On 2 February 2026, Banaadir regional police stormed the federal parliament in Mogadishu, halting any proceedings. Journalists were expelled, MPs threatened to be shot, and a female MP physically assaulted. This marked the apex of political tensions that have been steadily growing during president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second term (2022-2026). They have been induced by the total war against Al Shabaab, federal-regional conflicts and crucially a constitutional reform that has been signed into law on 8 March. This does not bring an end to the crisis however, with parliamentary and presidential mandates extended by a full year. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), since its inception in 2013, has been no stranger to institutional instability, parliamentary chaos and political violence. Foremost reasons have been the provisionality of the constitution of 2012, clan-based political system, foreign patronage, widespread corruption and insecurity, power struggles at the federal, regional and district levels, and recurring extensions of mandates.
Major rows have happened regularly at the federal and regional parliaments, while armed clashes occurred in Mogadishu (2021) and in Garowe, Puntland (2023) on account of term extensions of then sitting presidents. Police has entered the federal parliament twice before, in 2018 and 2025. The violence against female MP Adar Hareed also fits a broader pattern, including death threats, digital sexual assault, and assassinations. In 2022, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has been elected on a platform of peace & reconciliation, aided by a finalization of the constitution and consolidating of the state. On many accounts, he has been successful, and although these successes mainly pertain to foreign relations, they have had and will continue to have a concrete effect, not only on state-building, but on the daily life of Somalis. The logical final step was the constitutional reform, in order to build a modern, functioning state, sovereign and dealing on an equal footing with other UN members.
Antagonizing federal states
It was foreseeable that this agenda would make waves. Regional presidents — retitled “leaders” by the constitutional reform opposed the changes when it was perceived to directly threaten either their exercize of power (through centralization and presidentialization) or the duration of their mandates. The National Consultative Council (NCC), central to the resolution of the 2021 electoral crisis, was the natural forum to allow for a peaceful transitional period.
The most obvious opposition expectedly came from Puntland, which creation (1998) preceded that of the FGS. As early as December 2022, president Said Abdullahi Deni boycotted NCC proceedings. And on May 2023, the state held one person, one vote (OPOV) local elections, the first such elections to be held in Somalia since the 1960’s. The OPOV principle had been one of the key provisions of the constitutional draft at the federal level, and one that Puntland had fought against at the national level. The move was partly inspired by Somaliland’s example in showcasing a functioning democratic process, drawing an unfavourable comparison to the FGS. It also allowed for the legitimation of Deni’s rule, who obtained a second term after a parliamentary coup in January 2024.
The Somaliland dossier deepens the rift
The situation was further complicated by the Somaliland dossier, which has strained further relations with some federal states throughout 2024 and since January 2026. As Somaliland signed a MoU with Ethiopia on an eventual recognition of its independence from Somalia (January 2024), Mogadishu adopted a firm and uncomprising stance. A war between Somalia and Ethiopia, a pivotal contributor to Somali security since 2007, had been looming. Ethopian client states – Jubaland and Southwest, heavily dependent on Ethiopian presence to fight Al Shabaab, instantly became wary of such an adverse federal policy.
Soon after, Puntland declared it severed all ties to authorities in Mogadishu and engaged their newly declared enemy (April 2024). This also meant that the FGS more frankly supported the unionist insurgency in SSC-Khatumo, recognizing it as a federal state under the name “Northeast” in August 2025 – despite Puntland’s long-standing claims on the territory. The conflict with Jubaland escalated sharply at the occasion of the reelection of president Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” for a third term (November 2024), boycott of NCC proceedings the month before. These elections, considered illegal by the FGS, immediately escalated into a military conflict. Mogadishu and Kismayo are still currently fighting for the control of Gedo, despite a Kenyan attempt at mediation.
Further security risks going forward
Abdiaziz Laftagareen served as the president of Somalia’s Southwest state from 2018 until his forced resignation in March 2026. He was initially elected thanks to the support and brazen interference of Somalia’s former president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo.” His mandate was controversially extended for five years in December 2022, inducing clashes in the regional capital of Baidoa and prompting current President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to mediate in February 2023. Relations later soured during tensions with Ethiopia before normalizing after Turkish mediation helped avoid war and allowed for a continued Ethiopian military presence in Somalia. The conflict between Mogadishu and Baidoa flared up again in February 2026, with Laftagareen blaming the FGS for clashes with local militias. The standoff escalated sharply in late March 2026, when the Southwest regional parliament re-elected Laftagareen for another five-year term — a result the federal government immediately rejected as illegal. Sustained coercive pressure from Mogadishu culminated on 30 March 2026, when federal forces seized control of Baidoa, the regional capital. Hours later, Laftagareen announced his resignation on Facebook, bringing to an end over seven years in office. Southwest’s Finance Minister Ahmed Mohamed Hussein was appointed acting president pending a political settlement. Many residents had already fled Baidoa in the preceding days, and a number of aid agencies had suspended operations amid fears of broader fighting. The federal government pledged no retaliation and committed to protecting lives and property during what it described as a “sensitive” political transition.
Strategic Outlook
The FGS–Southwest Standoff. While the immediate crisis has been resolved through Laftagareen’s departure, the underlying fault lines remain unaddressed. Mogadishu leveraged a policy of sustained coercive pressure — combining military posturing with political isolation — to force a concession on the contested “one-person, one-vote” electoral framework, the same principle around which much of the federal–regional tension has revolved. The rapid escalation from political standoff to a military seizure of Baidoa illustrates just how razor-thin the margin for error has become in Somalia’s federal system. Any localised skirmish at flashpoints like Deynunay could still draw in clan militias and regional actors, triggering broader, unintended escalation. The events of late March 2026 represent one of the sharpest tests yet of the federal framework — and their ultimate implications for stability, governance and the coming general elections remain to be seen.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, and the suspected intermediary role undertaken by the UAE, has led the FGS to suspend all deals with that country, straining further still relations with UAE client states Puntland and Jubaland (January 2026). To all of these internal political issues should be added a failed negotiation with Al Shabaab after Hassan Sheikh’s election in 2022, followed by an all-out war which originally resulted in the largest ever military gains against the organization, only to stall in 2023, and be deprioritized since 2024. These gains have seen been fully reversed, with the capital Mogadishu under direct threat by the group.
With federal mandates extended by a full year ahead of planned general elections, the political and national security situation looks grim. Deprioritizing the fight against Al Shabaab to resist partition and finalize the constitution may come with long-term benefits of unfathomable value to Somalis and Somalia, at home and abroad. Meanwhile, three federal states have virtually seceded, two of which are engaged in a war with the federal government, while Al Shabaab is at the door of the capital. A lack of avenues for the political opposition to further contest constitutional changes may also radicalize the political opposition and federal government alike. The year ahead will rock the boat; yet not every beden sinks in a storm.
Photo Credits: Al Jazeera
Dr. Mathieu Gotteland is a Scholar and Researcher of History of International Relations, his research interests include informal imperialism, terrorism, hybrid and secret warfare, and the dynamics of international and non-international conflict, particularly in Africa.
