Afghanistan and Syria fell to Islamist insurgencies of the Taliban and Haya’t Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on August 15, 2021 and December 08, 2024. Both insurgencies were remarkably swift, with the Taliban taking only 10 days to capture Kabul and overthrow President Ashraf Ghani. HTS took 7 days amassing quick victories from Aleppo to Damascus. Somalia faces a similar threat, with the imminence of an al Shabaab take-over, growing with each day of military and territorial advance by the insurgent group. To prevent a similar development in Mogadishu, the country’s capital, Somalia’s external partners will be required to robustly build the country’s security sector to adequately train and equip the military, intelligence and internal security units. Somalia’s defense and security organs are showing significant capacity challenges and the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), a critical component of Somalia’s defenses today, is acutely under-funded and soon exiting.
The Al Shabaab Advance
Al Shabaab came into existence in Somalia nearly 19 years ago, in central and southern Somalia. The group lost nearly 80 percent of the territory it controlled, to the African Union peacekeeping force – African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) between 2007 – 2022. Upon the assumption of AMISOM forward operating bases and the phase-out of AMISOM in 2022, the new Somali government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud mounted counter-insurgency operations. The operations by the Somali military captured more territory from Al Shabaab and pushed the group to the fringe until December 2024, when Al Shabaab made a surprise come-back.
Al Shabaab has intensified offensive operations, with its attacks across southern and central Somalia increasing by 50 percent in 2025. Al Shabaab has also been making strategic seizure of territories and supply lines, especially in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle regions, as the Somali forces abandon defensive positions following military engagement with the insurgents.
The Fundamental Risk
The quick military victories al Shabaab against the Somali forces since the beginning of the year, put the defensive capacity of the Somali forces in doubt. The capture and re-capture of strategic towns of Moqokori, Maxaas, Tardo, Yusoman, and Wabxo, among others, was not imaginable or at least so swift given the years of extensive multinational military and security sector support which Somalia has been receiving from Turkey, the United States of America (US), Germany, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union. Turkey, Germany and the US have also had ground troops deployed in Somalia for years now. Turkey has additionally deployed a private military company, SADAT, to bolster Somalia’s defenses.
The current military and territorial advances are enabling Al Shabaab to re-link its support zones in southern and central Somalia, initially cut off by counter-offensive operations. With the newly-acquired advantage, Al Shabaab is able to rebuild its finances by expanding revenue base through taxation in the captured towns and illicit trade through the re-opened transport lines. The group is equally able to recruit and re-arm using increased financial capabilities and access military supplies through the re-established supply lines. The Houthi militants in Yemen have allegedly allowed Al Shabaab access to advanced military assets including drones and offensive weapons including surface-to-air capabilities.
The loss of Somalia’s defensive positions has weakened the Somali army’s defensive posture and particularly worsened the vulnerability of Mogadishu. In short-term, Al Shabaab is reclaiming its critical supply lines to rebuild, which require territorial capture and administrative control. In the medium-term and long-term, the group’s military advances might intensify with any poor transition and exit by the peacekeeping mission and strategically focus on the vulnerable capital, Mogadishu.
The Security Vacuums
Al Shabaab’s surprising resurgence is driven by a set of security vacuums in Somalia. First, the transition process from the internationally backed to a nationally owned security sector and stabilization seems weak and poorly assessed and supported. Funding and security sector partner fatigue may be dominating considerations and the planning of these transitions and exit plans, and such dynamics are weakening Somalia’s defenses. AUSSOM which is a critical component of Somalia’s defense arrangements given its decisive contribution to the successes of the Somali military including the recapture of territories and towns from Al Shabaab, is for instance, currently faced with over USD 150 million funding gap, as the funding partners especially the US, remain non-committal. The AUSOM force is thus operationally ill-equipped to support the Somali security forces in halting the advancing Al Shabaab and fortifying the country’s security sector.
Second, the weak security sector transitions are worsened by the lack of a matching capacity in the Somali army to effectively take-over and defend these positions. However, not just is Somalia’ defense weak in general, but particularly, in the capital city, Mogadishu as evidenced by al Shabaab’s intensified attacks deep in the city and targets close to the presidential palace. In February this year, al Shabaab attacked the main Airport the airport was attacked just as the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was about to land on an official visit. A month later, al Shabaab narrowly assassinated Somalia’s president. The city is thus externally vulnerable to an advancing insurgency and internally from hostile penetration. The current ‘capture and recapture’ engagements between al Shabaab and the Somali forces, often supported by African Union peacekeeping forces, are barely few kilometers from Mogadishu including Bariire which is 60 kilometers away and Sabid Anole which is 30-40 kilometers away.
Conclusion
Al Shabaab’s expanding territorial and military gains indicates the limited capacity for territorial control and defense by the Somali government. SNA appears to be fundamentally inadequately prepared to deter and defeat military threats on its own, and to hold and effectively control territory. The poor transition from AMISOM, ATMIS and AUSSOM and associated exit plans which are not satisfactorily guided by technical capacity assessments, and the attendant financial challenges brought on by funding partners’ fatigue, alarmingly weaken Somalia’s defenses especially in the wake of al Shabaab’s resurgence.
The subsequent security vacuums are likely to be exploited by al Shabaab to rebuild financially and militarily, long enough to stage more territorial recapture and eventually, an attempt on Mogadishu. Unless the external partners of Somalia’s security sector intervene to reinforce the country’s defenses and re-design its stabilization, an al Shabaab insurgency targeting power will not be a surprise, given the similarly patterned Islamist take-overs in Afghanistan and Syria.
Edmond Pamba is a Researcher at The HORN Institute.
Photo Credits: Al Jazeera
