Introduction
The resurgence of the M23 rebellion in eastern DR Congo reflects not only the persistence of armed violence but also the transformation of contemporary conflict environments into highly complex and multi-layered systems. The crisis illustrates a familiar yet evolving pattern: a fragmented battlefield populated by a multiplicity of armed actors, intersecting local and regional interests and sustained external involvement (Stearns, 2012).
While much scholarly and policy attention has focused on the fragmentation of armed groups in eastern DR Congo, less attention has been paid to a parallel and equally consequential phenomenon which is the fragmentation of peace processes themselves. Today, mediation efforts addressing the M23 crisis are dispersed across multiple tracks regional, continental, and international ranging from the Nairobi Process led by the East African Community (EAC) to the Luanda Process under Angolan facilitation, as well as diplomatic engagements in global capitals such as Washington, Doha and now Montreux (Switzerland).
The proliferation of mediation initiatives raises a critical paradox; rather than reinforcing one another, these parallel processes risk generating institutional competition, weakening coherence, and undermining the legitimacy of peace efforts (de Coning, Saraiva, & Muto, 2023). As a result, actors within the conflict both state and non-stateare able to strategically navigate between competing frameworks, thereby diluting accountability and complicating resolution. Then follow the conceptualization of the current stage of the conflict as the “Multipolar mediation phase”
This article argues that the M23 crisis is no longer defined solely by the fragmentation of violence, but increasingly by the fragmentation of peace architecture itself. It contends that without greater coordination, inclusivity, and a stronger emphasis on the rule of law, the multiplication of mediation initiatives risks entrenching instability rather than resolving it.
Genealogy of the M23 conflict: From a conventional insurgency to a multipolar mediation
The evolution of the M23 conflict since 2012 reflects a broader transformation in the nature of armed conflict and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region. What began as a relatively structured insurgency has evolved into a complex crisis marked not only by the proliferation of armed actors, but also by the multiplication of mediation frameworks and political interlocutors at regional and international levels.
a. Phase I (2012–2013): The Conventional insurgency and coordinated regional response
The M23 rebellion emerged in April 2012 under the presidency of Joseph Kabila, when former members of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People) (CNDP), including key figures such as Bosco Ntaganda and later Sultani Makenga, defected from the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo FARDC. The movement justified its insurgency by citing the Congolese government’s failure to fully implement the 23 March 2009 peace agreement (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
This phase was marked by relatively identifiable chains of command and a clear escalation trajectory, culminating in the capture of Goma in November 2012 (UN Security Council, 2013). At the regional level, the crisis quickly drew in neighboring states, notably Rwanda with President Paul Kagame and Uganda with President Yoweri Museveni, both of whom were repeatedly accused by UN experts of supporting the rebellion allegations they denied (UN Group of Expert on DRC, 2012).
In response, relatively coherent mediation architecture emerged. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), chaired at key moments by Yoweri Museveni, played a central convening role (ICGLR, 2013). Parallel efforts were supported by the African Union under the leadership of the South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.
At the global level, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and his Special Envoy Mary Robinson were instrumental in facilitating negotiations that culminated in the 2013 Addis Ababa Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. Key regional signatories included Jakaya Kikwete and Jacob Zuma, reflecting broader regional commitment. Simultaneously, military efforts were coordinated through MONUSCO, led by Force Commander Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, whose leadership of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) marked a decisive shift toward offensive peace enforcement (African Union, 2013).
The convergence of diplomatic and military strategies backed by relatively aligned regional and international leadership ultimately led to the defeat of M23 in late 2013. This phase can therefore be understood as a centralized and coordinated response to a conventional insurgency, where mediation authority, while multi-layered, remained broadly coherent.
b. Phase II (2021–present): The multipolar mediation phase
The resurgence of M23 in late 2021, under the presidency of Félix Tshisekedi, marks the beginning of a fundamentally different phase. While remnants of the original leadership persisted, the movement re-emerged within a far more fragmented political and security environment (UN Group of Experts, 2022).
At the regional level, tensions between the DRC and Rwanda intensified with Kinshasa accusing Kigali of renewed support to M23. Uganda simultaneously deepened its military presence in eastern DRC through bilateral arrangements, while the President of Burundi, Évariste Ndayishimiye, also deployed troops in the region (Ebuteli, 2024). Unlike the earlier phase, mediation efforts became dispersed across multiple leadership centers.
The genealogy of the M23 conflict demonstrates that while the nature of armed violence has evolved, the architecture of peace has evolved too. The transition from a relatively coordinated mediation framework in 2012–2013 to a fragmented, multipolar system today underscores a central challenge: the governance of mediation itself. Understanding who mediates, how, and under what authority is no longer a secondary question it is central to the prospects for sustainable peace in eastern DRC.
A multiplicity of mediation tracks: from complementarity to competition
The contemporary response to the M23 crisis is defined not by the absence of mediation, but by its proliferation. Unlike earlier phases of the conflict, where diplomatic efforts were relatively coordinated, the current phase marked by the resurgence of M23 since late 2021 has generated a dense constellation of mediation initiatives operating simultaneously across regional, continental, and global levels. While these processes are often framed as complementary, their coexistence without effective coordination has progressively transformed the peace architecture into a competitive and multipolar arena.
a. Continental and regional tracks: Nairobi, Luanda and Lomé facilitation
At the regional level, the Nairobi Process, launched in April 2022 under the East African Community (EAC), represents one of the primary mediation frameworks. Facilitated by Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of Kenya, the process aimed to engage non-state armed groups through dialogue and to promote disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(East African Community, 2022).
However, the M23 itself did not consistently participate, limiting the inclusivity and effectiveness of the process. As a result, while the Nairobi Process produced political declarations and partial agreements, it failed to secure a comprehensive ceasefire with all key actors (Ebuteli, 2023).
At the continental level, the Luanda Process, led by Angolan President João Lorenço, has focused on interstate tensions between Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame. A major milestone was reached in November 2022, when a ceasefire agreement was announced in Luanda, calling for the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of M23 from occupied areas and the deployment of a regional force (Africa News, 2023).
This was followed by additional roadmaps and verification mechanisms in 2023, including commitments to disengagement. However, violations of the ceasefire were repeatedly reported on both sides, and the implementation of withdrawal commitments remained partial. Thus, while Luanda produced more concrete diplomatic outputs than Nairobi, its effectiveness has been constrained by weak enforcement.
Following the Luanda process, the African Union sought to streamline mediation efforts through the appointment of Faure Gnassingbé, President of Togo, as facilitator in 2025 (Radio Okapi, 2025). This initiative aimed to harmonize regional mediation tracks, facilitate dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda but also to reinforce African-led solutions. However, unlike the Luanda Process, the Lomé facilitation has not yet produced a formal standalone peace agreement. Instead, it has functioned as a complementary diplomatic channel, supporting ongoing negotiations and attempting to bridge gaps between existing frameworks. Its main limitation lies in its lack of clearly defined authority vis-à-vis Nairobi and Luanda, which has reduced its visibility and impact despite its strategic intent.
b. Global engagement and alternative mediation arena: Washington initiatives/ Doha process
Beyond Africa, the United States has assumed a significantly more assertive diplomatic role in the Great Lakes region, particularly following the return of Donald Trump to office in 2025. Under his administration, and through the leadership of Marco Rubio as well as the active involvement of Massad Boulos, the US shifted from a largely supportive role to that of a central diplomatic broker in the M23 crisis.
This engagement culminated in the signing of a U.S. brokered peace agreement in Washington in June 2025 between the DR Congo and Rwanda (Reuters, 2025). The agreement often referred to as the Washington Accord included commitments to cease hostilities, respect territorial integrity, disengage support for armed groups, and promote regional economic cooperation, particularly in strategic mineral sectors. It also reflected a broader U.S. policy shift toward linking peacebuilding with economic partnerships and investment incentives (Gavin, 2026).
However, despite its diplomatic significance, the Washington agreement remains structurally fragile. Key provisions such as the withdrawal of Rwandan forces, the neutralization of armed groups including M23, and the effective implementation of ceasefire mechanisms have faced significant challenges (Jeune Afrique, 2024). Reports of continued hostilities shortly after the agreement highlight the persistent gap between diplomatic commitments and realities on the ground (Anderson, 2025).
Rather than consolidating mediation efforts into a unified framework, the Washington process has effectively added another layer to already fragmented peace architecture. Its coexistence with regional initiatives such as the Nairobi and Luanda processes, as well as parallel diplomatic engagements, contributes to a diffusion of authority and reinforces the multipolar character of mediation in the M23 crisis.
At the same time, the emergence of Qatar as a mediator further illustrates the diversification of diplomatic arenas. In 2025, Doha hosted a high level meeting between Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame, facilitating direct dialogue and confidence building measures. The Doha process has emphasized discreet, leader level engagement and has contributed to temporary ceasefire arrangements, including discussions involving M23 representatives (African Security Analysis, 2025).
However, like the Washington initiative, the Doha process has not resulted in a fully institutionalized and enforceable peace agreement. Its informal and confidential nature offers flexibility but also limits transparency, accountability, and long-term impact (Al Jazeera, 2025). Together, these parallel efforts underscore a defining feature of the current phase: the expansion of mediation spaces without corresponding consolidation, reinforcing a fragmented and competitive peacemaking environment.
c. Comparative trajectories and outcomes of mediation processes
A closer examination of the various mediation initiatives reveals significant differences not only in their approaches, but also in their timelines, outputs, and levels of effectiveness. Taken together, these processes illustrate a pattern of incremental diplomatic production without corresponding transformation on the ground.
Looking ahead, the evolution of the international context is likely to further reshape the geography of mediation. The increasing instability in the Middle East affecting traditional diplomatic hubs such as Doha has prompted a relocation of negotiation platforms toward more neutral and stable environments. Such a shift does not only reflect changing geopolitical realities but also reinforces the trend toward the internationalization of mediation spaces in the M23 crisis (Pole Institute, 2025).
The geographical relocation of mediation spaces from Nairobi and Luanda to Doha and then to Montreux, Switzerland symbolizes not progress, but the displacement of unresolved tensions across diplomatic arenas.
d. From outputs to impact: A fragmented peace architecture
Despite the production of multiple agreements, declarations, and diplomatic engagements, the overall impact on the ground remains limited. Ceasefires are frequently violated, armed groups continue to operate, and trust between state actors remains fragile. This discrepancy between diplomatic output and practical impact reflects a deeper structural issue, the absence of coordination among mediation tracks (International Crisis Group, 2025).
Rather than reinforcing each other, these processes often operate on different timelines, engage different actors and produce non-binding or weakly enforced commitments. As a result, the multiplication of agreements does not necessarily translate into sustainable peace.
The inclusion of multiple actors from regional leaders to continental and global figures demonstrates a strong and sustained commitment to resolving the M23 crisis. However, this multiplicity has also produced unintended consequences. The coexistence of overlapping initiatives, each with its own logic and constituency, has transformed the peace process into a fragmented and competitive system, where coordination is weak, and outcomes remain uncertain. The challenge is not the lack of peacemaking efforts, but the need to reconcile them into a coherent and enforceable framework (Bram & Said, 2025).
Analysis: Legitimacy Under Strain
Legitimacy constitutes a foundational pillar of effective peacebuilding. It shapes not only the acceptance of agreements, but also their implementation, durability, and capacity to transform conflict dynamics (Jonas & Michael, 2019). In deeply fragmented conflict environments such as eastern DR Congo, legitimacy is not a given attribute of mediation it is continuously negotiated, contested, and redefined.
The proliferation of mediation initiatives in the M23 crisis has fundamentally altered the landscape of legitimacy. While the multiplication of peacemaking efforts is often justified as a means of increasing inclusivity and diplomatic pressure, it paradoxically generates ambiguity over authority. When multiple actors simultaneously claim the role of mediator whether through the Nairobi Process, the Luanda Process, African Union facilitation, or external engagements in Doha and Washington the result is not a cumulative strengthening of legitimacy, but its fragmentation.
From a theoretical perspective, this dynamic can be understood through the distinction between input legitimacy (who participates in the process) and output legitimacy (what results the process produces) (Scharpf, 1999). In the current mediation landscape, both dimensions are under strain. Input legitimacy is weakened by the exclusion of key local stakeholders, while output legitimacy is undermined by the limited implementation of agreements and repeated ceasefire violations (International Alert, 2021-2025).
Competing mediation frameworks generate uncertainty regarding which process holds primary authority. For instance, commitments made under the Luanda Process may not align with discussions held in Nairobi, while informal engagements in Doha may bypass both. This institutional overlap creates a situation in which no single framework is recognized as definitive, thereby diluting the credibility of each.
In addition, the geographic and political distance of these processes from conflict affected communities further erodes legitimacy. Negotiations conducted in capitals such as Nairobi, Luanda and Doha are often disconnected from local realities in North and South Kivu (Pole Institute, 2022). Civil society organizations, customary authorities, women’s groups, and youth actors who bear the direct consequences of violence are frequently marginalized or entirely excluded.
This exclusion produces several interrelated effects. First, agreements risk lacking local ownership, reducing their social acceptance and long-term sustainability. Second, unresolved community grievances particularly those related to land, identity, and security remain outside the scope of negotiations, thereby perpetuating underlying drivers of conflict. Third, peace processes are increasingly perceived as externally imposed political arrangements, negotiated among elites and international actors, rather than as inclusive pathways toward collective security (Autesserre, 2010).
From a systems perspective, mediators themselves become embedded within the conflict ecosystem. Rather than operating as neutral facilitators, they emerge as competing nodes of authority, each associated with distinct political, regional, or geopolitical interests. The involvement of actors such as Donald Trump, Uhuru Kenyatta, João Lorenço and Faure Gnassingbé illustrates the density of this mediation field.
When these interventions are not effectively coordinated, they introduce additional layers of competition and complexity. Conflict actors can exploit this fragmentation by selectively engaging with processes that offer greater strategic advantage; a dynamic that further undermines the authority and coherence of mediation efforts.
Legitimacy in the M23 peace process is not only under strain it is structurally fragmented. The multiplication of mediation initiatives, in the absence of a unifying framework and inclusive participation, risks transforming peacebuilding into a contested arena where authority is diffuse, accountability is weak, and trust remains fragile.
The marginalization of Rule of law
A recurring and structurally significant feature across mediation tracks in the M23 crisis is the consistent prioritization of short-term stability over long-term justice. Across the Nairobi, Luanda, and associated diplomatic processes, negotiations have predominantly centered on immediate security imperatives ceasefires, disengagement of forces, troop withdrawals, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) frameworks while questions of accountability for serious human rights violations remain marginal or deferred.
This reflects a broader “stability first” paradigm that has become increasingly dominant in contemporary international peacebuilding. Within this approach, the immediate cessation of hostilities is treated as the primary objective, while justice-related concerns are often framed as secondary or post-conflict issues to be addressed at a later stage. In the context of eastern DR Congo, however, this sequencing has proven deeply problematic (Call, 2008).
The region has experienced repeated cycles of large-scale violence over several decades, including widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, recruitment of child soldiers, and systematic exploitation of natural resources (Amnesty International, 2025). These violations have been committed by both state and non-state actors, including armed groups operating in North and South Kivu, as well as elements within national and regional security forces. Despite the scale and persistence of these abuses, accountability mechanisms have remained weak, fragmented, or politically constrained (Internationale Center for Transitional Justice, 2021)(International Center for Transitional Justice, 2021).
In fact, frameworks such as the 2022 Nairobi Process, the Luanda mediation roadmap, and the broader regional commitments under the African Peace and Security Architecture recognize the importance of transitional justice (East African Community, 2022). But in practice, these processes have largely privileged political and military stabilization over judicial accountability. Even when ceasefire agreements or disengagement plans are reached such as those negotiated under the Luanda Process in 2022 and 2023, they rarely include detailed, enforceable provisions for investigating or prosecuting violations committed during or prior to hostilities.
This institutional gap contributes to the persistence of a culture of impunity. Armed actors whether state forces or non-state groups, are rarely subjected to credible judicial consequences for documented abuses. Judicial and accountability mechanisms, including national courts, military tribunals, and international instruments such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), have been selectively applied or politically constrained, limiting their deterrent effect.
Importantly, the absence of accountability does not merely represent a legal or normative failure; it has direct consequences for conflict dynamics. Unresolved grievances linked to past atrocities are not static historical residues. They actively shape present-day behavior by reinforcing distrust between communities, legitimizing cycles of retaliation, and sustaining recruitment narratives used by armed groups. In this sense, impunity functions not as an absence of justice, but as an active driver of continued violence (Autesserre, 2010).
Empirical observations from the M23 resurgence since 2021 illustrate this dynamic clearly. Despite multiple diplomatic efforts and ceasefire attempts under the Nairobi and Luanda frameworks, repeated violations and renewed offensives have persisted. The limited integration of justice considerations into these agreements has contributed to their fragility, as affected communities perceive them as political arrangements that prioritize elite bargaining over victim recognition and redress (International Crisis Group, 2025).
From a structural perspective, the marginalization of the rule of law is closely linked to the fragmentation of mediation itself. The existence of multiple overlapping processes has created a situation in which accountability is diffused across different forums, with no single mechanism possessing the authority or mandate to systematically address violations.
As a result, peace agreements risk becoming instruments of conflict management rather than vehicles for structural transformation. Without the integration of credible accountability mechanisms, including transitional justice processes, reparations frameworks, and strengthened judicial cooperation, these agreements function primarily as temporary stabilization tools rather than durable resolutions.
Externalization of peacebuilding
The growing involvement of external actors in the M23 crisis has significantly complicated the mediation landscape, contributing to what can be described as the progressive externalization of peacebuilding in the eastern DR Congo (Chandler, 2010). While international engagement can provide essential financial resources, technical expertise, and diplomatic leverage, it simultaneously raises critical questions regarding ownership, accountability, and the strategic priorities driving mediation efforts.
Historically, conflict intervention in eastern DRC has involved a wide range of external actors, including regional states, continental organizations, and global powers. Beyond security considerations, these interventions have often been influenced directly or indirectly by geopolitical and economic interests, particularly related to access to critical mineral resources such as coltan, cobalt, and gold (Ken & Eric, 2022). This has contributed to persistent perceptions among local populations that external actors may prioritize strategic or economic objectives that do not fully align with the needs and aspirations of affected communities.
In the current phase of the M23 conflict, this externalization is reflected in the multiplication of mediation venues and actors operating across different geopolitical spaces. While these multiple channels may enhance the availability of diplomatic entry points, they also contribute to a structural shift in which key decisions regarding peace and security are increasingly negotiated outside national and regional institutional frameworks such as those of the DRC, the EAC, and the ICGLR. This trend risks weakening domestic governance structures and diluting the authority of regional institutions tasked with conflict management (International Crisis Group, 2025).
In addition, the coexistence of multiple external actors operating in parallel often with distinct mandates, strategic interests, and time horizons reinforces a fragmented mediation ecosystem. Rather than converging into a unified framework, initiatives in Nairobi, Luanda, Doha, Washington, and Lomé increasingly function as parallel diplomatic tracks, each producing partial outcomes but lacking effective coordination mechanisms.
This fragmentation has significant consequences. First, it undermines state ownership of the peace process, as national authorities must navigate multiple and sometimes competing diplomatic pressures. Second, it weakens institutional legitimacy at both national and regional levels, as external actors become de facto central players in conflict resolution. Third, it fosters dependency, where local and regional actors increasingly rely on external mediation rather than developing autonomous and sustainable conflict resolution capacities (Autesserre, 2010).
Over time, these dynamic risks eroding institutional resilience. Instead of strengthening African-led peace architectures, externalization may inadvertently contribute to the weakening of endogenous mechanisms of conflict management. In such a context, peacebuilding becomes less a process rooted in local governance structures and more a globally dispersed diplomatic exercise, shaped by the interests and priorities of multiple external stakeholders (UNDP, 2023).
Toward coherent mediation and legal accountability
Addressing the challenges of fragmented mediation requires a comprehensive and integrated approach. The following policy recommendations aim to enhance coherence, legitimacy, and effectiveness in peace efforts addressing the M23 crisis.
● Establish a unified mediation framework
Regional and continental organizations should work toward harmonizing existing mediation tracks under a single coordinated framework. The African Union is particularly well-positioned to play a central coordinating role.
This framework should align the objectives of the Nairobi and Luanda processes, clarify roles and responsibilities of mediators and ensure consistent communication and information sharing. A unified approach would reduce duplication, strengthen leverage over conflict actors, and enhance overall coherence.
● Prioritize inclusive peace processes
DRC leaders must take the initiative to move peacebuilding efforts beyond elite-driven negotiations to include a broader range of stakeholders. This includes civil society organizations, women and youth groups, traditional and community leaders, representatives from conflict affected areas. Inclusive processes enhance legitimacy, improve the quality of agreements, and ensure that local realities are reflected in policy decisions.
● Integrate the Rule of law into mediation
Mediators and parties have to ensure the rule of law is a central pillar of peace negotiations, not a secondary consideration. This requires embedding accountability mechanisms within peace agreements, supporting national and international judicial processes, strengthening institutions responsible for justice and human rights. Balancing peace and justice is complex, but sustainable peace cannot be achieved without addressing impunity.
● Strengthen regional institutional leadership
Regional organizations must play a more decisive role in coordinating and sustaining peace efforts. This includes enhancing the capacity of regional bodies to manage complex mediation processes, promoting collaboration between organizations such as the East African Community (EAC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU), and AU, developing long-term institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention. Stronger regional leadership can reduce reliance on external actors and promote ownership.
● Align international engagement with local priorities
International actors should ensure that their interventions support, rather than fragment, existing frameworks. This involves coordinating with regional initiatives, avoiding parallel or competing processes and prioritizing long-term governance and institutional development. External engagement should reinforce, not replace, local and regional peacebuilding efforts.
Conclusion
The M23 crisis highlights a critical paradox in contemporary peacebuilding: the multiplication of mediators does not necessarily lead to more effective peace. Instead, it can deepen fragmentation, not only among conflict actors but also within the very systems designed to resolve conflict.
As eastern DRC continues to experience complex and interlocking dynamics of violence, addressing fragmentation requires more than military or diplomatic interventions. It demands a coherent approach that integrates legitimacy, inclusivity, and the rule of law.
Without such a shift, the region risks remaining trapped in a cycle where multiple peace processes coexist, yet sustainable peace remains elusive. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to increase the number of peacemakers, but to ensure that their efforts are aligned, accountable, and grounded in the realities of those most affected by conflict.
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