Introduction
Over the last decade, Mozambican national security strategy has been redefined due to terrorism. Since the emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique in July 2021, Mozambique national security has undergone significant change in strengthening its national security policy instruments. The approval of the Mozambique’s National Policy on Defense of 2019 depicts a commitment to update its security instruments in a sensitive moment. For nearly five years, Rwanda has been supporting Mozambique in fighting terrorism in the north of Cabo Delgado. Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique, which began in July 2021, represents a direct response to the escalating insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This intervention aims to support the Mozambican Armed Forces in restoring security and stabilizing areas affected by terrorism. Acting on the basis of bilateral agreements, Rwanda stands out for its readiness and effectiveness in recapturing strategic territories. Through its efforts in Mozambique, Rwanda is gaining relevance in shaping regional African geopolitics in place of traditional western actors.
The question that arises at this point is: to what extent does Rwanda’s engagement in combating terrorism in Mozambique constitute an instrument of geopolitical projection in Eastern and Southern Africa, and what are its implications for Mozambique’s security architecture?
This study adopts a qualitative, descriptive, and analytical approach, using a literature review based on articles, books, dissertations, theses, and news reports.
Rwanda’s Growing Geopolitical Projection in Eastern and Southern Africa
Military cooperation has increasingly become a central pillar for the projection of power and the strengthening of diplomatic ties between states, contributing to their geopolitical positioning or repositioning in areas of strategic interest. In contemporary international relations, security partnerships are no longer limited to defense purposes alone; they are also instruments through which states expand influence, consolidate alliances, and reinforce their strategic presence in regional and global politics. As a result, military cooperation agreements, counterterrorism partnerships, and joint security operations are increasingly sought after by major geopolitical actors.
Although classical geopolitical concepts are often criticized for their historical associations with imperialism and territorial domination, they still provide useful analytical tools when critically revisited and stripped of their normative assumptions. Strategic projection, territorial influence, and competition for regional dominance remain central elements in understanding contemporary geopolitics. Nowadays, geopolitical influence is exercised not only through military means, but also through economic, financial, technological, institutional, and discursive instruments. Nevertheless, physical presence in a territory continues to be one of the most visible and effective mechanisms of geopolitical influence.
A nation’s geographic setting is not neutral; it creates both constraints and opportunities that influence how states behave in the international system. Owens (1999) argues that geography plays a fundamental role in shaping a country’s foreign policy and strategic choices. For example, factors such as location, access to resources, borders, and proximity to conflict zones can limit certain policy options while enabling others. The author believes that Geopolitics builds on this idea by studying how geography affects political power and strategic behavior among states. It is closely linked to strategic geography, which focuses on the control or access to important territorial spaces. These spaces are significant because they directly affect a country’s security and economic prosperity. In essence, geopolitics explains how physical space becomes a source of power, competition, and influence in global affairs.
According to Owens (1999) assertion, we can assume that Rwanda’s geographic position in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa plays a fundamental role in shaping its foreign policy and strategic choices. The country is landlocked, without direct access to seaports, and surrounded by larger neighbors such as Tanzania, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi. This geographic constraint has historically limited its economic access to global trade routes and increased its dependence on regional cooperation for imports and exports.
In response to these limitations, Rwanda has actively pursued strategies to expand its influence beyond its immediate territory. It seeks opportunities to “stretch” its strategic space through economic partnerships, military cooperation, political alliances, and peacekeeping engagements. A clear example is Rwanda’s participation in peacekeeping missions under the United Nations, as well as its bilateral security engagements in countries such as Mozambique (Map 1), where it deployed forces to support the fight against insurgency in Cabo Delgado.
Map 1: Rwanda and its RDF deployments to CAR and Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado
Source: Cannon & Donelli (2022)
Geography has therefore influenced how the Rwandan state behaves within the African international system. It actively seeks access to resources, foreign investment, strategic partnerships, and secure environments for economic expansion. Its engagement in regional security also enhances its diplomatic visibility and political influence. Ultimately, Rwanda’s security and economic prosperity are closely tied to its ability to transform geographic constraints into strategic opportunities through regional integration and geopolitical engagement.
Rwanda Geopolitical Projection and Counterterrorism in Mozambique
Cooperation between Mozambique and Rwanda in the fight against terrorism in Cabo Delgado has opened an important strategic window for Rwanda’s geopolitical ambitions in Eastern and Southern Africa. Following President Filipe Nyusi’s request for support in 2021, Rwanda became the first external actor to send troops to the province, even before the broader deployment of the SADC mission. This gave it a prominent role on the ground and within the regional security architecture (Hanlon, 2021; Al Jazeera, 2021).
According to reports, the initial contingent consisted of approximately 1,000 military personnel, including Rwandan defense forces and police, who were deployed in July 2021. These forces were quickly deployed to critical areas such as Mocímboa da Praia and Palma (Map 2), playing a central role in retaking areas occupied by insurgents. Subsequently, various news sources reported a gradual increase in the Rwandan presence, with estimates putting the total at around 6,300 troops, including support and internal security units (Al Jazeera, 2022; Massango, 2026).
Through its military engagement in Mozambique, particularly in Cabo Delgado, Rwanda has established more than a simple security partnership. Its presence creates logistical networks and a permanent corridor of contact between the two countries, fostering both material and symbolic connectivity between Mozambique and Rwanda. This engagement also contributes to the creation of political and military interdependence, while facilitating the circulation of Rwandan strategic ideas, security doctrines, and diplomatic influence. Consequently, Rwanda strengthens its image, capacity and status as an emerging African power in Central and Eastern Africa.
Nevertheless, the geopolitical and geostrategic position Rwanda has acquired in northern Mozambique cannot be interpreted solely through the lens of military cooperation, solidarity, or African brotherhood. It must also be understood within the broader context of African geopolitics, where regions and subregions frequently become spaces of competition for hegemony, influence, and strategic control. Although Rwanda is not a global power, its projection in Africa has revealed that African states have been engaging in geopolitical practices competing with old hegemonic powers. This new trend in African geopolitics holds multiple layers of complexity as the old powers have not completely abandoned Africa, but due to global tensions and regional clashes such as the war in Europe and in the Middle East, they have been reducing their different sorts of geopolitical engagement including military and economic.
This significant military presence cannot be interpreted merely as technical cooperation. It is part of a strategy of power projection, enabling Rwanda to expand its political and strategic influence in a country with access to the Indian Ocean, significant natural resources, and strategic trade corridors. At the same time, the operational fragility of Mozambique’s defense and security forces contributes to a growing dependence on Rwandan support, which reinforces Rwanda’s continued presence and consolidates its influence within the local security architecture (International Crisis Group, 2021; Rabe, 2026).
Map 2: Presence of Military forces in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique)
Source: ISS (2022)
It is important to highlight that Rwanda’s engagement in Mozambique, which initially emerged as a solidarity-based and counterterrorism-oriented intervention, gradually evolved into a more institutionalized and strategically supported mission after 2022, particularly following the financial involvement of the European Union (EU). The growing international backing for the Rwandan deployment significantly altered the scale and political significance of its presence in Cabo Delgado.
In December 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted military assistance measures to support the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) deployed in Mozambique, including a grant of €20 million intended for the acquisition of military equipment and the maintenance of strategic air transport capabilities supporting operations in Cabo Delgado (Galeon, 2022). This financial support represented an important step in the international legitimization of Rwanda’s military role in Mozambique and reinforced Kigali’s image as a reliable African security partner.
The support was further expanded in 2024, when the European Union approved an additional €20 million under the European Peace Facility to sustain RDF operations in northern Mozambique. According to the Council of the European Union, the funding aimed to support equipment procurement and strategic airlifting capabilities for Rwandan troops operating against terrorist groups in Cabo Delgado (European Council, 2024). The continuation of European funding demonstrates that Rwanda’s presence in Mozambique is no longer perceived merely as a temporary bilateral security arrangement, but increasingly as part of a broader international security architecture in the region.
However, critics argue that the EU’s continuous support for Rwanda also contributes to strengthening Kigali’s geopolitical influence in Eastern and Southern Africa. Kennes and Titeca (2025) argue that the European Union’s support has indirectly reinforced Rwanda’s regional strategic positioning by enhancing its military projection capabilities and diplomatic leverage. Consequently, Rwanda’s engagement in Mozambique should not be interpreted solely through the lens of solidarity or counterterrorism cooperation, but also as part of a wider geopolitical strategy involving international partnerships, regional influence, and strategic projection.
What Mozambique Gains from the Partnership?
The benefits brought by the partnership are grounded in shared responsibilities. There is indeed a direct correlation between military intervention and national security, which manifests itself in that intervention can simultaneously serve as both a means of strengthening and a risk factor for the security of the state being intervened in. On the one hand, successful interventions can contribute to the stabilization of conflict-affected regions by restoring state authority and protecting vulnerable populations (Byman, 2003, p. 18; Rabello, 2020, p. 41). The concept of national security has evolved significantly, shifting from a strictly military perspective to a multidimensional approach that encompasses political, economic, social, and environmental factors. According to Buzan (1991, p. 19), national security refers to the state’s ability to preserve its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political autonomy in the face of internal and external threats.
Since the outbreak of terrorism in Mozambique Rwanda has played a critical role in supporting the restoration of security. The mandate for Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique is key to understanding the nature and scope of this operation. Since the mission began in July 2021, the Rwandan government, in coordination with the Mozambican government, has established that the primary objective would be to combat insurgents in Cabo Delgado and restore order in areas affected by jihadist violence (Habibe, 2021).
The strategies adopted by Rwanda are highly dynamic and effective, particularly in 2021, and have resulted in the dispersal of terrorists to peripheral and less strategic areas. After the Mozambican government requested external assistance, Rwanda in 2021 deployed around 1,000 soldiers and police, quickly retook Mocímboa da Praia and secured other areas. Nearly five years later, the terrorist group has continued its bloody insurgency, and Rwanda’s deployment has reached more than 4,000 troops.
It is noted that the Rwandan intervention contributed significantly to the recapture of strategic territories and to the reduction of the insurgents’ operational capacity. However, this intervention also raises questions about external military dependence, the influence of economic interests, and the long-term sustainability of security. Although Rwanda’s military intervention is effective in the short term, it could undermine Mozambique’s strategic autonomy and the sustainability of its national security in the long term. This issue is particularly relevant given that the Mozambican government faces structural challenges in consolidating its defense forces and managing complex threats such as terrorism.
Notwithstanding, Rwanda’s commitment to supporting Mozambique in regaining territorial control over strategic areas, particularly those where natural gas projects are located has been challenged by recent claims of fund cutting. This likely disengagement directly affects Mozambique national security architecture. Actually, Mozambique’s approach to military cooperation with Rwanda has not proven effective in altering substantially its national security architecture, as it does not focus on strengthening its own military capabilities, frameworks or structures.
The mission, therefore, was designed to ensure that the operations of major investors, such as TotalEnergies, could continue without the threat of insurgent attacks (Nimusiima, 2022, p. 91). This part of the mandate reflects the intersection between security and the economy, in which military operations also aim to create an environment conducive to sustainable economic development (Meyer, 2022, p. 44). Consequently, the mission has significant impact at the operational and tactical level more than at the strategic level.
Implications for Mozambique National Security Architecture
Rwanda’s military engagement in Mozambique reflects more than a counterterrorism partnership; it constitutes a broader strategy of geopolitical projection in Eastern and Southern Africa. Through a “security-first” foreign policy, Rwanda has positioned itself as an emerging African security provider by participating in stabilization missions and deploying the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in strategic regions such as Cabo Delgado. This military diplomacy allows Rwanda to expand its regional influence, strengthen bilateral alliances, and gain strategic access to the Indian Ocean corridor through Mozambique. Simultaneously, Rwanda enhances its international reputation, attracts investment, and consolidates domestic legitimacy through a narrative of stability and security effectiveness.
On the other hand, Mozambique’s security architecture reveals significant structural fragilities. The country’s defense policy, the National Policy of Defense and Security of 2019, remains reactive, while its counterterrorism strategy heavily depends on external actors such as Rwanda, SADC, and the European Union. Weak operational capacity, inadequate logistics, limited intelligence systems, and poor coordination within the Mozambican Armed Forces have deepened dependence on foreign military support. Consequently, the Rwanda-Mozambique relationship reflects a geostrategic asymmetry rather than a purely humanitarian partnership. Rwanda converts military cooperation into political and geopolitical capital, whereas Mozambique relies on external assistance to compensate for domestic security deficiencies. Cabo Delgado therefore emerges as a strategic space of influence, projection, and regional power competition.
Figure 1: The Rwanda Geopolitical Projections and Mozambique’s Security Architecture.
Source: Created by the author
The Figure (1) above depicts how the relationship between Rwandan Geopolitical Projection has contributed not only to securing Cabo Delgado but to weaken Mozambique’s security posture. Instead of improving capabilities, updating frameworks, reforming structures or accelerating its defense and security architecture, the Mozambican government has ceded the role of counterterrorism to Rwandan forces. Rwanda has a blank check to operate where government forces are unable or unwilling to operate. Although the Defense policy, the national security strategy and both the counterterrorism strategy and military strategy have focused on counter-insurgency and counterterrorism, little was made to materialize the ambitious desires into real and meaningful capacities at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical and logistical). The Rwandan forces on their side have been improving in all those levels.
Therefore, despite the benefits, dependence on Rwandan support undermines Mozambique’s strategic autonomy, posing risks of foreign economic influence in key sectors such as natural gas through bilateral agreements. The Rwandan presence, while proactive and technologically advanced, does not eliminate long-term vulnerabilities, as it prioritizes Rwandan bilateral interests over the strengthening of the Mozambican Armed Defense Forces (FADM).
To ensure sustainable national security architecture, Mozambique must maximize its partnership with Rwanda by investing in the internal capacity-building of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) through joint training exercises, the acquisition of equipment such as drones, and the integration of civil-military strategies. It is recommended that Mozambican officers be sent to Rwandan military academies and that rehabilitation programs for former insurgents, modeled after the Rwandan approach, be implemented in conjunction with socioeconomic development in Cabo Delgado.
Conclusions and Recommendations
African regional geopolitics have been highly reshaped by African states’ interests, goals, and actions. By taking roles of traditional actors whose presence has reduced in Central and Southern Africa these African states redefine the security architecture at the regional level. Rwandan geopolitical projection through its military, economic and political presence in Mozambique reveals that African states can secure their geopolitical interests providing security support to other states, yet this action per se is not enough to alter the national security architecture as seen in Mozambique. Counterterrorism measures adopted in Cabo Delgado have shown that long-term vulnerabilities for Mozambique remain. Therefore, creating a coherent security architecture is needed. In that, it is important to address issues at the strategic and operational levels to build capacity, reform doctrine and renew strategy structures. Although Rwanda’s potential withdrawal from Mozambique can undermine the achieved gains so far, yet Mozambique should yield more gains from this partnership to be manifested in the long run at the strategic and operational levels.
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