For months, African exporters and US importers, retailers, and sourcing firms reliant on AGOA preferences have operated in uncertainty. The expiration of AGOA in September 2025 created a vacuum that threatened to unravel decades of industrial progress in sub-Saharan Africa. On Tuesday 3rd 2026, that vacuum was filled, but not with the long-term stability many had hoped for. The US House of Representatives had initially signaled strong bipartisan support for a three-year extension a timeframe that would have provided investors with a reasonable horizon for capital planning. However, the final legislation signed into law extends the program only until December 31, 2026.
This decision is not a mere administrative delay; it is a strategic signal. The Trump administration’s insistence on a shorter timeframe, retroactively effective from September 30, 2025, serves as a clear notice that the era of non-reciprocal access to the US market is drawing to a close. As stated by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, the coming year will be used to “modernize the program to align with President Trump’s America First trade policy.” For African policymakers, “modernization” is now the keyword for a transition toward reciprocal tariffs and stricter conditionality.
Reciprocity over Preference
The philosophy underpinning AGOA since its inception in 2000 has been one of unilateral preference: the US opens its market to African goods (like textiles, apparel, and agricultural produce) to spur development, expecting only governance and human rights compliance in return. The 2026 extension marks the potential end of this asymmetrical relationship. The “America First” doctrine views trade deficits as strategic vulnerabilities. With the US maintaining a cumulative trade surplus with Kenya but running deficits with other key partners, the administration is likely to demand reciprocity. This means that for African countries to retain duty-free access to the US, they may soon be required to lower their own tariffs on US goods a move that could threaten nascent domestic industries in Africa that currently rely on protectionist tariffs to survive.
For the 32 eligible nations, the next 11 months will not be business as usual. They are effectively on probation. The “modernization” talks will likely focus on three pillars: the demands for US companies to have unhindered access to African markets; removing barriers to US tech giants operating in Africa and using trade access as leverage to ensure alignment with US foreign policy interests, particularly regarding China and Russia.
The South African Dilemma
Perhaps no country faces a more precarious future under the new extension than South Africa. As the continent’s most industrialized economy, South Africa utilizes AGOA extensively, particularly for its automotive and agricultural exports. However, its position is increasingly fragile. First is the economic structure;Washington has long argued that South Africa, as an upper-middle-income country, should “graduate” from AGOA and open its markets to US poultry and meat products a contentious issue that has sparked “chicken wars” in the past. Second and perhaps more critical, is the geopolitical dimension. In an era of great power competition, South Africa’s non-aligned stance often perceived in Washington as tilting toward Beijing and Moscow puts it at odds with the eligibility requirement that beneficiaries must not undermine US national security or foreign policy interests. The one-year extension serves as a potent diplomatic lever. It forces Pretoria to the negotiating table with a deadline looming, making the retention of AGOA privileges contingent on concessions that may be politically difficult for the South African government to swallow.
Kenya’s Strategic Hedging
In contrast to the uncertainty clouding South Africa, Kenya appears to be positioning itself as the model for the “new era” of US-Africa trade. The visit by US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau to Nairobi in late January 2026 underscores Kenya’s status as a “keystone state” in US Africa policy. Kenya’s export data highlights the stakes. With USD788.6 million in exports to the US in 2025, primarily in apparel and nuts, the US remains a vital market. The textile sector alone supports approximately 68,000 direct jobs, largely filled by women and youth. The retroactive refund of duties paid since September 2025 will inject much-needed liquidity back into these businesses, which have been hemorrhaging cash to cover tariffs during the expiration gap.
However, President William Ruto’s administration has correctly read the writing on the wall. Rather than relying solely on the shaky ground of AGOA, Nairobi is aggressively pursuing a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement (the Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership). President Ruto’s recent comments following his meeting with Deputy Secretary Landau reflect this strategic pivot: “At the bilateral level, Kenya and the US are discussing a comprehensive trade agreement for which a lot of progress has been made. The issues under discussion include elimination or reduction of tariffs in various goods and products, digital trade, and investment…”By negotiating a bilateral deal, Kenya is effectively “hedging” against the eventual death of AGOA. If the multilateral AGOA framework collapses or is radically altered in 2027, Kenya aims to have a standalone free trade agreement (FTA) already in place, securing its market access regardless of the broader continental outcome.
The “Third-Country Fabric” Lifeline
A critical technical component of the renewed bill is the extension of the “Third-Country Fabric” provision. This rule allows Lesser Developed Beneficiary Countries (LDBCs) including Kenya to source raw fabric and yarn from non-AGOA countries (such as China or India), assemble the apparel in Africa, and still export it duty-free to the US.
Without this provision, Kenya’s textile industry would collapse overnight. The country does not yet produce enough cotton or high-quality fabric domestically to meet the “rules of origin” requirements without this waiver. The extension of this specific provision through 2028 (unlike the general program’s 2026 cliff) offers a small window of stability for the garment sector to invest in vertical integration growing its own cotton and milling its own fabric.
Conclusion
The one-year extension of AGOA is not a victory lap; it is a warning shot. It provides a brief 11-month runway for African economies to prepare for a fundamental restructuring of their trade relationship with the United States. For Kenya, the path forward is clear: leverage the temporary stability of AGOA to finalize a permanent bilateral deal. For the rest of the continent, the message from the Trump administration is unambiguous. The age of aid-based trade is ending; the age of transactional, reciprocal, and strategic trade has begun. The question now is not whether African nations can afford to adjust, but whether they can afford not to.
Photo Credits: SAUL LOEB /AFP
Bravin Onditi is a Researcher at the HORN Institute.
