When the wave of coups swept across the Sahel—from Mali (2020, 2021) to Burkina Faso (2022), Niger (2023), and Sudan (2021)—the new military governments promised security and return to constitutional order. But first, under bouts of populism, they expelled foreign powers and troops, which played large counter terrorism and counter-insurgency roles, opening up security vacuums. Few years later, the coup leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan are increasingly presiding over failing counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations, shrinking state authority, and growing humanitarian crises. The risk of full state collapse, or fragmentation, or the slip from failed transitions to failed states, is no longer hypothetical. The entire region stares at an unimaginable contagion of instability.
Counterterrorism with Mercenaries
The coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan were not purely inspired by domestic politics, but also geopolitical dynamics and anti-Western sentiment, following neocolonial perceptions and counterterrorism failures. In one fell swoop, Mali and Burkina Faso opted for the opportunity cost of enlisting the Wagner Group, as substitute for the exiting French troops. Niger under its junta has pulled back from certain regional and international cooperative counterterrorism frameworks (e.g. the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad region), weakening regional coordination.
But the strategy has shown serious flaws. Wagner forces lack terrain familiarity and the grasp of local conflict dynamics. Much of the effort has been on targeting militant leaders or staging raids—rather than a full counterinsurgency strategy which holds ground, protects civilians, and rebuilds governance. Civilian casualties have also been a significant consequence. In Mali, four out of five people killed in Wagner operations are reportedly civilians. Wagner/Malian operations are blamed for egregious massacres (e.g. central Mali, 2022) that have deepened public distrust. In Burkina Faso, civilian abuses and the inability to provide services in “liberated” areas feed insurgent narratives and recruitment, blowing back on core security goals. Such gaps have allowed jihadists to regroup in ungoverned rural areas, recruit, stage ambushes and advance territorially.
Territory Loss and Control Gaps
Despite declarations of “having militarily cleared” jihadist threats or “securing capitals,” the actual map on ground shows that the military rulers are far from defeating jihadist insurgencies. Strategic gains are fragile and symbolic, and retreat is often the pattern after offensives. The Malian state effectively controls only a fraction of its territory, especially in the north and central regions, with over 60-70 percent of territory largely outside effective control. The capital Bamako is relatively secure, but large swathes remain under insurgent influence, ungoverned or intermittently contested. Just two weeks ago, jihadists seized the strategic town of Farabougou in central Mali.
In Burkina Faso, the situation is even more severe. As of late 2023 and early 2024, approximately 40 percent of Burkina Faso’s territory was reported as controlled by non‐state armed groups; this territory has grown to between 60 percent to 70 percent. State authority is nearly non‐existent in many border regions, particularly along the Mali and Niger borders. Niger, while perhaps less dramatic in outright loss of territory compared to Mali or Burkina Faso, has seen increasing frequency and reach of jihadist attacks into areas that were formerly more stable and control in remote rural zones has declined remarkably. Niger’s exit from regional security cooperation further erodes ability to contain insurgent spillovers from Mali and Burkina Faso. In Sudan, the Sudan Armed Forces have lost nearly half of the country to insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since the outbreak of civil war in April 2023. RSF controls much of Darfur, South Kordofan, North Kordofan and other southern regions. SAF operates from Port Sudan, having vacated Khartoum at the height of the war in 2024.
Failed Transitions and Authoritarian Drift
After each coup, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan made sweeping promises of transition and reform. They proffered election timelines and constitutional review, among other milestones. But those promises have repeatedly slipped, been postponed or abandoned. The juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger have withdrawn from ECOWAS, created alternate alliances (Alliance of Sahel States), introduced new identity documents, dissolved political parties, and suspended constitutions—moves that consolidate military power rather than enable civilian oversight. The political space is shrinking sharply.
In Niger, for example, after the July 2023 coup, the junta under Abdourahmane Tiani declared it would rule until 2030 under a new charter. In Burkina Faso, the 2024 election timeline was abandoned, allowing the military government to stay in power until 2029; but in July 2025, it disbanded the electoral commission, to “reinforce sovereign control on the electoral process and limit foreign influence”. In Mali, the elections remain postponed for another five years. In Sudan, the situation is worse. The attempted transition after the October 2021 coup was derailed by the April 2023 eruption of armed conflict between SAF and RSF. The SAF-RSF power struggle turned violent, with no meaningful roadmap for civilian governance, and now, Sudan is buried in outright civil war. The civilian political groups have become severely fragmented, factionalized and excluded from the formal peace processes, limiting the pathway for a civilian-led transition. In its third year, the civil war has no end in sight and Sudan is hurtling towards fragmentation with two parallel governments in Darfur (RSF) and Port Sudan (SAF).
Conflict, Isolation and Collapse
The coup leaders in Mali, Sudan, Niger and Burkina Faso, under-estimated the scale of armed conflict they faced. Few years later, under the scourge of conflict and insurgency, these governments are struggling against significant erosion of territorial integrity and control, with sizeable territories and ungoverned border areas increasingly falling under jihadist or rebel influence.
The humanitarian toll and breakdown of basic services in both the Sahel states and Sudan, including health systems, education, water, food, and shelter, coupled with abuses, failure to protect civilians, rampant corruption, absence of visible improvements in living conditions have significantly eroded legitimacy and popular trust of most of these military governments. In Sudan, for example, over 30 million people need humanitarian assistance, and millions more (15 million internally displaced and 4 million refugees in neighbouring countries) are displaced, translating to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis currently. In Burkina Faso, fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence have nearly tripled in three years to 17,775 deaths from 6,630 deaths; civilians and soldiers face record-scale attacks.
At the same time, the military governments in Sudan, Burkina Faso and Mali have shown security weaknesses. State military units are overstretched and poorly equipped, leaving these countries reliant on mercenaries and local auxiliary fighters, which introduces dual chains of command and sometimes friction and human rights abuses.
The affected countries are also facing external isolation. The withdrawal from ECOWAS by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the sanctions and reduced aid to all including Sudan, further degrade their diplomatic capacity. Regional and international communities maintain support and pressure for democratic transitions. Perhaps the most worrying development, is the placement of Bamako, Khartoum and Ouagadougou in the red travel lists by the United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway, among others. This signals the weakening of government capacity to secure the capitals, hence the potential for “Syrian-” or “Afghan-style” insurgent victories or wider regional instability is only growing.
Conclusion
The coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the collapse of transition in Sudan have not delivered the promised stability or victory over jihadist insurgencies. Instead, the loss of territory, humanitarian crisis, authoritarian consolidation, erosion of legitimacy, and the risk of state fragmentation are all growing. Unless global actors reengage with real urgency—re-engaging security support and transition mechanisms—the instability in these countries is likely to spiral further beyond national borders and engulf entire region. This is a test for the international community’s capacity to respond not just to crises, but to prevent state collapse in the Sahel.
Photo Credits: AP Photo
