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Tracing the Origin of the Tensions between the DRC Government and the M23 Rebels in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

14 min read

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has long suffered from instability that has largely been driven by armed groups. The recent capture of Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu provinces respectively by the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group, has so far led to the displacement of over 500,000 people and the death of close to 3000. The capture of cities by rebel forces is however not a new phenomenon in the DRC. One of the most notable instances occurred during the First Congo War (1996–1997) when the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)—a regionally backed rebel group supported by Rwanda and Uganda—seized control of key cities, including Goma and Kisangani before finally seizing Kinshasa and ultimately overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko.

In the last decade, M23 has emerged as the most formidable armed rebel group out of the estimated 100 armed groups currently operating in the eastern DRC, owing to its documented support from Rwanda, sophisticated weapons and huge personnel. The rebels previously seized control of Goma in 2012 but later withdrew and agreed to a ceasefire and a peace agreement after suffering a defeat from the UN-backed Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). The M23, which is primarily made up of the ethnic Congolese Tutsis, justifies its rebellion by citing systemic injustices and discrimination against them, arguing that the government has failed to protect their rights. M23 also cites unimplemented peace agreements by the DRC government as a reason for their rebellion. Currently, the rebel group has made several negotiation calls to the DRC government but the latter has been adamant in engaging them in any form of negotiation.

Origin of the Congolese Tutsis in Eastern DRC

The origin of the ethnic Congolese Tutsis in DRC is key in determining their citizenship status. Some of them trace their presence in the eastern DRC to early Tutsi pastoral migrations in search of grazing land in the late 19th century. Their numbers began growing significantly during King Rwabugiri’s rule (1867–1895) when the Rwandan Kingdom expanded its influence into parts of present day  eastern DRC, particularly South Kivu.  Massive migration would later start occurring in 1937 during the Belgian colonial rule after the implementation of the Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB), a policy that facilitated the migration of both Hutu and Tutsi laborers into eastern Congo to work in plantations, mines, and other colonial projects. Many of these migrants eventually settled permanently in the region.  In the build-up to and during the 1959 Rwandan revolution, Rwanda was plagued by political instability which resulted in the overthrow of the elite-Tutsi monarch by the Hutu majority. As a result, close to 550,000 Tutsis, were displaced into neighboring countries including DRC.  During the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, a significant number of Tutsi refugees fled to eastern DRC, seeking safety from the genocidal regime. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) gained victory and took control of Rwanda, some of these Tutsi refugees returned home, while others remained in the DRC.

Why did the Tensions start?

The Congolese Tutsi whose presence in eastern DRC dates back to the 19th century, identify as Congolese citizens but the government does not officially recognize them as such. In 1981, the Congolese parliament passed a law that revoked their citizenship, a status they had previously acquired after Mobutu signed the 1972 nationality law that granted citizenship status to all individuals with Rwandese and Burundi origins who had settled in the country before 1950. The consequent statelessness of the Congolese Tutsis has exposed them to marginalization, exploitation, and systematic attacks from both the government and ethnic communities. The DRC government has for instance been accused of collaborating with the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—a group largely composed of the Rwandan génocidaires residing in DRC, in carrying out systematic attacks on the Congolese Tutsis, a claim verified by the final report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC. The injustices committed against them triggered the formation of a Congolese- Tutsi dominated self-defense militia known as the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) in 2006. From 2007, CNDP proceeded to launch multiple offensives towards the Congolese army and FDLR, consequently capturing parts of North Kivu. They later on marched towards Goma in 2008, with the aim of capturing it, only for them to back down owing to international pressure and international mediation efforts. The result of the process was the March 23rd agreement, that provided for the integration of CNDP fighters into the society and the army, protection of the Congolese Tutsi community among others. After the government’s failure to fully implement the peace agreement, ex-CNDP fighters mutinied and split to form the M23 in 2012, drawing their name from the date the failed peace deal was signed. M23 has since grown, proving to be a force to reckon with. The presence of precious minerals has drawn in foreign actors who have engaged in arms-for-mineral trade, further exacerbating instability in the region.

Peace Efforts

There have been numerous peace processes and resultant agreements but none has been successful owing to lack of full implementation. The peace processes have been supported by peacekeeping missions from the UN, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and East African Community (EAC). The missions have however not been able to fully achieve their mandates in the region. As it stands, the M23 is currently occupying Bukavu and Goma and has called for negotiations with the government. Despite previously maintaining a firm stance of not negotiating with M23, President Tshisekedi agreed to participate in peace talks, scheduled for the 18, March 2025, to be hosted by Angola. The M23 however pulled out of the talks at the last minute, citing EU sanctions against its leaders and continuous Congolese military offensives.

For lasting peace in the DRC, the government and the rebels need to engage in peace talks. The resultant peace agreement that is reached should be fully implemented, with the help of the international community to ensure full compliance by both parties. A military approach proves to be futile and costly. Should the grievances of the ethnic Congolese Tutsis not be addressed, the resurgence of rebellion in the eastern DRC remains inevitable.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the HORN Institute.

The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-profit, applied research and policy think-do tank focusing on research and providing evidence-based analysis and strategic interventions to address political, security, economic, and environmental challenges affecting the greater Horn of Africa region.

© 2026 by The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved.

Author

Jeremy Oronje

Research Assistant

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