Abstract
Over the past two decades, the Horn of Africa has emerged as a strategic arena for Gulf states seeking to extend their power and influence beyond the Arabian Peninsula. While Gulf states defend their continued infiltration in the Horn of Africa on grounds of conflict intervention, a more critical analysis reveals the extension of their regional supremacy rivalries and economic and security imperatives as the main motivating factors. Endowed with mineral-rich countries, proximity to strategic maritime routes, extensive arable land, and opportunities for military expansion, the Horn of Africa has been opportune ground for Gulf states’ pursuits. This strategic penetration has produced a complex intersection of external rivalries with local conflicts. Rivalry among dominant Gulf countries has shaped conflict dynamics by influencing local actors, deepening internal divisions and complicating chances of amicable resolution of conflicts in the fragile states in the Horn of Africa. By interrogating the hidden agendas underlying Gulf interventions, this article examines how Gulf supremacy rivalries shape conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa and assesses the subsequent impacts of such interventions. To achieve sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa, the article recommends transparent and inclusive interventions that transcend elite interests and prioritise community-level benefits.
Introduction
In a narrow sense, the Horn of Africa (HoA) comprises four countries – Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea – while in a broader sense, it includes Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya (Long, 2024). The region is troubled by deep-rooted inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Somalia, for instance, has endured political instability since the collapse of its central government in the early 1990s. Despite concerted stabilisation efforts in the recent past, the country continues to struggle with persistent separatist movements, most notably the self-declared Republic of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Puntland. Ethiopia, on the other hand, contends with domestic instability in the Tigray region, which has had significant spill-over effects on the security and politics of the neighbouring countries. Additionally, Ethiopia is also engaged in numerous territorial disputes with her neighbours, with allegations of infringing on Somalia’s sovereignty; contestations over transboundary resources with Sudan; and cross-border ethnic rivalries and military supremacy battles with Eritrea. Sudan continues to live through a protracted transition characterised by attempts of the military to reassert its power in a contested political space following the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir. Both Sudan and South Sudan have experienced deep factionalisms, which are part of the causes of domestic and regional instabilities (Wilson, 2025; Dubale, 2024). The Gulf countries have increasingly viewed these developments as threats to their security and economic interests, necessitating their interventions.
Notwithstanding the numerous conflicts, the region carries significant geopolitical and economic advantages. Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the HoA is strategically located at the crossroads of critical global trade routes that link the African, Asian and European markets. Moreover, it is richly endowed with natural resources, vast arable land, a huge consumer market and enormous industrial potential. According to Wilson (2025), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that 15% of global trade passes through this route, bolstering the region’s strategic relevance in global geopolitics. These factors make the HoA attractive to external actors, both regional and international, seeking to enhance their influence and power. To the Gulf countries, in particular, the HoA remains a geostrategic hotspot for their economic and security pursuits.
The Gulf comprises the seven countries – Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – bordering the Persian Gulf in the Arabian Peninsula. Of the seven, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar stand out, not only as the political and economic heavyweights, but also as the most ambitious in expanding their sphere of influence outside the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This quest to expand their influence is largely linked to the Arab Spring, a wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings in MENA between 2010 and 2012, and the subsequent fall of authoritarian regimes in North Africa. The United States (US), their major ally, was in full support of the uprisings, for instance, in Egypt and Tunisia, and welcomed the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the two countries (Shiferaw, 2016). It was, therefore, clear to the Gulf monarchs that their national interests and that of their major ally were no longer synchronised. Henceforth, Gulf countries have embarked on diversifying their political and economic allies and assumed a more proactive role in regional affairs, all in a bid to improve their international relevance. Given the geographical proximity and cultural similitude with the HoA, the latter became a prime site for Gulf’s strategic alliances and an arena to pursue its interests.
It is on this basis that, in the last two decades, the Gulf countries have stepped up their involvement in the HoA, notably in conflict intervention. Gulf countries consider their stability to be inextricably linked to that of the HoA, making it one of their strategic priorities. Lyammouri (2018) attributes the rise of the Gulf’s prominence in the HoA to the conspicuous absence of traditional Western peace brokers, who have shown little or no interest in the protracted conflicts in the region. The challenge is compounded by the fact that the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have exhibited limited conflict response capacity, partly due to their operational and structural challenges. As such, the Gulf countries have seized the opportunity to fill in the vacuum, as underscored by their willingness to host some of the important peace summits regarding the HoA. According to Laako & Hatab (2024), the Gulf states have leveraged their financial resources and deep historical and cultural ties with the HoA to outpace other international actors as they position themselves as key mediators in the HoA.
Both regions recognise that peace and security are imperative for their political and economic well-being. They face shared security concerns emanating from armed conflicts, transnational terrorist networks and the consequent humanitarian crises. Also, the Gulf is constantly concerned with the influx of forced migrants from the HoA due to the persistent conflicts (Kinkoh, 2024). It is also worth noting, as argued by Marangio (2024), that most countries engaging the HoA are mostly keen on safeguarding their economic interests, including access to natural resources. The Gulf is no exception to this. Over and above these shared interests, Gulf states have leveraged their shared history, culture, and Islamic values to advance their agenda and outwit their competitors in the HoA (Gaid, 2022). They have capitalised on the Islamic soft power approach to cut a niche in cultural cooperation and humanitarian and developmental assistance in the HoA. To a large extent, albeit controversially, this engagement has been mutually beneficial to the two regions. On the one hand, the HoA is eager to collaborate with the Gulf, not only to address the contemporary security threats it contends with, but also to fill in their infrastructural deficits from the massive investments from the Gulf. On the other hand, apart from guaranteeing their domestic security through mitigating security threats in the HoA, the Gulf has benefited immensely through establishing new allies, diversifying their economies and positioning itself as an emerging regional and international stakeholder.
Gulf’s Strategic Interests in the Horn of Africa
Gulf countries have played a significant role in promoting peace and stability in the HoA. This is evident through their initiatives in mediation and peace talks, supporting regional security programmes, training and equipping security personnel and enhancing security through diverse investments across various sectors. In 2023, Saudi Arabia played a significant role in clinching the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan. This was in an attempt to quell the conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (ASF), the two warring factions in Sudan. Qatar, while mediating various inter-state conflicts in the HoA, has dared to venture where traditional power brokers have struggled. In 1999, she brokered an agreement between Sudan and Eritrea, restoring relations that had stalled since 1994. In the 2000s, Qatar was an intermediary between the warring factions in Somalia, between Djibouti and Eritrea (2008) and between Kenya and Somalia (2021). Saudi Arabia and the UAE were in the limelight for brokering the Jeddah Peace Agreement, restoring relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea (2018), two major rivals in the HoA (Kinkoh, 2024; Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 2024). Although most of the initiatives have not been successful, they have contributed to enhancing the role of these states as important actors in international mediation.
Gulf countries have contributed to a more stable and secure environment in the HoA by supporting regional security frameworks. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have stepped up their efforts to secure strategic maritime routes, especially in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This is through the establishment of military outposts in Eritrea and Somaliland with the aim of containing piracy and terrorism. This increased military foothold not only enhances the Gulf’s geopolitical influence but also responds to shared threats in the HoA and the Gulf. Gulf states have also been involved in training and equipping local security forces in the HoA. For example, the UAE has provided extensive support to the Puntland Maritime Police Force and Somaliland’s military. Qatar has invested in training and equipping security forces in Somalia to enhance their capacity to combat piracy and terrorism. These efforts have been crucial in reinforcing regional security. Moreover, Gulf countries have also invested significantly in developmental peace. This is by investing in projects aimed at improving infrastructure, healthcare and education in the HoA. Saudi Arabia, through the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), supports sectors in agribusiness, energy, mining, transport and tourism. Qatar has been involved in the construction of Hobyo Port in Somalia and funding the expansion of the Port of Mombasa in Kenya (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025; Kinkoh, 2024). These investments are important to the Gulf countries, as they help in diversifying their economies, and to the HoA, promoting sustainable peace by addressing some of the root causes of conflict, such as poverty and inadequate access to basic necessities.
However, the interventions have resulted in a mix of successes and failures. Gulf countries have a preference for bilateral over multilateral engagements. This has continually sidestepped important peace and conflict stakeholders in the region, hence minimising chances of successful and constructive conflict resolution. The Jeddah Peace Agreement, for instance, was negotiated in the absence of both the AU and IGAD. Unfortunately, it is on the verge of collapse (Gaid, 2022). Secondly, the interventions have not been immune to the longstanding rivalries between the Gulf countries, which has only served to exacerbate conflicts in the HoA. In Sudan, SAF enjoys support from Saudi Arabia, while the UAE sides with RSF. The conflicting agendas and hidden interests of the two Gulf countries have significantly stalled efforts to find a lasting solution (Chome, 2025; Mosley, 2021). In addition, Somalia has expressed strong reservations against Qatar’s working relationship with Somaliland, the unrecognised breakaway republic in Somalia. Just like in Sudan, this has dimmed chances of positive peace in the already delicate Somalia.
Conflict intervention is not the primary goal of the Gulf countries’ presence in the Horn of Africa; rather, it serves as a strategic façade for advancing their economic interests, which appear to be the central priority. Driven by their economic interests, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are emerging as generous development partners and the leading sources of capital and private sector engagement for the HoA. The UAE, for instance, has an estimated investment of $22 billion in non-security sectors in Sudan. South Sudan is the second largest recipient of UAE investments, primarily on an oil agreement valued at $13 billion. Saudi Arabia’s investments in the HoA are approximated at $15.6 billion, mostly in energy, infrastructural and agricultural sectors. These investments are channelled through the SDF, with most of them concentrated in Djibouti. Although Qatar does not have significant investments in the HoA, it has a pending 40,000-hectare agricultural project in Kenya and is a major financier of the SAF in Sudan’s conflict (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2025; Donelli, 2020; Ayman, 2019). These Gulf states have gained relatively easy access to the region due to the non-conditional nature of their financial assistance, which, as Laako & Hatab (2024) and Shiferaw (2016) note, does not require economic or political reforms, unlike Western aid, nor is it primarily resource-extractive like China’s. This approach aligns well with the preferences of many Horn of Africa governments, which are in dire need of funding but often unable or unwilling to meet Western donor requirements.
Despite the preceding observations, Chome (2025) underscores the transactional, interest-driven, and personalised nature of relationships between key conflict actors in the Horn of Africa (HoA) and Gulf commercial elites—often operating under the guise of powerbrokers. Gulf states have secured and sustained loyalty from warring factions in the HoA using petrodollar diplomacy, while these factions, in turn, have perpetuated violence using the same financial support. This dynamic casts the HoA as a political marketplace where Gulf commercial interests consistently overshadow the pursuit of sustainable peace. Such transactional engagement has marginalised formal diplomatic efforts and undermined peace initiatives led by regional bodies like the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Wilson (2025) and Mosley (2021) contend that this approach extends beyond traditional conflict intervention. Gulf states are also focused on securing maritime trade routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, thereby creating favourable commercial conditions for their investments in the HoA. By expanding into sectors such as logistics, agriculture, and infrastructure, Gulf countries seek to diversify their economies and reduce dependence on oil revenues, which have steadily declined since 2014 (Ayman, 2019).
Gulf Supremacy Rivalries and Conflict Dynamics in the Horn of Africa
The contemporary rivalry among Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar traces its roots to the political upheavals of the 2011 Arab Spring, which revealed divergent visions for regional order in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Central to this rivalry is a contest for leadership within the Sunni Arab world, compounded by stark differences in positions on political Islam. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are firmly opposed to Islamist movements, viewing the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups as existential threats to both domestic and regional stability. Their response to the Arab Spring reflected a coordinated effort to suppress Islamist political influence (Hilde, 2019). Notably, the UAE has spearheaded an international campaign framing political Islam as a driver of instability and a security risk to the Gulf region (Long, 2024). In contrast, Qatar has openly supported Islamist movements and cultivated close ties with Turkey, positioning itself as a patron of political Islam. Its hosting of Islamist leaders contributed to a diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, culminating in the 2017 Gulf diplomatic rift (Larsen & Stepputat, 2019). Economically, the three states are locked in a parallel competition over diversification strategies focused on logistics, aviation, and maritime infrastructure. For example, Qatar’s expanding global presence in aviation and shipping has challenged the UAE’s long-standing dominance in those sectors. These overlapping ideological and economic rivalries have evolved into a multidimensional contest for regional influence, one that directly shapes conflict trajectories and political outcomes in the Horn of Africa.
Somalia is perhaps the most visible arena of Gulf rivalry. During the GCC crisis (2017), Somalia’s political system split along Gulf-aligned lines. Qatar and Turkey invested heavily in Somalia’s central government in Mogadishu, providing political finance, military aid, and institutional support (Mishra, 2019; Long, 2024). In contrast, the UAE established relations with breakaway federal states – Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland – thereby undermining the central government’s efforts at building national unity. The 2018 seizure of UAE funds in Mogadishu and the subsequent withdrawal of their trainers further heightened tensions (International Crisis Group, 2018). As Mwangi (2024) submits, such alignments deepen factionalism and erode the prospects for sustainable peace, only exposing Somalia to further external manipulation. On the same note, Sudan offers another important arena where Gulf states’ presence has been experienced heavily. Prior to the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were key supporters of his regime. Following his fall, they extended support to the Transitional Military Council (TMC) to deter the rise of a civilian government with perceived Islamist linkages (Freer, 2022). Despite subsequent Western pressure moderating their influence, their involvement strengthened military dominance and complicated Sudan’s transition.
Further, Qatar’s role as mediator in the Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute illustrates how Gulf rivalries directly impact local conflict dynamics. The sudden withdrawal of Qatar’s peacekeepers in 2017, which was triggered by the GCC crisis, created a security vacuum that increased the risk of military escalation between the two neighbouring countries (Lyammouri, 2018; Kinkoh, 2024). The 2018 Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement, brokered in Jeddah by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, marked a notable moment of Gulf diplomatic activism (Mishra, 2019). The UAE’s pledge of $3 billion to Ethiopia and its military presence in Eritrea brought to the fore its broader maritime strategy. Qatar’s earlier influence in Djibouti and mediation roles declined significantly after the diplomatic fallout with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Moreover, the Yemen conflict expanded Gulf rivalries into the HoA through military recruitment, port access deals, and political alignments. Eritrea, Sudan, and Djibouti became entangled in the Saudi-UAE coalition (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 2024; Shiferaw, 2016), linking domestic politics in the HoA to external geopolitical agendas.
The HoA increasingly mirrors the ideological and political divisions of the Gulf itself. The region has become an arena for Gulf rivalries and proxy wars. This has led to prolonged political instabilities by introducing external dynamics that favour conflict persistence. The HoA’s vulnerability to Gulf infiltration owes to its fragile political systems. Notably, the resulting alignments in Somalia worsened internal divisions, empowering breakaway federal states to defy the central government, thereby undermining national unity goals. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar has become a defining feature of the HoA’s conflict and security landscape. While Gulf states have occasionally contributed to diplomatic breakthroughs, such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement, their competitive interventions more often fragment domestic politics, weaken regional governance mechanisms, militarise strategic maritime routes, and embolden authoritarian actors. As Freer (2022) asks whether Gulf states are cooperating or competing in the Horn, the evidence strongly suggests the dominance of competitive dynamics. These conditions collectively undermine the prospects for sustainable peace and regional stability.
Impacts of the Gulf’s Conflict Intervention in the Horn of Africa
Gulf rivalries have repeatedly contributed to the prolongation and complexity of conflicts across the Horn of Africa. The 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis polarised the region along the Saudi Arabia–UAE versus Qatar–Turkey axis, further destabilising already fragile political landscapes in Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan. Eritrea and Djibouti’s alignment with Saudi Arabia and the UAE led to Qatar’s abrupt withdrawal of peacekeepers, creating a security vacuum that reignited tensions between the two countries. Although the Gulf-brokered 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough, Gaid (2022) notes that it reshaped Ethiopia’s internal political dynamics in ways that indirectly contributed to the eruption of the Tigray conflict. The UAE’s provision of drones and military equipment to the Ethiopian government further intensified the conflict, shifting battlefield dynamics and prolonging hostilities. In Somalia, competing Gulf alliances deepened political fragmentation: the UAE supported federal member states while Qatar backed the central government, fostering rival power centres that undermined national reconciliation efforts (Donelli, 2020; Hilde, 2019). In each of these contexts, Gulf involvement has seldom addressed root causes of conflict; rather, it has entrenched factional divisions and sustained cycles of violence across the region.
Gulf states often engage in the HoA through elite-driven, personalised bilateral diplomacy that bypasses established regional institutional frameworks. This approach undermines governance by empowering rebel groups and authoritarian leaders, encouraging patronage politics, and weakening formal state institutions. In Somalia, the UAE’s direct engagement with Somaliland, Puntland, and other breakaway federal states ignited constitutional disputes and weakened the country’s fragile federal structure. Qatar’s political and financial support for particular Somali leaders further reinforced elite competition, consolidating power in narrow networks rather than strengthening state institutions. Similar patterns emerged in Sudan, where Gulf support for competing military factions eroded chances for a smooth transition and reduced prospects for democratic consolidation (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025; Lyammouri, 2018). Ultimately, these interventions dilute sovereign governance, fragment national authority, and distort political incentives, often pushing leaders toward short-term survival strategies rather than institutional development.
Gulf geopolitical rivalry has reshaped alliances and produced new regional arrangements that destabilise the HoA. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea security strategy involves Djibouti and Eritrea, while the UAE has expanded economic and security partnerships with Ethiopia, as seen in recent disputes surrounding Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. The region has thus become a theatre for Gulf competition, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE seeking to counter Qatar’s influence while Qatar capitalises on mediation and its financial capabilities to expand its footprint. Somalia’s attempt to remain neutral during the GCC crisis provoked retaliatory measures from the UAE, disrupting security cooperation and aggravating internal political tensions (Mahmood, 2020; Carbone, 2020). These evolving external alignments contribute to a volatile peace and security environment where domestic disputes easily escalate into regional crises. As Gulf states reshape alliances based on shifting geopolitical priorities, the HoA remains vulnerable to external shocks that undermine long-term regional stability.
One of the most consequential outcomes of Gulf involvement is the rapid militarisation of the HoA and the Red Sea corridor. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have pursued military installations in Eritrea, Somaliland, Puntland, Djibouti, and on the Red Sea (Donelli, 2020; Mwangi, 2024). The UAE’s strategy, described as the geopolitics of ports, integrates commercial port management with military operations to secure maritime chokepoints from Aden to Berbera and onwards to the Suez Canal. These developments have prompted an arms race in the region, with HoA states increasingly reliant on Gulf-supplied drones, armoured vehicles, and surveillance technology. For example, Ethiopia’s reported use of drones supplied by the UAE during the Tigray conflict demonstrates how Gulf militarisation reshapes conflict dynamics in the HoA (Gaid, 2022). Such militarisation raises the risk of interstate conflict, strengthens coercive state apparatuses, and transforms the HoA into a contested security space where external actors drive regional security agendas at the expense of peace.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Gulf conflict intervention in the HoA has generated outcomes that overwhelmingly undermine regional stability. Although Gulf states have occasionally facilitated diplomatic progress, their broader involvement has contributed to prolonging conflicts, weakening local and regional governance structures, increasing regional instability, worsening humanitarian conditions, and accelerating militarisation of the HoA. These interventions reflect strategic calculations informed by Gulf regional rivalries rather than the long-term peace and security needs of the HoA. Stability in the HoA requires the strengthening of regional agency. HoA, therefore, must adopt coherent, sovereignty-centred engagement strategies that prioritise institutional resilience, transparency, and accountable governance. Rather than competing for Gulf support, states should coordinate their diplomatic positions to enhance collective bargaining power. Equally important is enhancing conflict responsiveness among regional multilateral organisations such as the AU and IGAD. The regional bodies should reclaim leadership in peace processes and insist on structured inclusion in Gulf-backed interventions. On their part, the Gulf states should endeavour to pursue more transparent, development-orientated and inclusive partnerships that move beyond elite interests and prioritise benefits to the community.
Addressing militarisation in the region will require collective security frameworks capable of monitoring arms flows, regulating foreign military bases, and enhancing maritime cooperation. Sustainable development partnerships must replace transactional investment models that deepen vulnerability. Ultimately, long-term peace in the HoA demands a balanced approach that recognises the strategic interests of Gulf states while upholding the peace and stability of HoA states. Without such changes, Gulf involvement is likely to continue exacerbating rather than resolving the region’s complex conflict dynamics.
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