For decades now, the Horn of Africa remains a hotspot for protracted conflict, fragile political transitions, and humanitarian crises, from Somalia to Sudan, from South Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique. One obstacle, the chronic under-funding of peacekeeping, peace-agreement implementation, civil society, and humanitarian operations has undermined regional peace in perpetuity. As such, without sustainable African-led financing, peace in the region heavily depends on external donor support. Given the recent global disruptions in peace financing and development assistance to Africa, peace is deteriorating and the Horn of Africa is increasingly becoming fragile as a number of countries including South Sudan, Sudan, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) struggle with conflict and post-conflict recovery.
Peacekeeping and the Limits of African Financing
The African Union (AU) Peace Fund is the key financing mechanism for African peace and security operations. Yet its capacity remains limited. As of January 2024, the Peace Fund’s balance was USD 388.6 million, composed largely of assessed member-state contributions (about USD 338.9 m), plus smaller voluntary contributions and interest. In September 2024, the AU disbursed USD 7 million from its Crisis Reserve Facility, about 70 percent of its 2024 ceiling, to support stabilization efforts in conflict zones such as South Sudan, Sudan, Mozambique, and the DRC. The AU has “endowment” target of USD 400 million via 0.2 percent import levy on member states (agreed in 2016) to boost predictable funding. Private sector contributions jumped significantly in 2024, with firms like Afreximbank pledging an additional USD 210 million over three years.
Despite the promising contributions the Peace Fund remains far short of the broader needs. The scale of operations for many missions in the Horn of Africa alone including in Somalia (African Union Stabilization and Support Mission – AUSSOM), South Sudan, Sudan, and the DRC, requires more than what the Peace Fund can reliably mobilize. External dependence remains high, leaving missions vulnerable to donor fatigue or shifting geopolitical priorities.
Even newer conflict zones such as Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado illustrate a similar challenge. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), established to counter the insurgency, has confronted funding shortages that limited air assets, operational tempo, and coordination. Without sustained financing, member states found it difficult to maintain their contingents, leading to periodic uncertainty about the mission’s future. In the Central African Republic, the AU’s initial African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) mission was quickly replaced by a UN operation because of unsustainable funding, showing again that African-led efforts struggle to sustain themselves even when political commitment is present.
The Cost of Under-funding Peace Agreements in Ethiopia and South Sudan
When it comes to implementing peace deals, financial shortfalls are undermining progress. The provisions of Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) such as security sector reform, cantonment, disarmament, and the unification of forces as well as sustaining the transition, require substantial resources. The closure of South Sudan’s embassy in Nairobi due to unpaid rent at the time Nairobi is playing a key mediation role targeting hold-out warring groups in South Sudan, underscores the pain limited resources is inflicting on the country’s peace.
Delays in training unified forces and political dialogue and reforms, failures in economic restructuring, and uneven deployment of monitoring bodies all stem partly from financial gaps. The postponement of elections three times, is a major sticking point; the government often cites the lack of budget for electoral administration — voter registration, security, polling logistics, and institutions.
Similar challenges are being experienced with the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement which ended the 2020 – 2022 conflict in Tigray region of Ethiopia. Following frustratingly slow implementation of agreement, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has factionalized between members supporting the Pretoria Agreement led by Getachew Reda and those opposed to it, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, reviving tensions with the Federal Government of Ethiopia.
These financial breakdowns do not just hamper governance, they erode legitimacy, fuel rivalries, and make peace institutions seem hollow. Mistrust persists as timelines and key benchmarks are repeatedly missed, dropped or extended. In such a structurally constrained environment, fragility remains the default condition, without reliable domestic or regional funding, as donor-supported benchmarks stall. The likelihood of confidence eroding among signatories and fractures for resurgence of clashes aand total relapse remains high in both South Sudan and Ethiopia.
Early this year, South Sudan experienced renewed violent clashes in some of its states. President Salva Kiir’s main rival, key signatory to R-ARCSS and First Vice President Riek Machar, alongside his wife, the Interior Minister, Angelina Teny, remain in detention for treason charges related to the clashes, since March. The upcoming general elections in 2026, could re-ignite instability should the elections be postponed or even be finally held, without Riek Machar’s or his faction’s participation. In Ethiopia, the Debtrestion-led faction of TPLF overthrew the Getachew Reda faction and has over the past two or so months been remobilizing fighters and military assets as tensions escalate, with considerable prospect of Tigray relapsing back into armed conflict.
Civil Society’s and Humanitarian Funding
Civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Horn, critical for grassroots peacebuilding, reconciliation, and local mediation, are heavily dependent on international donor funding. The war in Ukraine has had ripple effects beyond Europe. Many major donor countries have redirected funds toward European security and humanitarian needs, tightening their purse strings for African crises. Aid agencies have repeatedly warned of funding shortfalls in Africa driven by this competition for resources. Cuts in Official Development Assistance (ODA) are expected: the OECD projects a 9–17 percent drop in ODA in 2025, affecting funding for refugee support, governance, and peacebuilding in the region. This donor squeeze undermines long-term, locally led peacebuilding, when external grants shrink, CSOs downsize or shut projects, leaving a void where reconciliation and conflict prevention efforts once flourished.
On the other hand, humanitarian funding gaps in the region are stark and worsening. According to the UN Secretary General’s 2025 humanitarian report, Somalia received only 48 percent of its appeal, Ethiopia got just 29 percent, South Sudan 54 percent, Sudan 62 percent, and the DRC 52 percent. For the Sudan displacement crisis, UNHCR required USD 1.031 billion in 2024, but only received 43 percent (USD 444 million). In South Sudan, UNHCR required USD 380.5 million in 2024 but received only 49 percent (USD 186 million), leaving a gap of USD 194 million. The regional UNHCR global report (2024) shows that in the East, Horn, and Great Lakes region, expenditure was USD 899 million against a required budget of USD 2.209 billion, meaning 59 percentof the budget was unmet. These funding shortfalls chronically delay life-saving assistance (food, shelter, protection), hamper refugee response, and weaken the capacity of humanitarian agencies to scale up operations when human security crises flare in the Horn of Africa.
Implications for Peace and Stability
The broader peace equation in the Horn of Africa underscores a harsh reality. Under-funding is not just an operational challenge, it is a destabilizing factor which is making peace operations fragile in the region. Peacekeeping missions including AUSSOM in Somalia, SAMIM in Mozambique, Central African Republic (MINUSCA), in South Sudan (UNMISS) and others lack certainty in funding, have weak long-term planning, suffer troop morale, and are struggling to build local capacity. It is thus oxymoronic in its expectation, for fragile missions to stabilize fragile societies. Peace accords particularly in South Sudan and Ethiopia are likely to dissolve and make relapse inevitable, not just because key milestones have not been implemented and inspired mistrust been main signatories, but also because shrinking donor budgets, affect horizontal peacebuilders, watchdogs, and reconciliation agents. The humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa also risks escalating as insufficient and unpredictable aid has left millions vulnerable including refugees (6 million), internally displaced persons (IDPs – 19 million), and conflict-affected populations. There is urgent need for a shift towards innovative, self-reliant and predictable African peace financing for peace.
Photo Credits: Kanel Bulle/Shutterstock
Edmond Pamba is a Researcher at the HORN Institute.
