensions outlined above. First, political patronage and elite sponsorship constitute a central mechanism through which influence is established. External actors cultivate relationships with key political elites at both federal and regional levels, often through financial support, diplomatic backing, or preferential access to resources. Qatar’s engagement at the federal level, for instance, has been characterized by close alignment with central government actors, while the United Arab Emirates has historically maintained strong ties with regional authorities, particularly in Puntland and Somaliland. These differentiated patronage strategies enable external actors to embed themselves within competing centres of authority, thereby hedging political risk while maximizing leverage (Vertin, 2019). Second, security sector embedding, and proxy alignment play a crucial role in shaping the distribution of coercive capacity. The United Arab Emirates’ support for the Puntland Maritime Police Force exemplifies how external actors can strengthen specific security actors outside the central chain of command, thereby influencing local security architectures (Mohamud, 2025). Similarly, Turkey’s military training mission in Mogadishu reflects a more centralized approach, aimed at building the capacity of federal security institutions while simultaneously securing long-term strategic access (Thiessen & Özerdem, 2019). Ethiopia and Kenya have historically pursued their security interests through cross-border interventions, security partnerships, and support for local allied actors, particularly in Somalia’s border regions (Menkhaus, 2014; Clapham, 2017).
Across the above cases, security engagement does not merely enhance stability, but redistributes coercive capabilities in ways that align with external strategic interests. Third, geo-economic entrenchment constitutes a key pillar of hybrid power projection. Investments in port infrastructure, logistics corridors, and urban development projects create material dependencies that extend beyond immediate political cycles. The involvement of the United Arab Emirates in port development and management illustrates how control over critical infrastructure can be translated into long-term geopolitical leverage (Jost, 2025). Such investments are not neutral economic activities; they embed external actors within the economic foundations of the state and create enduring channels of influence.
At a broader level, China’s infrastructure diplomacy in the wider Indian Ocean region reinforces this pattern by linking local economic projects to transregional networks of trade and connectivity (Gebru, 2020). Through these mechanisms, geo-economic engagement becomes a structural component of influence rather than a supplementary instrument. Fourth, narrative and symbolic power projection complements material and institutional forms of engagement. External actors actively shape perceptions of legitimacy and partnership through diplomatic visibility, humanitarian initiatives, and public diplomacy. Turkey’s emphasis on humanitarian assistance and state-building narratives, for example, has contributed to framing its presence as supportive and partnership-oriented, thereby enhancing its acceptance among local populations and political elites. Similarly, Gulf actors utilize media networks, religious diplomacy, and symbolic gestures to reinforce their political alignments and legitimize their involvement. These narrative strategies are critical insofar as they normalize external presence and reduce resistance to deeper forms of institutional and economic embedding.
Crucially, these four dimensions do not operate independently. Their strategic effectiveness lies in their cumulative interaction. Political patronage facilitates access to decision-making processes, which in turn enables security cooperation and economic agreements. Geo-economic investments reinforce political alliances, while narrative strategies legitimize and stabilize these relationships over time. Hybrid power projection in Somalia thus unfolds as a multi-layered process of strategic entrenchment, in which influence is gradually institutionalized across interconnected domains. Importantly, this process should not be reduced to a unidirectional model of external imposition. Rather, it reflects a pattern of competitive entrenchment in which multiple actors pursue overlapping and sometimes conflicting strategies (Ylönen, 2021). Somalia’s political landscape becomes embedded within a wider network of geopolitical interactions spanning the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Western Indian Ocean. In this emerging configuration, characterized by ports, bases, logistics corridors, and political partnerships, the country functions as a nodal point through which regional and extra-regional rivalries are mediated and materialized.
The cumulative outcome of these dynamics is not necessarily state collapse, but a reconfiguration of governance and security structures. Formal institutions increasingly coexist with externally supported patronage networks and parallel security arrangements, producing a layered and hybridized political order. Multilateral stabilization efforts, such as those led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), operate alongside bilateral engagements that often bypass or undermine collective frameworks. The result is a fragmented security environment characterized by overlapping spheres of influence rather than coherent regional governance (Jost, 2025). At the systemic level, these patterns reflect broader transformations in the Horn of Africa.
As global and regional power constellations shift, external actors expand their engagement through indirect and multi-domain strategies. China’s growing economic presence, Gulf rivalries, and the security interests of neighbouring states intersect within local political arenas, transforming domestic alignments into extensions of wider geopolitical competition (Telci, 2021). Somalia thereby emerges not merely as a case of fragility, but as a microcosm of contemporary multipolar contestation.
Conceptualizing Somalia through the lens of hybrid power projection thus provides insight into how fragile states become embedded in broader architectures of indirect competition. Influence is not imposed through singular interventions, but accumulated incrementally through the interaction of political, security, economic, and symbolic instruments. This perspective also suggests that hybrid rivalry is unlikely to remain episodic; rather, it constitutes a persistent feature of the regional order, as external actors continue to seek strategic depth through indirect engagement (Vertin, 2019).
Regional and strategic implications
This section translates the Somali case into regional-level insights. Its purpose is not to introduce additional theory, but to derive broader strategic consequences from the observations above. Somalia should not be understood as an isolated anomaly, but as an illustrative case whose dynamics reveal structural transformations in security governance, sovereignty, and geopolitical competition across the Horn of Africa and its adjacent maritime spaces.
A closer examination of hybrid power projection in Somalia reveals a broader transformation in regional competition. What was historically characterized by relatively overt geopolitical rivalry has increasingly evolved into a subtler form of influence projection. Rather than direct confrontation or formal military intervention, contemporary regional power politics relies on political patronage, security cooperation, infrastructure investment, economic leverage, and strategic narrative-building.
This shift reflects the logic of hybrid power projection outlined in the theoretical framework. Influence is exercised below the threshold of open conflict, minimizing escalation risks and political costs while allowing for sustained regional presence. In this sense, hybrid strategies enable foreign actors to secure long-term footholds without formal occupation or visible intervention. The Somali case demonstrates how such indirect engagement gradually reshapes the understanding of geopolitical influence in the Horn of Africa. Somalia’s geostrategic significance explains why it has become a focal point of this competition. Positioned between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and connected to major Indian Ocean shipping lanes, Somalia constitutes a strategic hub within global maritime trade networks. Port concessions, logistical hubs, military training facilities, and security partnerships create durable entry points for external actors. Through these mechanisms, Somalia becomes integrated into a wider geopolitical “archipelago” composed of bases, trade corridors, stabilization missions, and infrastructure projects stretching across the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean. These developments correspond with broader international trends often described as the re-emergence of geopolitics and the securitization of aid and trade. Development assistance, infrastructure investment, and capacity-building initiatives increasingly intersect with strategic agendas (Leonard, 2021). In Somalia, hybrid engagement transforms the country into a multiplier of regional power projection, where rivalries among Gulf states, neighbouring African powers, and global actors intersect within a fragile political environment.
Importantly, foreign power projection in the Horn of Africa is not historically unprecedented. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union were deeply involved in regional conflicts, underscoring the long-standing strategic relevance of the region (Schwab, 1978). What distinguishes the current phase, however, is the systematic reliance on hybrid instruments rather than overt military confrontation. External competition is exported into domestic political arenas, reinforcing patronage networks and elite fragmentation while embedding long-term dependencies.
The cumulative effect of sustained hybrid engagement has significant implications for state sovereignty and regional governance. Formal sovereignty may remain intact, yet functional autonomy becomes increasingly constrained. When external actors provide essential security assistance, financial resources, or infrastructure investment, the recipient state may gradually become structurally dependent on these partnerships. Such dependency does not necessarily imply direct foreign control. Instead, it reflects a more subtle transformation: decision-making processes, economic priorities, and security arrangements become intertwined with external strategic interests. Particularly in fragile states that are still consolidating institutions and legitimacy, this dynamic may complicate efforts toward autonomous governance and coherent state-building (Chandler, 2007).
At the regional level, hybrid competition challenges the effectiveness of multilateral institutions. Organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union face difficulties when bilateral and elite-centered arrangements operate parallel to, or bypass, formal frameworks. This contributes to a layered security order characterized by overlapping patronage networks rather than unified regional governance structures.
From the perspective of external actors, hybrid strategies can be strategically efficient in the short term. They provide access, leverage, and influence without the costs of open intervention. Infrastructure investments, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement may generate visible stabilization gains and economic opportunities. However, over the longer term, structural risks emerge. If elite patronage, external dependency, and institutional bypassing become entrenched, domestic fragmentation may deepen. Regional resilience mechanisms are often insufficiently prepared to address such indirect forms of influence. As a result, hybrid competition may unintentionally contribute to prolonged instability, even when framed as stabilization or capacity-building (Jost, 2025). These dynamics highlight the necessity of strengthening both national and regional resilience. Limiting structural vulnerabilities, such as weak institutions, fragmented security sectors, and opaque governance arrangements, reduces entry points for external manipulation. Hybrid rivalry in the Horn of Africa should therefore be understood as a structural feature of contemporary geopolitics rather than a temporary deviation. Somalia exemplifies how incremental hybrid influence-building can gradually transform regional order. The country illustrates how fragile states become embedded in wider architectures of geopolitical competition and how indirect power projection reshapes security governance beyond national borders.
While Somalia remains a distinct case shaped by its specific historical and political trajectory, the structural patterns observed here extend far beyond its borders. Hybrid power projection systematically alters regional alignments, redistributes influence among external actors, and contributes to a fragmented security environment across the Horn of Africa.
The strategic implications are therefore regional rather than purely domestic. Somalia functions as a warning case: where structural fragility intersects with high geostrategic value, hybrid competition is likely to intensify. Understanding these dynamics is essential for anticipating future patterns of rivalry and for designing governance frameworks capable of mitigating fragmentation effects.
Conclusion
Somalia is not an outlier but a paradigmatic case of contemporary hybrid power projection, as external actors systematically combine political patronage, security embedding, geo-economic leverage, and symbolic instruments to achieve durable influence below the threshold of open conflict in the country. Hybrid strategies, as evidenced here, are not episodic interventions but mechanisms of structural entrenchment that gradually reshape governance, redistribute power, and anchor external presence within domestic systems.
Theoretically, Somalia’s case confirms that hybrid power projection is most effective in fragmented political environments, where institutional weakness and elite competition provide multiple access points for indirect influence. Rather than seeking territorial control, external actors pursue positional advantage through long-term embedding across political, economic, and security domains. This shifts the locus of competition from the battlefield to the structure of governance itself. The implications are consequential. While hybrid engagement can generate short-term gains, such as enhanced security capacities or infrastructure development, it simultaneously risks deepening dependency, reinforcing elite fragmentation, and constraining functional sovereignty. Statehood is not dismantled but reconfigured, as domestic decision-making becomes increasingly intertwined with external strategic interests. Scaled regionally, these dynamics contribute to a fragmented order characterized by overlapping spheres of influence and weakened multilateral coordination.
Addressing these challenges requires a recalibration of policy approaches. First, strengthening institutional resilience must take precedence over transactional engagement. This includes reinforcing state capacities, increasing transparency in security and infrastructure agreements, and prioritizing rule-based governance over elite-centered arrangements. Second, external investments should be embedded in accountable and, where possible, multilateral frameworks to reduce the risks of dependency and institutional bypassing. Third, regional coordination needs to be enhanced. Strengthening organizations such as IGAD and improving mechanisms for monitoring indirect forms of influence, such as elite co-optation or parallel security structures, are critical for mitigating fragmentation effects.
Ultimately, hybrid power projection reflects a broader transformation in contemporary geopolitics. Competition increasingly unfolds through indirect, cumulative, and embedded strategies rather than overt confrontation. Ensuring long-term stability in the Horn of Africa therefore depends less on deterring visible conflict and more on addressing the structural conditions that enable external actors to convert fragility into strategic advantage.
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[tK1]only Nye (2009) exists in the reference list; “smart power” belongs there
