The elephant in the room, which came charging in 26 December 2025, is Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Only weeks before, Israel made it public it had “certain communication” with Somalia, an information denied by Mogadiscio but likely true, given Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s early and continued arguably discreet policy on the issue. Retrospectively, it might have been an open ultimatum by Israel, searching for a definite diplomatic victory in the Horn.
The context is complex and is situated within the wider Iran-Israel proxy war as well as the ongoing war in Gaza. Israeli influence has been receding in Africa, albeit rarely to a point of rupture (Chad, South Africa). Meanwhile, Iran has dramatically expanded its footprint over the continent. Djibouti and Sudan in particular have restored diplomatic relations (2023), even as now Iran-friendly Sudan promised to join the Abraham Accords in 2020 but the price has likely risen very high in the context of the current civil war there. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland might therefore be seen as impatience towards Sudan and a strategic pushback against Iranian influence in the Horn, an interpretation reinforced by Israel’s own reference to the Accords.
Consequences for Somaliland
Proximity to Yemen is naturally a factor, although the lack of a naval base close to that country has not hindered Israeli efforts against the Houthis thus far. Neighbouring Djibouti hosts an array of bases, including US and Western ones. This in turn could turn Somaliland into a Houthi target, and one at an uncomfortably short distance from Houthi controlled territory. A concern amplified by a the landing of a stray Houthi missile landing in the Sool region (controlled by SSC, claimed by Somaliland) in May 2024.
That is if Israel does plan on building a naval base there, an intention denied by Somaliland, while Israel insists one reason it recognized the secessionist state is to counter Houthis in the Red Sea. A lower profile monitoring station, which seems a likelier option, would likely remain a target. The site of said base/station would also be contentious, as a similar Ethiopian plan revived Gadabuursi-Issa tensions in the Awdal (West) region of Somaliland, and ignited a proxy war with former Somaliland ally Djibouti. FRUD now openly supports Somaliland, while Djibouti has been claimed to train Awdal militias on its soil. Awdal has very recently known its own Las Anod moment with non-Issa protests in capital Borama leading to security forces firing on the crowd (19 dead).
Israel’s motives
A proper naval base would further go directly counter to the interests of major regional powers, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia — for which reason projects of an Iranian base in Sudan have failed and those of a Russian one have dragged on for years. More largely, and not unlike Ethiopia in 2024, Israel seems to have underestimated Somalia’s newfound but yearly growing diplomatic clout on the world stage. Condemnations by the AU, EU, UN, EAC, IGAD, Arab League, GCC, OIC have been forthcoming, with Azerbaijan, Egypt, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Uganda taking the lead.
Both Russia and Ukraine have joined the chorus. China’s tight relationship to Mogadiscio is based on a perceived equivalence of Somaliland and Taiwan’s status and each recognizing the other (since 2020). Both the US and the UK, regularly cited as likely to recognize Somaliland in their own time, have distanced themselves from the move. US President Trump is largely uninterested in both Somalia’s and Somaliland’s fate.
The official reason for Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is the establishment of a strategic partnership with a stable, Western-friendly country on a wide range of issues. Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, Israel’s engagement with African nations has been focused on a number of issues, including diplomatic support, replacement of Palestinian and foreign workers in the agriculture sector and the prospective resettlement of Gazans.
A labour agreement, smaller in scale than those signed with Malawi and Kenya, could be in the works. The main fear however, successfully utilized by Somalia to gather international support, is that the move had occurred in exchange for the illegal resettlement of a number of Gazans.
Both US and Israel have prospected a number of countries throughout 2025, most of which are African, with this very purpose. Those include, Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. All of them have either denied these reports or walked back their support, including Somaliland after Israel’s recognition. The US now seem to have rolled back that policy as well.
Consequences for Somalia
In any case, a security agreement — which wouldn’t be limited to intelligence-sharing — is highly likely. Somaliland is in the process of rebuilding its armed forces after the Las Anod fiasco, and as it is still embroiled in a war for control of Sool, Sanaag & Cayn, in the East of the country. SSC-Khatumo, now rebranded as Somalia’s Northeast state, currently controls ca. 70% of its claimed territory.
That was one of the main purposes of the infamous MoU signed with Ethiopia, currently under review by the new Somaliland presidency, and for which Addis Abeba’s interest seems to have waned. Having lost Djibouti’s support over the same MoU, Somaliland naturally seeks security partners able to furnish it with sufficient support to reverse unionist gains.
The deal Israel’s recognition is a part of includes maritime security & blue economy. This comes in direct contradiction with Somalia’s own deal with Turkey on the issue, and while a direct Turkey-Israel confrontation over Somaliland’s waters is highly improbable, the Turkish deal had been crafted in part to reassert Somali sovereignty over the same.
Somalia breaks with the UAE
Israel’s recognition should also be understood as a natural extension of the recent flare up in the Saudi-UAE geopolitical rivalry. This has long been coming over issues ranging from their common maritime border to impatience towards the ever growing influence of Saudi Arabia’s supposed ally, including the control of major logistics hub including Sokhna, Berbera (Somaliland), Bosaso (Puntland), Dar es Salaam & Maputo and the building of a network of proxies, especially in North & East Africa — including in Libya (LNA), Egypt, Chad, Sudan (RSF), South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia (including Puntland and Jubaland) and Somaliland, and as well obviously as nearby Yemen (STC).
While Somali-UAE relations had reached their apex under current Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud — which was the UAE’s candidate, a cold spell had overcome them after the rise in Turkey’s involvement in Somali politics, economy and security, now Somalia’s closest non-Western ally. The obvious imperialistic aspects of the UAE security deal (2023), the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU (2024), the killing of Emirati soldiers in Mogadiscio (2024), Somalia’s tentative rapprochement with Iran and later reviving of security ties with Saudi Arabia and Qatar had brought the crisis to a point when Somalia asked for Saudi mediation in the bilateral crisis (2024).
The spectacular suspension by Somalia of all agreements signed with the UAE (12 January) as well as the latter’s suspected role in mediating Israel-Somaliland talks should therefore not come as a surprise, especially after the recent revelations on their use of Bosaso (Puntland) to arm Sudan’s RSF (July 2025) and on their exfiltration of STC’s leader al Zubaidi through Berbera and Mogadiscio (8 January).
The way forward
Meanwhile, Puntland is caught between a rock and a hard place. A UAE client state, it has long supported SSC-Khatumo against Somaliland, but its hopes of annexing the region have been thwarted by that region becoming the Northeast federal state. Reinforced unionist, anti-Israel sentiment also lessens Puntland’s leverage against Mogadiscio, which partly explains leader/president Deni’s silence. This is also the case for Jubaland. It might therefore weaken their opposition to a national compromise on the constitution and elections to be held in 2026.
It is extremely unlikely that Israel may roll back its now announced recognition of Somaliland. The question is rather now what have been the negotiated counterparts and which form a new Israel-Somaliland partnership might take, including crucially on defence and maritime security.
While uttering the usual threats, and protesting its resilience and unity — and Israel’s recognition might indeed also strengthen the new Northeast state and other unionists — Somalia’s president has already announced the only possible way forward: bilateral talks with Somaliland. But these are doomed to failure on any account, if they are not preceded by a needed, urgent, just step, which is the unconditional recognition of the Isaaq genocide (1987–1989), which is understandably — both the core argument and main rationale behind Somaliland’s secessionism.
Photo Credits: Office of the Foreign Minister of Israel.
Dr. Mathieu Gotteland is a independent scholar and researcher of history of international relations, his research interests include informal imperialism, terrorism, hybrid and secret warfare, and the dynamics of international and non-international conflict, particularly in Africa.
