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
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Governance Dimensions of the Climate Change Adaptation Discourse

Exploring Some Policy Action Options for Eastern Africa



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Abstract

It is a fact that many hurdles stand on Africa's path towards the attainment of UN Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. One of these challenges has to do with climate change. The negative impacts of climate change in Africa and the implications of the same on sustainable development are widely documented. Nonetheless, more often than not, there is lack of overwhelming consensus as to exactly what needs to be done in order to put the continent on a sure path in as far as the climate change adaptation discourse is concerned. In response to this lacuna this by teasing-out a number of policy-action centred on the governance dimensions of the climate change adaptation discourse in the Eastern Africa sub-region. Taking on a



Illustration of UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 a sure way towards actualization and implementation of Africa Agenda 2063. (Photo Credit: United Nations)

descriptive and discursive analytical approach informed theoretical and policy-oriented secondary data on the subject area under focus herein. The analysis begins by examining the theoretical and conceptual relationship between governance on one hand and climate change adaptation on the other. The paper then takes stock of the climate change discourse in the Eastern Africa sub-region before examining the dynamics of governance thereof. Thereafter, the analysis confronts the hard questions around the debate by examining the likely policy options for the same in the sub-region. The main argument in the paper is that governance issues are key in as far the achievement of climate change adaptation is concerned, and this would be a sure way towards the actualization of not only the sub-region's SDG aspirations ahead of 2030 but also a critical pathway in the implementation of Africa Agenda 2063.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 95% of global rain-fed agriculture, making it a critical segment in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment. However, this heavy reliance on agriculture, along with other weather-sensitive activities like herding and fishing, increases vulnerability to climate change vagaries (Africa Development Bank, n.d.). Between 1991 and 2021, Africa experienced an average warming rate of approximately

+0.3°C per decade, which is faster than the warming rate observed from 1961 to 1990, which was +0.2°C per decade. In terms of temperature records, the year 2021 was the fourth warmest year on record for Africa (Maino & Emrullahu, 2022). Drought, conflict, population displacement, and food insecurity have severely affected the Horn of Africa region, leaving over 58 million people in acute food insecurity. Ethiopia, Somalia, parts of Kenya, and southern Madagascar have been particularly impacted.

In addition, severe floods have occurred in South Sudan, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Burundi, with South Sudan experiencing extreme floods for three consecutive years. Northern Africa, including Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya, has faced extreme heat, wildfires, and sand and dust storms. Droughts and floods pose the greatest hazards in the region, with over half a million lives lost and economic losses exceeding 70 billion USD in the past 50 years (Angelakis, 2023). Glaciers in East Africa are retreating rapidly, and increased temperatures have led to a 34% reduction in agricultural productivity growth since 1961 in Africa, posing a risk to food security and nutrition. Climate-related hazards continue to drive displacement in Africa, with around 14.1 million people internally displaced in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 due to conflict, violence, and disasters (Angelakis, 2023).

From the forgoing statistics, Africa bears a disproportionate burden of the impact of climate change, despite its minimal contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. Besides, addressing the challenges posed by climate change in Africa entails significant costs. Most African nations lack the financial capacity to allocate resources towards climate change adaptation, underscoring the crucial need for international assistance. More importantly, poverty and development challenges, high dependence on agriculture, climate variability and extreme weather events, land degradation and deforestation, limited institutional capacity, international dynamics, and conflict and political instability have all made the response to climate change in Africa even more complex.

The response to climate change in Africa has been multifaceted, with each country facing unique challenges and priorities. This paper explores the interplay between governance and climate change adaptation, discussing the theoretical and conceptual relationship between the two. Specifically focusing on the Eastern Africa sub-region, the paper evaluates the current discourse surrounding climate change and analyzes the governance dynamics within the region. The analysis further delves into the complexities of the debate by addressing critical questions and examining potential policy options for climate change adaptation in the sub-region. The central argument of the paper emphasizes the significance of governance in achieving effective climate change adaptation. It posits that addressing governance issues is crucial not only for realizing the sub-region's Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) aspirations by 2030 but also for advancing the implementation of Africa's Agenda 2063.

Research Objectives

The broad objective of this paper is to examine the interplay between governance, discourse, complexities, and policy options in climate change adaptation efforts in Eastern Africa. Further, the specific objectives of the paper include to: Assess the current discourse surrounding climate change adaptation in Eastern Africa; Analyze the impact of governance dynamics on climate change adaptation efforts in Eastern Africa; Explore the complexities and challenges of climate change adaptation in the sub-region of Eastern Africa, and finally, to: Identify and evaluate policy options for enhancing climate change adaptation in Eastern Africa.

Methodology

This paper adopts a qualitative research methodology, drawing upon authoritative secondary sources to comprehensively investigate climate change adaptation in Africa. The paper leverages the valuable insights and up-to-date findings disseminated by key institutions, including the United Nations, African Development Bank, African Union, and East African Community Secretariat, along with other reports and scholarly materials with a shared focus on this pivotal area of concern. The research aims to provide an insightful and comprehensive examination of the multifaceted aspects associated with climate change adaptation in Africa, contributing to the body of knowledge in this domain.

Discussion of Findings

Governance and the Climate Change Adaptation

Climate adaptation governance encompasses various perspectives on climate change management, different tiers of governance at the national, regional, and global levels, as well as diverse actors such as government entities, civil society organizations, and local administrators. This complexity necessitates a comprehensive understanding and strategic approach to ensure effective implementation and tangible outcomes in climate adaptation efforts. At the global level, the governance dimensions of climate change adaptation involve international cooperation, policy coordination, and financial mechanisms. Global governance frameworks, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement, provide a platform for countries to collaborate and negotiate collective responses to climate change. The governance dimensions include the establishment of adaptation goals and targets, the development of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), and the mobilization of financial resources to

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... challenges remain in ensuring equitable representation and meaningful participation of all countries, particularly developing nations, in decision-making processes, as well as in bridging the gap between financial commitments and actual disbursements for adaptation projects

support adaptation efforts. International organizations like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) play a crucial role in facilitating financial flows and providing technical assistance to developing countries. However, challenges remain in ensuring equitable representation and meaningful participation of all countries, particularly developing nations, in decision-making processes, as well as in bridging the gap between financial commitments and actual disbursements for adaptation projects (UNFCCC, 2015).

In Africa, governance dimensions of climate change adaptation are shaped by the unique challenges faced by the continent, including vulnerability to climate impacts, limited financial resources, and capacity constraints. The governance approach in Africa involves multi-level coordination, integration of adaptation into national development plans, and building resilience at the community level. Regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), play a critical role in facilitating coordination and knowledge exchange among African countries (AfDB, 2018).

Additionally, initiatives like the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) promote the mainstreaming of adaptation into policies, plans, and projects across various sectors. However, effective implementation is hindered by factors such as insufficient technical capacity, limited access to finance, and inadequate data and information systems. Strengthening governance in Africa requires enhanced institutional capacity, improved coordination mechanisms, and increased support from the international community to address the specific needs and priorities of the continent (AUC, 2017; AfDB, 2018).

The Climate Change Discourse in Eastern Africa

The Eastern Africa region already experiences direct consequences of climate change, particularly affecting climate-dependent activities like agriculture, which

contributes 43% to the gross domestic product (GDP) of East Africa and sustains the livelihoods of 80% of the population. The East African Community (EAC) Secretariat has been actively involved in local, regional and global discourse on Climate Change policy by taking a leadership role in regional Climate Change policy formulation and integrating climate change adaptation and mitigation into regional integration programs (EAC, 2023). The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organization consisting of seven nations located in the East Africa region known as the Great Lakes. These countries include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republics of Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda (EAC, 2023).

Since 2009, the EAC Secretariat has facilitated National Climate Change Roundtables in the Partner States of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda. These roundtables are instrumental in identifying national Climate Change priorities, which contribute to the development of national Climate Change positions. These positions are then incorporated into the African Common Position on Climate Change (EAC, 2023). The EAC was granted official observer status by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change during the COP18 in December 2012, in accordance with the Convention's provisions (EAC Secretariat, 2023).


In 2009, the EAC also devised the East Africa Climate Change Policy (EACCCP) in 2009. This policy aimed to enhance the region's ability to adapt and withstand the adverse impacts of climate change. The policy predominantly focuses on specific sectors such as livelihoods, energy, forests, agriculture and food security, disaster response, transport, and coastal zones, aiming to address adaptation priorities. However, Price contends that this sector-based approach hampers policy coherence by neglecting the interconnectedness across sectors. In addition to the policy, the Eastern

Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Platform (EACSAP) was established in 2014. This platform aims to foster agricultural productivity, adaptation, and resilience to climate change by leveraging technological innovation. Besides, individual East African countries have developed their own national climate change strategies, each at different stages of implementation.

Impact of Governance Dynamics on Climate Change Adaptation Efforts in Eastern Africa

The governance of climate change adaptation in Eastern Africa is complex and fragmented. There are a number of different actors involved, including national governments, regional organizations, local governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Hamilton & Lubell, 2019). These actors have different priorities and interests, which can make it difficult to coordinate and implement adaptation efforts (Johansson, Owidi, Ndonge, Achola, Garedew, & Capitani, 2018).

Viewed through policy and institutional framework lenses, the governance dynamics in Eastern Africa play a crucial role in shaping climate change adaptation efforts. The region's policy and institutional framework is essential for providing a supportive environment for adaptation initiatives (Njuguna, Biesbroek, Crane, Dewulf, & Tamás, 2023). However, Johansson et al. (2018) argue, limited coordination and integration between different sectors and levels of governance often hinder effective implementation. For instance, fragmented decision-making processes and conflicting policies among different government agencies and departments create challenges in adopting cohesive adaptation strategies. As a result, the integration of climate change adaptation into national development plans is often inadequate. This fragmentation can be mitigated through the establishment of intergovernmental coordination mechanisms and the development of comprehensive policies that mainstream climate change adaptation across all sectors (Johansson et al., 2018).



A farmer showcasing her maize produce and the benefit of investing in innovations and technology ranging from better seeds, machinery and digital tools alongside good agricultural practice (Photo Credit: AATF)

Second, the involvement of various stakeholders, including local communities, non-governmental organizations, and private sector actors, is vital for successful climate change adaptation. Governance dynamics heavily influence stakeholder engagement and participation. In Eastern Africa, limited engagement of local communities, especially marginalized groups, in decision-making processes constrains the effectiveness of adaptation initiatives. Additionally, power imbalances, corruption, and weak accountability mechanisms often undermine inclusive participation. To enhance adaptation efforts, there is a need for improved multi-stakeholder platforms, participatory approaches, and capacity building initiatives that empower local communities. Strengthening transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption measures is crucial for fostering trust and ensuring equitable distribution of resources (Apollo & Mbah, 2021).

Third, the availability and allocation of financial resources for climate change adaptation are strongly influenced by governance dynamics (Renner, 2020). Eastern African countries face significant challenges in accessing adequate funding and mobilizing resources for adaptation projects. Weak governance, including corruption and lack of financial transparency, hampers the efficient use of available funds and discourages international support. To overcome these challenges, strengthening financial management systems, promoting transparency and accountability, and establishing partnerships with international organizations and donors are essential. Effective governance mechanisms that ensure the fair distribution and utilization of financial resources will enhance the region's capacity to implement climate change adaptation measures successfully.

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Complexities and challenges of climate change adaptation in Eastern Africa

Despite efforts made in addressing climate change in Africa, it is still largely seen as a technical problem requiring specialized solutions (Addaney, 2018). Furthermore, East African countries tend to treat climate change as a separate issue from their overall development agenda (Orindi & Murray, 2005). It is possible that governments prioritize immediate poverty challenges over climate change due to their urgency. However, the region's sustainable development could be severely affected by predicted climate change impacts, economic constraints, governance issues, and land tenure problems, which pose significant challenges for adaptation (Adenle et al., 2017; Addaney, 2018; Nyasimi, Radeny, & Kinyangi, 2013).

Weisser et al. (2014) argue that adaptation to climate change should not solely focus on new activities, but rather strengthen existing livelihood coping strategies through knowledge empowerment and skills sharing. Therefore, Verburg et al. (2010) propose a coordinated approach involving the government, private sector, civil society, and community members to promote climate change education and innovation in East Africa. This collaboration aims to maximize the implementation of existing strategies for effective climate change mitigation and adaptation.

From a governance perspective, there is limited coordination and cooperation among stakeholders. Effective climate change adaptation requires collaboration and coordination among various stakeholders, including governments, non-governmental organizations, local communities, and international institutions. However, in Eastern Africa, there is often a lack of coordination and cooperation among these actors. This can be attributed to weak governance structures, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and inadequate communication channels. For instance, the absence of a clear mandate and coordination mechanism among government agencies leads to fragmented efforts and duplication of activities. Furthermore, insufficient involvement of local communities and civil society organizations in decision-making processes limits the effectiveness and inclusivity of adaptation initiatives (Nyong et al., 2018).

Climate change adaptation also requires strong institutions with the capacity to develop, implement, and monitor adaptation strategies. However, in Eastern Africa,

many institutions lack the necessary resources, technical expertise, and coordination mechanisms to address climate change impacts effectively. Limited human and financial resources, inadequate training, and high staff turnover contribute to the overall weak institutional capacity. This hampers the development of evidence-based policies, the implementation of adaptation measures, and the monitoring of progress. Moreover, the absence of comprehensive legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms further undermines institutional effectiveness (Baker et al., 2020).

Besides strong institutions, climate change adaptation requires significant financial resources to implement measures such as building resilient infrastructure, promoting sustainable agriculture practices, and improving early warning systems. However, in Eastern Africa, there is a significant gap between the financial resources needed for adaptation and the available funding. Limited public budgets, competing development priorities, and dependence on external aid make it challenging for governments to allocate sufficient funds for climate change adaptation. Additionally, the complex and lengthy procedures to access climate finance from international funds further exacerbate the financial constraints faced by Eastern African countries (GIZ, 2021).

Loss and Damage Fund: Operationalization Challenges

The establishment of the loss and damage fund was conceivably one of the key outcomes of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)'s 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) conference at Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt. 'Loss and damage' refers to the adverse outcomes resulting from hazards of climate change such as sea levels, prolonged episodes of extreme heat, land degradation, ocean acidification, and extraordinary incidents like wildfires, biodiversity depletion, and agricultural shortfalls. While there can be physical losses, such as damage to infrastructure or crops, there can also be cultural losses such as the loss of traditional knowledge or practices, and severe impacts on the health and well-being of individuals, such as death, trauma, and other psycho-social consequences. This makes it difficult to measure and quantify the actual impacts of climate change. With the ongoing progression of the climate emergency, these incidents are poised to occur with heightened frequency and

“The region's sustainable development could be severely affected by predicted climate change impacts, economic constraints, governance issues, and land tenure problems, which pose significant challenges for adaptation

intensified ramifications. It is important that the fund fills the gaps that current climate finance institutions do not, such as the Green Climate Fund. However, for the fund to be effective, the root cause of climate change must be tackled – and that means reducing emissions. The world urgently needs to find more resources for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. If we do not act now, climate change will have devastating consequences for people and the planet. Between 2000 and 2019, a total of over 7,300 natural hazard-related disasters occurred, resulting in an economic toll of approximately \$2.97 trillion. Nearly 6,700 of these incidents were directly linked to climate influences (Practical Action, n.d.).

Despite this great step towards cushioning vulnerable countries against climate change effects, challenges abound. First, due to the absence of a clear definition and a lack of systematic framework for assessing loss and damage, obtaining a reliable estimate of the expenses required to tackle these consequences, let alone reducing or preventing them, becomes an exceedingly challenging task. Second, the Transition Committee will need to make a determination regarding the allocation of funding for addressing loss and damage. This allocation could be directed towards countries in vulnerable positions, such as national or subnational governments, as well as vulnerable communities. This distribution might involve the participation of international and local NGOs and civil society organizations as intermediaries. In the event that developing country governments are entrusted with the responsibility of deciding the utilization of funds for addressing loss and damage, it becomes essential, given the probable scarcity of funds, to prioritize those countries that are most vulnerable. However, identifying the most vulnerable nations is not solely linked to their economic status as the poorest countries. Certain small island developing states, despite falling within the



Young activists demand a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate developing countries for the impacts of climate change at the COP27 UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (Photo Credit: Dominika Zarzycka/ Nur via Getty Images)

(upper) middle- and high-income categories, can be considered highly vulnerable due to factors like income loss stemming from extreme weather events and the loss of landmass caused by rising sea levels. Additionally, these states grapple with significant debt burdens and possess limited resources to effectively cope with the consequences.

Third, the issue of 'who bears the cost for loss and damage' is a major point of contention in global climate change talks. Developed nations are worried that this might lead to compensation and legal liabilities. Their acceptance of a loss and damage fund was contingent on excluding these terms from the COP27 negotiations' final text. Contributions to loss and damage funding have been made by both sovereign and non-sovereign entities, showing solidarity with vulnerable developing nations facing severe climate threats. However, the responsibility should not solely lie with governments. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres suggests involving the fossil fuel industry by imposing a 'loss and damage tax', collected from operating countries and directed to the fund. Since loss and damage finance is currently voluntary, the Transitional Committee and

Paris Agreement Parties need to agree on a sustainable approach for future fund contributions. This shouldn't be limited to initial contributions from wealthy countries but should establish an ongoing mechanism for fund replenishment.

Some Policy Options

First, as demonstrated from the literature, there is lack of coherence between and among countries in the region with regards to climate change adaptation. As a collective, East African countries need to strengthen policy coherence and integration by developing comprehensive policies that integrate climate change adaptation across all sectors. It is also imperative to establish intergovernmental coordination mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and coherence between different government agencies and departments. This will ensure that climate change adaptation is adequately addressed in national development plans and strategies.

Second, there is a need to promote more meaningful stakeholder engagement and participation within countries. Improving multi-stakeholder platforms and participatory approaches to enhancing the engagement

of local communities, marginalized groups, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector in decision-making processes will lead to empowerment of local communities. This can also be done through capacity building initiatives, ensuring their active participation in climate change adaptation efforts.

Third, countries should strengthen transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair distribution and efficient use of financial resources allocated for climate change adaptation. The countries should implement anti-corruption measures to combat corruption that hampers the effective utilization of available funds. This will help build trust, foster equitable distribution of resources, and attract international support.

Fourth, countries should improve financial management systems at both national and regional levels to enhance the mobilization and efficient use of financial resources for climate change adaptation. This includes promoting financial transparency, streamlining procedures for accessing climate finance, and establishing partnerships with international organizations and donors to secure additional funding.

Lastly, countries should build institutional capacity which might involve providing adequate resources, technical expertise, and training to enhance their ability to develop evidence-based policies, implement adaptation measures, and monitor progress effectively. Establishing comprehensive legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to support institutional effectiveness in addressing climate change impacts would also be critical in this instance.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper highlights governance, discourse, complexities, and policy options in climate

change adaptation efforts in Eastern Africa. The current discourse surrounding climate change adaptation in the region is actively led by the East African Community (EAC) Secretariat, which has facilitated roundtables and policy formulation to address national and regional priorities. However, the governance dynamics in Eastern Africa present challenges, including fragmented decision-making processes and limited stakeholder engagement, hindering effective implementation. To enhance climate change adaptation, policy coherence, intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, and meaningful stakeholder engagement are crucial. In addition, addressing governance issues such as corruption, weak accountability, and limited financial transparency is essential to ensure the fair distribution and efficient utilization of financial resources.

Moreover, the complexities and challenges of climate change adaptation in Eastern Africa require comprehensive approaches. The integration of climate change adaptation into existing livelihood coping strategies and the promotion of climate change education and innovation can strengthen adaptive capacity.

However, there is a need for improved coordination and cooperation among stakeholders, as well as stronger institutional capacity. Enhancing policy coherence, stakeholder engagement, transparency, and accountability, along with improved financial management systems, will contribute to successful climate change adaptation in the region. Also, building institutional capacity, addressing legal frameworks, and mobilizing financial resources through partnerships and streamlined procedures are vital for implementing effective adaptation measures. By adopting these policy options, Eastern Africa can enhance its resilience to climate change and ensure sustainable development for its population and ecosystems.

It is also imperative to establish intergovernmental coordination mechanisms to facilitate collaboration and coherence between different government agencies and departments. This will ensure that climate change adaptation is adequately addressed in national development plans and strategies

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Sixty (60) Years in The Making: A Look at China-Kenya Relations Since Independence

Mariah Faridah Muli

Abstract

The year 2023 marks a significant milestone in the diplomatic ties between China and Kenya as both nations celebrate the 60th anniversary of their establishment of diplomatic relations. This enduring partnership has witnessed remarkable growth and mutual cooperation across various sectors, fostering economic development, cultural exchange, and strategic collaboration. In the past month, the relationship between China and Kenya received a notable boost with the successful visit of President Ruto to China for the 3rd Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This visit further solidified the strong bond between the two nations and underscored the commitment to deepening cooperation for the mutual benefit of their citizens. The economic dimension of the China-Kenya relationship has been noteworthy. Major projects like Moi International Sports –Kasarani, Thika Super Highway, Standard Gauge Railway, Nairobi Express way and the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor showcase the positive impact of Chinese expertise. Cultural exchange has also been pivotal, fostering a deeper understanding through educational collaborations, people-to-people exchanges, and cultural events. These initiatives have enriched the social fabric of both nations, contributing to a vibrant grassroots-level relationship. The 60th anniversary of China-Kenya diplomatic relations provides an opportune moment to reflect on the achievements of the past and chart a course for an even more dynamic and fruitful partnership in the future. This article delves into the historical evolution of China-Kenya relations, highlighting key milestones, achievements and challenges over the past six decades. From the early days of diplomatic engagement to the present, both countries have navigated challenges and capitalized on opportunities to create a robust and multifaceted partnership.

Introduction

As China and Kenya celebrate the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic ties, it is a fitting occasion to contemplate the noteworthy journey that has forged the enduring connection between these two nations. Across six decades, China and Kenya have navigated a course defined by diplomatic achievements, economic partnerships, and cultural interchange. The significance of the 60th anniversary extends beyond a mere reflection on the past; it stands as evidence of the robust and adaptable nature of a diplomatic relationship that has successfully weathered the passage of time.

The diplomatic ties between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kenya were established on December 14, 1963. In the initial phase of this diplomatic relationship, there was steady progress. However, in 1965, the relationship experienced a downgrade to the

chargé d'affaires level, gradually returning to normalcy in the early 1970s. Notably, when President Daniel Arap Moi assumed office in 1978, the bilateral relationship witnessed rapid development. High-level mutual visits further strengthened friendly cooperation, leading to significant achievements across various sectors.

From the inception of diplomatic ties between China and Kenya since 1963, the collaboration between these two nations has transcended traditional boundaries, extending into various spheres such as economic, technological, cultural, and military affairs. The bilateral economic and trade relations have flourished over the years, marked by notable projects and significant increases in trade values. Noteworthy initiatives, including the Moi International Sports Center, the Eldoret hospital expansion, and the Gambogi-Serem Highway,



Mzee Jomo Kenyatta taking an oath during his swearing-in as Kenya's first Prime Minister on June 1, 1963 in Nairobi (Photo Credit: Nation Media Group)

underscore the depth of China's commitment to aiding and assisting Kenya's development.

In recent times, the economic landscape has witnessed a substantial surge in bilateral trade, with China exporting a diverse array of products, ranging from household appliances and industrial tools to textiles and pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, Kenya reciprocates with exports like black tea, coffee, and leather goods. The year 2002 witnessed a remarkable trade value of US\$186.37 million between the two nations, with Chinese exports accounting for US\$180.576 million and imports totaling US\$5.798 million. The mutually beneficial cooperation initiated in 1985 has led to the establishment of over 20 Chinese companies actively engaged in business ventures across Kenya.

Furthermore, a series of vital agreements, including the "Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation" and the "Agreement on Trade," signed between China and Kenya, serve as cornerstones for fostering enduring economic partnerships. Beyond the economic realm, China and Kenya have forged bonds in cultural and military exchanges. The cultural cooperation agreement inked in 1980 paved the way for educational

collaborations, scholarships, and the establishment of China's Xinhua News Agency's general branch office in Nairobi in 1985. In the military arena, the exchange of high-level delegations, including visits by General Liu Jingsong, General Li Jinai, and General Fu Quanyou, highlights the growing military cooperation between the two nations. The reciprocal visits of Kenyan military officials to China further solidify the commitment to mutual understanding and collaboration. The dynamic relationship between China and Kenya spans political, economic, cultural, and military domains, showcasing a comprehensive and mutually beneficial collaboration. This article will explore each facet in detail, shedding light on the positive trajectory of Sino-Kenyan relations.

Historical overview of China-Kenya Relations since Independence

In 1954, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, outlined five principles that constitute China's foreign policy. These principles encompass mutual respect for the sovereignty of other nations, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and the promotion of peaceful coexistence (Bergsten, 2008). According to Webster (2012), these

principles serve as the foundation for China's interactions with other countries, particularly in Africa. Despite changes in government, Dikotter (2010) notes that China has remained consistent in its foreign policy, leading many African leaders to characterize China as their "all-weather friend" (Ndola, 2009 & Guoji, 2010). China's adherence to these principles can vary, with instances where its implementation, such as the principle of mutual non-interference, differs significantly. China is steadfast in its belief that it should refrain from engaging in activities that violate the sovereignty of other nations. Conversely, China does not allow external interference in its own internal affairs (Condon, 2012).

Chinese investment in Africa has experienced a substantial increase during the post-Cold War era. According to Condon (2012), China surpasses the World Bank in financing infrastructure projects and offering sizable, cost-effective loans and grants to African governments. An example is the China Exim Bank, which extends substantial subsidized concessional loans to developing nations, featuring interest rates well below the market average (Lawson & Chan-Fishel, 2007). Typically, these loan agreements stipulate that a minimum of 50 percent of the funds must be allocated to Chinese goods and services, such as materials and construction firms (Brautigam, 2008). These loans are explicitly or implicitly linked to assurances of access to African resources like oil (Alden & Davies, 2006). Notably, the conditions for aid differ from Western practices, as they do not hinge on compliance with human rights and democracy standards.

Jomo Kenyatta's Era 1963-1978

At the time of independence, the relationship between China and Kenya was friendly, despite the ideological contrast of China embracing communism while Kenya adopted capitalism. The initial nations to recognize Kenya's independence were Germany (then West Germany), followed by Russia, Ethiopia, and subsequently China. This order of recognition is still evident in the diplomatic numbering assigned to their respective embassies as 1-CD, 2-CD, 3-CD, and 4-CD. China formally recognized Kenya's independence in 1963, marking the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two nations. On February 5, 1964, Wang Yutien assumed the role of China's ambassador to Kenya (Kamau, 2007).

China's embassy in Kenya is considered one of their largest in Africa, both in terms of physical size and staff. It is strategically situated in an area with relatively high

“At the time of independence, the relationship between China and Kenya was friendly, despite the ideological contrast of China embracing communism while Kenya adopted capitalism

security, close to the Defence Headquarters, Kenya Army Barracks, and in proximity to Kenya's State House. Similarly, Kenya maintains an embassy in Beijing, which serves China and a few neighboring countries.

During the initial decade of independence (1963-1973), Kenya navigated a world divided into two blocs during the Cold War: the capitalist West, led by the USA, and the communist East, led by the USSR (Sandrook, 1971). Even before gaining independence in 1963, Kenya was identified as a crucial regional player in the ongoing East-West rivalry. Both superpowers considered Kenya a pivotal country in Eastern Africa, recognizing the significance of its international political and economic relations.

Given its status as the most advanced nation in the region, boasting a well-developed infrastructure and a strategically located deep natural harbor near the Gulf of Eden, Kenya's foreign policy decisions became a matter of keen interest for the competing power blocs. Atwood (1967) illustrates the intensity of the competition to win Kenya's allegiance, with the Soviet Union and China launching a combined diplomatic offensive against the USA. Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya represented the interests of the West, while Jaramogi Oginga Odinga acted as the proxy for the East.

Jomo Kenyatta's foreign policy was characterized by a neutral stance, emphasizing non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, non-alignment in the broader East-West global power dynamics, and support for decolonization movements in Africa (Thomas, 1992). Despite the public rhetoric from Kenyan leadership, the country was deeply enmeshed in the sphere of influence of the Western world (Flint, 1965). Great Britain emerged as Kenya's most significant ally in the West, maintaining uninterrupted friendly relations since independence. Britain played a pivotal role as Kenya's principal trading partner, primary source of economic

The end of the Cold War marked significant shifts in global power dynamics, catching President Moi and his foreign policy advisors off guard with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union in 1989-1990

and military assistance, and major provider of private investment capital (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998). The diplomatic ties between Kenya and China were established on December 14th, 1963, when the People's Republic of China inaugurated its embassy in Nairobi. Wang Yutien was appointed China's ambassador to Kenya on February 5, 1964. This development was facilitated by the radical left wing of the ruling party KANU, led by the then KANU vice president and Minister for Home Affairs, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga led a high-powered Kenyan delegation to Beijing in May 1964 to discuss the enhancement of ties between the two countries.

The delegation primarily comprised Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's political allies within the party. While in Beijing, Odinga urged China to join independent African states in a collective effort against apartheid South Africa and the remaining colonial territories on the continent. Subsequently, his associate, Information Minister Achieng Onoko, followed suit in August 1964, engaging with Chinese Vice Premier, military commander, and Minister for Foreign Affairs Marshall Chen Yi. This was a significant accomplishment, given Marshall Chen Yi's prominent position in China's political establishment at that time (Chege, 2008).

In July 1964, the Chinese ambassador visited James Gichuru, who was then the Minister of Finance, to initiate negotiations on economic and technical cooperation between the two nations. They reached an agreement to dispatch a Chinese delegation consisting of 15 experts to Kenya to finalize specific areas of economic cooperation (Chege, 2008). Simultaneously, the relevant departments in the Kenyan government were invited to submit suitable project proposals to the Ministry of Finance. Despite a lengthy list of proposals from the Kenyan side, the Chinese delegation, in early 1965, committed to the construction of a textile factory and a sugar refinery (Kenya National Archives, File AE/14/70, 1965). Unfortunately, none of these proposals materialized due to internal political divisions within the Kenyan government.

Initially, China-Kenya bilateral relations were positive, but tensions emerged after 1965, leading to a downgrading of relations to the *charge d'affaires* level (Kioko, 2012). According to Morton (1999) in his biography of former President Moi titled "*The Making of an African Statesman*," British Intelligence closely monitored Odinga's strong connections with Eastern bloc countries, particularly the Soviet Union and China. They believed he sought their support to steer Kenya towards a more socialist orientation. Morton (1999) notes that by 1966, both Kenyatta and his Western supporters, especially Britain, became convinced that Odinga posed a significant threat that needed to be neutralized. This perception led to Odinga losing the influential position of Kanu's vice-president at the Limuru party conference in the same year. The conference resulted in the creation of eight vice-presidents within the ruling Party. Amid the escalating internal discord, anti-China sentiments were voiced in the Kenyan Parliament, warning against imperialism from the Eastern bloc. These warnings were championed by cabinet ministers close to Kenyatta and Mboya. As the left and right wings within the ruling party clashed, China became closely associated with the left wing, analogous to the Western states aligning with the right wing (Gertzel, 1968).

The Chinese Embassy registered a protest against speeches delivered in parliament by Tom Mboya, J.N. Osogo, and Daniel arap Moi, asserting that these speeches had subjected the People's Republic of China "to slander, vilification, and grave provocation" (East African Standard, Nairobi, July 13, 1966: 6). Following this, the left wing of KANU lost its position and was removed from the government in April 1966 (Gertzel, 1968). In March 1966, Kenya expelled Yao Chun, the third secretary at the Chinese Embassy, suspecting involvement in subversive activities. Yao Chun had protested against Kenya's Senate adopting a motion condemning Chou En-Lai's remarks on the five principles for developing relations between China and Africa (Chege, 2008). By August 1966, demonstrations took place outside the Kenyan embassy in Beijing, featuring posters condemning Kenya's

perceived reactionary politics. The Kenyan government issued a protest note to the Chinese embassy in Nairobi, but without receiving a satisfactory explanation, it recalled Kenya's ambassador to China. In what seemed like a retaliatory move, youths associated with the right wing of KANU staged a counter-demonstration outside the Chinese embassy in Nairobi, during which some of the embassy's windows were broken (Chege, 2008). The relations between the two states further deteriorated, ultimately leading to a diplomatic rupture in 1967.


In June 1967, Kenya formally declared the Chinese chargé d'affaires persona non grata, instructing him to leave Kenya (East African Standard, Nairobi, June 8, 1967, p. 2). In response, China expelled the Kenyan chargé d'affaires in July 1967, resulting in the absence of top-level representation at the Kenya embassy. With both ambassadors and their deputies absent from their respective posts, China and Kenya severed diplomatic relations. This state of affairs persisted for 11 years until the exits of Mao Zedong and Jomo Kenyatta (Chege,

2008). By the time of Kenyatta's death in August 1978, Kenya's foreign policy had firmly aligned with the Western sphere.

From the analysis above, it becomes evident that China-Kenya relations between 1963 and 1978 were shaped by the Cold War, the dominant global political trend of that era. This was exemplified by the internal struggle within KANU between the radical left wing, advocating for socialism and closer ties with the Soviet bloc and China, and the right wing, committed to enhancing cooperation between Kenya, the United States, Britain, and Western Europe (Gertzel, 1967). The eviction of the pro-China left faction from the government in April 1966 precipitated a deterioration in relations between the two states, culminating in a diplomatic rupture in 1967.

Daniel Arap Moi's Era (1978-2002)

In 1978, Daniel Arap Moi assumed the presidency, succeeding Jomo Kenyatta, and continued to adhere to a foreign policy that closely followed the existing template,



Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, former president of Kenya, (1924-2020) pictured at Kenya's 34th Independence Day celebrations in Nairobi on December 12, 1997 (Photo Credits: George Mulala/Reuters)

making only minor adjustments (Mwega, 2009). By the end of 1980, Kenya was perceived as a client-state of the West, as evidenced by two notable incidents. The first involved the controversial release of a US sailor, Frank Sand, who murdered a Kenyan woman named Monica Njeri in Mombasa, despite significant public outcry. The second incident was Kenya's decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics, urging the US to protest the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Both events underscored Kenya's foreign policy entanglement with and dependency on the Western bloc (Mwega, 2009). By the late 1980s, Kenya had solidified its status as the principal ally of the Western bloc in Eastern Africa. The country had entered into various security and military cooperation agreements, as well as mutual defense pacts, with the United States, Britain, and Israel by the conclusion of the second decade of its independence in 1983.

The end of the Cold War marked significant shifts in global power dynamics, catching President Moi and his foreign policy advisors off guard with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union in 1989-1990. This period witnessed the emergence of a uni-polar world order, increased influence from emerging economies like China and India, and the resurgence of Russia in global politics. The West began advocating for political reforms in client states, emphasizing pluralism and internal democracy (Koeberle, 2003).

In 1982, President Moi had amended Kenya's constitution, establishing it as a de jure one-party state (Goldsmith, 2001). The administration introduced intimidating electoral procedures and faced aid conditionality from Western agencies, demanding the allowance of multiple parties, the establishment of an impartial elections board, reinstatement of the secret ballot, and relaxation of press censorship (Lawson, 2013). The Western powers

... the relationship between China and Kenya from 1978 to 2002 during Daniel Arap Moi's era was shaped by personal interests and the prevailing global political trend, namely, the collapse of Communism

demanded these changes, warning of consequences if Kenya did not align with the democratic tide. By 1993, leaders like Moi, who had benefitted from Western support during the Cold War despite limited emphasis on internal democracy, found the honeymoon irretrievably over. Other leaders facing a similar scenario included Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, and the apartheid rulers in South Africa (Barkan, 1994).

In response to the Western conditions on pluralism and internal democracy, President Moi sought new economic and trade partners, particularly from the growing Orient. China, India, South Korea, and other middle-income non-Western nations like Turkey, Brazil, and Iran became potential suitors. Despite Moi's earlier accusations against China in the 1960s, he reached out to the People's Republic of China, reopening the embassy that had been technically closed in 1967. The restoration of relations between China and Kenya saw high-level visits, including Vice Premier Ji Pengfei's trip to Kenya in August 1980 and President Moi's state visit to China a month later, marking the first of three trips before his retirement in 2002. During Moi's first visit, Kenya and China signed agreements on economic and technological cooperation, covering various projects such as a new sports stadium, support for universities, scholarships, military and cultural exchanges, as well as a trade agreement (Alden & Oliveira, 2008).

A key component of the economic cooperation agreement was the Moi International Sports Center, a significant sporting facility in the Eastern and Central Africa region. It included a stadium, an Olympic-size swimming pool, and a modern gymnasium, constructed at a cost of 930 million Kenyan shillings, with 52% funded by an interest-free loan from China. This marked a departure from the commodity-financed projects of the 1960s and 1970s. China also constructed a teaching hospital at Moi University in Eldoret, the Gambogi-Serem highway, and provided teaching equipment at Egerton University under the economic cooperation grant. Notably, these projects were located in Moi's Rift Valley Province homeland. China committed to providing 10 scholarships annually to Kenya, two top-level military exchanges per year, and sought Kenya's expertise in training Chinese students in tourist management at Utalii College in Nairobi (Ministry of Tourism, February 5, 2007). Chinese officials were also interested in learning from Kenya's tea and coffee products for their agricultural modernization drive two decades later.

President Moi's state visit paved the way for diplomatic exchanges and negotiations at various levels of government. These visits prompted lower-level technical exchanges and activities, leading to significant developments and commercial initiatives involving China being reported in Kenya every month by the year 2000. It is noteworthy that China engaged with Kenya not just as a donor but as a rapidly modernizing developing economy transitioning from the Communist era. China sought to learn from Kenya's areas of outstanding progress, particularly in agriculture and tourism (Draper & Biacuana, 2010).

In April 2002, President Daniel Arap Moi held talks with visiting Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at State House, discussing bilateral ties and common concerns between China and Kenya. President Moi emphasized the profound friendship between the people of Kenya and China and expressed optimism that Zhu's visit would enhance their cooperative relations. He reaffirmed Kenya's adherence to the One-China policy and appreciated the close cooperation between the two countries in international affairs. Zhu, in turn, acknowledged the long history of traditional friendship between China and Kenya and expressed confidence in their continued cooperation in international affairs. The two leaders signed several agreements, including a memorandum of understanding on agricultural cooperation and an agreement on economic and technological cooperation.

Since President Moi assumed office in 1978, the friendly and cooperative relations between China and Kenya had consistently strengthened. By the time Moi left office in 2002, he had cultivated a positive relationship with the political authorities of the People's Republic of China. Despite Moi's government having a questionable human rights record, China overlooked these concerns to enhance economic relations with Kenya, similar to some Western governments like Britain and France until the late 1990s when they introduced conditions. President Moi's era laid the groundwork for enhanced cooperation with China, diversifying Kenya's sources of investment. Moi's primary motivation was to diversify the external development funds for Kenya and secure new development projects for his Rift Valley home region to consolidate his political base. Thus, the relationship between China and Kenya from 1978 to 2002 during Daniel Arap Moi's era was shaped by personal interests and the prevailing global political trend, namely, the collapse of Communism.

“In his visit to China in August 2010, President Kibaki witnessed the signing of an agreement allowing Huawei Technology Company of Shenzhen to provide wireless communication links to all government divisional offices

Mwai Kibaki's Era (2002-2012)

In December 2002, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) assumed power in Kenya, led by President Mwai Kibaki. His government implemented comprehensive governance and economic reforms, resulting in robust economic recovery and sustained growth from 2003 to 2007. The GDP surged from 2.9% in 2003 to a projected 7.1% in 2007, accompanied by a reduction in poverty levels from 56% in 1997 to 46% in 2006. The NARC government, replacing the long-standing KANU rule, received support from traditional donors while expressing a willingness to engage with the East if lectured on corruption by the UK and the US.

Diplomatic tensions escalated between Kenya and its Western allies, notably the UK and the US, as the NARC government pursued economic opportunities with China. Former British Ambassador Edward Clay's corruption allegations triggered a clash, with Kenya highlighting its interest in China's economic potential. President Kibaki's visits to Washington, London, Beijing, New Delhi, and Tokyo reflected a strategic diversification of diplomatic ties. Agreements with China covered development assistance, air services, technical cooperation, and trade. President Kibaki's "Look East Policy" signaled a shift away from Western influence, drawing criticism but emphasizing Kenya's pursuit of economic opportunities in the rapidly growing Chinese market.

As Kenya strengthened ties with China, traditional Western investors faced challenges. British firms lost contracts to Eastern competitors, and Chinese products gained traction in Kenyan markets. The NARC government's alignment with China was marked by infrastructure projects, mining concessions, and technological contracts. Despite concerns about human rights and governance, Kenya welcomed Chinese development assistance, contrasting with declining Western investments and



Mwai Kibaki, Kenya's Third President in 2010 at the signing ceremony for Kenya's new Constitution, which promised greater freedoms and rights. (Photo Credits: Tony Karumba/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images)

travel advisories. China emerged as a significant donor, contributing 13% of Kenya's external assistance in 2005.

The former president expressed a positive view of the relations with China, expressing a willingness to deepen and expand friendly cooperation between the two countries (Kioko, 2012). According to Chege (2008), economic relations between China and Kenya during the Kibaki era began with high-level political contacts, leading to a series of agreements. President Mwai Kibaki's official visit to China in August 2005 marked the first such visit by a Kenyan head of state in 11 years. During the visit, extensive talks with President Hu Jintao and Chinese officials resulted in a five-part agreement covering development assistance, air services, technical support for industrial products, equipment modernization, and training at the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (Gadzala, 2009).

The delegation also visited Shanghai, engaging in discussions with Mayor Han Zheng on special export industrial zones. Explorations in tourism, joint ventures in power generation, and machinery were pursued, leading to a successful Chinese trade exhibition in Nairobi in mid-2006. The NARC government quietly adopted a "Look East Policy," emphasizing improved

relations with Eastern countries, challenging the perceived Western condescension on human rights and democracy (Kurlantzick, 2007). During President Kibaki's era, China secured major infrastructure projects, mining concessions, and substantial technological and service contracts that were traditionally dominated by Western companies (Kibirenge, 2012). President Kibaki and his team considered Western protests insincere, viewing them as rooted in a sense of entitlement from past relationships when Kenya relied heavily on Western countries.

In his visit to China in August 2010, President Kibaki witnessed the signing of an agreement allowing Huawei Technology Company of Shenzhen to provide wireless communication links to all government divisional offices. This service had initially been undertaken by UK companies (China Daily, September 21, 2010). By then, Chinese assistance in health, infrastructure, energy, and education had exceeded Ksh 8 billion (\$109 million). Over ten ministers in the Kibaki government visited China, bringing cooperation in tourism, ICT, economics, and technology. President Kibaki's government focused on diversifying partnerships and fostering economic cooperation with China, welcoming Chinese investments and trade. The shift in diplomatic dynamics, accompanied

by growing Chinese influence, marked a departure from Kenya's historical alignment with the West. The study underscores the multifaceted nature of Kenya's engagement with China during this period, driven by economic interests, changing global dynamics, and a desire to reduce reliance on traditional Western alliances.

Kenya –China Relation gains momentum during Uhuru Kenyatta's Era (2013-2022)

Upon assuming office in 2013, President Kenyatta and his Deputy William Ruto had personal challenges at the International Criminal Court. Despite this, President Kenyatta expressed his determination to elevate Kenya's standing on the global diplomatic stage. With the inauguration of a new government, there was a prevailing belief that it would uphold President Kibaki's "look east" policy, fueled by strained relations between Kenya and Western countries due to ICC cases (Brown and Sriram, 2012).

Munene (2013) notes a significant observation during President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy William Ruto's inauguration on April 9, 2013, where China's flag was the sole foreign flag displayed outside Africa. Notably, China sent a high-ranking special envoy to the event, while Western nations were represented only by their ambassadors. President Kenyatta's initial state visit outside Africa took place in China from August 19th to 23rd, 2013, encompassing diplomatic and bilateral engagements with Chinese state officials and investors (Ongiri, 2013).

Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang reciprocated the visit on May 10, 2014, resulting in the signing of 17 agreements between President Kenyatta and the Chinese Prime Minister. These agreements were anticipated to inject significant funds into Kenya's economy, particularly benefiting the railway, health, wildlife, and security sectors. The flagship project was the multi-billion standard gauge railway (SGR), with China financing 85 percent of the Mombasa-Nairobi phase estimated at Ksh 327 billion. Additionally, the leaders agreed to establish a China-

Africa Development Bank in Nairobi, with an infusion of around Ksh 170 billion. The China-Africa Research Centre, funded at Ksh 5.1 billion, and a Ksh 860 million financial support for wildlife conservation in Kenya were also announced by Prime Minister Li. During the high-profile visit, educational collaborations were solidified, including the establishment of a state-of-the-art joint laboratory for crop molecular biology, with an estimated cost of Ksh 5.1 billion. President Kenyatta, addressing the press at State House, emphasized the government's commitment to maintaining a strong relationship with China. This underscored the foreign policy direction expected from the Kenyatta administration.

From March 13 to March 18, 2017, President Uhuru participated in the Belt and Road Initiative forum in Beijing, engaging in bilateral discussions with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. In November 2018, he attended the 7th FOCAC summit in Beijing. In April 2019, President Kenyatta visited China accompanied by officials, including Raila Odinga, the African Union High Representative for Infrastructure Development in Africa. During these meetings, he advocated for enhanced connectivity, market openness, adherence to rule-based international trade, strengthened multilateral cooperation, and sustainable, people-centered development.

Oruko (2019) characterized the meetings between Presidents Kenyatta and Jinping as "extremely successful," citing the following outcomes: i) the signing of a trade agreement for the export of frozen avocados from Kenya to China, following a Memorandum of Understanding on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards signed the previous year for the export of various horticultural products from Kenya to China; ii) the signing of a Framework Agreement between the Kenya National Highways Authority and the China Road and Bridge Cooperation for the construction of Kenya's first expressway from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport to Westlands; iii) the signing of a Sh17 billion financing agreement between Kenya and China EXIM Bank for the construction of the Konza Technopolis Data Center and IT infrastructure.


President Kibaki and his team considered Western protests insincere, viewing them as rooted in a sense of entitlement from past relationships when Kenya relied heavily on Western countries

Despite the anticipation of financing for the second phase of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) during the visit, the deal fell through as China requested a feasibility study. Transport Cabinet Secretary James Macharia had prematurely portrayed the deal as certain before the visit, expressing Kenya's intent to sign a \$3.8 billion (Sh380 billion) financing deal with Beijing to extend the SGR between Naivasha and Kisumu. The abrupt change was attributed to negative media reports from Kenya, concerns about rising debt, and increasing tensions between the two nations, as revealed in an interview with a Chinese Embassy official (personal communication, June 14, 2019). Chinese Ambassador Wu Peng highlighted positive aspects of China-Kenya relations on April 23, 2019, emphasizing the awarding of scholarships to 170 Kenyan students and training for 686 Kenyans in China. He noted the significant influx of Chinese tourists to Kenya and the exchange of Kenyan employees with Chinese enterprises. Wu Peng expressed confidence in the elevated stage of China-Kenya relations and pledged to foster bilateral cooperation in various sectors.

Acknowledging China's recent criticism for using debt as a means of control in Africa, the narrative was challenged by China, asserting that it was funded by Western powers losing influence on the continent. President Kenyatta's communication strategy shifted focus to investment deals during visits to China, avoiding controversial discussions on debt. The China-Kenya relationship has reached its peak during President Uhuru's tenure, establishing a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership between President's Xi Jinping and Kenyatta.

China Initiatives in Kenya in various sectors

Through trade, investment, and strategic diplomacy, China is reshaping the landscape of sub-Saharan Africa. Beijing has established robust economic connections with the region's major economies, and Chinese companies are predominant in the execution of infrastructure projects. In 2020, Chinese firms were responsible for nearly one-third of infrastructure initiatives in Africa valued at a minimum of \$50 million. Moreover, China is progressively



Uhuru Kenyatta, former president of the Republic of Kenya held bilateral talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li to foster enhanced cooperation between the two countries (Photo Credits: Capital News/PSCU)

supplanting the United States and Europe as primary trade partners for Africa. This expanding economic influence is concurrently translating into geopolitical sway for Beijing.

The China's Belt and Road Initiative in Kenya

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) encompasses extensive regions of the developing world, with a primary focus on establishing linear connective infrastructure. This infrastructure spans roads, railways, ports, airports, oil and gas pipelines, telecommunication networks, and underwater cables. Additionally, the initiative extends to diverse projects, including energy plants, power grids, utility stations, extractive and manufacturing industries, industrial parks, processing zones, tourism, information technology, biotechnology, and alternative energy. The project's scope also involves 'soft infrastructure,' incorporating the development of free trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and the liberalization of market sectors for foreign investment. China aims to train over 20,000 'connectivity professionals' in the next five years to ensure a sufficient pool of talent capable of sustaining the BRI (Blanchard and Flint 2017: 227).

The appointment of Kenya's third president, Mwai Kibaki, not only marked the conclusion of nearly three decades of rule under the second president but also signaled a substantial shift in Kenya's foreign policy, leading to the adoption of the "Look East" policy (Kagwanja, 2015). This policy change involved modifying Kenya's investment climate to favor nations like China over its traditional European and U.S. partners (Kabaruku, 2011, December). Consequently, China has now become Kenya's primary trading partner, investor, and contractor (Liu, 2018). The collaborative efforts between China and Kenya have resulted in the completion of various projects, including the Thika Superhighway and the refurbishment of the Moi International Sports Centre in Nairobi.

A pinnacle in the Kenya-China partnership was the country's inclusion in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. The BRI focuses on enhancing Kenya's connections with landlocked nations like Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan through the construction of a modern railway line from the port of Mombasa. The BRI comprises a land-based silk road, the "belt," and an ocean-going maritime road, the "road." Kenya now hosts the recently completed BRI Africa hub, underscoring its significance in the BRI initiative.

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In 2017, under the leadership of President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya joined the China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the third African country to do so after South Africa and Egypt. Launched by China in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative is an extensive infrastructure project designed to establish connectivity between Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa through a comprehensive network of ports, railways, highways, and various other infrastructure initiatives. Through the BRI, China has demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting Kenya in achieving mutual development goals. This support encompasses capital investment, technology transfer, market access, enterprises, talent exchange, and the sharing of rich development experiences. To address the labor needs of numerous ongoing projects in Kenya, including the 609 km long Standard Gauge Railway with extensions to Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan, the Chinese government has played a crucial role. Furthermore, educational collaboration between the Chinese government and the Kenyan Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology (Mo-HEST) has been established, with AVIC International signing a USD 30 million agreement for Phase I of the Kenya-China TVET Project. This project involves establishing technical and vocational laboratories in Kenya, with AVIC International commissioning, installing, and equipping 10 vocational and technical institutions during Phase I. The initiative also includes instructor training for approximately 15,000 Kenyans, along with curriculum content provision.

Moreover, as part of its commitment to corporate social responsibility, AVIC International Kenya initiated a program known as the Africa-Tech Challenge, which has been operational since June 2014 and has conducted three successful competitions. The primary objective of this initiative is to empower young individuals by providing them with technical skills. After receiving training, participants engage in a competition where

the top performers are granted full scholarships for master's degrees at prestigious Chinese universities, along with cash prizes. Additionally, the learners have the opportunity to undertake internships in various Chinese companies based in Kenya. Winning institutions are also granted commercial contracts for the manufacturing and supply of spare parts to China.

For example, in 2014, Nyeri National Polytechnic and Kabete National Polytechnic emerged as winners, securing scholarships for students to pursue studies in China. Furthermore, they earned a commercial contract valued at USD 100,000 for the production and export of mechanical spare parts to China. AVIC International Kenya has taken the initiative to implement Phase II of the TVET Project, with the goal of equipping a total of 134 technical and vocational education and training institutions nationwide by the year 2020.

The implementation of the SGR project led to the generation of approximately 30,000 new jobs for local residents. In its inaugural year, the railway facilitated the transportation of 5.4 million passengers and 1.3 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of shipments across Kenya. If this performance had been sustained, it held the potential to significantly amplify African exports. The Chief Economist in the State Department of Infrastructure within the Kenyan Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure emphasized that the SGR would not only enhance trade and investment but also generate additional employment opportunities, ultimately contributing to the improvement of livelihoods in the East African Community. As of 2023, this dynamic collaboration continues to shape Kenya's economic landscape. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ushered in a more positive era for globalization, fostering global rebalancing. In Africa, this initiative has facilitated the continent's transition to a new framework, where

international collaboration promotes value addition, innovation, and heightened prosperity. In Kenya, for example, projects under the BRI, such as Standard Gauge Railway line linking the port of Mombasa to the capital, Nairobi, have alleviated traffic congestion, generated employment opportunities for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) graduates, and supported the growth of businesses.

Economic Ties and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

China has significantly increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Kenya, particularly over the last decade. The inflow of FDI from China is driven by its closer economic ties with Kenya, bringing both new investments and policies. China's FDI in Kenya is largely directed towards the production of goods and services for domestic and international markets. While the FDI flows from China have become substantial, ranging from \$1-13 million, they remain relatively low. The competitive attractiveness of Kenya for FDI weakened, making it reliant on China's investments, which constitute a significant proportion of the country's FDI. (Brautigam, 2009: 142)

The nature of China's FDI in Kenya is more focused on capital investment rather than the quality of activities, with a notable emphasis on extractive industries such as oil, mining, gas, minerals, and natural resources. The loans from China often support multinational or state-owned companies, facilitating market access and the purchase of Chinese goods. Kenya's investment environment underwent liberalization in 1995, and the Investment Promotion Act of 2004 demonstrated the government's commitment to attracting FDI. However, corruption and a poor investment climate have historically hindered FDI inflows in Kenya, with levels dropping to less than 10% of GDP around 2000. Despite fluctuations, Kenya's FDI inflows have recently recovered, reaching levels comparable to the 1990s. China's FDI in Kenya includes medium to short-term loans, often supporting infrastructure development in sectors like telecommunications, with projects such as Huawei's national fiber-optic network. (Taylor, 2009)

Between 2015 and 2019, China-Kenya bilateral trade experienced significant growth, with a total value reaching USD 18.20 billion. However, the trade balance heavily favored China, with Kenya's imports constituting 97 percent and exports accounting for only 3 percent. The surge in imports was attributed to Kenya's participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly

“Since 2005, the Kenyan Investment Authority had registered and facilitated 313 Chinese investment projects worth USD 1.55 billion, surpassing U.S. investments in Kenya

through projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. Despite the trade deficit, there was a slight increase in Kenyan exports to China, suggesting potential opportunities in the Chinese market. (CARI, 2022)

Since 2005, the Kenyan Investment Authority had registered and facilitated 313 Chinese investment projects worth USD 1.55 billion, surpassing U.S. investments in Kenya. Chinese investments increased notably with the initiation of the SGR in 2014, creating opportunities in construction and manufacturing. China played a role in reducing Kenya's dependence on imported commodities, particularly in high-tech fields like cloud computing. The growth in trade and investment was reflected in the increasing Chinese loans to Kenya, making China the leading bilateral creditor and raising concerns about fluctuating interest rates and long repayment periods. (Miriri, 2022)

China's deepening economic ties with Kenya expanded its conceptualization of national security interests with a focus on maritime safety and involvement in mega infrastructure projects. However, security concerns arose due to local frustrations over job opportunities for Kenyans. China's interest in Kenya's security sector attracted Western attention, with discussions on peace and security during China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit in January 2022. An Afrobarometer survey revealed mixed sentiments among Kenyan respondents regarding the past economic and political influence of China, the United States, and Japan. While 54 percent viewed China as a positive influence, the United States received slightly higher favorability at 57 percent, and Japan garnered positive responses from 39 percent. (Kitimo, 2022)

China's official Visit to Kenya amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2022

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Kenya on January 6, 2022, engaging in crucial talks expected to result in several bilateral agreements. This marked his fourth visit, following his Africa trip that commenced in Eritrea. Kenya's former Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Raychelle Omamo greeted him, and the visit included activities like a tour of the Kipevu Oil Terminus, a Ksh 40 billion (\$353 million) Chinese-built facility to enhance access for larger oil vessels at the Mombasa Port. Meetings with President Uhuru Kenyatta and discussions with Kenyan ministers were part of the agenda.

The purpose of the visit, outlined by the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Nairobi, focused on following up on the nine-point declaration made by African and Chinese ministers during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in Senegal the previous November. This declaration covered various areas, including the supply of Chinese Covid-19 vaccines, collaboration on the blue economy and climate change, green investments, infrastructure support, skills training, and technology sharing. The ministry clarified that the visit aimed to "dovetail new measures for practical cooperation," including support for local Covid-19 measures and economic recovery.

During the FOCAC, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed to delivering one billion doses of Covid-19 vaccines to African countries in 2022 and pledged an additional \$40 billion for investments in Africa. While the specific agreements signed by Mr. Wang in Mombasa were undisclosed, a diplomatic source suggested they would involve health, the blue economy, utilization of deep-sea resources, and arrangements for value addition to agricultural products. These agreements followed a "roundtable" with Ms. Omamo and other Cabinet Secretaries, emphasizing the opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations and solidify the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership between Kenya and China. Wang expressed China's commitment to working with Africa to overcome the pandemic, adding that China would appoint a special envoy to the Horn of Africa to support security efforts in the region and ensure lasting peace and prosperity. The diplomatic discussions also highlighted the strong economic growth and infrastructure development in Kenya due to robust collaboration with China and participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. The two nations signed cooperation agreements in various sectors, including the digital economy, investment, agriculture, and the export of Kenyan agricultural products to China. (ChinaDaily, 2022)

Transformative Chinese engagement in Kenyan Education and innovation

In recent years, Kenya underwent rapid economic growth, yet its education sector faced significant challenges, including a lack of resources and waning interest in traditional education. The arrival of Chinese nationals played a pivotal role in transforming this landscape. Between 2007 and 2018, large Chinese corporations, such as the state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and multinational giant Huawei,

addressed Kenya's educational issues. Huawei's "Seeds for the Future" project, initiated in 2008, established ICT classes in five Kenyan universities, significantly contributing to the development of skilled professionals. Huawei have ICT classes, a portion of SFF, in five universities in Kenya, University of Nairobi being one of them. Beyond major corporations, smaller Chinese businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actively supported education. For instance, China House's funding of the Anti-Circumcision Rescuing Centre in 2017 addressed cultural barriers to female education by providing free primary education to girls escaping circumcision. The Dream Building Service Association (DBSA), through projects like the Changrong Light Center, significantly contributed to school construction in Nairobi's Mathare slums, enhancing access to education and providing free meals through the Free Lunch Program. (Olander E, 2018)

The Chinese government also played a crucial role in supporting Kenyan education. Recognizing the importance of soft power, the government funded Mandarin language programs through the Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi. This renowned Chinese language and culture learning center collaborated with universities in Nairobi, including private schools like Rusinga School. The government's investment in qualified teachers, classroom decorations, and textbooks demonstrated its commitment to enriching Kenya's education system. (Olander E, 2018)

William Ruto's Era (2023-to Present)


As Kenya ushers in a new chapter under the leadership of President William Ruto, the intricacies of its relationship with China take center stage. Against the backdrop of mounting debt and escalating living costs. In 2022, President Ruto, was a prominent presidential aspirant and pledged transparency by vowing to publish government contracts with China. Furthermore, he had emphasized a commitment to tackling illegal practices, asserting that Chinese nationals working without proper authorization will face deportation if he secures the presidency in the upcoming elections on August 9. These promises resonate with a population grappling with the significant challenges posed by increasing debt levels, exemplified by Kenya's indebtedness of approximately \$8 billion to China amid a 2022/23 budget deficit of 6.2% of the gross domestic product amounting to 3.3 trillion shillings (\$27.86 billion). The unfolding era of President Ruto holds the potential for reshaping the dynamics of Sino-Kenyan

collaboration and addressing the pressing concerns of the Kenyan populace. (Kinyanjui M, 2023)

China and Kenya have affirmed their commitment to deepening Belt and Road cooperation, as senior Chinese diplomat Wang Yi met with Kenyan President William Ruto in Nairobi on July 2023. Wang highlighted the equal and supportive relationship between the two nations over the past 60 years, emphasizing China's strategic approach to relations with Kenya. Both sides expressed the desire to elevate their comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership to a new level, focusing on development, cooperation, and mutual revitalization. China pledged active collaboration with Kenya in various fields, including railway, highway, aviation, and information, within the frameworks of Belt and Road cooperation and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. President Ruto praised China's efforts in fostering relations with Kenya and affirmed his country's commitment to deepening cooperation, particularly in areas like trade, investment, agriculture, healthcare, and infrastructure. Both nations expressed readiness to work together for common development, regional peace, and security, aiming for a mutually beneficial and win-win partnership. (Kinyanjui M, 2023)

On October 15, 2023, a pivotal moment unfolded as the collaboration between China and Kenya came to the forefront. President William Ruto played a central role in substantial discussions with President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People, marking a significant episode during the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing. This meeting showcased the enduring friendship between the two nations and laid the groundwork for strengthened ties, marking a noteworthy chapter in Africa-China relations. President Ruto emphasized Kenya's dedication to the one-China policy, acknowledging the trust and respect that have defined the diplomatic relations between the two countries over the past 60 years. (Capital News, 2023)

Key achievements during President Ruto's visit include the signing of a significant Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Kenyan government and Huawei, extending collaboration to enhance Kenya's information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure. This partnership aligns with Kenya's digital future aspirations and underscores the potential for technological advancements to transform various aspects of the nation's development. Another notable



Kenyan President William Ruto meets with Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, in Nairobi, Kenya, July 22, 2023. (Photo Credit: XINHUA)

agreement involves the partnership between Kenya and China's Energy International Group, promising to modernize Kenya's power system and address a vital component of its development agenda – a robust and sustainable energy infrastructure. These agreements highlight the depth of collaboration between the two nations, focusing not only on economic growth but also on technological advancement and sustainable development. As Kenya continues its journey toward economic growth and technological advancement, these partnerships are poised to play a pivotal role in shaping the nation's future. (African News, 2023)

During the talks, President Ruto commended China's successful hosting of the Belt and Road Forum, expressing confidence in President Xi's outlined "eight major steps" for high-quality Belt and Road cooperation. President Ruto highlighted the positive impact of the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway on Kenya's economic capacity and people's lives, emphasizing its role in driving industrialization, agricultural modernization, and economic integration in Kenya and Africa. Undeterred in Kenya's commitment to the one-China policy, President Ruto praised China's stance on human rights and international issues. Kenya aspires to draw upon China's development experiences,

fostering practical collaboration and cultural exchanges to solidify the Kenya-China comprehensive strategic partnership and reinforce Africa-China relations. (African News, 2023)

The meeting between President Xi and Ruto not only reflects the depth of the bond between China and Kenya but also signifies a shared commitment to equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation. It underscores the profound impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on Kenya's development and exemplifies the diplomatic wisdom displayed during the meeting. This engagement holds broader significance, serving as a testament to the growing importance of China's engagement with Africa and its promising impact on the continent's future.

As Kenya and China further deepen their diplomatic ties, it is crucial to recognize that this relationship, spanning 60 years, extends beyond the borders of two nations. It symbolizes the promotion of a world where countries, irrespective of size, cooperate for the collective good. This exemplifies the ideals of diplomacy and partnership that have the potential to make our world a better place. The path forged by China and Kenya stands not only as an example but as a blueprint for fostering greatness

through collaboration and creating a more prosperous and interconnected world.

Navigating the Geopolitical challenges and complexities

Similar to any enduring connection, the dynamics between Kenya and China have faced numerous challenges, evolving through periods of instability and change. It is crucial to acknowledge the imperfections that have played a role in shaping this relationship, as this recognition is vital for fostering a resilient and equitable connection between the two nations. From the early years characterized by ideological disparities to contemporary shifts in economic landscapes, Kenya and China have demonstrated flexibility and resilience, emphasizing the enduring strength of their friendship.

During the formative years of the 1960s-1970s, Kenya aligned with the Western bloc, creating tension with China, a socialist state. The clash of ideologies strained diplomatic ties as Kenya pursued capitalist economic policies while China leaned towards socialism. In the subsequent decades, marked by economic challenges in the 1980s-1990s and Kenya's dependence on Western aid, concerns arose regarding China's commitment to the relationship. Periodic strains emerged as Kenya sought economic stability and diversified its partnerships, challenging the depth of the China-Kenya bond.

The 2000s-2020s introduced a new set of challenges, with ambitious Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Kenya contributing to escalating debt levels. There was a question in regards to the Belt project, questioning "is the belt and road a debt trap?" This sparked public debate and scrutiny over the terms of Chinese loans, prompting both nations to reassess the financing model for major projects and address concerns about debt

sustainability. Also, the geopolitical influences and regional tensions added another layer of complexity. The heightened global scrutiny on China's influence in Africa and regional geopolitical tensions impacted diplomatic ties. Navigating external pressures became crucial, necessitating a delicate balance between regional alliances and the longstanding China-Kenya friendship. Over the years, the relationship between Kenya and China has developed and matured, with challenges seen as opportunities for growth rather than obstacles. The adaptability, resilience, and commitment exhibited by both nations provide a solid foundation for a future in which the partnership not only endures but flourishes amid the constantly changing dynamics of international relations.

Conclusion

Over the 60-year diplomatic relationship between Kenya and China since 1963, the connection has proven resilient, evolving with changing political landscapes in both nations. Spanning various Kenyan administrations, from early independence to the current leadership of William Ruto, the relationship has encompassed political, economic, social, and cultural exchanges. Politically, the two countries have adeptly navigated leadership changes, demonstrating a robust diplomatic dialogue. Economically, China's transformative investments in infrastructure, such as the Standard Gauge Railway and road constructions, have significantly impacted Kenya's economic landscape, addressing infrastructure deficits and fostering job creation. Socially and culturally, educational initiatives, scholarships, and cultural exchanges have enriched understanding between the nations. China's involvement in healthcare, education, and technology transfer has contributed to Kenya's capacity building.

Looking ahead, under William Ruto's leadership, the future of Kenya-China diplomatic relations appears promising, with an emphasis on continued economic collaboration, potential investments, technological partnerships, and diversified trade. The established foundation suggests deeper cooperation in emerging areas like renewable energy, digital innovation, and sustainable development. In conclusion, the adaptability and shared commitment to development goals have marked the enduring nature of the diplomatic journey, paving the way for a bright and promising future in bilateral relations between Kenya and China across political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions.

“... the future of Kenya-China diplomatic relations appears promising, with an emphasis on continued economic collaboration, potential investments, technological partnerships, and diversified trade

Recommendation

Key recommendations involve prioritizing sustainable development, sustaining investments in human capital, and proactively addressing potential challenges. Strengthening the partnership between China and Kenya is an opportunity that can be realized through diversifying economic collaboration, emphasizing sustainability, and enhancing cultural and educational exchanges. Critical to success is leveraging China's technological expertise for

skills development, fostering a positive public perception, and ensuring transparency in investments. Openly addressing challenges and sustaining regular bilateral dialogues will nurture a resilient and mutually beneficial relationship. The enduring nature of the China-Kenya partnership positions them as a model for international cooperation in the years ahead.

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
The untold story of Ethiopian civil conflicts

By Collins Mandu.

Abstract

This article provides an in-depth overview of the Ethiopian society which has for long endured a political crisis that many analysts concluded it as an ethno-political driven conflict which from the fundamental understanding of civil crisis; the case of civil war in Ethiopia can be related to the theory of bargaining-failure approach as an onset to the fragmented crisis in Ethiopia. It provides an account of the political history of the country, transitional periods that shaped the country's politics to the current chapter of socio-political disorders and the complexities sustaining the conflicts.

Introduction



Map showing the geographical regions of Ethiopia (Photo Credit: Pinterest)

Since 2018, Ethiopia has witnessed ethnic based violence initiated primarily by differing ethnic nationalism based on state fragility, party institutions, and rising militancy. The complexity of this dynamics have been persisting for the last past decades hence aligning with the fabrics of the country political systems. The consistency of this mechanism allowed ethno-social movements to intertwine with political institutions and the state, diminishing their constitutional effect by fracturing command and control in its key sectors. Authoritarianism and political exclusivity during both the imperial and military regimes eras contended nationalism that was further complicated by federal political institutions during the Ethiopian People Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF) where several groups of ethno-nationalist struggles were created paving the way for a gradual up-rise of violent ethnic conflicts in parts of the country.

Empirics on the understanding the logics behind the Ethiopian literature and politics has widely pointed out parallel inceptions dating post- 1960 Ethiopia where scholars like Ethiopians nationalist having parallel arguments with ethno-nationalist Ethiopians while on

the other debate, Ethiopians progressive minded against ethno-conservatives on Ethiopian ideals. The basics of this argument focused on the glorious statehood and the importance of promoting unity among citizen of the federal state of Ethiopia and on policy implementation, they emphasized on convergent frameworks aimed at unifying and initiating nation building while the ethno nationalist camp proposed secession and realization of ethnic-self independence.

Elites also contributed to ethnicizing of national politics in Ethiopia because of opportunistic reasons that further facilitated conflicts because it allowed increased bureaucracy, nepotism, political exclusivity and widen socio-inequality gap. Economic downfall being another factor to the onset of civil crisis also provoked the conflicts further by mobilizing ethnic polarization. It is important to consider that despite the conflicts in parts of Ethiopia, many Ethiopians are not affected by the political disorders, and they are participating in day-to-day normal societal routines in other parts of the country including Addis Ababa peacefully.

Nationalism in Ethiopia



The flag of Ethiopia which is a symbol of national unity (Photo Credit: Adobe Stock Photos)

The country has been ethnically separated society since the emergence of the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. The peculiar Ethiopianising project did not induce celebration of common culture and language but it commissioned institutional order that had already been strategized during imperial era resulting into ethno-nationalist social groups. Schemes by other ethnic groups who were not Amharic speakers from the north where they institutionalized religion, military, education and politics also perceived as an alleged initiative to counter nationalism idea crafted and engineered on a wider scale.

Decolonisation, marxist-leninist idea and the legacies of Italian colonization were some of the dynamics which influenced the elites to drive an ethno-nationalist movement an offensive against the initiative of nation building that was currently underway at that time and an all-out war with the Ethiopian nationalist spearheaded by liberationist rebel movements that had already been established. The ethno-nationalist won the war in 1991 ending the Dergue regime that had ruled Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991. The revolt led to the fall of military junta in 1991 making Ethiopia a country under the rule of an ethnically organized group; Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) mobilized by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front(TPLF).

The Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) reshaped Ethiopia along ethnical backgrounds by putting in frameworks that saw the implementation of ethnic federalism as a solution to the ethnic challenges. Nepotism and bureaucracy was at the core of political rule because only the elites from certain regions were appointed to the executive, legislative, and judiciary where they practiced their authority and rule by implementing policies which favoured their own interest not forgetting that those elites were loyal to the ruling party which controlled the entire political governance system through its hierarchal party structure. The irony behind ethnic institutionalization of the federated state had various adverse effects on the Ethiopian society:-

- Empowering and disempowering of Ethiopia's ethnic groups by creating a sharp division between natives and settlers.

“The Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) reshaped Ethiopia along ethnical backgrounds by putting in frameworks that saw the implementation of ethnic federalism as a solution to the ethnic challenges

- It encouraged political exclusivity because the ruling elites were from one ethnic group hence marginalizing others ethnic communities.
- Mobilization of constituencies both within and outside the framework of the ruling party by ethnic nationalist where federal structure and ethnic charged environment was used to nurture ethnic ideals leading to anti-regime mobilization.
- Nationalist who consolidated their regions against the ruling regime perceived the Ethiopian People Revolution Democratic Front as anti-Ethiopian an onslaught that also gave birth to rebel groups like Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front both of which initiated nationalist ideals at their respective regions although they did not have the capacity to transform the political order that had already been set-up by the regime.

In 2015, anti-regime protest started taking shape because of increased nationalist social movements dissatisfied by political, economic and governance grievances that needed to be addressed. Increased state of anomie rose against resilience allowing mushrooming networks to emerge countrywide, paving way for political opportunities. Globalization, cyber technology, and urbanization of the country enlightened the nationalist in enforcing organizations during the protests.

A new chapter of politics was attained in Ethiopia after the Tigray People Liberation Front lost to the reformist who later reinforced liberalization policies that opened the doors for suppressed ethnic based agitations and contentions.

Federalism and Constitutional Design In Ethiopia



Ethiopian federal parliament the legislative arm of the federal government in session, Addis Ababa, February 15, 2022 (Graphics Credit: Ethiopian Citizen)

A rational examination about Ethiopia's federal system of governance is critical for analysis in understanding various institutional mechanisms and how political elites and actors are applying multinational federal system that has been in practice for more than three decades, bringing in the interest of detractors and supporters in within its own frameworks. Most importantly is the fact that despite the parallel relevancy from the opposing sides of ethno-nationalist and Ethiopianist dichotomy, they both were school of thoughts that had diversified internally. Wide ranges of perspectives were categorized differently, they were dynamic, and overlapping to each other because party ideals are prone to change in order to cope with transforming political environment.

Principled national federalist.

There has been an existing parallel opinion among Ethiopians on this category because of their understanding of the significance of altering the current federation due to fault lines between ethnic groups who were initiating re-organization of the federal system. True Democratic Party elites from Balderas had an opinion

that the Oromo, Amhara and Somali who resided from among the largest regions with deep seated internal fragmentation because of clan-based difference bringing separations into different regions mostly politically pragmatic, for instance; clan-based divisions among the Somalis did not bother non inhabitants of the Ogaden region neither did it pushed for secession to their own region if given the opportunity.

The main agenda of those political factions was to represent the grievances of their own people and ensure elites did not interfere with them by instilling their own wishes against the people because the ideological foundation of the federation accepted the primacy of ethnicity as a procedure for making borders. The exposition on the management of ethnic diversity exposed the complexities in understanding the contemporary Ethiopian politics in general. However, political factions have at different occasions pushed for alternatives outside the federal mechanisms to what they view as the background of the countries problems. Nonetheless arguments centered on resolving ethnicity

have always been handled within the jurisdictions of federalism as the legal system on the ground although apparatus to this fixation had its own limits such as:

- It was not designed like the ones used by other states in the world in managing their diverse societies since they did not only depend on federal parameters but also other constitutional designed packages.
- Examinations from other separated countries have coordinated the inclusion of government types and electoral institutions in resolving ethnic challenges because the system does not include important mechanism other than channels that frames federal formations and their mode of governance, socio-economic and political implications. In Ethiopia, such debates have not been sufficient on institutions within the ambit of ethnic management.

Pragmatic national federalist

Over the years, pan-ethiopianist underwent critical opinions about national oppression because there was an assumption linking cultural domination throughout the years though many ethno-nationalists denied it as a function of deliberate state policy. The response was not just because of domestic circumstances but also of external Marxist thoughts and movements. National unity was diminished by ethnic fragmentation of the country throughout decades of ethno nationalist struggles coupled with a post-1991 ethnic friendly state project. Ethiopian Revolutionary People Democratic Front (ERPFD) interpretations since inception is what Ethiopian nationalist have rejected for the current federal order because it denies citizen their sovereignty rights, prone to national disintegration and abuse of minority rights. Ethiopian nationalist further identified an alternative form of federation considerate to administrative feasibility, historical and geographical affinity, economic viability, topographic features, and population size.

Content multinational federalist

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), and Afar Peoples Party (APP) are some of the ethnic groups from their own regions supporting these structures. Their ideals are such that a democratized multinational federation can also nurture a sense of unity among the larger Ethiopian community. Federalism provides opportunities for cultural revivalism, social enlightenment, economic liberalization, and upliftment of popular esteem for promoting unification.

Republican and liberal integrationism

Republican is an idea about nation state and opposes any public manifestation of identity seen to diminish the public promoted common identity. Apart from being loyalist to the nation and national identity, Republicans believe in civic virtue among citizens that is achieved through a common and deliberate public culture. Republicans are well known to be advocates of a nation of individuals and their collective well-being; they also reject any grouped based solution to it. Republicans are always against politics that would bring any form of splinter and strongly oppose the idea of federalism, instead they support a central unifying figure made up of a prime minister or president from a national political party that has no link to any ethnic background in particular but through a popular majority vote.

Liberals integrationism contains the anti-ethnonationalism stance of republicanism. Liberals believe in the importance of national unity against divisions and they have measures to protect the collective identity. Contrary to republicans, they propose the idea of federation but they do not advocate for multinational federations that recognizes political entities formed on the basis of ethnicity. Liberals believe that individual empowerment and effective governance should be through federations and also they should not separate the nation or any form

A rational examination about Ethiopia's federal system of governance is critical for analysis in understanding various institutional mechanisms and how political elites and actors are applying multinational federal system that has been in practice for more than three decades

of tyranny. In Ethiopia, integration has both proposers and opposers in the principled settlement propounding elements of republicanism or liberal integration. Majority advocate for a powerful nation of Ethiopia and that, the Ethiopian movement that transform ethnicity into a political tool was not important and has brought socio-political interference to the nation. It is also strongly believed that the social movement pointed out certain injustices, which it profiled to specific cultures, and languages that turned to be a pretext of mobilization and ethnic conflicts.

The literature of secession was an idea for long decade's struggles that ended in 1991 where an ethno-federation that divided Ethiopia along ethnic grounds was created paving way for suppression of individuals and minority rights. Ethno-federation turned out to be an existential threat to the nation Ethiopia. Nationalist have been proposing the idea of liberal integrationism, by emphasizing the importance of basic human fundamental rights, which they stress, should be protected. They believe in the existence of national identity despite it being threatened by ethnic- nationalism. Marginalised communities of Ethiopia have been demanding self-

determination and rule, realization of group rights, languages and cultural rights. Responding to autonomy and representation demands of ethnic groups will guarantee peace and stability in Ethiopia.

State Fragility

Weakening of state

State structures in Ethiopia were weakened by emerging ethno-nationalist movements complicating law enforcement and administration of justice in an ethnic diverse country. These institutions ended up being reduced to structures of themselves because they lost agility and autonomy in wider Ethiopia especially in areas where socio-political movements had emerged such as Oromia and Amhara. In areas like Tigray regions, paramilitary forces were formed, violating federal orders. Failure by the regime to implement frameworks for enforcing law and order, opting to turn to the old era of authoritarianism. This issue does not reflect fragility since it could be because of deliberate choice by the regime not to relapse to authoritarian procedure of handling violence done in the past. The current government in Ethiopia has opted for new approaches to peace



Pro-Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels arrive in Mekele, the capital of the Tigray region, Ethiopia on June 29, 2021 (Photo Credit: AFP photo)

building like national dialogue and reconciliation. This turn by the government has helped to bring a climate of freedom from state and contributed in reducing anti-regime struggles.

Sample of conflicts.

Contending nationalism can be found in the face of institutional fragility and incoherence resulting in the proliferation of violence. The Qemant crisis in the state of Amhara is simply because of self-determination and autonomy in the context of uprising Amhara nationalism and reoriented Amhara regional autonomy compounded in the internal divisions inside the Ethiopian Peoples Revolution Democratic Front. The quest for self-rule from the regional government since 2007 by the Qemant has been met with much resistant resulting into violence. Leaders of the National Movement of Amhara and their security branch viewed Qemant grievances as a form of proxy war orchestrated by the Tigray Liberation Front against the Amhara. The conflict led to persecution of activist, destruction of property and displacement of people.

The conflicts in the Oromo special zone of the Amhara regions is as a result of conflicting Oromo and Amhara nationalism in changing federal region dynamics and the autonomisation of the Amhara regional administration. When the Amhara organizations were beefing up under National Movement of Amhara, the Oromo Liberation Front had returned to the country as a legal entity in the zone motivating the Oromo ethnic group. It took the intervention of the National defense force to pacify the zone because violent conflict had already erupted.

The conflict between the government and Oromo liberation front is also not new, it erupted after the breakdown of state structures after the Oromo liberation front entered the country to stamp its brand of nationalism. The protest that led to political liberalization fractured the Oromia state. Command protocols were violated within the ranks of security forces and this forced some members to shift their loyalty to rebel factions. Violence began after supporters of Oromo Liberation Movement joined hands with complicit state agents against the government.

Security dilemma

This happens when an actor is intimidated by the behavior from a hostile potential actor both having common interest against each other initiating a power build-up to maintain

its security resulting in militarization attempts between the sides. The main reason why ethnic actors in Ethiopia take up arms against each other's is because of the fear each actor thinks about the other actor (mindsets). In their own thoughts, Oromo extremist will continue possessing firearms as long as the Amhara militia keep theirs while a Tigrayan armed formation is a reaction to militarization agenda of Amhara regional state elites and the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Force along the Tigrayan border is the reason for Amhara military reaction. The culmination of power struggles between Special Forces (Liyu police) in the regions occupied by Somali and Oromo led to mass displacement from the conflict. In addition, the Amhara militarization and Liyu police action initiated to gun escalation in Kemisa Woreda of the Amhara region.

Weakening of state power happens because of increased insecurity levels forcing ethnic groups, clans, and tribes to take up arms and protect their own people, which according to their own take, it is a measure to restore order in their own dominion.

Economic malaise

High population growth, increased unemployment, high cost of living and devaluation of the common currency definitely will increase chances of civilian unrest in the event that the regime in power will not have put any effort in addressing aggravating civilian frustrations. Despite impressive economic growth in Ethiopia in the past decades, poverty has still been unresolved menace in the country. Unskilled labor force and lack of sufficient infrastructure did not add up to any promising results despite large-scale investment by the government. Diminishing value of the Ethiopian Birr against the dollar gave rise to reduced living standards of ordinary citizens because of increased inflation rates. With increased unemployment against the high growth rate, mass protest in the streets forced the government to focus

The conflicts in the Oromo special zone of the Amhara regions is as a result of conflicting Oromo and Amhara nationalism in changing federal region dynamics and the autonomisation of the Amhara regional administration

much on social policing other than economic resolutions. These culminations of events harbored a fertile ground for violence that was not only ethnic driven as earlier perceived.

Conclusion

Nationalist mobilizations are outcomes of political arrangements in Ethiopia. A classical national development supported by a unitary authoritarian state during the Dergue and imperial era together with other factors nurtured ethnic movements to rise against the government. Ethiopia was reshaped along ethnic lines in 1991 by Ethiopia People Revolution Democratic Front without shedding the centralist and

authoritarian tendencies of the past, resulting into contending nationalism within a tightly controlled state through a hierarchically organized party structure. Ethnic dissatisfaction and mobilization rapidly shattered apart the foundation of the regime, triggering a major shift in the institutional arrangement of the federal state and party of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolution Democratic Front. Ethnic mobilization in Ethiopia is at peak with all factions closely antagonizing each other on a more or less open playing field bounding to lead to violent conflicts. That is the logic on the ground in Ethiopia that its relevance actually reflects into concerns for group security whose aftermath is the proliferation of weaponisation and counter-militarization.

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The Status of the Namibian Defence Force Capabilities in Securing the Maritime Domain: The Case Study of the Extended Continental Shelf

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Abstract

The study sought to investigate the (Maritime Domain Awareness) MDA capabilities of Namibia in securing the country's territorial waters. The specific objectives were to identify the technical and operational capacity of the Namibian defence force in maximizing the security of the maritime domain. The study also highlights the challenges preventing collaboration between maritime stakeholders and potential solutions to these challenges. Further, with a specific focus on MDA tools, the study assessed the utilization of MDA in increasing the country's capability to secure its waters and the extended continental shelf. According to secondary data sources, the maritime domain is a critical security issue in Namibia and the Southern Africa region. Namibia's reliance on its continental shelf area for economic benefit has increased the country's effort to pursue surveillance capacity to secure the maritime domain. However, Namibia faces some challenges that hinder its efforts to pursue maritime domain awareness effectively. The study findings indicate that the lack of a collaborative culture, leadership challenges, lack of surveillance equipment and technological equipment, and the incapacity of exploiting sea resources are some of the challenges that have limited the capabilities of maritime agencies in securing Namibia's water resources. In addition, Namibia is employing the utilization of MDA tools while training MDA operators to increase the nation's capability to secure the maritime domain. Namibia has maritime professionals equipped with knowledge and skills to address maritime issues. Lastly, the continued collaboration of Namibia with stakeholders both within and outside the nation, and increased allocation of the nation's budget to facilitate maritime security, also aim to enhance the defence forces' capabilities to secure the maritime domain.

Introduction

Maritime security is a dynamic concept that involves various interest groups. This is because the maritime domain is characterized by strategic security implications. Some threats that affect developmental efforts in the maritime domain include illicit maritime activities and piracy, among others. Such threats can rob a state of the precious resources needed for economic growth. They can also weaken state security destabilizing a region and causing terrorism to thrive. This explains why various navies around the world have concentrated on securing the maritime domain. Globally, nations like the U.S. have succeeded in maritime power and heritage sectors because of their strong navies that support their policies. In Africa, for example, maritime domain awareness has

significantly enhanced the stability and security of the continent. Africa has approximately 38 coastal countries (Laird,2019). This has attracted defence forces efforts from various global navies to help secure the maritime domain and offer the continent a chance to prosper. Namibia is a coastal country on the south western coastal line of Africa. Before its independence under the apartheid regime, it was discovered that its coastal location had always been its advantage, and there was a need to protect and manage its maritime domain.

In 1990, Namibia saw its independence and formed its National Defence Force to protect its territorial integrity and interest. Not long after that, the Namibian Navy was



The Namibian Navy celebrating its 15th Anniversary in a form of a ceremonial parade on October 18, 2019 at Naval Base (Photo Credits: Capt (Navy) PN Sacharia/Namibian Navy Organisation)

commissioned from its infant start as a maritime wing, as it was called after independence. Lacking equipment and technological expertise, it set out to carry out its duties in line with the Constitution. The state recognized the need for a small well-equipped skilled green water navy and availed the necessary resources to men. However, it was later discovered that the country is more extensive than what its official international borderline depicts. With the discovery, petitioning, and official granting of the rights to its extended continental shelf stretching over 200 nautical miles seawards, the exploration process later led to the discovery of oil, gas, and other natural resources (Burkhardt & Cranny, 2022). This study will investigate some of the possible solutions and measures to be adopted to ensure that the discoveries of these natural resources do not lead to adverse outcomes but instead benefit the country and its citizens while they continue to enjoy the freedom that it currently has. There is a need for a well-equipped and coordinated maritime security boost through the Namibian Defence Force's Maritime capability aided by other state agencies in the maritime domain. Understanding the maritime domain is critical to properly coordinating operations in securing the country's waters and natural resources. Namibia

has recently become a major maritime trading hub for Southern African Development Community (SADC). Recently, the country joined other states in the World that produce and export oil in commercial quantities. The protection of oil installations, vessels engaged in the vibrant fishing industry, and tourism have created the need to monitor the maritime area constantly. With increasing maritime traffic, especially in the Namibian waters and its extended continental shelf, regulatory and law enforcement agencies are under pressure to mitigate pressing problems such as Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of drugs and people, and transport of illegal goods by sea (Shigwedha, 2022). Therefore, the lack of remote surveillance of the country's maritime sector, which allows for the detection of all vessels entering Namibian waters, includes surveillance and monitoring of the Namibian coast to enhance the safety and security of the marine environment. In addition to achieving results, the system can also share necessary information about the movement of ships along the extended continental shelf of Namibia with other neighbouring countries to ensure the security of Namibia's maritime integrity.

Problem Statement

The economic security and safety of any country significantly depend on the secure use of resources such as oceans. Namibia, like any other country with a continental shelf, must portray an increased national interest in enhancing maritime security. One question that this research intends to answer pertains to the capabilities that the Namibian defence forces have depicted in trying to secure the maritime domain. Any country with a vast continental shelf like Namibia needs to be prepared to counter rogue states or terrorists before they threaten or engage in any attacks. To address such issues, countries like Namibia may need to take advantage of international cooperative arrangements and strengthened alliances. In addition, they may need to take advantage of military forces or law enforcement personnel. The security of the maritime domain has been characterized by complexity and ambiguity. In add on to issues such as the major combat operations that take place at sea, issues such as terrorism have increased the nature of asymmetric threats that are witnessed in the maritime domain. As opposed to traditional military scenarios where threats were clearly defined, transnational threats not only require military undertakings, but they also need additional effort for them to be defeated. The dramatic improvements that have been witnessed in fields such as international commercial logistics, together with advances in telecommunications, have increased the range and effects of threats. These advancements have offered physical ways of transcending borders that have been perceived as the most secure (Bush, 2007). It is essential to examine how the defence forces capabilities can help secure the maritime domain because it not only provides a medium that enhances the movement of threats but it also presents a medium through which various actors can achieve their operational objectives.

Aims and Objectives

- To investigate Namibia's MDA capabilities, ascertain the related technical and operational capacity, and bring to the fore major challenges that prevent effective collaboration between maritime agencies while identifying workable solutions.
- To identify the security and safety costs associated with all the tools required to maximize effective maritime safety and security operations by law enforcement agencies in the country.
- To increase Namibia's maritime security capacity by assessing the impact of the MDA tools within Namibia's territorial waters to enforce relevant laws within the country, specifically, and the Namibian extended continental shelf in general.

Review of related literature and theoretical framework

Maritime Security merges two critical concepts to the country's economic development. First, maritime infer activities around the marine environment, including resource utilization, fishing, sea rescue, maritime surveillance, and shipping. Furthermore, maritime incorporates non-military utilization of the sea, navies operation, or both (Till, 2021). The second word, "Security," implies the well-being and survival of the state (McSweeney,2009). On the other hand, Arnold Wolfers describes security as the ability of a state to deter or defeat an attack (Ayoob,1995). However, according to The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), security incorporates human survival under seven main categories: Political, Community, Personal, Environmental, Health, Food, and Economic Security. Therefore, using the maritime domain, such as the Namibian extended continental shelf, demands protection- that is where the Namibian Defence Force chips in.

Namibia's Maritime Boundary

The Namibian extended continental shelf (NECS), totalling an area of 1,062,935.85 km², is one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. According to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Namibia has the right to explore and exploit the natural resources and seabed within this area (EUGENE,2022). However, other states can lay pipelines and cables through the coastal state. The Namibian extended continental shelf has an extreme restriction that shall now no longer stretch beyond 100



... According to The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Namibia has the right to explore and exploit the natural resources and seabed within this area

... systemic violations of maritime pollution regulations have become rampant. For instance, illegal transshipment is common in African nations, requiring enforcement of regulations to counter such operations

nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) from the 2,500 meters (8,200 ft) isobath, which is a line connecting the depths of the seabed at 2,500 meters, or past 350 nautical miles (650 km; 400 mi) of the baseline. The shelf is one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and acts as the Southern African Development Community gateway that allows landlocked countries to receive their imports and exports.

Namibia Maritime Threats

In Namibia, maritime terrorism is possible as the sea offers an opportunity for perpetrators to access commercial technologies and carry out operations and attacks, leading to economic destabilization. Maritime threats also emphasize piracy as a major threat due to general weakness in maritime governance. Piracy contributes to increased attacks at sea, theft of ships and cargo, and robberies against ships off the sea. Another prevalent threat is drug trafficking and smuggling of people and weapons, with the weak maritime space providing free movement of drug and criminal syndicates across Africa (Very, 2013).

While the maritime threats mentioned call for maritime security agencies to act, closer attention should be paid to other issues that also pose a threat to life and land. Health issues are often overlooked, yet diseases spread from elsewhere into the country. Without clear health protocols, the maritime domain can be the source of a public health crisis that threatens mariners' and civilians' lives. Other overlooked threats are associated with technology or cyber concerns as well as environmental crimes. With the advancement in technology, cyber threats are on the rise. Automation of maritime space makes the system vulnerable to cyber threats, including phishing and complete hacking of the systems. Further, systemic violations of maritime pollution regulations have become rampant. For instance, illegal transshipment is common in African nations, requiring enforcement of regulations to counter such operations (Gesami, 2021).

Given the frequent occurrence of maritime threats, maritime security must identify and address them to

guarantee the safety of the land. Awareness of maritime issues is key to helping reduce the chances of criminals using maritime space for illicit gain. With limited resources, prioritization is needed to successfully limit the extent to which the threats impact land and life.

Existing Surveillance Systems to Tackle the Threats

Namibia has a Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) system that has evolved over the years to become one of the most effective systems in the international community to tackle threats. MCS system is an integrated program that allows inspections and patrols at sea, land, and air to ensure compliance with Namibia's fisheries regulations. These patrols help detect unlicensed vessels and monitor the movement and operations of sea vessels. As part of the fisheries management strategy, the MCS system has ensured effective and comprehensive monitoring of ships, thus preventing transshipping (Ndara, 2015). The system also promotes a coordinated effort to ensure effective management measures for ports and sea vessels. The state has made significant progress in countering unregulated fishing and preserving marine ecosystems through MCS measures.

In 2007, Namibia implemented a national satellite-based vessel monitoring system to ensure real-time monitoring of vessel movement and activities. Data captured through the system helps to detect illegal activities at sea and guides the concerned authorities to implement measures to counter potential threats (Ndara, 2015). Security authorities must optimize the use of surveillance as an approach to improve the governance of waterways and facilitate sustainable maritime development.

Maritime Safety and Security

The maritime functions of any maritime country should include safety and security. Maritime safety focuses on protecting life and property at sea from operational and environmental threats. Maritime countries have a legal safety framework to govern global, regional, and

national maritime operations. The aspect of security seeks to secure the nation from terrorism, piracy, pollution, and other threats caused by illicit activities such as smuggling people, drugs, and weapons or illegally exploiting sea resources (Drycz et al., 2009). Thus, maritime security focuses on anything that creates, improves, or sustains the safe use of waterways and supporting infrastructure.

At the global level, member maritime countries of the European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recognize maritime safety and security management. The member states led by the International Maritime Organization have a legal framework that governs the operations of the whole shipping industry. The Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System, operating at the middle level, provides surveillance to enhance security in sea areas of member states. These states have maritime operation services at the national level that are mainly conducted by the navies of the states operating under NATO or EU forces (Drycz et al., 2009).

Maritime security in Africa is increasingly becoming a prominent security agenda, suggesting the need to develop an appropriate security approach to ensure order at sea. Maritime threats pose enormous risks for the larger African population as marine resources offer great potential for ensuring a sustainable economy for nations. Piracy and armed robbery have been significant problems in parts of West Africa. In Southern Africa, IUU fishing has for a long time affected the region taking different forms such as unlicensed activities and harming sea species (Coelho, 2013). Given the importance of Maritime resources, the defence of the sea must be prioritized to secure maritime assets and ensure peace and security in the different areas of the world.

Following the continued terrorist activities and piracy at sea, a regional action plan was drafted to respond to the threats. Southern African Development Community (SADC) maritime security strategy was developed and adopted by states in the region to eradicate threats and secure Southern African nations from harm. The strategy has two components consisting of military deterrence and intelligence gathering. Military deterrence involves the deployment of South African naval vessels to patrol the region, while intelligence gathering comprises maritime domain centers located in strategic areas to gather information on maritime matters (Coelho, 2013).

Similar to maritime governance at the global and regional levels, maritime safety and security at the national level focus on securing the sea from terrorist threats and illegal activities. According to Finke et al. (2020), Namibia chose Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) as an approach to improve ocean governance in Namibia. The nation recognized the need for an integrated approach to manage its territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). With support from global partners, Namibia has managed to establish initiatives and a framework for managing its coastal zone. Comprising various ministries from fisheries, and planning, to defence, MSP is a critical strategy for transforming Namibia's economy and society through improved regulation and management




Figure 1: The Extended Continental Shelf of Namibia and the total area claimed.

Source: www.google.com, Nam2009executivesummary & author

of the sea. As one of MSP's goals, the country seeks to promote a healthy, safe, and well-understood maritime environment.

Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime Situational Awareness

Maritime Domain Awareness

Cheng (2019) asserts that the sea remains to be an important area of international and national security because it continues to be a vital means of transport for goods in today's globalized world. Even with the existence of cargo aircraft, most equipment, and various supplies are transported via ships. For instance, the supplies of the U.S. Army Task Force, including trucks, tanks, and other wheeled vehicles, are often transported by ships. This means that the world is still much dependent on oceans to keep people alive, industries working, and the economy growing. Regardless of the sea's usefulness, gaps in the maritime domain are evident.

Put together, MDA is the ability to gather information to detect potential threats, fuse the information to determine it is a threat, analyse it to establish a corrective action, and then share that information with to appropriate authority so that necessary action is taken. This process is highly dependent on technology, with awareness of maritime activities achieved through intelligence gathering and information sharing. Maritime domain awareness enables quick identification of threats, informed decision-making, information sharing, effective action support, and more accurate situational awareness.

Maritime Situational Awareness

The world is a system of systems where people, cargo, information, infrastructure, and the environment are linked. The dependency of these elements on one another initiates looking at the maritime domain from various inter-dependencies in a complex system of systems rather than in isolation and targeting the sea, Maritime domain should encompass the land, air, space, and cyber domains to understand the complex system at play (Levien et al., 2015). While maritime domain awareness focuses on integrating information to identify and track potential threats at sea, maritime situational awareness focuses on persistent monitoring of the maritime domain.

African countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana are developing sophisticated MDA architecture

At the global level, member maritime countries of the European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recognize maritime safety and security management

to monitor and track shipping in their waterways and those of neighbouring countries (Walker & Reva, 2020). Similarly, adopting maritime domain and situational awareness in Namibia is essential to keep track of all sea- or ocean-bound activities and respond to any security incidents. Therefore, maritime domain and situational awareness are important tools for escalating safety and security at sea. Understanding the events, activities, and circumstances associated with the maritime environment is relevant for the operations of security agencies in addressing threats.

Information Sharing

Information sharing is a critical requirement to meet multiple threats and challenges of maritime security. The current threats, such as the trafficking of humans and weapons, illegal fishing, and organized crime occurring at sea, are transnational and have devastating consequences. Globalization has brought many problems that require a coordinated effort to address them. Collaboration is mandatory for states across the region and world to deal successfully with these challenges. In this context, partnerships across states to address maritime security demands for information-sharing capabilities are to be implemented by single states. Further, maintaining the safety of oceans for use by different nations can be achieved through effective maritime domain awareness, with information sharing lying at its core (Soto, 2010).

In recent years, cooperation agreements have been signed to promote maritime domain awareness and information sharing in different states. Namibia finalized a maritime cooperation agreement with South Africa and Angola, which could promote ocean governance and protect the sea (Walker, 2015). A key feature of these agreements is information sharing, where nations can share intelligence, scenarios at sea, and even ideas on solving maritime problems. With a network of professionals and formal arrangements between states, maritime security

operations are driven forward to address real-world situations. Given the importance of cooperation and information, the opportunities for information sharing should be explored to ensure that real-time information is conveyed to relevant stakeholders.

Automatic Identification System (AIS)

The automatic Identification System (AIS) is a tool for maritime safety, developed primarily as a means for getting information on vessels in maritime navigation. AIS was designed by the International Maritime Organization in the 1990s to augment safety and security at sea (Wolsing et al., 2022). Several vessels use waterway routes to carry out maritime activities such as fishing, cruising, or sailing. These increased numbers of vessels entering or leaving ports and their numerous movements with different objectives lead to navigation difficulties and, in turn, evolve into other maritime hazards that threaten security. For this reason, AIS provides an opportunity for continuous monitoring of vessels allowing autonomous transmission of information on the vessel's identity, speed, position, and course. This information is critical in enhancing maritime domain and situation awareness in support of security missions.

Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)

The Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system allows global identification and tracking of ships for purposes of promoting maritime safety and security. This tool supports maritime domain awareness by providing thorough information on ships across the world. Ships are obligated to transmit LRIT information to LRIT Data Center. The information is transmitted to the contracting government and used to promote maritime security (International Maritime Organization, 2019). LRIT is more advanced and secure as compared to AIS, as it cannot be easily manipulated to provide false information.

Namibia's use of digital skills is still low, prompting an urgent need to overcome the slow digital transformation for purposes of promoting security. However, IMO requires that all ships crossing different parts of the world transmit information on the ship's position, shipborne equipment, and time at specific time intervals. This implies that even Namibia's ships operating under international shipping lanes are obligated to transmit data as required by IMO.

Radar

Radar technology is the most useful satellite tool that provides wide coverage of the sea in all weather conditions

and at any time, day or night. Radar can be used for early detection of threats and organized criminal activities in the sea domain. The technology has widely been used to detect illegal activities at sea and even oil spills, but it cannot recognize the ship responsible for the pollution. Radar for maritime helps to detect targets or objects on the water's surface. Surveillance radar monitors ships in the coastal area using antennas that receive and transmit signals (Firdayanti et al., 2022).

The establishment of appropriate technology in the maritime domain in Namibia is essential for the nation to secure its borders. Namibia's defence force can utilize different forms of technology to conduct its operations on the sea for a secure nation and region. Investment in security resources such as technology is vital to enhance the state's security measures. There is still a need to implement and improve surveillance capabilities to facilitate effective maritime domain and situation awareness (Dalaklis, 2019).

Methodology:

In this study, much of the input was from secondary data drawn from theoretical work and literature studies. Besides theoretical work, secondary sources were obtained from the internet, magazines, journals, and books. The data helped analyse the role of the Namibian defence force competence and the challenges faced in meeting maritime goals. An investigation of the current set-up of the Namibian defence force was carried out to determine its coordinating mechanism, level of cooperation, structure gaps, and institutional capacity (Herbert Burns, 2022).

The study explored the status of the Namibian defence force's capabilities in securing the maritime domain: Therefore, it falls under the military niche. Furthermore, the case study focuses on the Namibian extended continental shelf, which demands protection from the country's defence forces. Namibia's continental shelf zone was extended for economical use beyond 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) from the baselines of the territorial sea into the Atlantic Ocean. The study area was purposely chosen since it faces multiple adversities such as terrorism attacks, piracy, smuggling of drugs and weapons, and insurgency cases. Besides, research is yet to be carried out in the area to gather information on the Namibian defence forces' challenges. Data collection implies gathering accurate info from multiple sources for analysis to evaluate possible outcomes (Simplilearn,




Figure 2: Outer limit of the Extended Continental Shelf of Namibia showing the distinct provisions of Article 76 invoked.

Source: www.google.com, Nam2009executivesummary & author

2022). With data in digitalized form, the case study will offer possible solutions that Namibia to guard its maritime domain. The study will use conventional research to gather information from secondary sources. The secondary data will be retrieved from public libraries, websites, or published reports and noted down (Makbul, 2021).

The study will employ secondary data collection methods. As the name suggests, secondary data can be obtained from second-hand records that have undergone analysis and are recorded or published by other parties. Second-hand data is easier and cheaper to collect since it comes from other parties. The secondary data will be obtained from different sources including reports prepared by research scholars or universities, publications, reports, newspapers, magazines, books, technical and trade journals, and government publications.

Validity and Reliability

The validity of data is usually difficult to assess. However, for this study, the validity of the sources can be determined by using other sources to

verify the data. For example, after obtaining a source that can be useful for the study, I can counter-check the references that were used in the study.

Reliability, on the other hand, is assessed by matching different versions of a similar measurement. Research is considered reliable and valid if it develops a strong research design, uses proper samples and methods, and the researcher conducts research carefully and consistently. Additionally, the researcher must standardize the conditions of research to limit variations in research. In this study, for example, reliability will be examined by evaluating data that had been collected initially from secondary sources. For example, sources that use reliable instruments are likely to generate reliable data for the study.

In this case, for example, the study relied on useful secondary sources from reliable resources and references for a check-up. For instance, Wikipedia is not a reliable resource since anyone can log in and edit. Examples of valuable sources include secondary sources from the internet, magazines, journals, and books (Žukauskas, Vveinhardt, & Andriukaitienė, 2018).

Results

Strategies and Priorities

Namibia is pursuing concerning MDA

Secondary data shows that there is a widespread view that the maritime domain is a critical security issue in Namibia and the Southern Africa region. According to Mkhonto (2022), SADC states such as Namibia, Angola, and South Africa are among the countries with the Atlantic Ocean zones. The continental shelf area of the Namibian maritime domain is large, showing the country's reliance

on waters for economic benefit. For this reason, Namibia is increasingly pursuing the surveillance capacity of the maritime domain to ensure maritime security. However, the literature shows that these maritime security capabilities are likely to decline over the years due to budget constraints. The country will need to advance its surveillance and analysis technology to pursue MDA effectively.

Namibia acknowledges the security of the sea and uses everything in its power to prevent the enemy from using its waters. The nation has prioritized protecting sea lines communications, planning and conducting maritime campaigns, and the disposition of naval forces.

Challenges preventing effective collaboration between maritime agencies

Maritime security challenges to Namibia and the Southern African region have far-reaching effects on the country. The lack of a collaborative culture is the most significant problem of MDA in the nation. The leadership of the nation influenced by political instability and disproportionate allocation of resources has contributed to a less collaborative culture and a non-participative culture in the nation. Other challenges include a lack of surveillance equipment and technological equipment and the incapacity of exploiting sea resources (Kezumo, 2015).

Solutions to these challenges

A solution to the challenges in maritime domain awareness should include establishing an overall MDA cooperative structure within and outside the country. This collaborative approach should involve various stakeholders from diverse fields who bring in ideas to make an informed decision. Another solution to the challenges is ensuring continuous communication on the situation of the marine area to ensure that all stakeholders are updated on the current situation at sea. Creating a memorandum of understanding with neighbouring nations such as Angola and South Africa also presents an opportunity for establishing a supportive operational framework in the region (Mkhonto, 2022).

According to Kenyette (2022), Namibia is part of Exercise Obangame Express 2022 (OE22) which brings together the militaries of participating nations to work together to address maritime security issues. Sponsored by U.S. Africa Command, Exercise Obangame Express is designed to improve maritime domain awareness,

regional cooperation, and information-sharing practices that enhance the collective capabilities of nations in the region to secure the sea. OE22 also conducts search and rescue operations, response to emergencies, and information management and communication (Kenyette, 2022). On issues of equipment, Mkhonto (2022) suggests better equipment of MDA tools to collaboratively address security concerns. Advanced technology instruments should be utilized to benefit all stakeholders or partners.

MDA Tools, training, costs, and Effectiveness

Africa, Namibia included, utilizes a variety of MDA tools to understand anything associated with the maritime domain that impacts the safety and security of the nation. The tools commonly used include Automatic identification system (AIS), Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), Maritime Safety and Security information system (MSSIS), Cooperative Situational Information Integrated System (CSIS), Maritime Electronic Highway, and Computer Assisted Maritime Threat Evaluation system (CAMTES) (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2018).

In Namibia, all the personnel involved in maritime operations are trained to perform individual tasks. Team training is also integrated to support an individual's ability to work in a team. The operators of MDA are involved in exercises where they are trained to coordinate specific procedures and techniques and operate specialized equipment in a simulated or actual environment. MDA training emphasizes a joint multinational strategy that emphasizes mastering knowledge and skills on maritime issues. Namibia still imports facilitators of MDA training from outside the country to ensure the exchange of skills and knowledge that facilitates the development of competent professionals.

Namibia's Government commissioned a naval base on Impalila island in the Zambezi region to reduce the security challenges of the region. The school trained the Namibian navy to guard against unregulated fishing, illegal crossing of the border via sea, theft, and drug smuggling (Martin, 2019). The government also attends international workshops on security issues at sea. For instance, the Walvis Bay workshop funded by the EU and facilitated by International Maritime Organization (IMO) has led to crucial improvements in maritime security (Niilenge, 2021). In 2019, a whole-of-Africa maritime dialogue was organized in Windhoek by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies to ensure a safe and secure maritime environment.

Namibia's Collaboration with Stakeholders

The Namibian Navy conducts individual and joint operations with various stakeholders including the Namibian Police Force, the Conservancy Authority, the local community, and Botswana's Defence Force and police. Other key national stakeholders in maritime security include the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the Namibian Ports Authority (Martin, 2019). Different ministries such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Ministry of Forestry and Tourism, and the Ministry of Mines and Energy also collaborate with the Ministry of Defence to secure the maritime domain (Kezumo, 2015).

On regional and global levels, Namibian Navy is participating in the multilateral maritime exercise on the West African Coastline. The country deployed its largest vessel "Elephant" to monitor Namibia's economic zone and extend its operational capabilities on the Coastline (Kenyette, 2022). Namibia has also collaborated with international partners including IMO, EU, UNODC, Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), and INTERPOL to enhance maritime security.

Namibia as a host to several important transnational maritime security initiatives has still not achieved a secure maritime environment. The country lacks the naval capability to prevent the threats of the maritime domain and secure the nation. Analysts have stated that the naval power in most African states is declining due to poor investment, poor quality

or lack of equipment, corruption, and shortage of skills. Various states also have a complex management system of contracts for procuring foreign equipment thus limiting the operations of the defence force to secure the maritime domain. The ineffective control of the maritime domain in African states indicates their limited quality of defence force power to secure the sea. Thus, criminal groups will continue using the maritime domain to conduct their illegal activities including supply of weapons, piracy, and other maritime terrorism activities (Lekunze, 2022).

Namibia is strengthening its structures to enforce maritime laws, monitor maritime activities, and deter crimes at sea. These efforts are further supported by international assistance where countries work in collaboration to address maritime problems. For instance, multilateral missions have enhanced coordination mechanisms and the development of the best guidelines to secure maritime domains. These initiatives are broadened to include diverse maritime security issues other than piracy, helping developing states secure their waters from illegal activities.

Namibia is one of the African countries that are developing MDA capabilities to improve the nation's ability to monitor and track the activities in its waters




Figure 3: Details of the outer limit of the Extended Continental Shelf of Namibia (from FCS W10 to W25)

Source: www.google.com, Nam2009executivesummary & author

and those of neighbouring states. Like South Africa, Namibia is focusing on maritime security threats to achieve the protection of the nation's largest resources. According to the defence force, the illegal movement of goods and trafficking of people remains one of the most significant maritime threats in most states. For this reason, proper strategies must be put in place to ensure that maritime resources are maximized fully for economic and developmental gains.

Given Namibia's regular interaction with regional and global partners, establishing multilateral activities to govern the sea is critical to maximizing maritime security. The Navy which is at the forefront of ensuring maritime security should work with other stakeholders to enhance interoperability and MDA. MDA expertise in Namibia is still wanting to increase the intelligence, intellectual, operational, and technical capacities that support maritime-related missions. MDA training should be emphasized to enhance the skills needed to carry out maritime security operations, surveillance, and coordinated decision-making on maritime issues.

The Department of Defence regards countering security threats at sea as a primary concern. In South Africa, the Ministry of Defence has focused on the maritime security initiative that strengthens the nation's capacity to enforce international maritime laws. Together with other states, Namibia has the opportunity of interacting, exchange important pieces of information, and share best practices or lessons learned to ensure necessary strategies and structures are put in place to boost maritime security (Walker & Reva, 2020). But before going beyond the state to ensure coordination, cooperation between various state ministries or departments is critical. The departments should come up with a common MDA strategy that will enable Namibian decision-makers to determine the best manner of deploying maritime assets and personnel to prevent potential threats at sea.

Namibia has stepped up its security measures in the maritime sector ranging from monitoring activities at sea to screening vessels and cargo in the ports. The government has invested in installing security equipment and adding personnel which has increased the nation's maritime operation costs. Accurate projection of the cost is difficult given that the government seeks to improve equipment and manpower every year. Regardless, the effectiveness of the measures to ensure maritime security outshines the costs incurred with the positive effects

such as reduced terrorism at sea and a decline in illegal maritime activities associated with new measures to secure the maritime environment (OECD, n.d.).

Recommendations

Namibia has made significant progress in ensuring the safety and security of the maritime domain. However, the country still needs to do more to address potential maritime security threats on its continental shelf. Hence, the Namibia defence force should be at the forefront working with other stakeholders within and outside the nation to address various threats. Since MDA can only be achieved through partnerships with government agencies, making progress in securing the maritime domain requires strong cooperation and real action to address serious threats that continue to harm Namibia's sea resources. Threats such as trafficking, illegal fishing, and piracy require a coordinated response from different stakeholders to achieve a successful and sustainable management of the maritime domain.

Another recommendation is the need for continuous analysis of a maritime strategy to identify high-risk areas and suspicious activities for further tracking and analysis. Doing this can contribute to the cost-effective protection of Namibia's territorial waters, helping to restore the territorial integrity of the maritime domain where threats and crimes such as piracy, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking become very minimal.

Challenges in securing the maritime domain continue to evolve, making the management of territorial waters more complicated. Today, the world is becoming more dependent on technology. The maritime domain is not exempted, implying that concerns of cyber-attacks are prone to occur which threaten maritime security. Therefore, the nation needs to invest more in maritime infrastructures and tools to increase its capabilities to counter the new forms of threats brought by technology.

Suggestions for Further Research

This study shows that Namibia's approach to maritime security is still lagging due to specific issues such as a lack of a collaborative approach and limited resources invested in the maritime strategy. The country will continue facing maritime threats and insecurity that will lead to loss of maritime wealth and increased risk of external interference if workable solutions are not put in place. Therefore, the flaws in the maritime strategy to secure its waters need wide-ranging reforms to

prevent the deterioration of maritime security. Namibia's maritime strategy requires more research to identify the best possible options to maximize maritime safety and security and achieve full domination of its continental shelf with minimal external output. This research would

also recommend that additional research be done to get the perspectives of relevant stakeholders in the maritime domain to help narrow the gaps in knowledge regarding the challenges to cooperation and workable solutions on maritime security strategy.

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
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