Introduction
The call for integration on the African continent began soon after countries gained their independence. Leading this clarion call was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. While both leaders advocated for the political unity of the African continent, Kwame Nkrumah called for the immediate unification of Africa while Mwalimu Nyerere advocated for the gradual unification of Africa (Mazrui, 1967; Qobo, 2007). The Organisation of African Unity, the premier organisation tasked with coordination of African integration, through the Assembly of Heads of State and Government opted for the latter and this led to creation of different regional economic communities within Africa. Currently, there are eight RECs in Africa that include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Regional integration has been defined as the coming together of countries within one region with the aim of overcoming barriers and engaging in trade and creating a common market (Kimbugwe et al., 2012, p. 11). In Africa, regional integration has been touted as an effective way of addressing the challenges of having small national markets with the 54 different states that make up the continent. Accordingly, regional integration in Africa can be a force for good and contribute to peace and security, strengthen economic integration through the establishment of free trade areas and create an enabling environment where the private sector can develop. Spillover effects of regional integration include development of joint infrastructure projects between member states and strengthening of the region’s interaction with other regions in the world (Nwokedi & Adie, 2019, p. 3).
The Evolution of IGAD
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a Regional Economic Community within the African Economic Community framework, serving the Greater Horn of Africa. Established in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and reconstituted in 1996, IGAD has evolved from a drought-focused institution into a broader regional economic community. The original members of IGAD included Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea joined in 1993 and South Sudan joined in 2011. The mandate and objectives of IGAD have evolved over time and expanded to other areas of co-operation including economic co-operation, political and security collaboration and developmental integration.
The region covers an area of about 5.2 million square kilometres and the citizens of the member states of IGAD make up a population of over 280 million people (IGAD, 2024a). The IGAD region is characterised by significant socio-cultural, linguistic, and economic diversity, which continues to shape its integration trajectory. According to the African Multidimensional Regional Integration Index (AMRII), IGAD remains one of the least progressive regional economic communities in Africa (Africa Visa Openness, 2025).
Institutional Framework
Article 7 of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development spells out the core mandate of IGAD and this includes strengthening peace and security frameworks, coordinating responses to forced displacement and public health emergencies, promoting environmental governance and climate resilience and facilitating regional integration through cross-border trade and infrastructure. The institutional framework of IGAD comprises the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government remains the supreme decision-making organ of IGAD and determines the objectives and programmes for IGAD. Co-operation within IGAD is coordinated by the Secretariat based in Djibouti and complemented by other specialised bodies including IGAD Drought Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN), the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC).
Theoretical Framework: Intergovernmentalism versus Supranationalism
The operational models of most regional economic communities in Africa follow the intergovernmentalism model. Under this model, governments collaborate on an equal footing and decision-making requires the consensus of the Heads of State and Government. This not only applies to IGAD but also applies to the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) among other regional economic communities in Africa. The intergovernmentalism model is premised on the rationale that national governments and state leaders determine and direct integration outcomes (Adino & Abebe, 2025).
The intergovernmentalism model of integration faces setbacks since it naturally limits co-operation and at times slows down integration efforts as states place their sovereign interests first and the integration agenda is left at the periphery. By contrast, the European Union represents a supranational model in which member states delegate limited sovereign authority to regional institutions. The ECJ in the case of Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, held that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community was a sovereign legal order and had direct application in national law and the implications were that the Treaty took precedence over national law. In the place of a supranational entity and binding organs such as regional courts and an independent parliament, the decisions of these institutions are binding thereby shaping the regional agenda (Goldmann, 2020). Sovereignty concerns based on the adopted model of co-operation continue to present a major hurdle in integration efforts across most regional economic communities in Africa and IGAD is not an exception.
Notable Successes and Milestones
Since its establishment in 1986, and its revitalization in 1996, IGAD has recorded notable gains particularly in addressing drought and food security, peace, security and conflict mediation, and movement of persons.
Drought and Food Security
Climate change and climate shocks also continue to be a persistent challenge within the region. Considering 70 – 75% of the land in the region is arid to semi-arid, droughts and floods continue to threaten livelihoods. Resource conflicts continue to persist over land, water and grazing rights that fuel local disputes in the region. The larger part of the IGAD region is found in an arid and semi-arid region in the Horn of Africa.
Since its establishment, IGAD has actively implemented various programmes and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of drought, combating desertification, addressing land degradation, fostering resilience and increasing investments particularly in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs). These endeavours touching on agriculture and environment include the IGAD Inland Water Resources Management Programme, the IGAD Biodiversity Management Programme, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme, the Land Governance Programme and the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). IGAD is also actively engaged in building operations to address drought and resilience, climate-smart agriculture through the IGAD Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (2025–2034). IGAD has also undertaken to boost cross-border agricultural trade and regulating pastoralist movements across borders through the adoption of the Protocol on Transhumance that sets out to facilitate the safe and orderly cross-border mobility for pastoralists and their livestock to access water and pasture.
Peace, Security and Conflict Mediation
IGAD has also participated in regional peace efforts within the Horn of Africa particularly in South Sudan. IGAD mediated the South Sudan conflict culminating in the Comprehensive Agreement (2005) and the Agreement on the resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) and the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). This was a key milestone for regional peace efforts and arguably a win for African-led diplomacy. By drawing on its familiarity with the region and political pragmatism, IGAD spearheaded a process that helped bring to an end one of the continent’s deadliest civil wars (Magara, 2025).
IGAD has successfully mediated several conflicts in the region and this remains the organisation’s key achievements to date. However, IGAD has not been successful in mediation of some conflicts such as the ongoing conflict in Sudan that began in April 2023. The impasse in mediating and resolving this conflict has negative consequences on the security, regional integration and economic stability of the region.
Movement of Persons, Migration and Refugees
In 2020, IGAD proposed the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. The Protocol was adopted in 2021. To date, 5 Member States have signed the Protocol including the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Republic of Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan, the Republic of Kenya and the Republic of Uganda (Djama, 2024). The Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons provides a framework for the free movement of persons and progressive realisation of the rights of establishment and residence. The objective of this Protocol is to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement by providing for the progressive realization of free movement of persons, rights of establishment and residence in IGAD Member States.
In 2024, there were 5.4 million refugees and asylum seekers within the IGAD region (IGAD, 2024b). Uganda hosted approximately 1.8 million refugees, the largest number in the region and in Africa in general. Member states in IGAD have endeavoured to co-operate with regards to refugee matters including through the Policy Framework on Refugee Protection (2023) aimed at harmonizing rights of refugees and their protection and documentation. IGAD also applies the Comprehensive Refugee Response Network. There are also direct forms of co-operation including workshops, the latest in Ethiopia discussed refugee rights to work and inclusion in national economies.
More recently, IGAD has proposed the introduction of a Single Visa Initiative aimed at enhancing regional mobility, economic development and tourism among member states. The initiative seeks to establish a unified digital system aimed at non-IGAD citizens visiting the region. Consequently, this will position IGAD as a competitive destination for international visitors and investors. The initiative is anchored in Article 7 and 13 (A) of IGAD’s founding agreement, and the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons. The initiative also includes plans to introduce a Regional Identity Card (IRBIC) for IGAD citizens to facilitate movement of persons and particularly intends to benefit pastoralist and cross-border communities. Currently, IGAD’s visa-free reciprocity score stands at 21 percent up from 14 percent in 2024 which is relatively low and continues to act as a barrier to regional integration and economic growth (Africa Visa Openness, 2025).
Trade, Tourism and Economic Co-operation
IGAD has also engaged in capacity building among member states to enhance access to markets for small scale producers and traders extending to those in the informal sector. The development of a Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) has also facilitated cross-border agricultural trade and improved financing for farmers across member states of IGAD. IGAD has also formulated a Sustainable Tourism Master Plan 2024 – 2034 that aspires to position the region as a competitive region in the world when it comes to tourism. The master plan aims at promoting economic growth, fostering sustainability, cultural preservation and environmental stewardship (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2025).
Ongoing Challenges and Constraints
Ongoing challenges within IGAD include political instability among member states. The persistent conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan and occasionally Ethiopia and Eritrea undermine IGAD’s peacebuilding capacity. IGAD has limited capacity due to limited funding and reliance on external partners. Consequently, IGAD faces constraints when it comes to implementing long-term strategies. Trust among member states of IGAD remains minimal and consequently this affects the political commitment and meeting of the obligations and mandate of the organisation.
Critics have argued that IGAD remains overly state-centric and elite-driven, with limited mechanisms for citizen participation or private-sector inclusion. Dependence on foreign financing has also limited the ability of IGAD to be an autonomous and independent regional organisation. Reliance on funding from external donors means that the organisation has to abide by the rules laid out by the funding parties and consequently IGAD lacks self-reliance.
Security Focus versus Economic Integration
According to Weldesellassie (2011) peace, security and regional politics have been the main drive of IGAD and regional integration as a model is more recent. A focus on conflict and security as its major focus for the large part of the community’s history has sabotaged strengthening regional economic development co-operation. This security-centric orientation is also reflected in citizens’ perceptions of regional co-operation, thereby undermining broader integration efforts. For example, economic integration, say between Kenya and Somalia is rarely a focus of IGAD and the focus is mainly on the peace and security.
“Rethinking regional integration schemes in Africa and basing them on an outwardly-oriented approach aimed at integration into the global economy, is no longer an option for Africa. It is a necessity if economic progress is to be achieved, and if regional integration is to be meaningful.” (Qobo, 2007, p. 7)
Naturally, trade brings people and countries together as the primary factor and therefore trade largely underpins regional integration (Qobo, 2007). The absence of economic benefits from IGAD has contributed to members withdrawing their membership unilaterally. In the presence of tangible economic benefits such as cross-border trade or belonging to a single economic monetary union, withdrawal of membership would come with costs and consequently this guarantees long-term membership within the regional economic community. Scholars have noted that member states’ dependence on trade taxes and customs duties has reinforced protectionist policies and constrained deeper market integration (Gaas, 2023).
In comparison to EAC and ECOWAS, IGAD does not have a free trade area (FTA) nor a customs union to ease trade barriers of intra-regional movement of goods, services and capital flows. Consequently, this reduces the volume of trade. Gaas (2023) has argued that member states of IGAD are also over-dependent on trade taxes and customs duties to fund their annual budgets and consequently member states have developed protectionist markets further hindering intra-regional trade.
Overlapping Membership in Multiple RECs
In the beginning, we reviewed how regional integration emerged in Africa. While there were diverging routes of embracing regional integration, the choice of RECs was adopted as opposed to immediate unification. Some arguments for this model were that regions start integrating and opening up while getting accustomed to each other as opposed to immediate unification that would lead to conflicts. It is to be remembered that in the first two to three decades after any African states received their independence, there was continued conflicts in various regions.
However, having different regional economic communities has also led to overlapping membership. Member States in IGAD have overlapping memberships gaining benefits such as market and trade exchange and people-to-people exchanges. Four out of eight member states (Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Somalia) are in the East African Community. Kenya and Uganda have integrated more within the EAC as compared to IGAD.
Overlapping membership is a common feature among regional economic communities in Africa. Consequently, this makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness of regional integration on the continent. Membership of multiple RECs leads to difficulties in committing to objectives, multiple interests and generally a lack of a clear focus and alignment. The question posed is what metric would be used to measure success and outcomes of integration when a member state belongs to more than one economic community. For example, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan are both members of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC). Somalia is the latest entrant of the EAC having officially joined the Community in 2022.
Membership Volatility
Commitment by Member States also remains fragmented as there are more active and willing member states than others. Political commitment and commitment of member states has been lacking. Sudan withdrew its membership in January 2024 citing overstepping by the organisation when IGAD placed Sudan’s domestic crisis on the agenda of the 42nd summit. Sudan reactivated its membership in 2026 (Abdeen, 2026). Eritrea withdrew its membership in 2007 and rejoined in June 2023 before withdrawing again in December 2025. More recently, Eritrea cited as a principal concern failure of the organisation to live up to its objectives and more often than not, IGAD had shown bias towards Ethiopia when it came to addressing the conflict between the two countries (The East African, 2026).
Membership within the bloc is also not strict in the spirit of meeting the ends of integration. Eritrea’s withdrawal and Sudan’s fluctuating participation highlight political divisions. While the justification for withdrawals should not be entirely dismissed, it is essential that the underlying principles of integration adhere to the spirit of co-operation, as unilateral withdrawals can undermine such mergers in the long term.
Institutional Gaps within IGAD’s Legal Architecture
The institutional architecture of IGAD does not grant it executive or autonomous decision-making powers. Decision-making authority remains concentrated within intergovernmental political organs, limiting institutional autonomy. Consequently, this leaves the regional economic community lacking the capacity to be able to truly make any meaningful decisions. The institutional framework of IGAD is also lacking since the regional organisation lacks instruments to enforce regional agreements.
Structural inefficiency of the regional community remains one of the main challenges facing IGAD. IGAD further lacks instruments to assist member states that may fail. This is evident in the ongoing war in Sudan between the government forces and the RSF that has been going on for three years now. IGAD structural deficiency is underpinned by not having a legislative and enforcement arm and therefore members are reluctant to obey and domesticate rules and policies which leads to low morale and less commitment from member states (Weldesellassie, 2011). There is much emphasis on the security arena while other areas of co-operation have not been formulated or thought through such as a legislative arm or creating legal infrastructure that manages disputes among member states nor the means to enforce the rules (Gaas, 2023).
A Common Identity
This commentary submits that regional integration efforts in IGAD still face hurdles because of the lack of a core identity that defines the respective regional economic community. While the organisation was formed in the backdrop of famine and drought, one can argue that identity formation still faces its unique challenges. The region is defined by differing histories, religion and languages. Member states of IGAD still maintain similarities, for example, all Member States except for Ethiopia experienced colonisation. In most countries, a significant part of the population are engaged in pastoralist farming.
This paper argues that unlike the East African Community (EAC) which is brought together by language and culture (Swahili) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which is brought together by a unique history of member states collaborating to fight for their independence, the IGAD community still struggles to find commonality that would accelerate their integration.
Opportunities and Future Prospects
Despite these constraints, IGAD retains strategic opportunities for deeper integration. Market opportunities exist as Ethiopia opens up its economy. Somalia has also gained relative peace and calm in the last few years. Kenya and Ethiopia’s economies lead in the region. Somalia’s discovery of oil prospects and its enhanced co-operation with Turkey especially in defense, energy exploration, and infrastructure development presents opportunities for Somalia and the region in trade and stability within the region (TRT, 2021).
Over the next decade, Ethiopia is a key member state to watch in the region as it continues to open up its economy and become a regional power. Holding the seat of the African Union, a diplomatic hub of Africa, Ethiopia’s close co-operation with other regional powers in the globe such as BRICS positions Ethiopia as a key state and regional power in influencing policy direction within IGAD. However, this won’t come easy for Addis Ababa considering the regional power rivalries and historical mistrust between states.
In addition, Somalia in its post-conflict construction continues to gain stability while maintaining close co-operation with Turkey. Its long coastline and the possibility of discovering oil provides great opportunities not only for Somalia but the region. Based on the different existing asymmetries, it remains to be seen whether continued market integration between Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and now Somalia under the auspices of the East African Community will have an impact on trade and market dynamics of IGAD.
Conclusion
IGAD’s principal paradox is that its strongest institutional legitimacy derives from peace and security interventions, yet this same security-centric orientation has delayed economic integration. While there are different economic communities within the African Union, overlapping membership has slowed down movement towards one direction. Different citizens have varied perceptions of regional integration and their objectives and consequently priorities and commitment differ. While the EAC for example has succeeded in areas mainly economic integration, IGAD has performed relatively well with regards to conflict management. This suggests that African RECs can benefit from greater inter-REC policy learning and institutional benchmarking. Yet, regional economic communities in Africa are not meant to be polarised but in the midst of all these differences, they ought to co-operate and work together. It is on this basis that recommendations have been made that IGAD learns from other RECs that have integrated better on the African continent such as the East African Community and the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS who for example have thrived in areas such as market access and regional co-operation especially among the Heads of States and Government providing political commitment to the process.
However, more recently, the region has been gaining economic and political stability despite the intermittent fissures and disruptions, conversations and commitments on regional trade, opening up and economic integration have begun in earnest. External geopolitical partnerships continue to shape the strategic and developmental trajectory of the region. Still, the conversation needs to focus on adopting and enacting protocols on macroeconomic convergence, infrastructure development, industrial development, investment and regional information technology.
Recommendations
Strengthen Economic Integration
Economic integration provides a strong guarantee for integrating member states since benefits are tangible and immediate. It also facilitates people-to-people exchanges. Despite adopting policy resolutions on regional digital trade solutions and cross-border agricultural trade signalling a shift towards macroeconomic convergence, IGAD ought to pay attention to policy considerations covering, industrial development, infrastructure development and investment and regional information technology. Adopting the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons signals opening up and working towards operationalising a free trade area (FTA) and a customs union. Establishing a free trade area will reduce the need of protectionist markets among member states. There is also need to follow up and implement the Protocol on Transhumance and the Protocol on Free Movement.
Deepen Free Movement and Regional Mobility
The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons holds significant promise to the region. There is need for the remaining Member States to sign and ratify it. Implementation of the Single Visa initiative by Member States will also enhance regional mobility, economic development and tourism. Introduction of the Regional Identity Card also needs to be fast-tracked to facilitate movement of persons especially among cross-border communities, pastoralists and commercial and business operators. Implementation of these measures will improve IGAD’s low visa-free reciprocity score and open up the region to furthering integration and economic growth.
Reform Institutional Architecture
Structural inefficiency and institutional gaps emerged as one area where IGAD is struggling and that is leading in slowing down integration in the region. There is need to strengthen IGAD’s institutional framework by addressing the RECs lack of autonomous decision-making powers and enforcement mechanisms. There is need to deliberate on making amendments to the founding agreement to accommodate a legislative arm, legal avenues of managing disputes among member states either through a regional court or tribunal and mechanisms of enforcing regional agreements.
Improve Political Commitment and Membership Stability
To address the persistent challenge of membership volatility and fragmented commitment, IGAD member states should prioritise the development of stronger mechanisms for ensuring political accountability and long-term engagement. This could include the adoption of a binding political commitment protocol that outlines clear consequences for unilateral withdrawals or prolonged non-participation, alongside regular high-level political dialogue forums beyond the ordinary summits. Strengthening trust among member states through confidence-building measures, such as joint economic projects and transparent decision-making processes, would reduce the perception of IGAD as an elite-driven organisation. Greater ownership by member states, including increased domestic financial contributions, would also diminish overreliance on external donors and enhance the organisation’s autonomy and credibility.
Build Regional Identity and Social Cohesion
A critical gap in IGAD’s integration agenda remains the weak sense of shared regional identity among its citizens and governments. IGAD should invest in deliberate efforts to foster social cohesion through cultural diplomacy, people-to-people initiatives, and educational programmes that highlight common histories, challenges, and aspirations. Practical steps could include the promotion of intra-regional tourism packages, youth and sports exchange programmes, joint cultural festivals, and the integration of IGAD-focused content into national school curricula. By nurturing a collective regional consciousness — beyond the current focus on security and drought — IGAD can create the social foundation necessary for deeper integration, similar to the role played by Swahili language and shared anti-colonial history in the EAC and SADC respectively. This long-term investment in identity formation would complement economic and institutional reforms and help sustain political commitment.
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