- Introduction
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 sent ripples to different corners of the world, owing in large part to some of the policies he introduced during his first term, that redefined relations between the United States and other countries. On the African continent, accusations that the government of South Africa was instigating genocide against its white population grabbed international media headlines and the United States government action to establish an emergency refugee programme in response, brought to the fore the aggressiveness of the Trump administration in handling differences with African nations. In quick succession, the United States boycotted the G20 summit held in South Africa in November 2025 and President Trump has announced that his country will bar South Africa from participating in this year’s conference, to be held in the United States in December 2026.
This article investigates the strategic priorities and distinguishing features of the Trump administration’s policy toward the continent, while also examining the responses of African governments to these developments. In particular, the article explores how African states are exercising agency by adapting to the evolving U.S. approach in pursuit of their own national and regional interests. This article is guided by the central research question: What patterns are emerging from Trump 2.0’s Africa policy, and what are the implications for African agency?
2.0. The Evolution of U.S.–Africa Relations Before Trump
Since the end of the Second World War, United States policy toward Africa has evolved in response to changing global geopolitical dynamics, yet its fundamental foreign policy orientation towards the continent has remained largely the same. Although successive administrations differed in their priorities and policy instruments, American engagement with Africa was consistently anchored on a combination of strategic interests, development assistance, security cooperation, and the promotion of liberal international norms. This continuity provides an important backdrop against which the significance of the Trump administration’s approach can be understood.
During the Cold War (1947–1991), Washington’s engagement with the continent was principally driven by the imperative of containing Soviet influence rather than by Africa’s strategic importance to the United States. Newly independent African states became arenas of ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, with both superpowers seeking allies through military assistance, economic aid, and diplomatic support (Taylor, 2018). During this period, Africa was viewed less as an independent strategic actor than as a theatre within the broader East-West rivalry. The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the international environment within which U.S.-Africa relations operated. Without the Soviet threat, successive administrations sought to redefine the rationale for American engagement on the continent. The Clinton administration (1993–2001) shifted emphasis toward democratic governance, market liberalization, conflict resolution, and economic integration. The enactment of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 represented a significant milestone by granting eligible African countries preferential access to the U.S. market, reflecting an emerging recognition that trade, rather than aid alone, could become a cornerstone of U.S.-Africa relations (Lyman & Morrison, 2006)
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, introduced a new strategic dimension to U.S. engagement with Africa under President George W. Bush (2001–2009). Security cooperation and counterterrorism assumed greater prominence as Washington increasingly viewed weak governance and fragile states as potential breeding grounds for transnational terrorist networks. This shift culminated in the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 to coordinate American military activities across the continent. Yet Bush’s Africa policy cannot be understood solely through the lens of security. His administration simultaneously launched some of the most ambitious development initiatives in U.S.-Africa relations, most notably the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (Pham, 2017).
The election of Barack Obama in 2008 generated widespread expectations that U.S.-Africa relations would undergo a transformative shift owing to his Kenyan heritage and symbolic connection to the continent. While Obama largely retained the strategic priorities inherited from his predecessor, his administration sought to reposition Africa as a long-term economic and political partner rather than merely a recipient of aid. These priorities were operationalized through flagship initiatives such as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Power Africa, and the inaugural U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014, all of which emphasized entrepreneurship, investment, energy access, and people-to-people partnerships (Carson, 2013).
3.0. Trump 1.0 and the Reorientation of U.S.–Africa Relations
Against this backdrop, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked a significant inflection point. Rather than merely recalibrating existing priorities, the first Trump administration questioned many of the assumptions that had underpinned U.S.-Africa relations for nearly three decades. The first Trump administration (2017–2021) marked a noticeable departure from the tone and emphasis of previous U.S. engagement with Africa. Unlike the Obama administration, which sought to frame Africa as a long-term strategic partner, President Trump initially accorded the continent limited diplomatic attention (Carson, 2020). His administration was widely criticized for its perceived neglect of Africa, reflected in the absence of a presidential visit to the continent, repeated proposals to reduce foreign assistance, and rhetoric that strained diplomatic relations with several African governments (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).
Whereas Africa has never really featured as a strategic priority for the U.S. across the Democratic and Republican divide (Nuwair & Nasser, 2025), the first Trump administration treated the continent with mistrust, hostility and neglect (Singh, 2024). Caomique et al (2025), argue that while President Bush focused on debt relief and trade, Obama on good governance and development aid, in contrast, Trump implemented “America First” policies, leading to cuts in foreign aid and the promotion of protectionist measures.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration did articulate a more coherent Africa policy in December 2018 when National Security Adviser John Bolton unveiled the Prosper Africa Strategy. The strategy rested on three pillars: advancing U.S. commercial interests through expanded trade and investment; strengthening security cooperation to counter terrorism and violent extremism; and ensuring that U.S. development assistance served American strategic interests more effectively (Bolton, 2018). Trump’s Africa strategy was explicitly framed within the context of great-power competition, identifying China and Russia as America’s principal strategic rivals on the continent. Bolton argued that Chinese and Russian engagement threatened both African sovereignty and U.S. interests, signaling a shift from a development-centered approach toward one driven by geopolitical competition and commercial diplomacy.
Prosper Africa consequently sought to reposition the United States as Africa’s preferred economic partner by mobilizing private investment and reducing reliance on traditional aid. While this represented a significant policy innovation, critics argued that the administration’s emphasis on bilateral, transactional relationships and strategic rivalry often overshadowed broader objectives relating to long-term development of the continent (Signé & Olander 2019). The result was an Africa policy characterized by selective engagement anchored on viewing Africa from the lenses of strategic competition with other global powers.
4.0. The Biden Interlude: Restoring Conventional U.S.–Africa Engagement
The election of Joe Biden in 2020 was widely interpreted as signalling a return to a more conventional U.S. foreign policy after four years of Trump’s “America First” approach. In Africa, the Biden administration sought to restore diplomatic engagement, reaffirm multilateral cooperation, and rebuild relationships that had been strained during the first Trump presidency. Although Biden did not fundamentally redefine America’s strategic interests on the continent, his administration largely revived the partnership-oriented framework that had characterized previous Democratic and Republican administrations, emphasizing development cooperation, democratic governance, investment, and engagement with regional institutions. Consequently, many scholars’ regard Biden’s Africa policy less as a new strategic vision than as a restoration of the pre-Trump policy paradigm (Westcott, 2026; Sseruwagi, 2024).
A defining feature of the Biden administration’s Africa policy was the revival of multilateral engagement and institutional partnership. This was most evident during the 2022 U.S.–Africa Leaders’ Summit, where President Biden convened African political and business leaders to deepen cooperation across a range of sectors. The summit resulted in the launch of the Digital Transformation with Africa Initiative to expand digital connectivity and the African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT) initiative to support countries transitioning from military to democratic governance. Biden also pledged US$55 billion in investment over three years and announced commitments exceeding US$15 billion in two-way trade, reaffirming the administration’s emphasis on development, economic partnership, and collaboration through multilateral institutions (Sseruwagi, 2024; Adebajo et al., 2024). This approach contrasted sharply with the first Trump administration, which generally favoured bilateral and transactional engagement while displaying scepticism toward multilateral institutions.
Beyond diplomacy, the Biden administration continued to advance strategic American interests in Africa through infrastructure investment and security cooperation. During his 2024 visit to Angola, Biden announced US$560 million in additional funding for the Lobito Corridor, a major rail and infrastructure project linking the mineral-rich regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to the Port of Lobito. While presented as a development initiative, the project also reflected Washington’s efforts to strengthen access to critical mineral supply chains and provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (OECD, 2025). Similarly, the administration maintained long-standing counterterrorism partnerships, including the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), underscoring continued U.S. commitments to regional security (Sseruwagi, 2024). Together, these initiatives suggest that although Biden restored the language of partnership and multilateralism, U.S. engagement with Africa remained firmly anchored in strategic competition and national interests.
5.0. Trump 2.0 and the Consolidation of Transactional Statecraft
Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 marked more than the restoration of his “America First” foreign policy agenda; it signalled the consolidation and expansion of the transactional approach to international relations first introduced during his initial administration. Whereas Trump 1.0 questioned many of the assumptions underpinning traditional U.S.–Africa engagement, Trump 2.0 has sought to institutionalize a foreign policy in which diplomacy, development assistance, trade, migration, and security cooperation are increasingly deployed as instruments of strategic bargaining in pursuit of narrowly defined American interests. In this respect, the second Trump administration represents not simply a continuation of its predecessor but a significant intensification of the logic of transactional statecraft (Long et al, 2025).
The most far-reaching consequence of Trump’s new policies to the African continent in 2025 was the creation of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), headed for a short period of time by Billionaire businessman Elon Musk. Musk summarily abolished the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), putting an end to all its programmes without regard to contractual obligations (Westcott, 2026). At the time of Trump’s freeze on foreign assistance, USAID was overseeing programmes in Africa totalling over $12 billion (Kohnert, Africa Practice, 2025) across sectors such as health, education and environmental conservation. The abrupt end to these programmes spelt doom for many countries especially in the health sector where HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis programmes had for years benefited from this funding. The cut on foreign assistance by the United States appears to have motivated similar action by other actors including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Canada (OECD, 2025).
The other immediate and consequential Trump policy is the imposition of tariffs on imports from various countries. Even though the tariff war was shaped as one between the United States and China, several African countries were included in Trump’s long list. The “reciprocal” tariffs imposed on African countries ranged between 11% for Cameroon to 50% for Lesotho while the revised tariffs range between 10% and 15% (Baloyi, 2025). However, goods from at least four African countries will attract higher tariffs; South Africa (30%), Algeria (30%), Tunisia (28%) and Libya (31%) (The White House, 2025). The imposition of these punitive tariffs has had the effect of prohibiting the export of goods from Africa to the United States, running counter to efforts by previous administrations to promote it through initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). President Trump has also made tariffs a weapon to be waged against those who disagree with him and challenge his policies and actions, as has been the case with South Africa.
In May 2025, Trump made allegations to the effect that the Government of South Africa was waging a genocide against its white population. When South African President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Washington and met Trump at the White House on May 21 2025, the host ambushed his guest by showing footage of alleged graves of white farmers (Reuters, 2025). Despite Ramaphosa’s protestations, Trump continued the narrative and his administration moved swiftly to offer refugee status to the Afrikaner farmers with total refugee numbers initially capped at 7,500 a year. This ceiling was adjusted by 10,000 in May. Of the more than 6,000 refugees admitted between October 2025 and May 2026, all but three were white South Africans (AP & Westcott, 2026).
Apart from limiting immigration on a general scale, the administration between June and December 2025 imposed a travel ban on several countries, including an initial seven in Africa. They include Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan, and added another five later (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and South Sudan) citing reasons such as terrorism, regular overstaying of visas and refusal to accept illegal immigrants deported from the U.S. (Westcott, 2026). South Sudan for example, was involved in a diplomatic spat with Washington following the third country deportation of a Congolese citizen. Third country deportation or removal involves the Government of the United States sending someone to a country that is not the country in which they lived prior to arriving in the United States, nor to a country of which they are a citizen or national (American Immigration Council, 2025). In reaction to a visa fraud scandal in the state of Minnesota involving members of the Somali diaspora, Trump referred to Somali immigrants as “garbage” and soon after ordered the withdrawal of temporary protected status for 5,000 Ethiopian and 700 Somali refugees (Westcott, 2026).Trump’s low-value approach towards Africa is also seen in the lack of priority or urgency in the appointment of substantive ambassadors to many African capitals and generally the staff of the Bureau of African affairs. As of April 2026, 37 of 51 U.S. ambassadorial posts in Africa were vacant. One of the few new U.S. ambassadors to be approved by the Senate is Leo Brent Bozell III, a conservative, anti-abortion campaigner who was sent to South Africa. With little direct African experience, but closely allied to Trump, he has deeply antagonised the South African government, especially in light of Trump’s rhetoric about the treatment of white South Africans (BBC, 2026). The Bureau of African Affairs, the division of the State department charged with policy development in Washington’s relations with Africa has also been peripheral in both Trump administrations
6.0. Transactional Diplomacy and Strategic Partners in Africa
Perhaps the clearest indicator of the Trump administration’s transactional diplomacy has been its focus on countries that provide leverage for the U.S. in the global competition for resources (EU, 2026). Whereas Trump has demonstrated little or no interest in the affairs of other countries, his approach has been different when dealing with countries that are rich in mineral resources. The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the conflict that has rocked the Eastern part of the country best illustrates Trump’s interest. On December 4 2025, a peace deal brokered by the United States was signed by president Felix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame of Rwanda in the White House. Before the Washington Accords, the United States and the DRC entered into an agreement in which in exchange for preferential or exclusive access to certain mineral concessions, the United States will extend security assistance, foreign direct investment and diplomatic support to the DRC (Christien & Tshimbombu, 2025).
On June 17 2026, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in France, Kenyan President William Ruto told journalists that Kenya and the U.S. were close to sealing a critical minerals deal (Reuters, 2026). However, not all targeted African countries have acceded to Trump’s demands. Zambia has rejected a critical minerals partnership with the U.S. which would have seen American companies receive preferential access to minerals especially copper, in exchange for $2 billion health package (S&P Global, 2026). In April, a similar deal between the United States and Ghana collapsed after the latter pulled out citing sovereignty concerns, ostensibly regarding the requirement to share health data with the Americans (DW, 2026). These cases demonstrate a significant shift in American foreign policy towards Africa, Washington’s preference in striking minerals deals a clear departure from the broader policy approach of previous administrations.
It is also worth noting that the Trump administration has demonstrated its bias in dealing favourably with countries that grant its wishes while demonising those that do not. With continuing elaboration of South Africa’s place in the BRICS formation, and its decision to file a case against Israel, a key US ally, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Trump administration has been particularly vengeful against it. Trump has personally levelled accusations of genocide against South Africa and has taken personal initiative to frustrate the country’s role in the G20 and G7. Trump boycotted the last G20 summit held in South Africa and has threatened to bar South Africa from the next summit that will be held in Florida, United States. The African countries that will retain visa processing rights under Trump’s new policy are the ones that have acceded to his transactional diplomacy, those that host American military bases such as Djibouti and Kenya, and those that have agreed to receive third country deportees from the United States.
7.0. African Countries’ Responses to Trump 2.0
The emergence of Trump’s second-term Africa policy raises an important question: how have African states responded to this increasingly transactional approach? Thus far, the continental response to policies such as punitive tariffs, travel restrictions, aid reductions, and migration measures has been fragmented and largely reactive. Much of this can be attributed to the Trump administration’s preference for bilateral rather than multilateral engagement, which has weakened the collective bargaining power that African states might otherwise exercise through institutions such as the African Union. By negotiating with individual countries rather than regional blocs, Washington has effectively compelled many African governments to engage from relatively weaker positions. Those that have resisted or challenged U.S. positions, most notably South Africa, have faced diplomatic pressure and public criticism. Even incidents with symbolic continental significance, such as the denial of entry to Somali referee Omar Abdulkadir Artan—Africa’s Referee of the Year in 2025 and an official selected to officiate FIFA World Cup matches in the United States—failed to generate a coordinated continental response, illustrating the limited cohesion of African diplomacy in confronting Trump’s policies.
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to portray African states as passive recipients of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, many have demonstrated increasing strategic autonomy by diversifying their diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships. Countries such as Kenya and Nigeria have continued to cooperate with the United States on selected security initiatives while simultaneously deepening engagement with regional institutions such as the African Union and external partners including China and Turkey. This reflects a broader strategy ofhedging, whereby African states seek to maximize strategic and economic opportunities through multiple partnerships while reducing dependence on any single external power (Oluwadare, 2023). Viewed through this lens, African agency under Trump 2.0 has not been expressed primarily through collective resistance but through pragmatic adaptation, selective cooperation, and the pursuit of greater strategic autonomy within an increasingly competitive and multipolar international order.
8.0. Conclusion
Contemporary Africa–United States relations are increasingly shaped by the interplay of cooperation and competition within a rapidly evolving multipolar international system. Unlike earlier periods that were defined by Cold War ideological rivalry or the liberal partnership paradigm that characterized much of the post-Cold War era, the current phase is marked by diversified partnerships and greater strategic competition among external powers. Although the United States remains an influential actor on the continent, it now operates within an increasingly crowded geopolitical landscape in which African states have access to a broader range of political, economic, and security partners.
The analysis presented in this article suggests that Trump 2.0 is replacing the liberal, values-driven, and development-oriented approach that traditionally underpinned U.S.–Africa relations with a more transactional and interest-based model of engagement. Rather than diminishing Africa’s importance, this shift has redefined the basis upon which the United States engages the continent, privileging strategic value, commercial interests, and geopolitical alignment. At the same time, this evolving environment presents new opportunities for African states to exercise agency by strategically engaging external powers, bargaining more effectively, diversifying partnerships, and leveraging intensifying geopolitical competition to advance their national and regional interests.
To strengthen their bargaining position under this emerging policy environment, African countries should pursue a more coordinated and collective approach through the African Union and other regional institutions. Whether responding to punitive tariffs, negotiating trade and investment agreements, or addressing migration and security issues, African states are likely to exert greater influence when acting collectively rather than individually. Ultimately, the future of U.S.–Africa relations under Trump 2.0 will depend not only on the policies pursued by Washington but also on the extent to which African states can transform their growing strategic relevance into collective diplomatic leverage and meaningful policy influence.
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