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
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Emergent Global Players and Likely Power Transitions of the 21st Century

Implications for Peace and Security in Africa



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
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Rashid Elmi and Mumo Nzau, Ph.D

Abstract

Peace and security have always been elusive in the international system. Throughout the 20th Century, scholars as well as policy actors and practitioners have debated over how best to achieve a more peaceful and secure world. In these debates, one of the major preconditions for peace and security has been pegged on a proper management of global power transitions. Many theorists in the academy have for instance been convinced that region-wide wars and international conflicts and their attendant ramifications on the human condition have, for the most part been a reflection of unmanaged and poorly handled power transitions at the global level. Two decades into the 21st Century, the literature and the world of policy alike are rife with



South Africa led by President Cyril Ramaphosa hosts the 15th historic BRICS Summit on Wednesday 23, August in Johannesburg, South Africa. (Photo Credits: Wilder Alejandro & Radomir Romanov)

debates concerning the phenomenon of emergent global players and/or actors of the non-state kind in the international system. The rise of China, India and other countries of the BRICS family has brought to focus the question of how their disposition and character as emergent challengers impacts the strategic calculations and global standing of older and more established status quo world powers of the global north. Taking on a conceptual and discursive methodological approach mainly informed by systematic qualitative analysis of secondary data on this subject area; this paper responds to the following critical questions, centred on Africa's role in the entire discourse: what do these emergent players and likely power transitions dynamics portend for peace and security for 21st Century Africa? Does Africa have a role to play in this outlook of things or will she remain a mere spectator, observer or net consumer in a theatre of global actions and processes that would have a bearing on continental peace and security? How and why does Africa matter in this discussion and what is the outlook of Africa's perspective and understanding in this discourse? Such are the questions that this paper seeks to respond to.

Background

Since 2008 financial crisis in the United States (US), the unipolar world predicated on American hegemony (Pax Americana 1945 – 2010s) has been steadily declining, as

new centres of power emerge in Eurasia, and elsewhere in the Global South (Nye, 2010). The American hegemony had also hinged on the Western Alliance (North America and Western Europe), which has played out in global economic, military, cultural and commercial spheres as well as global governance circles of institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other global regimes such as World Trade Organization (WTO) (Nye, 2010). The US accounted for 25% of global GDP, 5% of global population, 50% of global military expenditure, and maintained extensive cultural/or soft power resources by the beginning of the 21st century (Nye, 2010). However, with increased liberalization of the global economy, trade and capital, partly as a result of globalization which intensified since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the first decade of the 21st century flashed signs of growing capital and power shift from the Western hemisphere to the Eastern hemisphere and brought on events which precipitated the US hegemonic decline (Nye, 2010). The emergence of China and India, the re-emergence of Russia, and the ascendancy of new economies such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, alongside the South East Asian tigers implied that global power was tilting back into contest and fading from American dominance (Nye, 2010; Flint, 2016). Between 2000s – 2023, the power and capital shifts have slowly created and maintained what we would call the "Western Plateau" in geopolitical

power, as Western economies and political power hang in the rut of considerably invariant growth margins which sometimes showed signs of slumping, perhaps to adjust to imminent geopolitical transitions.

The announcement of the formation of the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in 2009 was perhaps the official confirmation of a second geopolitical force to counter the Western Alliance. BRICS which in 2009 accounted for 40% of the global population and 25% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) (IMF, 2009), presented a formidable challenge to the hitherto status quo in the international distribution of power. A long view would have foreseen a re-introduction of the balance of power equation in high politics. As the century entered its second decade, it was certain that a new struggle for global dominance or share of global power, trade and influence was in the offing, given the significant growth among BRICS economies, trade and influence across the world especially in regions such as Africa. A new hegemonic contest, a "New Cold War" or a multipolar world were imminent.

Today, BRICS which accounted for 42% of the world population and 32% of the global GDP in 2022 (Richter, 2023), is set to grow to 47% of the world population while its GDP will grow by 36% in 2024 (Ntengento, 2023). The growth is attributed to the expansion of the alliance

with six new members (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - UAE) as approved in the last BRICS Summit in South Africa in August 2023. In total, Africa will make 27% of BRICS membership and significant shares of BRICS population and GDP by 2024. This paper assesses whether as opposed to Africa's non-aligned position in the 1945-91 Cold War, there is a paradigm shift or not in Africa's position on geopolitical transitions, and analyse whatever ramifications Africa bears on peace and security? Cold and hot wars are characteristically replete with events of conflict, economic and social upheavals and today, the world is experiencing some of the early signs of such events. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine (with the proxy involvement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO), the geopolitical stand-offs in Syria, Yemen, Libya, in the East China Sea over Taiwan, the volatility on the Korean Peninsula, the instabilities in the Middle East and Latin America countries, and the coups in Africa (Niger, Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso) bear geopolitical undertones which Africa may have to consider in its positioning in the new hegemonic rivalry between the West and new alliances including BRICS.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts George Modelski's (1987) Kondratieff Circles theory of hegemonic transition and Organski's (1958; 1968) power transition theory. Modelski asserts




Figure i: The Kondratieff Circles by George Modelski, source: Tammen et al., 2017

that hegemony decays after 70 – 100 years, from where new powers emerge and assert their hegemony. Modelski focusses on four phases: (i) global war, (ii) world power, (iii) delegitimization and (iv) de-concentration, as the four Kondratieff waves. In the phase of global war, hegemonic rivalry boils down to war from which the victor exerts hegemony by authoring international or global order (Tammen et al., 2017)). The hegemon enters into the second phase of enjoying global power and dominance for at least 70 years, before falling into the phase of de-legitimization where hegemonic benevolence is questioned and challenged by emerging powers (Tammen et al., 2017). The challengers to existing hegemony, if not effectively countered, push the international system into the phase of de-concentration, with powers applying ideological and material tools to engineer a transition. The struggle dissolves into another global war to determine the new hegemon, and the patters repeats cyclically between 70-100 years as shown in figure i:

Organski's (1958; 1968) power transition theory buttresses Modelski's theory, by predicating the geopolitical power shift on the likelihood of war and the stability of alliances. Organski (1958; 1968) categorizes powers into the dominant power (hegemon), the great powers (with the capabilities to challenge the dominant power), the middle powers without capabilities to challenge the dominant power, and the small powers. Organski (1958; 1968) holds that when challenging powers attain certain levels of power parity with the dominant power, war is most likely when the challenger is dissatisfied with the existing world system and facilitates the transition to a new world system. Only when the alliance of the challengers is satisfied with the system does war not occur, hence no power transition nor a new system (Tammen et al., 2017). Geopolitical strategy however, becomes of importance during power transitions to avert warfare at

least between the direct contending powers. Drawing from the maxim of Thucydides, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must," Africa's power positioning in the international system, and alignment in the global power transition, will certainly have peace and security implications on the continent. Power transitions characterized by dissatisfaction of the challenger with thus bear significant implications for the stability of countries, regimes, international trade, economies, technologies and cultures as well as systems of governance (local and global).

Conceptual Framework

Beyond the semantics and lexicological derivations of the concept "emerging", in international politics, the "emerging powers" is defined by Fonseca et al (2016) as "one whose diplomatic behaviour aims to reform or to review the international order, having material support to its claims" (pp.51-52). Fonseca et al (2016) thus describe the "behaviour" as reformist or revisionist and go further to identify an "emerging power" based on its "non-identity with the status quo of the international or hegemonic order, increasing share of the international economy, anchorage of regional integration, regional military primacy, and expressive economic growth" (p.52). From a geopolitical angle, emerging powers translate their self-perception into foreign policies aimed at higher level of systemic influence. As a result, the emerging ambitions precipitated with power parities and declining legitimacy of the dominant power, occasion a power transition.

Great powers as Organski (1958;1968) had alluded, have the power capabilities of directly confronting the dominant power while middle powers or emerging powers employ strategies and collective action (for common and interdependent interests) to "rise" and challenge dominant power and the status quo as shown below:




Figure ii: The "emergence of powers" in the international system. Source: Fonseca et al (2016)

As such, BRICS alliance is behaving prototypically of the emerging powers, have seized a significant share of the global economy and trade, and demonstrate burgeoning power resources (military, economic, diplomatic and technological) as well as the dissatisfaction with the status quo.

The Emerging Powers and Power Transition

i. Shifts in Power Fundamentals

Over the last two decades, global economic and political power has experienced systemic shifts, with the emergence of China, India and Brazil, and the resurgence of Russia on the global stage, and the formation of BRICS in 2009. China's extraordinary economic growth (1978 - onwards) which averaged at 10% - 12% has cast China as a legitimate global economic and trading power (Flint, 2016). China's global trade has grown from USD 10 billion in 1978 to USD 4.3 trillion in 2019 before slowing down to USD 3.57 trillion partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic disruptions on growth and trade as well as domestic economic challenges. China's trade grew from less than 1% of global trade in 1978 to nearly 15% in the 2020 for instance, making it the largest trading power in the world (Nicita & Razo, 2021). China therefore out-trades the dominant power (the United States) which commands 8% of world trade, and trades nearly as much as the United States and Germany (largest European industrial power - 7.8% of the world trade) combined and as much as the entire European Union (14% of world trade) (Eurostat, 2023). China's growth in international trade means displacement of traditional powers and the shrinking commercial power of the United States. The BRICS also account for the largest landmass of any geopolitical alliance (26.7% of world landmass) and demography (42% of world population). Organski (1961) qualifies population as a central fundament of power.

With the formation of BRICS, the United States and the Western Alliance (NATO and the Euro-Atlantic cooperation) have met the counter-weight in the global distribution of power. The five founder members of BRICS economically out-grew the United States-led G7 economic alliance of Canada, United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan and Italy by 2020. The G7 have had significant influence over global economic decision-making, hence BRICS will begin to have more influence on global economic governance. Organski and Kugler (1980) added GDP to the computation of national

“The announcement of the formation of the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in 2009 was perhaps the official confirmation of a second geopolitical force to counter the Western Alliance

power. The BRICS account for 32.1% of the global GDP as compared to 29.9% of the global GDP held by G7 (IMF, 2023). Militarily, the United States (0.0712) maintains a narrow lead over Russia (0.0714), followed by China in the third position (0.0722) and India in the fourth position (0.1025), while the United States closest allies have fallen back to fifth (United Kingdom - 0.1435), ninth (France - 0.1848), tenth (Italy - 0.1973) and eleventh (0.2016) positions (Global Fire Power, 2023). Brazil and South Africa occupy the twelfth and thirty third military positions (Global Fire Power, 2023). The United States is however further helped by the NATO military alliance of 30 countries in the Euro-Atlantic sphere and other auxiliary military cooperation treaties or relations with similarly militarily powerful countries such as Pakistan and Australia.

ii. De-legitimization of Pax Americana

The American hegemony has come under fundamental question from various quarters of the world, and ultimately, from its closest competitors. The first act of delegitimizing the US hegemony, while unjustifiable, was the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 in New York (US Financial Capital) and failed attacks in Washington D.C (US Capitol or seat of US Federal Government) by Middle Eastern jihadist group Al Qaeda. The attack targeted the symbols of American: The iconic Twin Tower or the World Trade Centre, which is a symbol of US economic dominance and globalization; the US Capitol, which is the seat of the US Congress or legislative branch of the US Federal Government; and the Pentagon, which is the seat of the US military hegemony (Hopkins & Hopkins, 2003).

What followed the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda would be the US "global war on terror" which directed colossal amounts of US resources towards countering terrorist and military threats outside its borders in the Middle East, other parts of Asia and Africa (Brainard, 2001). Notably, Afghanistan and Iraq (Southwestern Asia) were

invaded by the US military in 2001 and 2003, and the US global military footprint grew across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The US militaristic foreign policy in these regions not only weakened states and regional security and stability, but also led to new brands of jihadism which as opposed to Al Qaeda's "far-distant enemy" approach, became territorial (Byman, 2015). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Levant (ISIS/L), Al Shabaab in Somalia, and the Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin are examples of territorially-oriented jihadist groups which acquired swathes of territory from weakened sovereign countries and governments in Africa and the Middle East. In the melee of the US global war on terror, deplorable human rights violations have been documented in all its theatres which has further aggravated anti-American sentiment in the respective regions of the world.

Tied with the global war on terror, the US militarized its approach to the promotion of democracy around the world and quickly adopted interventionist policies (Cordesman, 2016). The epic failures of this policy are the collapse of Libya under the NATO intervention, and the protracted civil war in Syria, and fragility of Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Sudan, Iran, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe, over decades of US and other international economic sanctions (Cordesman, 2016; US Government Accountability Office, 2020). The US militaristic policy also instrumentalized unilateralism, thereby weakening the very foundations of the Post-War world order and norms. The impunity around the US actions ruined the image of the US around the world and its fidelity to international norms, and soiled the notion of "American exceptionalism".

Further, the economic ascendancy of China and the military buoyance of Russia which became interpreted as strategic threats to the US, led to NATO's expansionism and Sino-American trade war (Flint, 2016: 234-235). The legitimacy of NATO's existence in the Post-War era has thus fallen into question and inspired a regional security

complex in Europe (Damerow, 2022), while America's trade war with China eroded the primacy of the World Trade Organization (a continuation of unilateralism) and normative framework of international trade. NATO's eastward expansion into the former Soviet territory from the original 12 countries to now 30, has practically encircled Russia (the Soviet successor) and complicated security guarantees for Russia in eastern Europe partly leading to Russia's invasions of Ukraine and aggressive manoeuvres over the Baltic region (Masters, 2022; Sullivan, 2022). The invasion of Ukraine is thus part of the security implications of the current geopolitical power struggles as Russia surges to push back against NATO and project Russian interests beyond its immediate environment into the Middle East and Africa (Masters, 2022; Sullivan, 2022). Russia is helped by decades of slow but steady growth in its industrial and agricultural sectors, and more so energy (oil, gas and nuclear) and industrial-defence sectors.

The mounting tariffs and import and export bans by the US on China, *inter alia* for US national security and to offset the trade deficit between the two countries, attracted rightful criticism from China and even the US own allies in Europe and Asia for trade and economic disruption. The World Trade Organization (WTO) clashed with the US President Donald Trump in 2020, whereupon WTO criticized the US for breaking the rules of global trade with its trade war against China (Reuters, 2020). At the same time, Russia has suffered nearly a decade of US sanctions mostly for the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, hence geo-strategically allying with China and other US-sanctioned countries such as Venezuela, North Korea and Iran. The alliance between China and North Korea threatens the US Pacific interests and the security and stability of the region, including critical US strategic positions on Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and South China Sea (Flint, 2016; 236-237). In fact, China is constantly carrying out "invasion drills" against Taiwan while North Korea has resumed nuclear tests and drills against South Korea and the two powers threaten the

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NATO led countries pose for a group photo in October 19, 2023 at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium (Photo Credit: NurPhoto via Getty Images)

security interests of Japan. As such, the US and especially NATO are increasingly appearing not enough to secure allies such as Ukraine and the Pacific ones (China's South China Sea neighbours, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and to an extent, Australia).

The alliance between Russia and China and similarly sanctioned countries as well as countries with hot anti-American sentiment, announced the intention to create an alternative financial system after decrying the abuse of the current financial system by the US and the Western alliance as a weapon against their competitors. Lastly, the Covid-19 pandemic which broke out in early 2020, put the US global leadership to test. The pandemic occasioned closure of national borders globally, disruption of trade and supply chains, and what was called "vaccine nationalism". Strategic leadership in the times of the pandemic from the US was poor, with countries such as China, India and Russia playing more critical roles in vaccine development and covid-mitigation aid especially to developing countries. The US itself fell one of the greatest victims of the Covid-19 pandemic in terms of fatalities, unemployment, GDP growth, income loss, and post-pandemic inflation. Considered collectively, all the above factors point to a de-legitimization of the US global power by emerging powers and new players

which are mostly in the BRICS camp, and demonstrate dissatisfaction of the challenging power(s). Pax Americana also falls within the 70 – 100 years hegemonic decay bracket hence meeting most of Modelski and Organski's primary conditions for global power transition.

Africa's Position: Spectator or Player?

Africa's positioning in the contemporary geopolitical contest is ill-defined but slowly evolving into form. The traditional African position has been non-alignment since the Cold War era. With the formation of BRICS, South Africa became part of the founder members and this year, Ethiopia and Egypt have joined the alliance. South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia are some of Africa's largest economies, populations and militaries and are regional anchors in southern Africa, Northern Africa, and Eastern Africa respectively; only Western and Central Africa is not represented in BRICS but 22 countries had applied for membership in 2023 among which are other African countries. While it might be early to determine whether through BRICS membership Africa is making a foreign policy shift from nonalignment to alignment, more events continue to point towards alignment. For instance, the coups in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Gabon have had anti-Western (especially anti-French and anti-imperialism) innuendos with Russian flags being openly displayed

... African countries have increasingly taken on Chinese financial loans, granted China the largest share of the continent's infrastructure development projects and entered into defence cooperation agreements with Russia

in Niger in support of the coup (Tharoor, 2023). The Burkinabe military ruler appearing to shift his country's foreign policy away from Western powers to the East in his statement to the Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2023 (TRT Afrika, 2023).

Besides the African BRICS membership and the anti-Western sentiment taking root in the region especially West Africa, African countries have increasingly taken on Chinese financial loans, granted China the largest share of the continent's infrastructure development projects and entered into defence cooperation agreements with Russia. Africa – China trade has grown 40-fold in the last two decades alone, to over USD 140 billion, while Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks have grown 60-fold over the same period to USD 43 billion by 2017 for instance (Maru, 2019). China is also responsible for the construction of some of Africa's longest railways (Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Angola), ports (Kenya), roads (most countries in Africa), energy plants (Angola) and telecommunication infrastructure (over 70% of Africa's telecommunication technologies) (Maru, 2019).

Nearly the whole of Africa has taken Chinese loans and many insurgency-troubled countries enlisting Russian foreign internal defence support. In fact, the major economies of Africa are heavily indebted to China and continue taking on Chinese loans including Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. On the other hand, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso and recently Niger, enlisting Russian military and security support in the fight against insurgents and jihadists (Maru, 2019). Africa has also gradually replaced the US and the Western alliance with China as the largest industrial trading partner, and Russia as the largest exporter of arms to the region. On the other hand, Africa – US trade has declined from USD 120 billion to about USD 50 billion in 2019,

and US FDI in-flows decreasing from USD 9.4 billion in 2009 to just about USD 330 million in 2017 (IMF, 2009; Maru, 2019).

The de-dollarization rhetoric seems to gain traction on the African continent, an idea introduced vehemently by China, Russia, Venezuela and Iran which face various levels of economic sanctions or commercial difficulties imposed by the US (Nikoladze & Bhusari, 2023). President William Ruto of Kenya has for instance been popularizing de-dollarization in Africa and most recently, with the backing of Africa Export and Import Bank (AFREXIM Bank) (Kagwanja, 2023; Ibukun, 2023). The move towards de-dollarization is seen as a strategy to facilitate trade by ensuring easy currency convertibility between trading countries.

Lastly, the Western-sponsored resolution in the United Nations on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, exposed the African division on perhaps the largest geopolitical question at the moment. The UN resolution condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine, called for ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. Only 51% of African members voted in favour as opposed to 81.29% of the non-African members (White & Holtz, 2022). Further, of the 35 countries which abstained, 17 or 48.6% of the abstentions were from Africa, while eight (8) African countries not voting. Eritrea voted against the resolution alongside Russia, Syria and North Korea (White & Holtz, 2022).

Interestingly, Africa has for the first time offered to mediate the peaceful resolution of a global geopolitical conflict through a 10-point peace plan for the Russia – Ukraine conflict in June, 2023 (Jones, 2023). The presidents and representatives of South Africa, Senegal, Egypt, Congo-Brazzaville, Comoros, Uganda and Zambia visited Kiev and Moscow to secure a de-escalation and present the peace plan, which was rejected by the warring parties in Europe. However, Africa has had its own agency in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, since the conflict has caused a 30 million tonne shortage of grain in Africa, due to the blockade of Ukraine grain exports through the Black Sea by Russia (Jones, 2023). The conflict has also affected Africa's agriculture with fertilizer shortage, and disrupted Africa-Ukraine-Russia trade especially African exports. The sanctions against Russia's energy sector has further affected the supply and prices of oil and gas in Africa, which have hiked since the beginning of the conflict and spiralled into commodity inflation in African markets (Jones, 2023). The shortage of

grain on its part has occasioned food crisis as a result of shortage and increase in prices. Perhaps, Africa's peace plan was mostly driven by its own agency as opposed to the urgency for international security and peace. Nonetheless, Africa could not have afforded to occupy the spectator role.

Nonetheless, beyond the African membership of BRICS, peace plan for Ukraine-Russia conflict, band wagoning the de-dollarization rhetoric, Africa maintaining larger economic, financial and commercial relations with China, and some African countries "contracting" Russia to play a direct security and defence role, the majority of the African countries demonstrate neutrality and continue to call for cooperation among contending world powers and political behaviours which ensure international peace and stability. Majority of the African states at least at the official level are members of the non-aligned movement (NAM) which has outlasted the 1945-1991 Cold War.

Possible Peace and Security Implications for Africa

To determine the impact of the new global power transition on Africa's peace and security, the lessons from history would suffice. Africa's experience of the World War I (1914-1918) and II (1939-1945), and the Cold War immediately after, are important in assessing possible security implications of the New Cold War. First, there are military implications for alignment. In the World Wars, African countries participated as foreign mercenaries of their colonial powers; in the new global power struggle, both sides of the contest will need military alliances should hot war it become inevitable. African member states of challenging alliances such as BRICS and African states aligned with the West, will most likely be sucked into the military alliances or direct military confrontation. As during the World Wars, Africa will most likely become another theatre for global war.

The US, China, Russia, Japan, India, Iran, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Italy and other powers have been increasing their military footprint on the African continent. More than any other region, 13 foreign nations were conducting military activities on African soil as of 2019. The majority of these nations operate many bases around the continent. At least 47 foreign outposts are located throughout Africa, with the US and France each holding the majority of them (Fofack, 2023). Djibouti exceptionally hosts American (shared by Germany, Spain and Italy), French, Japanese and Chinese military

outposts; China and Japan have thus established their first overseas military outposts in Djibouti in the post-War era. The idea of Africa becoming a theatre of hot warfare, is thus not far-fetched.

Second, there is a likelihood of proliferation of inter and intra-state proxy conflicts in Africa between countries on the opposite sides of the global geopolitical divide or domestic political factions aligned with the opposite sides of the divide. At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the US President Dwight Eisenhower branded proxy conflicts "the cheapest insurance in the world", as he reflected on the low political risk and financial cost such conflicts are for sponsoring powers as opposed to direct military confrontation between the sponsoring powers themselves (Fofack, 2023). Proxy conflicts became common place in Africa during the Cold War. For example, early in the 1960s, the Cold War between the West and the East (Soviet Union and China) landed in Zimbabwe where the British were still colonizing. While the West backed the British colonial government, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China backed the two main nationalist movements in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) for the next 15 years of fighting (Heltz, 2016). A brutal civil war raged in Angola from 1975, just a few years after the Portuguese colonial rule had ended till 2002. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) were the two opposing factions with the backing from South Africa and later from the United States (US), and the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro's Cuba respectively. In the Horn of Africa, the Ogaden War took place between 1977 and 1978. The Marxist-leaning Somali government backed by the USSR by virtue of the Somali-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1974, invaded the Western backed Ethiopia in a revisionist expedition to "reclaim territory" - the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Heltz, 2016).

Today, Africa is reeling from military coups, civil wars, jihadist conflicts and insurgencies. South Sudan (2013 – 2018), Ethiopia (2020 – 2022), Central African Republic and Libya, have experienced civil wars with Turkey, Russia, China, France and American involvement on the opposite sides. Sudan, Niger, Gabon, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea have had militaries taking over power from civilian governments supposedly with foreign backing from the contemporary global contending powers (AJLabs, 2023; Suleiman & Onapajo, 2022; *The Intercept*,

2022). Jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, Lake Chad, Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and jihadist violence in Libya, have inspired direct foreign military involvement with the US, France and Russia leading in response and military involvement in counter terrorism operations in Africa. In contrast to a global drop, African countries are hence spending an increasing percentage of their budgets on the military, making macroeconomic management difficulties even more difficult.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2021) estimated that military spending in Africa had grown to \$43 billion in 2020 from \$15 billion in the 1990s, and by 5.1% compared to 2019 and by 11% compared to 2011 (SIPRI, 2021). In 2020, the average share of government spending on defence in Africa was 8.2%, compared to the unweighted global average of 6.5%. Conflict-affected nations like Mali (18%) and Burkina Faso (12%) have a significantly greater share especially due to the conflicts in the Sahel region (Fofack, 2022a). According

to SIPRI, three of the five African nations with the fastest growing military budgets—Mali, up 339 percent over the past ten years; Niger, up 288 percent; and Burkina Faso, up 238%—are battling terrorist networks in the Sahel, a region of the continent that stretches from Senegal to Sudan to Eritrea and is incredibly impoverished (Fofack, 2022a). The spectre of a new Cold War is likely to increase military spending sharply on the continent, undermine Africa's capability and strategy of managing the present conflicts, and increase the level of fragility for the African state and region as new conflicts or new wars emerge.

Third, Africa cannot afford another Cold War (or even hot war), given the current security challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, conflicts, state fragility, terrorism and violent extremism, poverty and cyber insecurity. The compounding effect of these threats spell doom for the African region should the new Cold War lead to destabilizing confrontations and obvious diversion of vital resources towards warfare as opposed to investment in common security challenges. Lastly, the new geopolitical



Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted African leaders in the second Russian-African Summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia on Thursday, July 27-28, 2023. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt shake hands with President Putin (Photo Credit: CNN)

struggle just like the Cold War is likely to affect Africa's economic growth and development as well as regional integration which are critical for peace in the region. The Cold War caused a 2.5% slump in Africa's regional GDP and fragmented the region and regional markets along the "iron curtain" of the East – West divide. Colonial borders hardened, markets were segmented and cross-border trade and regionalism declined (Fofack, 2022b).

Geopolitical Options for Africa

First, Fofack (2022b) argues that, Africa must lessen foreign influence in order to achieve its security and development goals. Fofack (2022b) opines, African states should prioritize "...preventing conflicts and moving towards a regional security strategy that maximises the benefits to economy and security brought about by political economies of scale". One such program to help tame conflicts in Africa is the "*Silencing the Guns and End Wars in Africa*" Initiative targets to create stable peace in the region through disarmament; counter terrorism; women and youth in peace and security; conflict prevention and peacebuilding by 2030.

However, the nexus between governance and conflict in Africa should be addressed to help resolve underlying fragilities and establish lasting peace on the continent. To accomplish such objectives, African governments must demonstrate sufficient commitments towards addressing the internal causes of conflicts which are related to governance inadequacies, weak institutions of governance, and economic inequalities. Strong institutions ensure political stability, effective delivery of justice and social services, ensure the rule of law, and can be counted on to effectively implement the SDGs (Dekanozishvili, 2019). Countries with strong institutions have robust mechanisms for conflict management and absorb better the economic shocks related to conflict Rodrik (1990). Conversely, countries with weaker institutions lack the capacity to contain or manage conflict without it spiralling into insecurity. In fact, strong institutions may act as policy buffers against undue external influence on domestic actors in African countries in the context of the global geopolitical contest.

Second, Fofack (2022b) prescribes that Africa needs to adopt a regional security strategy as a top priority. Such a process requires collective action, which is built on regional mobilization and organization of security resources in a manner that establishes the political economies of scale as well as the geopolitical bargaining



power of the region. By freeing up resources at the individual nation-state level, critical investments will shift towards ensuring economic development and growth, and ensure the region resolves its seeming debt distress to attain autonomy from its creditors such as China, the US, India, Brazil, the European Union and others in the contemporary global geopolitical contest.

Third, Africa should intensify regional integration process for two reasons: to create regional unity, regional identity and eliminate hard borders, to prevent global geopolitical fall-outs from exploiting the current fragmentation of Africa to further destabilize the region. Regional integration further helps raise the economies of scale necessary to position Africa to 'emerge' economically and take advantage of global capital shifts. Fast-tracking the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is a merger of Africa's 55 economies into AfCFTA, will amount to a regional gross domestic product (GDP) size of USD 3.4 trillion with a population of 1.3 billion people (World Bank, 2020). AfCFTA will also create a single market and aggregate regional industrial capacities which will facilitate and increase trade and investment, which will translate to growth in regional GDP and national economies (Nubong, 2021). AfCFTA was estimated to grow African trade by 52.3% (\$34.6 billion) and industrial exports by 53.3% (\$27.9 billion) by 2022 (Nubong, 2021). AfCFTA would further grow intra-regional trade by 29% and extra-regional trade by 19% at least by 2035 (World Bank, 2020).

In terms of foreign direct investment prospects, regional economic integration as seen by Fofack and Mold (2021), beyond securing about 25% increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) for Africa, will boost other factors which boost FDI inflows such as intra-Africa trade expansion. FDI gained will translate to economic growth and drive technology transfers, employment creation, income

growth and intra-regional division of labor in terms of regional value chains (RVCs) (Rodrick, 2018). African can thus through regional integration position itself an emerging power with a stake in the international affairs as opposed to a spectator. As Fofack (2018) rightly observes, regional integration has the potential to make Africa a global player.

Conclusion

Africa has experienced major geopolitical shifts in the international system between 1945 and 2023. These are: the First World War (1914-18) and the Second World War (1939-45), the Cold War (1945-1991) and now, the current global geopolitical contest between the declining US hegemony and the rising Eastern powers of China, Russia and India and their BRICS alliance. Africa just like in the past is still occupying the middle ground between the two global contending forces as the world prepares for a possible global power transition. However, the questions are should Africa be a spectator or an active player in the current global geopolitical contest? The other question is, what would be the implications of Africa's positioning on its peace and security? Africa countries have already formed part of the founder and new members of BRICS, have issued policy pronouncements on issues such as the dominance of the dollar, the sided with Russia on its invasion of Ukraine, and yet continue to demonstrate

division on their positions on the ongoing global power transition fall-outs.

Nonetheless, whether Africa's position is a clear neutrality as it were during the Cold War and the NAM bandwagon, a significant section of African countries are either explicitly in the alliance which is a counterweight to the US global dominance or implicitly so. Africa has already opened itself to hosting major power military bases, and are indebted to other contending powers such as China. As such, whether Africa declares neutrality, the global power transitions will have a considerable degree of Kondratieff waves hitting the continent in its various sub-regions and in various forms. In essence, Africa is not a spectator anymore; Africa is now a player and to an extent an umpire in the current global power transition fall-outs, and yet an imminent theatre for such contest. African governments have therefore the responsibility of embracing strategies which limit the impact of global power transitions on its peace and security by prioritizing conflict prevention, management and resolution; improving governance; limiting foreign influence on the continent; deepening regional integration, to ward-off any potential destabilizing influence from the contending powers in the spheres of conflict, governance, trade and economy, as well as regional integration.

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The Nexus between Border Management and Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa: Kenya's Role in the Region

By Paul Chayuga

Abstract

This paper focuses on the menace of smuggling of migrants in the Horn of Africa. The paper discusses the nexus between border management and migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa, with specific focus on Kenya's role in migrant smuggling. It is organized around the following thematic areas: the push and pull factors for smuggling, the process of smuggling in the Horn of Africa, the role of corruption in smuggling, the role of border management, and Kenya's role in smuggling.

Introduction

The world is increasingly becoming interconnected and interdependent, meaning whatever happens in one country has ripple effects in another. This interconnectedness makes - management of borders a complex issue and resulting into challenges at border points. States have a mandate of protecting their territorial integrity as a key national interest. However, activities at the border points create a complex operational environment for individual states in their bid to have safe and secure borders. This demands deliberate efforts to secure borders while promoting trade and travel. Well managed borders spur socio-economic development and reduce cross border threats and risks such as smuggling and trafficking. This can only be possible through the cooperation of local, regional and international agencies. Emerging global threats including but not limited to; terrorism, cross-border crime, smuggling, trafficking and global pandemics have had significant implication to border operations, and by extension, national security.

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines migrant smuggling as "a crime that involves the procurement of illegal entry of a person into a state of which that person is not a citizen or resident." It is existential and it is a highly profitable business in which criminals involved are at low risk of detection and punishment hence it has increasingly become attractive for this criminal and their networks. In the recent past, migrant smuggling has become more sophisticated. Perpetrators are using bribes and fraudulent documents

to reduce the risks of getting caught or those they smuggle. Conventionally, the masterminds of this heinous act are illegal profiteers who have absolute no regard for life. This paper discusses the nexus between corruption, border management and migrant smuggling in Africa - A case study of the Horn of Africa with specific focus on Kenya's role in migrant smuggling. Specifically, this paper is organized around the following thematic areas: 1) the push and pull factors for smuggling, 2) the Process of Smuggling in the Horn of Africa, 3) The Role of Corruption in Smuggling, 4) The Role of Border Management, and 5) Kenya's role in smuggling. This study is informed by personal insights and secondary data obtained from peer reviewed journals, relevant reports, websites as well as various regulatory frameworks among others.

The push and pull factors for smuggling

Smuggling is exacerbated by a number of factors. In most cases people resort to being smuggled because of poverty, economic reasons or political instability and cultural differences. Within the Horn of Africa there are various push and pull factors. For most migrants travelling to Europe, the motivation for leaving is mostly lack of economic opportunities and political instability in their mother countries even though there could be other external threats that have a spillover effect hence causing migration.

Political instability and weak law and order enforcement is a characteristic of 'failed and/or weak' state. Such states



Voluntary migrants returnees in Obok, (Djibouti in transit to the quarantine site in Ar Aousa in readiness to their departure to their respective countries of origin (Photo Credits: IOM Djibouti/Alexander Bee)

have challenges in exercising functional sovereignty because of dysfunctional governance structures. They have many a times been associated with internal and external disorders including problems of increased conflicts, local and transnational crime (Hamre & Sullivan, 2002). At one point, Kenya was ranked among the world's most unstable countries and placed in the category of 'failed states' (Ombati, 2013). Uganda has had a history of instability arising from conflicts between government forces and Lord's Resistance Army rebels led by Joseph Kony (Okiror, 2017). Somalia continues to grapple with the problem of inter-clan conflicts led by clan warlords following the fall of President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. This has contributed to the influx of refugees into Kenya and the creation of the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Garissa which has been associated with crimes such as human trafficking and smuggling (Gastrow, 2011; Voice of America, 2011).

Instability and armed conflict in the Horn of Africa since the 20th century, coupled with the authorities' weak capacity to control or monitor cross border movements has created grounds for the emergence of irregular migration flows leading people from the Horn of Africa, [especially Ethiopians and Somalis] to risk their lives to

escape conflict, poverty, and recurrent drought conditions by undertaking a dangerous journey across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia to Yemen.

In the East and Horn of Africa most people are smuggled because of economic reasons. This is a region characterized with fewer or no industries hence exposed to poor economic status resulting into high rates of unemployment and poverty. Poverty and unemployment continue to be a major problem in East Africa and the entire continent. Most African countries are in dire poverty as the population live below one dollar. A research by Kenya' National Crime Research Center (KNCRC) shows that migrant smuggling and other borderland-related crimes are orchestrated by unemployed youth thus confirming that unemployment is a significant factor promoting smuggling in the Horn of Africa region. According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), massive youth unemployment was partly to blame for smuggling and insecurity in Kenya. (KNCHR, 2018)

Corruption is now regarded as a serious threat to the region's security as a majority of the countries within the region have an endemic culture of corruption

especially at the borders and within the security agencies. Gastrow (2011) argues that some corrupt staff members at the United Nations refugee camp at Dadaab in the northeast of Kenya and embassy officials have also facilitated smuggling activities. In order to effectively tackle smuggling and other borderland-related crimes and security threats, then countries in the region need cooperation, proper coordination and information sharing of relevant information between and among respective border officials. Okoth (2018) argues that rampant corruption, negligence, poor coordination among State agencies manning the country's borders and other systemic weaknesses give smugglers an easy time, making Kenya a trading center for smuggled people.

External threats like the crisis in Sudan are creating a "snowball effect" on the region, Mar Dieye, the UN Secretary-General's Special Coordinator in the Sahel, told UN News. "Not stopping this fire that started from Sudan and then spilled over in Chad and other regions could be an international disaster that will trigger a lot of more migrants," said Mr. Dieye, who also heads the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS).

The Process of Smuggling in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa and the East Africa region faces a number of challenges, from political, instability to economic crisis and climate change among other disasters. The political transitions that have taken place in the East and the Horn of Africa region continues to place the region in a security crisis. Countries Somalia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Ethiopia, DRC and Sudan continue to face challenges with governance hence poor economic growth as well as massive violation of human rights forcing the population to migrate. These countries are fraught with tension and are home to recurring cycles of conflict, primarily due to conflicting geopolitical and economic interests, as well as environmental factors that have led to frequent droughts, floods and famine.

Smuggling networks in the Horn and East Africa have an informal but well-organized structure. An IOM report on the movement of migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia to Kenya and further south has compared the facilitators' modus operandi to that of courier service providers, with slight variations. The networks consist of opportunistic individuals, in contrast to the hierarchical structure of large organized crime syndicates operating in the West. According to IOM the movement of migrants is from

“Instability and armed conflict in the Horn of Africa since the 20th century, coupled with the authorities' weak capacity to control or monitor cross border movements has created grounds for the emergence of irregular migration flows

Ethiopia and Somalia to Kenya, as a transit or destination country. Migrants who are part of this movement often have South Africa in mind as their final destination. The region encounters mixed migration as movement has evolved from one involving refugees and asylum seekers to now people wanting to be smuggled. Mixed movements (flows) are, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), "complex migratory population movements that include refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants."

For instance the migration of Somalis and Ethiopians begun in the mid-20th century, and was exacerbated by the fall of the Mengistu rule in Ethiopia, and the Said Barre regime in Somalia, in 1991 where the people were moving in search of a safer place to live Outflows are dependent on the prevailing social, political, and climatic conditions in the regions of Somalia and Ethiopia. In Somalia, the early 1990s were characterized by displacement as a result of civil war. In 1991, the fall of the Siad Barre regime resulted in anarchy and violence. Somalis began to troop to Kenya during this period when key resources were controlled by warlords.

"Smuggling is normally a well-coordinated crime where all the actors from the bus, and lorry drivers, as well as bush guides and those who enter into contracts with and accompany migrants on irregular crossings. In some cases the smugglers buy their way at the border by bribing corrupt border officials." A Kenyan investigative journalist reported. The IOM study found that the notorious managers in the smuggling chain are Somalis and Ethiopians who are situated in major East African cities and at key transit points, such as, ports, refugee camps or border areas. The managers work with the chief smugglers. Typically, they sub-contract transportation, bush guide or facilitator services to local pools of

The considerable profits generated by migrant smuggling operations make corruption possible on large scale. Bribery and other forms of corruption are used to create and exploit opportunities for migrant smuggling

opportunistic criminals. The smuggling managers, who are stationed along the smuggling route, play a key role in the smuggling chain and are paid by the chief smuggler, who is the principal linchpin, to move a group of people from one point to another. The chief smuggler is not necessarily based in the same city.

The IOM study compared the human smuggling model in East Africa with the one in Mexico, which has been described as the “supermarket” model. Comparatively speaking, both models are relatively low cost, have high failure rates at border crossings, are characterized by repeated attempts, are run by multiple actors who act independently or are loosely affiliated to one another, and do not have a strong hierarchy or a violent organizational discipline. According to IOM report on migration, every year about 55,000 migrants are thought to be smuggled from East, North and West Africa into Europe.

It is believed that many migrants heading to Europe from Africa are either smuggled by air with the aid of fraudulent documents or initially enter Europe legally and then remain in the country of destination once their visa has expired. But a majority are smuggled along a combination of land and sea routes, which can take considerably longer and be more dangerous. The smugglers are aware that they are operating unlawfully, and in most instances are willing to face the consequences. Where a bribe does not suffice, they will most likely pay a modest fine or face deportation. Smuggled migrants are driven to Nairobi in lorries fitted with fake bottoms. A self-confessed Somali smuggler interviewed at a prison in Mombasa said that Somalis are always on the run to safety, with Kenya being one of their primary destinations. He said that he owns a boat that brings migrants to the shores of Kenya’s Mombasa County. According to RMMS, most victims of smuggling reported that they had use a smuggler along stretches of the journey south, paying on average USD 3,300 for the trip from the Horn of Africa to South Africa.

Nairobi plays a key role in smuggling, apart from being the country of transit it also the receipt of smuggling fees and is the Kenyan headquarters of the hawala system.

The Somalis are financed predominantly by the diaspora, while a significant number of Ethiopians are funded with the proceeds from the sale of private family assets. Characteristic among both communities is that the decision to leave home is taken collectively, because it is viewed as an economic investment by relatives and clan members. Mobile cash transfers are effected through the Western Union money transfer system and through Mpesa, a mobile phone cash transfer system popular in the East African region.

The journey from Africa to Europe is not always made all at once, there are stopovers and at times the migrants are forced to remain in North Africa for different periods of time, often to work to earn more money to pay for the rest of the journey. The fees paid for one to be smuggled vary, depending on the point of departure and the points of destination. Travelling from inland areas to coastal ports is a grueling journey. For instance in West and East Africa, Gao, Mali; Agadez; Addis Ababa; and Cairo are hubs from which migrants head to the coasts of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Turkey. From there, migrants are smuggled by boat to various locations in Europe.

The Role of Corruption in Smuggling

Spencer (2006), notes that corrupt practices secure the compliance of officials hence allow criminals an easy passage across borders and at the same time legitimizes their illegal practices. Conceptually, corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It is broad, systematic and even individual affecting a whole border protection, law enforcement and even justice systems. Commonly, bribery and fraud are used. We’ve had various bribery cases at border points that aid in smuggling of persons and goods. Today corruption is one of the biggest menace at most border points in the world that aid in smuggling of people.

Border smuggling and corruption are intertwined. It is a matter of fact that corruption is a significant predictor of migrant smuggling. They are connected in various ways depending on the country’s level of development, the prevailing level of integrity in institutions and

country's capacity to prevent and counter corruption. Cultural, economic and political reasons are also greater propellants of migrant smuggling and corruption. Corruption is consistent in all the process of migrant smuggling from the origin, through transit to the destination. It takes very different forms and may imply a very long number of intermediaries or even individuals. Sometimes it involves irregular border cross or use of fraudulent documents.

The considerable profits generated by migrant smuggling operations make corruption possible on large scale. Bribery and other forms of corruption are used to create and exploit opportunities for migrant smuggling. This include neutralizing the controls in place to prevent irregular operations interference by law enforcement and prosecution.

Corruption therefore is a very real barrier to effective cooperation in fighting smuggling. It undermines any

relationship of confidence and mutual trust that is quintessential for ongoing cooperation across borders. Little is being done to help fight and reduce cases of migrant smuggling especially in Africa as most of the smuggled people originate from the continent. Today we have increasing cases of smuggling from Africa to the gulf. For instance Tunisia and Libya are some of the leading hubs where migrants being smuggled to Europe are kept. Overtime smuggling is becoming a threat to global peace and security. In most cases of smuggling it is evident that corruption is a major aid.

Corruption of border guards could result in official residence stamp being placed in a passport and ignoring false documents or impostors (Spencer, 2006). Araia (2009) in his study of human smuggling in South Africa found out that a significant proportion of the police force was directly involved in the trade by providing direct passage through Beit Bridge Border Post. Respondents claim that police, immigration officials and officers responsible for



Thousands of migrants reach Europe from North Africa by way of the central and eastern Mediterranean routes. Many taken on the risky journey after paying lots of money to country border security agencies (Photo Credits: ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/Getty Images)



Dadaab refugee camp, one of the largest refugees camp in the world, located about 97 Kilometers from the Kenya-Somalia border (Photo Credits: Somalia Newsroom/Ubayda Sharif)

refugees are also bribed to facilitate movement (Araia, 2009:31). The scenario is likely to be the case in the Kenyan situation as the circumstances between the two regions are quite similar. It is a case of a poorer and politically unstable neighbor (Somalia and Zimbabwe) and a richer and politically stable neighbor (Kenya and Republic of South Africa) on the other hand. Human smuggling will therefore be prevented by addressing corruption within agencies tasked with immigration issues.

Most media report of arrest of illegal migrants in Kenya especially Somalis and Ethiopians show that corruption plays a key role (the Star, 19 Aug 2021; BBC News Africa 1stAug 2019; The Standard 28 Mar 2022). Many of these illegal immigrants pass through immigration controls and various road blocks only to be arrested inside the country. Smuggled persons often travel on genuine but fraudulently obtained travel or identity documents (Kenya Department of Immigration, 2010). In many cases, these are obtained by bribing registration officers or immigration officers (The Standard 28 Mar 2021). They may fraudulently obtain primary documents such as birth certificates and then proceed to obtain passports. In this category are the fraudulently obtained visas from corrupt consular officers. Smugglers and illegal immigrants also

depend on the cooperation of transporters hence bribe them to facilitate easy passage. Corruption, according to Araia is one of the key methods used in human smuggling as it lowers the risk in one of the most vulnerable part of the journey (Araia, 2009; Schloenhardt, 2002).

The Role of Border Management

Border management plays a very vital role in smuggling this is because the strategies employed at the border determines who enters, how they enter and even where they enter. Poor border management would mean that a state would have no control on who enters and when do they enter and what are they coming to do which would be a recipe for possible smuggling due to entry of illegal and undocumented immigrants. Article 11 of the smuggling protocol obligates state parties to strengthen their border control so as to prevent and detect the smuggling of migrants (UNODC, 2004:14).

There are dynamic characteristics of borders that make it for smuggling to keep reoccurring. For instance the porosity of most borders make it difficult to control and manage the entry and exit of persons. Secondly most borders being located in remote and underdeveloped areas hence border customs officials lack resources and

adequate supervision. In EU, physical location of remote land borders and coastal regions have been found to present a higher risk of corruption (centre of the study of democracy 2012). This situation in developing countries is even more aggravated by poor infrastructure, lack of human and institutional capacity, low levels of automation and computerization, lack of training and professionalism, low public service salaries and weak controls and oversight (Chene 2013). There's also lack of resources like facsimile machines, consistent electricity supply and proper living quarters for border officers, vehicles and proper research and storage facilities (Hennop, Jefferson and Mc Lean 2001).

In Kenya the Department of Immigration is the lead agency in border management and administration. It has the mandate of liaising with other government ministries, Departments and international organizations on matters touching on migration (Department of Immigration, 2010). The Department also has the function of controlling and regulating entry and exit of all persons at airports, seaports and land border posts. In addition, the Department is tasked with investigating; arresting and prosecuting persons who contravene immigration laws and regulations. They also facilitate repatriation of illegal immigrants and deportation of undesirable immigrants as may be directed by the cabinet secretary (Department of Immigration, 2010).

Kenya has a borderline of 4013 km and a coastline of 536 km. Its border with Somalia is 682km long while that with Ethiopia is 861 km. The border between Southern Sudan and Kenya is 232 kilometers (km) that with Uganda is 933 km while that with Tanzania is 769 km. A report from the Kenyan Immigration department revealed that the most vulnerable border is that between Kenya and Somalia as migrants come in either as refugees fleeing from internal conflict within their mother country. (Department of Immigration, 2010).

Despite the Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Ethiopia borders being the biggest source of human smuggling and illegal migration, there are no new border controls in the two regions due to inadequate policy and budgetary provisions. There are immigration offices at Garissa and Ijara purposely to check illegal immigrants or smuggled persons from Somalia. The Tana River acts as a natural barrier hence officers check at the bridges where vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians pass through en route to Mombasa or Nairobi. A similar check is done in Isiolo

where a state of the art mobile patrol unit is stationed to check on illegal immigrants mainly from Ethiopia. In addition there are numerous police roadblocks along the Moyale –Isiolo –Nairobi road and similarly along the Garissa-Nairobi and Garissa-Malindi roads to check on the same (Department of Immigration, 2013a). Despite all these efforts, illegal immigrants who are mainly smuggled persons are still arrested in various parts of the country. This suggests there are gaps which could be attributed to complicity by officers, or perhaps smugglers have employed new tactics to evade security agents. The capacity of the Department and the role played by corruption may therefore facilitate human smuggling.

The rationale of these checks is probably based on the assumptions that; all illegal migrants pass through the specific routes; that they travel by vehicles and that they travel during the day, that is, between 6am to 5pm. In reality there is a high possibility that smuggled persons can walk, travel at night or even use dugout canoes across the river and then catch buses at safer sections. This begs the question are the various border agencies within the region capable of curbing human smuggling?

Kenya's role in smuggling

Kenya plays a critical role in smuggling within the East African and the Horn of Africa region. It is either a country of destination, a transit route or a source of illegal migrants. For a very long time Kenya has been a country of destination within the region because of its history of arguably being the island of peace in a region full of political turmoil. Kenya as a destination country is also as a result of several consecutive years of sustained economic growth and levels of economic development higher than those of its neighbors combine to make Kenya an appealing destination for economic migrants from across the region. Ethiopia in particular, with a

Despite the Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Ethiopia borders being the biggest source of human smuggling and illegal migration, there are no new border controls in the two regions due to inadequate policy and budgetary provisions



Data shows tens of thousands more are believed to be living in or transiting through Kenya outside the formal refugee system. Kenya is a transit country, particularly for migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia heading to South Africa

population greater than 100 million, more than twice that of Kenya, has emerged as a source country for irregular economic migration to Kenya.

Kenya hosts the largest refugee camp in the region and the second largest in the continent and entire world. Most of these refugees are from Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, DRC and Burundi. The refugees reside in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. Men, women, and children from neighboring countries such as Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Ethiopia, as well as from countries in Asia, are smuggled into Kenya, where they become hawkers, domestic workers, barmaids or even beggars in the streets of Kenyan cities such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret. According to Awareness Against Human Trafficking (HAART), an NGO working to end human trafficking in Kenya, children are smuggled or trafficked into the country for the purposes of begging, street hawking, organ removal, and illicit adoption. Recently there have been stories in Kenya local media on how Burundians and Congolese are taking over in beauty parlors. In addition the Star newspaper reported that most beggars in the streets of Nairobi are from Tanzania while hawkers are either from Burundi or Rwanda.

On the other hand Kenya plays the role of a transit route where migrants from other countries are smuggled through Kenya to other regions such as South Africa, Europe, Middle-East and Asia. Data shows tens of thousands more are believed to be living in or transiting through Kenya outside the formal refugee system. Kenya is a transit country, particularly for migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia heading to South Africa. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that "an estimated 20,000 Somali and Ethiopian male

migrants are being smuggled to South Africa, mostly via Kenya, every year." Research by RMMS shows that the smuggling business is still very rampant on this southern route. IOM's Migrant Smuggling Data and Research on East Africa states that "air routes have been linked to mostly Kenya as a major transit country for smuggled migrants that can afford air travel where falsified travel documents are obtained."

Additionally Kenya serves as a source of migrant smuggling in the region. Even though it is not a major source country of irregular migration within the Greater Horn of Africa. According to RMMS, most Kenyan emigrants are skilled and well-educated, often migrating through legal channels to countries within the region but also to North America, Europe and the Middle East. Some may later become irregular migrants, either overstaying work or student visas, or transiting to a third country irregularly. Reliable data on the number of Kenyans living abroad is not available: estimates range between just under half a million and three million. The Gulf Region is a major labor market for unskilled Kenyan migrants, many of whom are women seeking jobs as domestic workers. According to Kenyan government figures, approximately 100,000 Kenyans are working in the Gulf Region, but other sources indicate that the true figure is probably much greater.

The government of Saudi Arabia, for example, reports that 80,000 Kenyans live in its territory, while Trace Kenya, an NGO that works with victims of trafficking, estimates that the total number throughout the Gulf is closer to 300,000. Within the flows of economic migrants to the Gulf Region are victims of human trafficking, who are either lured to the Middle East by traffickers with the false promise of legitimate employment, or who find themselves in situations that constitute human trafficking once they arrive. Furthermore, Kenya is a source country of male, female and child victims of human trafficking within the region, as well as within Kenya itself, where children from low-income families and rural areas are most vulnerable to being trafficked to urban areas and the coastal region. A recent report by HAART found that internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Kenya, including those who have been forced to leave their home due to conflict, political violence, or natural and man-made disasters, are more vulnerable to human trafficking than non-IDPs.

Conclusion

This paper concludes that human smuggling is still very active and even more complex within the Horn of Africa region. Furthermore it notes that this irregular migration is accelerated by a number of factors but the key one being

corruption and poor border management. Therefore this calls for cooperation and collaboration among the countries in the Horn of Africa region as far as the war against smuggling is concerned.

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Community Policing in Kenya: An Overview of Gaps and Opportunities; The Shakahola Massacre

By Vincent Wambogo and Paul Chayuga

Abstract

The Kenyan government is carrying out reforms aimed at ensuring security across the nation from the grassroots to the national level. Key among the things the government seeks to enhance is the police-public trust and partnerships through Community Policing (CP). The government has initiated two CP models that have been implemented; the National Police Service's Community Policing committees, and the Nyumba Kumi initiative. The police reform policy and community policing models appear to have the potential of improving police-public cooperation, however, implementation has proven difficult. Listening to the local communities, organizations, the police and other stakeholders indicate that skepticism towards CP model is common (Ngugi, 2014). This begs the question why is this so? Why is CP model unsuccessful in enhancing police-public trust and cooperation? This paper seeks to delve into some of the gaps in community policing; analyze the gaps and give recommendations.

Introduction

According to the National Police Service act of 2016 (National Police Service, 2016) community policing is defined as 'an approach to policing that recognizes voluntary participation of the local community in the maintenance of peace,' and consists of a 'partnership between police and the community in identification of issues of crime and general insecurity' whereby the police 'need to be responsive to the communities and their needs, with its key elements being joint problem identification and problem solving while respecting the different responsibilities the police and the public have in crime prevention and the maintenance of order.

In Kenya, community policing gained momentum in late 90s, when the Vera Institute of Justice proposed to support two projects runs by two civic organizations in Nairobi the Kenya Human Rights Commission and the Nairobi Central Business District Association (Ruteere, 2003). Later, community policing reemerged under the beacon of police reform under the Mwai Kibaki government with the Economic Recovery and Wealth Creation Strategy (Mutuma, 2011). Despite being a relatively new concept in Kenya and Africa at large, it slowly been taking shape progressively. Community policing has been implemented in some communities depending on the community's interpretation and understanding. Since its inception the concept keeps making progress even though it faces a number of challenges.

Since independence Kenya has witnessed diverse security threats. In most cases these security threats started at community level but later expanded and had effect on national security. Most of these insecurities have taken the form of dominant ethnic group against minorities, others have taken religious forms, cattle rustling, and gender based violence (GBV) among others. These threats have served to undermine peace, stability and development. Inspired by the thinking those communities members know best what is happening in their neighborhoods, the Community Policing approach was gradually introduced to leverage on the social capital of relationships between community members and law enforcers in advancing crime prevention. It is an endeavor to promote community solution to community problems.

The introduction of community policing would be termed as one of the key milestones in ensuring a safe, secure and crime free society. However, despite the existence of community policing, we still hear of crimes in various counties across the country, including high levels of murder, cattle rustling in the north rift, Gender Based Violence (GBV) in various parts of the country among other crimes. This begs the question, what are the challenges in rolling out and implementing the policy? Understanding what is working and what is not will help make suggestions on how to improve this noble initiative. Indeed there exists literature on community policing although limited, on

DIANI POLICE STATION



Kwale community leaders and the residence of Diani pose for a photo outside Diani Police Station after a Community Policing interfaith dialogue (Photo Credits: Inter-Religious Council–Kenya/Mary N. Ndulili)

the context of Kenya. This study seeks to understand progress made in implementing the Community Policing and the inherent challenges with a view to suggesting alternative policy options. In doing so, the study intends; to examine the role of community policing in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya; to analyze the successes of community policing. To investigate challenges faced by community in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and to give suggest recommendations based on ways of strengthening the community policing.

Justification

The study will contribute to an understanding of what community policing entails, and what is working and what is not with a view to suggesting alternative policy options. Moreover, the study will contribute to the existing body of academic knowledge especially in the context of Kenya.

Community Policing

Community policing is a great concept towards enhancing peace and security in Kenya, even though it seems to be doing so well in some communities while at the same time performing so poorly amongst others. Different

communities have different stories of community policing. In some it is a success story whereas others it has not been implemented fully or the community has implemented something totally different. This is because of a number of factors that have affected its implementation.

The Kenyan government initiated two CP initiatives all aimed at eradicating crime and any forms of insecurities within the country by improving police-public relations: the National Police Service' 'Community Policing Structure' and the 'Nyumba Kumi' model led by the President's Office (Gjelsvik, 2020). However, moving from policy to practice has proven a hard nut to crack; this raised the question why have these two CP models proven unsuccessful? To answer this, this study analyzed the data from interviews conducted in Bungoma, Kilifi and Samburu counties between January 2023 and August 2023. However, the study has identified some major achievements as well as the challenges hindering the proper implementation.

For community policing to be effective and efficient there must be collaboration between all stakeholders within the society. To understand the successes and failures

of CP a total of 30 individuals from different counties were interviewed, they included community policing members, youth, women and people living with disability. Communities have cooperated before and forged aspects of cooperation by establishing community policing. Globally, community policing has been effective in enhancing peace and security in states like Botswana, South Africa, and in others in Europe. The main goal for community policing is to promote partnership between the community and the police to create safer societies free from any criminal activities. Research on community policing on the African continent tends to refer to community policing as initiatives that are state-led, while other initiatives driven by community members are labeled as forms of citizen-based security provision (Buur, 2006; Baker, 2008; Kyed, 2009, 2018; Cross, 2014; Di Nunzio, 2014; Pendle, 2015; Ruteere, 2017). According to (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988) the central theme of community policing is crime prevention. Skogan (2006) suggests community capacity to prevent crime will be strengthened by encouraging communities to enhance community safety. The prevention emphasis of community policing is more proactive than traditional policing models (Cordner, 1999). Sherman and Eck (2002) argue that community policing needs clear objectives that focus on crime risk factors. To this end, Community policing has been an effective crime prevention tactic through deterrence. This is through developing closer liaison between Police and the public thereby improving their relationship and eliminating fear of Police, augmenting community confidence and trust in the Police ability to control crime, encouraged public participation thereby reducing the demand upon Police Service and ultimate enhanced crime reporting of the community members.

In as much as CP has been effective in some regions the lack of a clear direction in its implementation has led to it taking different forms in different communities. This has led to the definition and implementation of different forms of community policing in different regions when it should be uniform across the country. Some communities have formed vigilante groups instead of community policing committees, for instance we have "chinkororo" among the Kisii community, Sungu Sungu at the coast or Mungiki in central province that do patrols at night and during the day in the name of protecting the community.

The essential component of community policing is enhanced partnership. Therefore, the Police need to engage the community in dealing with crime and related

“Community policing is a great concept towards enhancing peace and security in Kenya, even though it seems to be doing so well in some communities while at the same time performing so poorly amongst others

problems that may include working collaboratively with other public and private agencies (Cordner, 1999). Police and community should work in partnership not only to solve problems, but to reduce the fear of crime, physical and social disorder, and neighborhood decay (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Wyckoff, 1988). Moreover, the police should not take sole responsibility for crime prevention. We've seen that in some regions the police developing strategies in partnership with local communities on how to prevent crime and secure the region. Furthermore, increasing community capacity to deal with issues has enabled them building capacity by mobilizing and empowering them to identify and respond to concerns (Segrave and Ratcliffe, 2004). The benefit of an empowered community is a stronger community who want to participate in addressing issues (Mastrofski, 2006). Problem solving has been a key milestone in some regions where traditional mechanisms of problem solving have been used to enhance security. Moreover, communities with existing capacity on problem solving are more likely to participate in community policing, but are less likely to benefit from it because, in general, they are already proactively addressing issues to increase community safety (Mayhill, 2007). For instance a resident from Bungoma reported that it is through community policing that most land disputes have been solved amicably.

The theme of community policing is the fact that problem solving techniques form an interactive process, involving police and communities in identifying crime problems and developing appropriate solutions (Young and Tinsley, 1998).

Community policing enables police to develop improved police-community relationships (Segrave and Ratcliffe, 2004). This provides the police with the opportunity to meet the community's needs (Ferreira, 1996), while increasing public accountability over police through

Describing his modus operandi, homicide detectives said “Mackenzie brainwashed his converts using William Branham’s End of Days Theology, and convinced them that starvation could hasten their escape from this life to be with Jesus,”

participation (Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Palmiotto, 2000). Furthermore, established initiatives have shown a positive improvement in police-community relationships and community perceptions of police (Skogan and Steiner, 2004; Sadd and Grinc, 1996). It is through community policing that we saw police reforms in Kenya which have encouraged participation of the community members in matters of fighting insecurity in some regions. One of the residents from Samburu County was happy that they can sit with the police on the community policing committee and discuss any security threats and how to deal with them. For instance, these partnerships have helped them address the issue of cattle rustling and GBV in some parts thus reducing such incidents. However reforms have not been fully implemented in some regions thus hindering the realization of community policing in the entire country, therefore the government should enhance commitment towards enhanced police participation towards the securing the needs of the citizenry more so, ensuring that there is people participation. The full implementation of the Kenya’s police reforms should be realized to enhance public participation.

The Shakahola Massacre

According africanews, *failures of the Kenyan justice system and police allowed Paul Nthenge Mackenzie to preach extreme fasting and partake to act religious radicalization, despite several alerts about this self-proclaimed pastor. His actions allegedly directly and/or indirectly led to the deaths of at least 428 people.* Kenya, a secular country is predominantly inhabited by Christian faith, has experienced deaths linked to religious extremism in the past, according the senatorial commission of enquiry to the matter of shakahola and pastor Mackenzi, opine that the Shakahola tragedy accounts for the highest number of religiously motivated deaths, exceeding the worst jihadist attacks on kenyan soil.

For the purpose of this study, the Shakahola Massacre, refers to the unprecedented incident of a religious cult engineered by Pastor Paul Mackenzie of Good News International Ministries in the Shakahola forest in the Southern part of the country, Malindi. According

to police records, the incident gained traction and countries attention in April following a report of missing persons, when a man reported that his wife and daughter were missing after attending Mackenzie’s Good News International Ministries in Shakahola. The chilling revelation prompted security agencies to swing to action in haste to get to the bottom of this. Shockingly, the revelation only opened a can of warms of what has been happening in the expansive 800 acre land.

The authorities commenced an operation to rescue survivors and to retrieve bodies in the larger property, a number of emaciated individuals, including one who had been buried alive for three days were discovered in the initial stage of the operation. According to Interior CS Prof Kithure Kindik, the majority of deaths were of children, with women being the next largest group. He further stated that apart from fasting to starvation, “there were other methods used, including hurting them, just by physical and preliminary observations. These reports were corroborated by Dr Johansen Oduor, government pathologist; autopsies conducted on more than 100 bodies showed that the victims died of starvation, strangulation, suffocation and blunt trauma and some had organs missing.

Describing his modus operandi, homicide detectives said “Mackenzie brainwashed his converts using William Branham’s End of Days Theology, and convinced them that starvation could hasten their escape from this life to be with Jesus,”.

These acts are a perfect example of religious extremism, indoctrination and high end radicalization. While assuring Kenyans, the CS interior Prof Kithure Kindiki apologized to Kenyans for letting the nation down, he promised to get to the bottom of the matter and to have individuals account of legal, institutional, security and intelligence laxity. In dealing with issue at hand, President Ruto ordered an inquiry in to the matter of Shakahola and Pastor Mackenzia, he further promised that the perpetrators must face full force of the law. Governments effort to find answers culminated to Cs

Kindiki criminalizing Good News International when he gazetted pastor Mackenzie's church as an organized criminal group in accordance with section 22 (1) of the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act.

Benign Neglect in Shakahola

The case of Shakahola not only exposed the laxity in our security sector, but also profoundly highlighted the attitude of benign neglect by civil servants, civilians and the general public. The study can confidently opine that actions of Pastor Paul Mackenzi did not occur in isolation or sporadic, it is a culmination of events, activities and a prolonged process of committing heinous acts, disguised as religious activities and/or teachings.

The Senate committee on the proliferation of religious organizations recommended disciplinary action against eleven security officers on allegations of involvement in the Shakahola cult tragedy that has so far led to the deaths of 428 people; this was reported by Citizen Digital. Indicating an involvement through act of commission or omission, this pointed to the act of benign neglect by

our security teams. In this regard, Member of Parliament, Opiyo Wandayi, said that it is an unforgivable failure of security intelligence that in theory extends from Nairobi all the way to the Shakahola ending with the chiefs, assistant chiefs, village elders and Nyumba Kumi heads and this system failed. However, allegedly the community around Shakahola village reported suspicious activities to the authorities in 2019, but the police failed to take action. According to police and court records, Mackenzie was acquitted of charges of radicalization in 2017 for illegally providing informal school teaching as he rejected the formal educational system that he claimed was not in line with the bible. In noting this, Pastor Mackenzie contravened the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—the right to education.

In driving the correlation and in-depth understanding of issues, the study elucidates some of the gaps in community policing that might have been exploited by Good News International Church in driving its natives to manipulate, radicalize and inhumanly kill its believers.



Kenya cult massacre; some of the exhumed bodies of faithfuls of Pastor Paul Mackenzie church buried in the gigantic Shakahola forest, near Malindi, Kilifi County (Photos Credits: Yasuyoshi/AFP)

Gaps in Community Policing In Kenya

Community policing has not attained its fundamental goal in Kenya and this is due to various challenges the policy has faced since its inception;

The first one is the **knowledge gap**; from interviews and through focused group discussions, it was evident that a majority of the country's population had little knowledge on what community policing is, its structure, and how it works. One of the residents of Samburu county asked the question, 'Nyumba kumi ni nyama gani?' which when loosely translated means, 'which animal is community policing?' this alone signifies on how little Kenyans know about community policing. It is also notable that some police lack or have little knowledge on community policing thus becoming a stumbling block to its implementation (Gjelsvik, 2020). Therefore, the key component of ensuring that community members are aware of community policing is through public sensitization.

The ownership gap; for community policing to realize its goals then the question on who should own community policing should be answered, is it the police, the

community or should it be a partnership. It has been difficult for CP to realize its goals because according to (Ngugi, 2014) it's viewed as a state-driven initiative. Robert Peel who introduced the concept articulated the fact that "the police are the public and the public are the police" (Fridell, 2004).

Accordingly, Fridell (2004) the key principle of community policing is that the police should not be detached from the community, thus emphasizing that community policing is aimed at creating partnership between police and the public at large. In some parts in Kenya, Community Policing has lacked ownership in communities because it was seen to be controlled by the police. CP has taken a top down approach where instead of the community choosing who should represent them on the committee in some areas chiefs or the police select the stakeholders they deem to be fit to be part of the CP committee. The ownership gap has affected the structure of community policing where CP members don't know who to report to, the chief or the police. Chiefs have also taken advantage of this concept and want to manipulate it in their favor by either appointing their kinsmen or friends to be members of community policing. A key example was the Shakahola



Good News International Church self-proclaimed pastor, Paul Mackenzie, and 95 accomplices (not in the picture) charged with murder and terrorism of 400 people over Shakahola mass deaths (Photo Credit: BBC/GETTY IMAGES)

massacre where the community raised concerns way back before it escalated in 2019 but it was ignored by the police until its reoccurrence in 2023. The issue of goodwill especially from the police is linked to ownership and control, CP has suffered a big blow as the police want to own the process

Corruption has and still is a key issue. Most communities have cited examples of police collaborating with criminals within the society. Public opinion polls rank the police the most corrupt state institution in the country. Many members of the public see the police as a hazard, not a protecting force or a service to the population (Ngugi, 2014). A case study of Kilifi, participants argued that their efforts have proved futile because most time police collude with perpetrators and at times receive bribes from criminals especially drug traffickers thus making it complex to end the issue of drug abuse and trafficking within the community, hence making community policing ineffective. This has created fear among the communities that if you report some criminal activities the police end up either not arresting the suspects or informing the criminals that you are the one who reported them.

Diversity; There has been great confusion around which community policing model should be implemented as the government initiated two model, the community policing committees and nyumba kumi initiative among other pre-existing traditional models. Furthermore, there is no clear direction on which CP model should be implemented as some communities are implementing nyumba kumi and community policing committees separately when they should be one. This creates confusion, uncertainty and ambiguity on what community policing actually is. This diversity allows police to implement CP in ways that serve their interests rather than community interests. For instance we had community based vigilante whose role was to patrol and ensure security in community now feeling that CP was belittling their role. For instance there has been confusion between Nyumba Kumi and Community policing committee whereby, Nyumba Kumi structure comprised of a leader for every ten or more households, while community is policing committee which has a representative from the community, the police and other members of the community like the religious leaders or the businessmen forming the committee. The residents of Bungoma raised the issue of who is superior between Nyumba Kumi and CP committee. This issue of diversity has really hampered the effectiveness of CP as the community is confused on which CP model to

adopt and it has also made it very difficult to differentiate between CP and organized criminal groups. Although there are efforts by the government to integrate all these forms of CP to provide a uniform, coherent, and all-encompassing program for CP, it will certainly take a while for the various initiatives to be streamlined. It is as a result of these diversity that there as criminal groups masquerading as nyumba kumi while they terrorize and rob people. Groups like Chinkororo among the Kisii and Sungu-Sungu at the coast among others would rob people but hide behind community policing.

The issue of **cultural gaps** has also made it hard for CP to work effectively and efficiently. Kenya being a vast and diverse country, where each county has its own unique characteristics in terms of demographics, culture, livelihood, crime and political alliances, this different dynamics has greatly affected the implementation of CP. There are debates on how some cultural practices would affect community policing as some communities would justify that some cultural practices are their way of life whereas on the other hand it is a security threat. Some indecent cultural practices among some communities like the Samburu culture that supports FGM and cattle rustling. A case study from Samburu who engage in cattle rustling which is a security threat showed that majority engage in this practice to either revenge for their lost animals through a similar attack or as a way to acquire more animals which is seen as an act of heroism especially among the Morans.

Recommendations

The study, recommends that the, Government should roll out **proper training**, create awareness and sensitization programs on CP. Effective community policing requires training for both police personnel and community members. Effective training aids the development of new police attitudes, knowledge, and skills and facilitates

Public opinion polls rank the police the most corrupt state institution in the country. Many members of the public see the police as a hazard, not a protecting force or a service to the population



CP has taken a top down approach where instead of the community choosing who should represent them on the committee in some areas chiefs or the police select the stakeholders they deem to be fit to be part of the CP committee

reorientation of perceptions and refinement of existing skills. (Ngugi, 2014) Training will enhance a collaborative CP relationship between all the stakeholders.

CP should be a **people driven and centered initiative**; this is to mean that for CP to be effective it must take the bottom-up approach. Community policing should start from the people for it to be owned by the community thus making it collaboration between the police and the local community. 'The police need to work with the communities to be effective in security. Security must be owned and driven by the community. Without the community it will never succeed (Gjelsvik, 2020). The police should not be at the front for CP to realize its goals; it should revolve around the community thus taking the form of a partnership. CP should be embedded on the pillars of community partnerships and a collective approach to problem identification and solving. This is to mean that the police on their own cannot maintain peace and security thus they must partner with the people to prevent crime. To build a successful and effective community policing then it should be people driven so that there is trust between the people and the security sector.

There should be joint efforts to **fight corruption** from the government and the people. The government should take a lead in war against corruption. According to (Gjelsvik, 2020), low police salaries impede the building of police-public trust. Thus recommends increment in police salaries and improved living standards to ensure proper implementation of the policy especially amongst the police. Corruption especially among the police can be fought if the police get better living standards by salary increment as well as impartation of moral values such as integrity, honesty and trustworthy. The public on the other hand should be educated on corruption,

its effects and how to fight it by holding unto principles of morality.

Adoption of one CP model that best suits the needs of the community to avoid confusion and misunderstanding from other existing CP models like Nyumba kumi. This will ensure proper implementation to avoid misuse and misunderstandings over which CP model is the best. CP should define its structure to avoid confusion on whether Nyumba Kumi or CP Forums or the traditional vigilantes. To help strengthen community policing there should be a clear and uniform community policing structure to avoid confusion brought about by overlapping issues.

Eradication of obscene cultural practices that promote crime and insecurity. The constitution should outlaw some practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and cattle rustling. These cultural practices have been a big hindrance to effective implementation of community policing yet they expose the community to security threats. The government should also narrow the illiteracy gap in these communities as most who engage in such practices have low literacy levels. This will make community policing effective amongst some communities thus reducing security threats within the community.

Conclusion

This paper concludes that, even though community policing continues to face a number of challenges it is making progress and thus should be strengthened in order to towards promoting security from the grassroots level to the national level. This paper endorses the philosophy behind community policing, yet still skeptical of the role that CP plays in its current configuration and contend that the three key issues of diversity, representation, and ownership need to be addressed for transformative police reform efforts in Kenya to fully flourish.

Community policing, recognizing that police rarely can solve public safety problems alone, encourages interactive partnerships with relevant stakeholders. There is need for collaborative efforts between the police and the community members towards enhancing community policing policies. Therefore, community policing calls for a long-term commitment that entails efficient and effective planning and full participation to eradicate the insecurity challenges among community members. Further, police reforms should be geared to targeting community policing efforts.

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Prospects for Peace and Prosperity in the Horn of Africa: Overcoming Historical Legacies and Embracing Regional Cooperation for Sustainable Development

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Abstract

This study provides an in-depth analysis of the Horn of Africa's historical evolution, current geopolitical dynamics, and future prospects. It explores the region's transition from ancient empires to contemporary nation-states, highlighting the impact of colonial legacies and post-independence challenges. The Horn's strategic location near major maritime routes underscores its global significance for trade, security, and cultural exchange. Despite facing socio-economic obstacles, the region possesses immense potential for stability and growth through regional collaboration, resource management, human capital investment, and governance reforms. The study emphasizes the importance of international partnerships that respect local aspirations and sovereignty. It argues that with concerted efforts towards peace and development, the Horn of Africa can harness its historical richness and strategic position to become a linchpin of regional and global progress. The synthesis of scholarly sources and data offers a comprehensive understanding of the Horn's development trajectory and the crucial role it plays in shaping a shared and prosperous future.

Introduction

Nestled at the strategic crossroads where the Middle East meets Sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa—encompassing Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia—has long been a theatre of rich historical narratives and geopolitical intrigue. Its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a crucial maritime choke-point for global shipping lanes leading to the Suez Canal, renders the Horn a focal point for international power plays. This study embarks on a scholarly voyage through time, tracing the region's journey from the birthplace of ancient civilizations to the complex tapestry of modern statehood. It examines the indelible marks left by colonialism, the arduous paths to post-independence, and the pressing socio-economic challenges that intertwine with the ambitions of global actors. By dissecting the past, scrutinizing the present, and contemplating the future, this research illuminates the Horn of Africa's pivotal role in shaping not only its destiny but also the contours of global affairs.

Historical Foundations

The Horn of Africa, an epicentre of early human evolution, boasts a wealth of archaeological sites that provide insight into the lives of some of the earliest hominids. These ancestral discoveries, which include the famous "Lucy" (*Australopithecus afarensis*) and other significant fossils, have shed light on human development dating back millions of years, suggesting the region as one of the primary cradles of humanity (White et al., 2009).

Further advancing into the historical timeline, the Horn of Africa became the seat of the Aksumite Empire, a kingdom that emerged in the 1st century AD and flourished until around the 7th century. The Aksumite Empire's influence extended across the Red Sea to Arabia, down the Eastern African coast, and even reached the trading ports of the Roman Empire and India. Aksum's strategic location on the Red Sea—one of the ancient world's most vital trade routes—enabled it to



The ancient Kingdom of Aksum during the first Century C.E. celebrated its achievements with monuments like King Ezana's Stela in Stelae Park, Ethiopia (Photo Credit: John ELK)

become a commercial hub, facilitating the exchange of goods such as ivory, gold, frankincense, myrrh, and exotic animals. The empire's economic prowess was further demonstrated by its sophisticated coinage system, which helped to standardize transactions and solidify Aksum's position within the global trade network of the time (Phillipson, 2012).

The Aksumite Empire is also notable for being one of the earliest states to adopt Christianity as the official state religion. This occurred in the early 4th century AD under King Ezana, which predated the Christianization of the Roman Empire. The introduction of Christianity had a profound and lasting impact on the region, with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church becoming a cornerstone of Ethiopian cultural and religious identity. The church's traditions, liturgy, and ecclesiastical art form a unique branch of Christianity that has been preserved through the centuries (Munro-Hay, 1991).

The architectural achievements of the Aksumite Empire also speak to its historical significance. The empire is renowned for its towering stelae—giant obelisks carved

from single pieces of stone, used to mark graves or celebrate victories. The largest of these, the Obelisk of Axum, is a testament to the empire's technological and artistic capabilities. These stelae are an enduring symbol of the Aksumite legacy and are considered one of Ethiopia's national treasures (Phillipson, 2012).

In sum, the Horn of Africa's rich history, marked by human evolutionary milestones and the grandeur of the Aksumite Empire, underscores its long-standing economic, religious, and cultural significance. The empire's integration into global trade, its early adoption of Christianity, and its remarkable architectural feats are integral chapters of the region's historical narrative, which continue to resonate in the collective memory of its people.

Medieval Sultanates and Colonial Encounters

The medieval era in the Horn of Africa was marked by the emergence and flourishing of Islamic sultanates and kingdoms, painting a vibrant mosaic of cultural and

religious diversity. The introduction of Islam to the region, primarily through trade with Arab merchants along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, had a transformative impact on the local societies. Islam became deeply ingrained in the social, political, and economic life of the region, giving rise to influential Islamic states such as the Sultanate of Adal, the Sultanate of Mogadishu, and the Sultanate of Ifat.

These Islamic sultanates were centers of scholarship, commerce, and art, playing pivotal roles in the extensive trade networks that connected the Horn of Africa to the wider Islamic world and beyond. They traded in a variety of goods, including spices, textiles, and precious metals, and their urban centers became hubs of intellectual and cultural exchange, where scholars, merchants, and travelers from different parts of the world interacted (Trimingham, 1952).

The strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, with its access to critical maritime routes and proximity to the wealthy Arabian Peninsula, did not escape the attention of European colonial powers. By the late 19th century, as part of the broader "Scramble for Africa," Britain, France, and Italy sought to establish their dominance in the region. This led to the creation of colonial territories such as British Somaliland, French Somaliland (present-day Djibouti), Italian Somaliland, and Eritrea.

The colonial period was characterized by the imposition of European administrative systems, languages, and economic policies, often at the expense of local traditions and governance structures. The colonial powers redrew the map of the Horn of Africa, creating new borders that frequently ignored existing ethnic, cultural, and political realities. These arbitrary boundaries, which became the modern borders of the post-colonial states, have been a source of ongoing conflict and tension, contributing to disputes over territory and identity that continue to affect the region's stability (Lewis, 2002).

The colonial legacy in the Horn of Africa has had profound and enduring consequences, shaping the region's contemporary political landscape. The challenges faced by the Horn today, including ethnic conflict, nationalism, and the struggle for resource control, are deeply rooted in the historical experience of colonialism. Understanding this colonial past is crucial for addressing the complex issues that the nations of the Horn of Africa confront in their pursuit of peace, unity, and development.

Post-Colonial Struggles and Nation-Building

The transition from colonial rule to independent nationhood in the Horn of Africa was marked by significant challenges as countries in the region sought to build cohesive states from the disparate territories and peoples forged together under European colonialism. Post-colonial nation-building efforts were complicated by ethnic diversity, ideological conflicts, and the legacies of colonial borders.

Ethiopia's political landscape changed dramatically with the Marxist revolution of 1974, which saw the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the rise of the Derg, a military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Derg attempted to implement socialist policies, which were met with resistance from various factions within the country. This resistance, coupled with droughts, famine, and superpower meddling during the Cold War, plunged Ethiopia into a devastating civil war. The conflict continued until the Derg regime was eventually toppled in 1991 by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of rebel groups. The EPRDF established a federal system that sought to accommodate Ethiopia's ethnic diversity, but the country has continued to face ethnic tensions and political unrest (Lefebvre, 1991).

In Somalia, the fall of Siad Barre's military dictatorship in 1991 led to a power vacuum that quickly descended into clan-based conflict. The absence of a strong central authority resulted in a fractured nation, with various clan leaders and warlords vying for control. The ensuing civil war caused a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions, including famine and mass displacement. Efforts by the international community to intervene and restore order, such as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the U.S. military operation Restore Hope, were ultimately unsuccessful in achieving lasting peace.

“The colonial legacy in the Horn of Africa has had profound and enduring consequences, shaping the region's contemporary political landscape”

The empire's integration into global trade, its early adoption of Christianity, and its remarkable architectural feats are integral chapters of the region's historical narrative, which continue to resonate in the collective memory of its people

Somalia has since struggled with ongoing instability, the emergence of the Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab, and the challenge of establishing a functional federal government (Menkhaus, 2004).

Eritrea's path to independence was marked by a long and bloody struggle against Ethiopian rule, which began in the early 1960s. After 30 years of conflict, Eritrean forces, led by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), gained de facto control of the territory in 1991. Following a UN-supervised referendum in 1993, in which the Eritrean people voted overwhelmingly for independence, Eritrea emerged as a sovereign state. However, tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia persisted, particularly over border disputes, leading to the Eritrean-Ethiopian War from 1998 to 2000, which further impacted regional stability (Tronvoll, 1998).

The post-colonial era in the Horn of Africa has been characterized by the struggle to create viable nation-states in the aftermath of colonial rule. The region's experiences highlight the complexities of nation-building in a context of deep-seated ethnic divisions, ideological differences, and the enduring impact of colonial legacies.

Contemporary Challenges and Global Involvement:

The contemporary socio-economic and geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa is marked by a complex interplay of challenges that stem from both its historical underpinnings and the prevailing global context. The region, which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, is beset by widespread poverty, with a significant number of its inhabitants deprived of fundamental services such as clean water, adequate healthcare, and quality education. This deprivation is not only a reflection of internal disparities but also indicative of the broader global inequities that affect the region.

Food insecurity remains a critical and urgent issue within the Horn of Africa. The situation is compounded by

environmental factors such as recurrent droughts and the advancing threat of desertification. These ecological adversities are further intensified by the overarching effects of climate change. As a consequence, the traditional livelihoods of millions, predominantly those reliant on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism, are under severe threat. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has highlighted the vulnerability of these populations, noting that the changing climate patterns have dire implications for food production and security (FAO, 2017).

The region's susceptibility to food insecurity is not solely a product of environmental factors; it is also a result of socio-political dynamics that include conflict, displacement, and governance issues. These factors disrupt food systems, exacerbate poverty, and lead to cycles of crisis and aid dependency. The interconnection between these challenges underscores the need for comprehensive and integrated approaches that address the root causes of instability and build resilience among communities.

In addressing these challenges, it is essential for both regional and international actors to collaborate in implementing strategies that promote sustainable development and climate adaptation. Efforts to improve agricultural practices, invest in infrastructure, and foster economic diversification are crucial in creating a more secure and prosperous future for the people of the Horn of Africa.

The socio-economic and geopolitical challenges facing the Horn of Africa are further exacerbated by the strategic importance of its geographic location. This has historically attracted various foreign powers, whose interests and interventions have sometimes contributed to regional tensions. The contemporary global environment, with its shifting power dynamics and economic interests, continues to influence the stability and development of the region. The Horn of Africa's proximity to critical shipping lanes, its potential as a gateway to interior

markets, and the presence of valuable natural resources make it a significant focus for international strategic and economic competition.

Amidst these challenges, there are opportunities for positive engagement and support from the global community. International development assistance, when aligned with the needs and priorities of the local populations, can play a vital role in addressing poverty and promoting sustainable development. Furthermore, global partnerships aimed at combating climate change can provide the Horn of Africa with the necessary support to implement adaptation and mitigation strategies, reducing the vulnerability of its agricultural systems and enhancing food security.

To effectively confront the myriad of challenges in the Horn of Africa, a multifaceted approach is required—one that combines humanitarian aid with long-term development initiatives, promotes good governance and the rule of law, and encourages regional cooperation and integration. Such an approach should also prioritize the empowerment of local communities, ensuring that they are active participants in shaping their future.

The Horn of Africa is at a critical juncture, where the actions of both regional and global actors can significantly influence the trajectory of its development and stability. Addressing the complex socio-economic and geopolitical challenges will require concerted efforts, strategic partnerships, and a commitment to sustainable, inclusive growth that benefits all who call the region home.

The geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa cannot be overstated, given its proximity to key shipping lanes that connect the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, and its position near the Suez Canal, a vital corridor for global trade. This strategic location has historically made the region a focal point for international interest and competition, a trend that continues to this day with various global powers establishing a presence in the area.

The United States has long recognized the importance of the Horn of Africa, maintaining a military base in Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier. This base serves as a central hub for U.S. counterterrorism operations and a staging ground for military activities in the Middle East and Africa, reflecting the strategic military interests of the United States in the region (Whitlock, 2014).



President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (right) and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (left) of the Federal Government of Somalia reaffirm their commitment, partnership and support in the effort to build and strengthen the security sector in Somalia, October 15, 2023, Ankara Türkiye (Photo Credit: Somali Guardian)

China's foray into the region, marked by the establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, further indicates the country's strategic ambitions. This move is part of China's broader efforts to protect its maritime interests, ensure the security of its trade routes, and expand its global influence through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The base also serves as a symbol of China's growing capability and willingness to project military power beyond its borders (Downs, 2017).

Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have also made significant inroads into the Horn of Africa. Their involvement often reflects a blend of economic and military interests, sometimes linked to their broader regional strategies, such as the conflict in Yemen. These states have pursued a variety of investments and formed military alliances, leveraging their economic wealth to gain influence and secure their interests in the region (Bishku, 2012).

The involvement of these external actors has brought investment and development to the Horn of Africa, but it has also introduced new dynamics that can complicate the region's security and political landscape. The competition among global powers in the Horn of Africa has the potential to impact the sovereignty and agency of the local states, as their actions are often influenced by the strategic calculations and interests of their foreign partners.

To navigate these complex geopolitical waters, nations within the Horn of Africa must balance their relationships with external powers while pursuing their own national interests. Regional cooperation and a focus on sustainable development can help mitigate the risks of overreliance on external actors and ensure that the countries of the Horn of Africa remain the primary architects of their own future.

The Horn of Africa's international exposure has not come without its share of complications. The presence of global powers within the region has occasionally fueled proxy conflicts, as external actors with divergent interests and strategic objectives have sometimes engaged with local entities in ways that exacerbate internal disputes. Such interventions can intensify existing tensions and contribute to the destabilization of the region, creating a geopolitical landscape fraught with complexity. The interplay between local dynamics and the broader contest for influence among global powers often results

The geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa cannot be overstated, given its proximity to key shipping lanes that connect the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean

in a challenging environment for the nations within the Horn of Africa, as they navigate the delicate balance between external involvement and internal sovereignty (Menkhaus, 2009).

However, the region also holds significant potential for regional cooperation and collective development. The African Union (AU), recognizing the need for a unified and strategic approach to the continent's challenges, has put forth Agenda 2063—a comprehensive framework that aims to realize a "transformed continent" over the next several decades. This ambitious plan is centered around inclusive growth, sustainable development, and regional integration, with a strong emphasis on leveraging Africa's own resources and capacities to achieve its developmental objectives. Agenda 2063 is a testament to the AU's commitment to fostering homegrown solutions and promoting continental collaboration, which are deemed essential for overcoming the myriad challenges facing Africa and for achieving long-term prosperity and stability (AU, 2015).

The pursuit of these objectives within the Horn of Africa necessitates a concerted effort to strengthen regional institutions, enhance cross-border collaboration, and implement policies that are responsive to the region's unique contexts. By focusing on building resilient economies, fostering good governance, and investing in human capital, the nations of the Horn of Africa can work together to create a future that is more secure, prosperous, and equitable for all its citizens.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), comprising countries from the Horn and neighboring regions, has been proactive in addressing issues of peace, security, and economic cooperation. IGAD has facilitated peace talks, mediated conflicts, and worked towards enhancing regional economic integration. Its initiatives aim to foster a more stable and

economically integrated Horn of Africa, which is seen as essential for the prosperity and security of its member states (IGAD, 2020).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) serves as a regional bloc that plays a pivotal role in promoting peace, security, and economic cooperation among its member states, which include countries from the Horn of Africa and the neighboring regions. As a mechanism for regional integration, IGAD has been instrumental in facilitating dialogue and peace negotiations among conflicting parties within its member states, thereby contributing to the stabilization efforts in the region (IGAD, 2020).

In its capacity as a mediator, IGAD has actively engaged in conflict resolution processes, seeking to address the underlying causes of disputes and fostering a conducive environment for sustainable peace. The authority's involvement in peace talks has been particularly notable in situations of political unrest and inter-state conflicts, where it has provided a platform for parties to come together and negotiate terms that are conducive to peace and reconciliation.

Beyond its peacekeeping and mediation efforts, IGAD has also focused on initiatives aimed at enhancing regional economic integration. By promoting policies that facilitate trade, infrastructure development, and investment among its member states, IGAD strives to create a more economically cohesive and prosperous Horn of Africa. The authority recognizes that economic interdependence and regional collaboration are critical components for achieving long-term stability and security, as they contribute to the creation of shared interests and the reduction of economic disparities that can lead to conflict.

IGAD's initiatives are aligned with the broader goals of the African Union's Agenda 2063, which envisions a

“IGAD has actively engaged in conflict resolution processes, seeking to address the underlying causes of disputes and fostering a conducive environment for sustainable peace

peaceful and integrated continent. By working towards a more stable and economically integrated Horn of Africa, IGAD contributes to the realization of a vision where the region's countries are interconnected, resilient, and capable of providing a better quality of life for their citizens.

The success of IGAD's efforts is contingent upon the continued cooperation and commitment of its member states, as well as support from the international community. By addressing both the immediate needs related to peace and security, and the long-term goals of economic development and integration, IGAD plays a vital role in shaping a more stable and prosperous future for the Horn of Africa.

The Latent Potential of the Horn of Africa: Advantages Arising from Regional Stabilization

Unlocking Potential through Stabilization and Governance, the Horn of Africa possesses untapped potential that, if realized through stabilization and effective governance, could yield significant benefits regionally and globally. The key domains in which the Horn of Africa's potential can be actualized include:

Economic Growth and Trade:

The Horn of Africa's strategic geographical positioning along critical maritime routes, such as the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, establishes it as an essential gateway for international commerce (Getachew, 2001). Stabilization efforts could catalyze enhanced trade flows between continents, bolstering economic ties between Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The development of port infrastructure could position the Horn as a significant logistics center, augmenting the efficiency of global trade (World Bank, 2020).

Natural Resources:

Endowed with abundant natural resources, including hydrocarbons and minerals, the Horn of Africa stands to attract foreign investment and contribute to the energy and food security of the world with the advent of stability (Bereketeab, 2013). Sustainable and equitable management of these resources could provide a substantial economic boost to the region and beyond.

Cultural and Historical Heritage:

The region's cultural and historical wealth, exemplified by Ethiopia's rock-hewn churches of Lalibela and Somalia's

ancient port city of Zeila, offers vast potential for tourism that could foster global cultural exchange and understanding (Pankhurst, 1998). A stable Horn of Africa could enhance its tourism sector, preserving its heritage while promoting international cultural engagement.

Security and Counter-terrorism:

The Horn of Africa plays a critical role in combating terrorism and piracy, with ramifications for both regional and global security (Menkhaus, 2004). Stability in the Horn could lead to more effective measures against threats such as Al-Shabaab and maritime piracy, thereby contributing to broader international peace and security initiatives.

Human Capital:

Investing in the region's education and healthcare systems could harness the potential of its youthful population, creating a dynamic workforce capable of contributing to the global economy across diverse sectors, including technology, services, and entrepreneurship (UNDP, 2019).

Regional Integration and Cooperation:

Stabilization could bolster regional cooperation, with the Horn of Africa playing a pivotal role in initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to create a more integrated African market that benefits intra-African trade and global economic partnerships (African Union, 2015).

Environmental Stewardship:

Home to a range of ecosystems, from the Ethiopian Highlands to coastal marine habitats, the Horn of Africa could, with stability, implement improved environmental management and conservation practices. This would contribute to global biodiversity preservation and climate change mitigation efforts (UNEP, 2006).

The stabilization of the Horn of Africa could unlock a multitude of economic opportunities, bolster global security, foster cultural exchanges, and promote environmental conservation. Realizing this potential necessitates concerted action from local governments,



Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia exemplify the growth in infrastructure and a rising economy.(Graphics Credit: Business Insider Africa)

Endowed with abundant natural resources, including hydrocarbons and minerals, the Horn of Africa stands to attract foreign investment and contribute to the energy and food security of the world with the advent of stability

regional organizations, and the international community to tackle the underlying challenges of governance, development, and peace-building.

Recommendations for the Horn of Africa:

By following these bellow listed recommendations, the Horn of Africa community can harness its potential and embark on a path toward stability, prosperity, and sustainable development, benefiting not only the region but also contributing to global progress.

Strengthen Regional Integration:

Enhance collaboration among the nations of the Horn of Africa through existing frameworks like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU). Support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to facilitate trade, economic integration, and the free movement of people and goods (African Union, 2015).

Develop Infrastructure:

Invest in the development of port infrastructure and transportation networks to leverage the region's strategic location for global trade. This includes modernizing existing ports and establishing new trade corridors that can handle increased maritime traffic and connect landlocked countries to international markets (World Bank, 2020).

Manage Natural Resources Sustainably:

Implement policies for the sustainable and equitable exploitation of natural resources. Foster partnerships with international investors that prioritize environmental conservation, local community benefits, and transparent governance (Bereketeab, 2013).

Promote Cultural Tourism:

Develop the tourism sector by preserving and showcasing the region's rich cultural heritage and historical sites. Implement strategies that ensure tourism development is sustainable, inclusive, and contributes to the local economy (Pankhurst, 1998).

Enhance Security and Counter-terrorism Efforts:

Strengthen regional security mechanisms to address the threats of terrorism and piracy. Encourage international cooperation and support for capacity-building initiatives that enhance the region's ability to maintain security and stability (Menkhaus, 2004).

Invest in Human Capital:

Prioritize investments in education and healthcare to build a skilled and healthy workforce. Support initiatives that foster innovation, entrepreneurship, and skills development, particularly among the youth, to drive economic growth and technological advancement (UNDP, 2019).

Environmental Protection and Climate Action:

Implement comprehensive environmental management policies that protect the region's diverse ecosystems. Engage in international climate change mitigation efforts and develop strategies to adapt to the impacts of climate change, such as drought and desertification (UNEP, 2006).

Good Governance and Institution Building:

Promote good governance practices, including transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. Strengthen institutions to effectively manage public resources, deliver services, and uphold human rights.

Peace-building and Conflict Resolution:

Support peace-building initiatives that address the root causes of conflict in the region. Encourage dialogue and reconciliation processes that involve all stakeholders, including marginalized groups and communities affected by conflict.

International Collaboration and Partnership:

Encourage international partners to engage with the Horn of Africa in a manner that respects sovereignty and promotes mutual benefits. International aid and investment should align with the region's priorities and support long-term development goals.

Conclusion:

The Horn of Africa, with its rich historical narrative and strategic geopolitical position, holds considerable promise amidst its current challenges. As the region stands at the crossroads of potential stability and economic prosperity, its future hinges on overcoming post-colonial legacies and socio-economic hurdles. The interplay between regional affairs and global interests underscores its significance for international trade, security, and cultural heritage.

Moving forward, the Horn's potential can be unlocked through regional cooperation, judicious resource management, human capital development, and strong governance. Addressing conflicts at their core, bolstering security measures, and investing in infrastructure are key to transformative growth.

Global partnerships, attuned to the region's aspirations and sovereignty, are vital. A stable and thriving Horn of Africa offers the world not only security and economic benefits but also a treasure trove of cultural and environmental riches.

In essence, the Horn of Africa's past grandeur and present relevance pave the way for a future of opportunity. With a unified approach to peace and development, the region can rise as a cornerstone of stability and progress, making a significant impact on the global stage. The path ahead is one of hope, guided by the lessons of history and a commitment to a shared, prosperous future.

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
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