Russia’s strategic expansion in Africa advanced with Sudan’s approval of its first naval base. On February 12, 2025, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef Ahmed al-Sharif confirmed Russia’s agreement to establish a facility in Port Sudan. Following Syria’s collapse in December 2024 and Turkey’s closure of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, this base secures Russia’s naval presence in the Red Sea and extends its reach into Africa and the Indian Ocean.
Historical Context: Sudan-Russia Relations
Sudanese Russian relations have evolved significantly since 1956, influenced by geopolitical shifts and Sudan’s internal politics. In the 1960s, ties deepened with high-level visits, but a failed Soviet-backed coup in the 1970s led Sudan to sever relations. After gradual normalization in the 1980s, Sudan re-established ties with Russia following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991.
Under President Omar al-Bashir, cooperation peaked as Sudan aligned with Russia on key issues, including support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In 2017, Bashir and Putin agreed on a deal to construct a naval base to host several hundred soldiers and four ships. Facing increasing international isolation—and despite the U.S. lifting its trade embargo while maintaining sanctions over Bashir’s ICC indictment—Sudan sought Russian protection against Western pressure. The First Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 further highlighted Moscow’s growing influence in Sudan.
The 2003 Darfur conflict, driven by the marginalization of non-Arab communities, increased Sudan’s reliance on Russian military aid to suppress the insurgency. Since Sudan’s 2019 transition under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), diplomatic engagement with Russia has deepened. Russia initially secured a foothold in 2020 by signing an agreement to establish a logistics center for its navy—allowing up to four ships (including nuclear-powered vessels) and 300 personnel for 25 years—but in 2021, the new government suspended the deal, banning the base and warship deployment. Mechanisms like the Higher Russian-Sudanese Working Committee have furthered economic ties, with bilateral trade reaching $305 million in 2021, largely driven by agricultural exports.
Port Sudan: Strategic Leverage and Economic Trade-offs for Russia and Sudan
Sudan’s military government recently approved Russia’s first African naval base near Port Sudan, as confirmed by Foreign Minister Ali Youssef Ahmed al-Sharif. With instability affecting its Mediterranean bases—particularly in Syria—Russia has accelerated its expansion into Sudan and Libya, securing footholds for broader military operations. Upgrades at Libya’s Maaten al-Sarra airbase, near the Chad-Sudan border, further strengthen Russia’s regional presence.
Port Sudan, located along the Red Sea, serves as a vital link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, handling approximately 12% of global trade. Control over this port allows Russia to monitor key maritime routes, counter Western and Gulf influence, and potentially disrupt Red Sea traffic if needed. Unlike its Mediterranean base in Tartus, Syria—where Moscow faces operational challenges—Port Sudan offers a more secure and strategically positioned alternative for power projection across Africa and the Middle East. The base could also function as an intelligence hub, enhancing Russia’s ability to monitor both commercial and military activities in the region.
Beyond its military presence, Russia has expanded its economic influence in Sudan, particularly in the gold sector. Partnering with the RSF, Russia, through the Wagner Group’s M Invest and Meroe Gold, secured lucrative mining concessions in Darfur and Blue Nile. These ventures bolster Russia’s gold reserves, bypass sanctions, and strengthen ties with Sudan’s ruling elites. In exchange for military aid, Sudan granted Russian entities preferential treatment, ceding a 30% stake in multiple projects.
Moscow’s support for RSF leader Hemedti has further consolidated his power, disrupting Sudan’s democratic transition while deepening Russian influence. In April 2023, Russia also expanded its energy trade, delivering 70,000 metric tonnes of diesel to Port Sudan, solidifying its foothold in the region.
Additionally, Russia has cemented financial ties through security contracts. The Sudanese intelligence-linked firm Aswar has received millions in payments to facilitate Russian military operations, including visa processing, weapons supplies, and logistics. These transactions underscore Moscow’s strategy of using private military firms and economic incentives to entrench its presence in Sudan.
A Russian naval base in Port Sudan promises military cooperation, offering Sudanese forces training, intelligence-sharing, and weapons upgrades. However, internal power struggles between the SAF and RSF have stalled progress. While Moscow officially backs the SAF, Wagner’s support for the RSF has fueled instability. Since 2003, Russia has supplied over 80% of Sudan’s weapons, and its arms transfers during the April 2023 war exacerbated the conflict, prolonging instability.
Global Reactions and Strategic Consequences
The establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan has raised alarms among Western and regional powers, as it could significantly boost Moscow’s military influence in Africa and disrupt key shipping lanes. Previously, the U.S. has threatened economic and diplomatic sanctions to deter Sudan from deepening ties with Russia. In 2022, Ambassador John Godfrey cautioned that reinstating the 2017 deal with Bashir’s administration would further isolate Sudan, prompting Washington to intensify its pressure.
Italy is alarmed by increased Russian activity near its strategic base in Djibouti—a hub that also hosts U.S., French, Japanese, U.K., Saudi Arabian, and Chinese forces—adding complexity to regional security. Turkey, which maintains a military presence in Somalia and has growing economic and security stakes in the Red Sea, is also closely monitoring these developments, balancing its own regional ambitions with broader geopolitical shifts.
While the full implications of Russia’s growing presence in Sudan remain uncertain, it could shift regional power dynamics, potentially affecting China’s economic interests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s geopolitical strategies, and Iran’s strategic ambitions in the Red Sea. Tehran views the region as a critical front for countering Western and Gulf influence, expanding its maritime presence, while also leveraging the Houthis in Yemen to disrupt global trade, and pressure its rivals. The UAE, expanding its military footprint in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, has also been linked to RSF support in Sudan via Chad, potentially complicating its regional ambitions.
Russia’s naval base in Port Sudan marks a significant geopolitical shift, strengthening Moscow’s influence in Africa and the Indian Ocean while challenging Western and regional powers. By securing military and economic footholds, Russia deepens ties with Sudan, fuels internal conflicts, and disrupts strategic balance in the Red Sea. While the long-term impact remains uncertain, Russia’s growing footprint in Sudan is already fueling geopolitical competition in the Red Sea and beyond.
Photo Credits: Reuters
Natalia Tsamalashvili is a Research Intern at The HORN Institute.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and they do not necessarily reflect the position of the HORN Institute.
