

#SudanConference2023

SUDAN CONFLICT

From Crisis to Resolution

Envisioning Sudan's National,
Geopolitical, and Security Pathways
for Effective Intervention

Conference **REPORT**
2023



Conference Conveners

i. About the HORN Institute

The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-profit, applied research and policy think-do tank based in Nairobi, Kenya. The Institute works closely with local communities, governmental and non-governmental organisations and partners on various projects and activities focusing on six thematic areas: defence and security; terrorism and violent extremism; climate change, migration, and development, diplomacy and foreign relations; governance and statecraft; and transnational crimes and strategic threats with a primary focus on 13 countries that include; Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2021, the Institute was ranked 18th globally behind leading Think Tanks such as Brookings, Chatham House, and Hoover Institutions, among others. Indeed, the HORN Institute has become the go-to think tank for opinion and analysis on its key thematic areas by local as well as leading international media houses.

ii. About Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)

KAS is a German political foundation that works worldwide to promote and preserve democracy, peace, freedom and justice through political education. The KAS is present with over 20 field offices across Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to our Country Offices, our Regional Programmes complement the Foundation's country-specific activities and deal with particular issues from a regional perspective. The Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa deals with security affairs and international relations in Eastern Africa. The thematic area of security affairs is to be understood in a broader sense. In addition to interstate and intrastate conflicts in East Africa and the development of (Islamist) terrorist organisations in the region, the RP SIPODI East Africa also deals with topics from the areas of flight and migration as well as the impact of climate change on security.



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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CEO	Chief Executive Officer
COC	Conference Organizing Committee (COC).
AU	African Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ISS	Institute for Strategic Studies
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontiers
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
RRP	Refugee Response Plan
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
USA	United States of America



Acknowledgment

The HORN Institute and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) would like to express their sincere gratitude to all the individuals and organisations that made the conference a success.

Special thanks to Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa for the strategic support for the event, as well as the the Conference Organizing Committee from the HORN Institute composed of Dr. Hassan Khannenje (Director); Asia Mustafa (Strategic Communications Officer); Raudhat Saddam Sayeeda (Researcher); Evans Ombisa (Publisher and Graphic Designer); and Sharif Nasir (Accountant) for their role in the success of such a timely and relevant conference. The Institute would further like to extend its appreciation to Angella Kasekende (Project Manager, KAS Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa); Susan Natumanya (Project officer, KAS Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa); Janice Sanya (Conference Coordinator) Abdulswamad Alawi (Assistant Conference Coordinator); Edmond Pamba (Conference Rapporteur) as well as all the service providers involved, for contributing to the overall success of the conference.

We also want to appreciate, in a special way, our keynote speaker, Dr. Korir Sing'Oei, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora affairs (Republic of Kenya), and all the members of the diplomatic corps present. Sincere appreciation once again for all the participants and presenters for their invaluable insights and contributions to this conference. Collectively, your efforts will significantly deepen the understanding of the conflict in Sudan, and enrich the peaceful conflict resolution approaches for a stable, peaceful and prosperous Sudan and the Horn of Africa region at large.



Executive Summary

The conference themed *From Crisis to Resolution: Envisioning Sudan's National, Geopolitical and Security Pathways for Effective Intervention*, was organized by the HORN Institute, in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa between September 27 – 28, 2023, in Nairobi, Kenya. The conference aimed at deepening understanding on the drivers of the conflict, the conflict's humanitarian, security and political impact, and the effectiveness and gaps in current diplomatic responses and peace efforts. The conference further aimed at identifying the prospects for peace and stability in Sudan, and developing ideas and solutions for its resolution.

Thematic areas of focus for the conference include the causes, the impact, the effectiveness of diplomatic responses and peace efforts by various actors, scenarios of peace and conflict in Sudan and ways forward. The conference brought together experts, policy practitioners, and representatives of relevant regional and international organizations and agencies such as IGAD, UN, UNHCR, MSF, AU as well as think tanks and members of the diplomatic corps. The key findings of the conference are that Sudan's conflict is a function of a long history of poor governance especially the marginalization of peripheral regions, groups and militarization of the state and the economy.



The current humanitarian situation in Sudan is worsening while peace efforts and humanitarian responses are fragmented without a unified approach, common objectives and common vision. Only 27 percent of the refugee response plan is funded while 31.7 percent of the humanitarian response plan is funded despite the conflict displacing 5.4 million people and plunging over 20 million in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The multiplicity of peace initiatives was noted as challenge to meaningful progress towards the resolution of the conflict. External geopolitical interests and role in Sudan is described as destabilizing and partly contributing to the intractability of the conflict. The peace process was found to be limited in terms of the participation and actors given the exclusion of civilians and civil society organizations in the formal talks, and the range of issues given the preoccupation with elite interests and proximate causes of the conflict and the jettisoning of the underlying drivers of the conflict.

There are three potential scenarios for how the situation in Sudan is likely to evolve in the coming weeks and months. Scenario 1: Military victory for either RSF or SAF. Scenario 2:

Military stalemate and diplomatic triumph (peace agreement). Scenario 3: Protracted conflict without decisive military and diplomatic outcomes. To bring an end to hostilities, ensure humanitarian assistance and restore the democratic transition in Sudan, the following main recommendations were made:

- o Regional players such as IGAD and Sudan's neighbours, civil society organizations and other international actors should pressure the primary conflict actors to commit to a ceasefire agreement and grant access to humanitarian emergency assistance and allow peace talks.
- o IGAD and UN should advocate for increased financing of the humanitarian response plan and refugee response plan for Sudan given the funding challenges experienced.
- o The peace actors in Sudan should promote a unified African-led peace process for legitimacy, coherence and meaningful progress. A unified approach would address the challenge of the multiplicity of efforts and establish common vision, common objectives and



coherence to the peace process. African leadership through AU-IGAD Cooperation Framework would lend legitimacy to the process and limit the destabilizing effect of external interests.

- o IGAD, AU and UN among other actors including the civil society organizations and national civilian movements and coalitions, should push for expansion

of the scope of issues, actors and participants in the peace processes beyond political and military elites.

- o UN-AU peace and security cooperation framework should authorize a regional protection force to Sudan to halt hostilities, protect civilians and provide support to the peace process, should a ceasefire prove difficult and atrocities escalate to outrageous proportions.



Background

The armed conflict in Sudan which broke out on April 15, 2023 has pushed Sudan to the brink of collapse. The fighting between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohammed Hamdan and the regular military, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Fattah Al Burhan has had significant humanitarian impact as populations flee as refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The conflict is a major set-back to transition efforts aimed at reversion to democratic civilian government in Khartoum. In fact, the current conflict is a function of the transition crisis and subsequent fall-out between SAF and RSF over the implementation of security sector reforms, specifically the integration of forces timeframe and modality, as enshrined in the Juba Agreement of 2022. The violence is mainly concentrated in Khartoum and spreading into other population centres across the country.

The conflict has killed 4000 people, displaced 5.4 million people (4.3 million internally displaced and 1.1 million refugees) and pushed 20 million people into acute hunger. In response to the escalations in the conflict, multiple actors have fronted numerous and parallel peace processes including the Quarter Process (by Intergovernmental Authority on Development – IGAD), QUAD (by United States of America – USA, United Arab Emirates – UAE, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Norway, the United Kingdom – UK), Troika (USA, UK and Norway), Saudi Arabia (Jeddah Process), and Egypt. However, no meaningful progress has been made in the peace processes to secure permanent ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access and, a comprehensive peace agreement five months later.

However, the conflict in Sudan has significant ramifications not just for Sudan but also for the entire Horn of Africa region, the Sahel and international security given that Sudan sits at the confluence of two conflict systems of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Against this backdrop, the Horn Institute and KAS organized the Conference to provide urgent and timely forum for policy makers, experts and regional actors to develop ideas and solution to help arrest the worsening political, humanitarian and security situations as well as the growing intractability of the conflict in Sudan.

Objectives of the Conference:

The conference aimed to:

1. Discuss the genesis of the ongoing political crisis in Sudan.
2. Evaluate the local and global geopolitical factors at play in Sudan to gain a deep the understanding of the national and geopolitical dimensions of the conflict.
3. Offer expertise on successful approaches that can be used to overcome the historical, social, economic and geopolitical hurdles that have obstructed the process of democratic transition in Sudan.
4. Provide options for effective intervention in achieving lasting peace in Sudan.



Conference Format:

Panel One: Current Dynamics and Root Causes. The panel traced the origins and underlying causes of the conflict and presented analysis of the conflict. Presenters included:

- **Ambassador Haile Menkerios:** *Understanding Historical Threads: Tracing the Evolution of the Sudan Conflict and the Complexities of the Ongoing Conflict.*
- **Ambassador Nureldin Satti:** *Deconstructing the Drivers of Sudan's Instability (Economic, Natural Resources, Political, and Ethnic Factors).*
- **Ambassador Erastus Mwencha:** *Navigating Challenges and Shaping Solutions: Exploring the Current African Union (AU) Mediation Efforts.*



Ochieng Kamudhayi, Ph.D.,
Senior Lecturer, Strathmore University



Ulf Laessing,
Head of the Regional Sahel Programme,
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)

Panel Two: Impact of the Sudan Conflict. The second panel focused on describing and measuring the current impact of the conflict in humanitarian, political and security terms. The presenters included:

- **Monica Camacho,** Representative for Central and East Africa, Médecins Sans Frontiers; *Understanding the Humanitarian Landscape in Sudan Humanitarian Aid Efforts.*
- **Rashid Abdi, Chief Analyst, Horn of Africa and the Gulf, Sahar Research (Kenya):** *Exploring Political Instability and Regional Dynamics in the Wake of the Sudan Crisis.*
- **Mumo Nzau,** Ph.D., Head of Programs, National Defence College/ University-Kenya; *Assessing the Effects of the Sudan Conflict on Refugee Populations (Displaced Populations, and Migrant Influx)*

Panel Three: Mediation Efforts and Global Responses to the Sudan Conflict. The third panel evaluated the progress, shortcomings, strengths and feasibilities of various diplomatic initiatives towards peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan. The key presenters were:

- **Walter Ochanda, Office of IGAD Special Envoy for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia;** *IGAD's Forum on Sudan (The Quartet) Mediation Efforts: Evaluating Progress and Challenges*
- **Rahel Hassan,** Programme Head, East Africa Peace Security Governance Programme, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), *Quad and Troika (Norway, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States) Mediation Efforts: Evaluating Progress, Shortcomings, Challenges*



Dr. Canan Atilgan,
Head of the Middle East and North Africa Division,
Department of European and International
Cooperation, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Germany



- **Prof. Peter Kagwanja**, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Africa Policy Institute; *Other International and Regional Mediation Efforts: Evaluating their Progress, Shortcomings, and Challenges*



Prof. Fred Jonyo, Ph.D.,

Chair of the department of Political Science and
Public Administration, University of Nairobi

Panel Four: Scenarios. The fourth panel described the scenarios of the conflict in Sudan from diplomatic and humanitarian perspectives. The presenters included:

- **Ayan Nuriye, Program Officer of the Mediation Support Unit, IGAD;** *The Role of Civil Society and other Key Groups in Sudan Mediation*
- **Walter Ochanda, Office of IGAD Special Envoy for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia;** *Responses and Strategies by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*
- **Joanina Karugaba, Senior Intergency Coordination Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);** *Responses and Strategies by the United Nations (UN)*

Panel Five: Navigating Challenges and Shaping Solutions: Key Recommendations. The final panel delved into charting ways forward and proffered important recommendations for sustainable conflict resolution in Sudan. The presenters were:

- **Duncan Ojwang, Dean, Africa Nazarene, PhD,** University Law School: *Reflections on Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union (AU), and United Nations (UN) efforts.*
- **Prof. Zakaria Ousman Ramadan,** President, Chadian Centre for Strategic Studies and Prospective Research (Chad), *Key Recommendations and way forward for Sudan:*
 - Humanitarian
 - Political
 - Diplomatic
 - Security



John Mwangi, Ph.D.,

Senior Research Fellow for Security and Defence
Pillar, The Global Centre for Policy and Strategy
(GLOCEPS)

Session One

Moderator: **Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.**, Director, the HORN Institute

Opening Remarks by **Mustafa Y. Ali, Ph.D.**, Chairman and Co-Founder, the HORN Institute. He congratulated Dr Hassan Khannenje and the HORN Institute for organizing the timely conference. He welcomed all the participants and expressed profound gratitude to them for finding time to contribute ideas and solutions for crisis-stricken Sudan. Dr Mustafa described Sudan as overcast with crisis and instability, and drew the participants' attention to the urgent need for leadership in the crisis. He attributed the perpetual instability in Sudan to poor leadership. Sudan is situated at the centre of the two conflict systems of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

The protracted instability in Sudan would likely merge the two conflict systems and create greater instability across the Sahel, Central Africa, Eastern and by

extension Northern Africa regions. Military coups are part of the problem in Sudan's long history of instability, including in the current crisis. There is a spreading wave of 'coups' in Africa and leadership from the international community is needed to stem the tide of undemocratic change of governments in Africa, which has a strong effect on the stability of respective countries. Such response or intervention from the international community should not be another tentacle of instability given the role of external interference in Africa's instability including through foreign mercenaries and proxy 'privatized' conflicts.

He ended his remarks by calling for a solemn introspection among Africans, as a critical step towards taking ownership and responsibility over the region's path towards stability and realization of development aspirations.



“ **The conference theme is a call to promptly end the pervasive violence and resolve the Sudan conflict. The war has not only caused massive loss of lives, livelihoods, and refugees, it also threatens to join the confluences of the Sahel & Horn conflict systems** ”

— Dr. Mustafa Y. Ali



Welcoming Remarks by **Nils Wörmer**, Regional Director, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) – Regional Programme Security Dialogue for EastAfrica, acknowledged the relevance of the conference. He remarked that Sudan's conflict has far-reaching consequences, not only for its own people but also for its neighbouring countries and the entire region. These effects include the flow of refugees, disruption of trade, and the risk of regional instability, among others.



He continued to highlight that the resolution of this crisis requires that we acknowledge the unique complexities of Sudan's conflict, its historical roots, and the diverse perspectives of its stakeholders.

Through this engagement, it will encourage finding a common ground and build sustainable pathways towards peace, stability, and prosperity for Sudan and the region at large. He appreciated the partnership between the HORN Institute and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa in three projects including the conference on the Sudan Crisis. He concluded his remarks by congratulating the Conference Organizing Committee (COC) and wishing the participants productive and fruitful discussions.

Keynote Address by **Korir Sing'Oei, PhD**, Principal Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, congratulated the HORN Institute and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) for organizing the conference and acknowledged its importance. He termed the conference theme as audacious amid the miasma of helplessness of the situation in Sudan. He based his speech on two critical questions: "Why is Kenya and President William Ruto invested in Sudan's search for peace?", and "What is it that Kenya has done so far [to that effect]?"

Kenya is invested in Sudan's search for peace, because peace diplomacy is Kenya's natural pedigree and diplomatic repertoire. Kenya has an exemplary history of involvement and leadership in resolving crises in the region and outside Africa including the imminent security support mission to Haiti. Kenya only seeks to export peace to its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Global interconnectedness further informs Kenya's policy in Sudan given the significant economic partnership between Kenya and Sudan, and the likelihood of instability in Sudan spilling over in the immediate environment and ultimately affecting Kenya's interests. The shared hope for democratic governance is thus a positive turning point and opportunity to break the cycle of violence, expand democracy and arrest the contagion of instability in Sudan and the Sahel. The dysfunction of global peace and security architecture

created a gap which necessitated a regional response and the involvement of Kenya.

Kenya first pushed for the activation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mechanism through the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government (HoSG). The HoSG through the President of South Sudan initiated high level efforts to secure ceasefire and humanitarian assistance within four days of the fighting. He however observed that further escalations undermined IGAD's initial progress warranting the IGAD meeting in Djibouti which deliberated on two issues:

- i. IGAD (then represented by Kenya, South Sudan and Djibouti) addressed the question of IGAD's leadership which was hitherto under Sudan's Chairmanship through its ousted Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok. Djibouti assumed the body's Chairmanship.
- ii. IGAD established a special mechanism for Sudan dubbed IGAD Quartet, to which Kenya's President William Ruto was elected Chair.



However, the multiplicity of diplomatic efforts to resolve Sudan's crisis as seen in the other processes led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the Jeddah Process), Egypt and QUAD (United States of America - USA, Norway, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom – UK, and United Arab Emirates - UAE). Kenya is increasing the regional and international sensitivity to unifying diplomatic efforts under an African-led

process with support from the rest of Sudan's partners, even as the international focus seems to be centred around the urgency of humanitarian assistance. He finished his speech by affirming that "Kenya stands with the people of Sudan in search for peace and remains willing to contribute to peace in Sudan".

“ One of the commodities Kenya seeks to export is peace, within its immediate neighborhood and all around the world, because we are interconnected. Resolving the Sudan conflict is crucial for regional peace and stability because it sits at the confluence of the Sahel ”

— Dr. Abraham Korir SingOei

Session Two

Moderator: **Ochieng Kamudhayi, Ph.D.**, Senior Lecturer, Strathmore University

Understanding Historical Threads: Tracing the Evolution of the Sudan Conflict and the Complexities of the Ongoing Conflict, Ambassador Haile Menkerios, Former Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and Special Representative to the African Union.

Introduction

The presentation on the evolution and complexities of the conflict in Sudan by Ambassador Haile Menkerios, Former Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and Special Representative to the African Union, essentially traces the historical genesis and analyses the intricate realities of the current conflict.



Historical Genesis

Ambassador Haile Menkerios began by tracing Sudan's perpetual fragility to the fractures of state formation process owing to the colonial artificialization of the state despite its multi-nationality. While multi-nationality is a characteristic of most of the Horn of Africa's states, there are particularities about Sudan which inherently create and sustain conflict. The conflictive centre – periphery relations is a major source of fragility in Sudan, having spawned a historically vicious competition for power and resources held by the centre (riverine groups and elites) at the expense of the peripheral regions and ethnic groups. The centre-periphery struggles have resulted in the Darfur Conflict of 2003, the Sudan Civil Wars between 1956 – 1972 and 1983

– 2005 which led to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the long-running conflicts in South Kordofan, West Darfur and East Darfur.

Militarization of the State

Ambassador Haile Menkerios further asserted that the militarization of the state and economy later imbued with Islamism, weakened the governing institutions and created a lasting state fragility. With the military controlling 70 percent of the institutions of wealth and fully in seizure of political power, the Sudanese state in historical legitimacy crisis as a result of exclusion of the public from political and economic participation. The attempt by its last long-ruling military leader Omar al-Bashir (1989 – 2019) to coup-proof by establishing a parallel military formation, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), lay the foundation of the current crisis. The delicate power dynamics between RSF and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) made militarization a delicate force in state formation and future military conflict inevitable. RSF quickly



assembled peripheral groups while the regular Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) was predominately maintained by the centre. In the wake of the political power vacuum after Bashir’s ouster, the ensuing power struggle between the two military factions precipitated the current crisis. The conflict between SAF and RSF epitomizes the conflictive centre–periphery relations given the growing tendency for the two military factions to move beyond their immediate military objectives and pander to their respective political bases. The conflict is further orchestrated by the military

elements to scuttle the reforms aimed at demilitarizing of the state and economy, and democratization.

Conclusion

It is critical that the peace process be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible, to allow civilians to participate and to address the root causes of the conflict. There is need to revive the civilian movement given the fragmented nature of the movement currently. An elite pact would not create stable peace since a popular revolution in 2019 was the beginning of the current crisis and the current elite factions represent a push-back against popular reforms and the gains of the revolution. The African-led process under the auspices of the African Union (AU) should not be exclusive given the interests, leverage and influence Sudan’s Gulf partners, Egypt, the Arab League and the West led by the United States of America (USA) have in the country. The process should thus be African-led in principle, form and substance but supported by Sudan’s other international partners.



Deconstructing the Drivers of Sudan’s Instability (Economic, Natural Resources, Political, and Ethnic Factors), Ambassador Nureldin Satti, Former Ambassador of Sudan to the United States, France, Portugal, Switzerland and the Vatican

Introduction

The presentation on drivers of Sudan’s instability by Ambassador Nureldin Satti, Former Ambassador of Sudan to the United States, France, Portugal, Switzerland and the Vatican, mainly looks at the fundamental drivers of the current conflict in Sudan. He looks at the economic, political, social, cultural and historical drivers of the conflict.

Multi-nationality

Ambassador Nureldin Satti traced Sudan’s instability to its multi-nationality, especially the failure to integrate the country’s multi-ethnic groups. The failure for Sudan to manage its cultural diversity in terms of religion, economic, ethnic and regional differences for example led to the secession of South Sudan. Sudan is also caught up in perpetual struggle for identity between Arabism, Pan-Arabism, Islamism, and

Communism among other ideological strands which have defined Sudanese politics and permitted extremism.

A History of Military Coups

Sudan’s fragility is further linked to failed central governments as a result of a series of military coups. While coups have become popular on the continent, the coup



Conclusion

The current situation in Sudan is one where the civilian movement, the military forces and peace processes by the international community are all fragmented hence the slow progress in the resolution of the conflict.

in Sudan remains unpopular ab initio given the military's historical dominance of politics and economy. The vicious struggle for resources between the centre and the periphery whereupon the exploitation and marginalization of the productive regions and sectors such as minerals (gold and oil) by the former is a major source of conflict in Sudan. For example, only two per cent of the oil revenue was allocated to oil-producing regions while the remaining 98 per cent was controlled by the central government which was heavily dominated by the riverine populations.

Navigating Challenges and Shaping Solutions: Exploring the Current African Union (AU) Mediation Efforts, Ambassador Erastus Mwencha, Former Deputy Chairperson, African Union Commission.

Introduction

The presentation on challenges and Solutions with a focus on African Union-led mediation efforts by Ambassador Erastus Mwencha, Former Deputy Chairperson, African Union Commission, outlines the key challenges which led to the conflict in Sudan and possible solutions to the ensuing crisis.



A History of Crises

Ambassador Erastus Mwencha began by characterizing Sudan as submerged in economic, social and political crises. The economic crisis was occasioned by the secession of oil-rich South Sudan, and the political crisis by the long history of

military coups and military rule. The social crisis is rooted in the inequalities between the centre and the periphery groups which are worsened by ethnic and religious tensions. Sudan's conflict and instability can be traced back to first civil war which began in 1956, the secessionist conflicts, and the conflict in Darfur.

Conclusion

To pull Sudan from the crisis, a single-track solution will not work and numerous players involved in peace efforts complicate the resolution process since other players are only pursuing their own interests. There is need to adopt one mediation process to be supported by the rest of the consequential players. Kenya should take the lead because it is a neutral arbiter as opposed to the other players pursuing vested interests.

“ Sudan's crisis is social, economic, and political, necessitating multiple-track solutions and reducing the number of players in the country ”

— Amb. Erastus Mwencha



Comments and Q & A

Question: In Kenya's effort to mediate in Sudan, have access to conflict parties?

Response: African Union or African-led processes work as a panel; the panel must have access to conflict parties typically through eminent persons such as former Heads of State and Government for example Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) delegated the Sudan crisis to an African-led process. However, it will require actors with significant leverage to put pressure on conflict actors to commit to the peace process and to drive concerted efforts through a legitimate body either IGAD or African Union. Regional bodies should work together and rally others behind Kenya or whichever actor with capacity to unify others behind them.

If AU and IGAD have endorsed Kenya, why not? Kenya has succeeded before in mediating between Sudan and South Sudan. The legitimacy of such a process is critical. Sudan's immediate neighbours Egypt and Ethiopia have their own interests as opposed to Kenya which is neutral. Kenya is thus suitable to lead the peace process on behalf of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Question: What incentives can be used to bring the conflict parties to the negotiating table?

Response: Incentives and pressure points should be used together. IGAD and African Union should work with the Gulf through the Arab League, the United States, Egypt, the European Union which have vested interests in Sudan, are critical partners of Sudan some through financial investments, and have significant leverage over conflict actors. The QUAD group can be tapped because it has the capacity to bring all actors together and, to use its leverage to put pressure on the military in Sudan, rallying arms suppliers and financiers of the Sudanese conflict actors to sever destabilizing ties.

Session Three

Moderator: **Ulf Laessing**, Head of the Regional Sahel Programme, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)

Understanding the Humanitarian Landscape in Sudan Humanitarian Aid Efforts, **Monica Camacho**, Representative for Central and East Africa, Médecins Sans Frontiers.

Introduction

The presentation on the humanitarian landscape in Sudan, by Monica Camacho, Representative for Central and East Africa, Médecins Sans Frontiers, provides an overview of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the humanitarian efforts of UNHCR.

The Humanitarian Crisis

About 4 million people have been displaced internally in Sudan, while 1 million have been forced into neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Chad and South Sudan as refugees. Violence is mostly concentrated in Darfur, Khartoum and South Kordofan and other population centres. The health systems are weak characterized by rising cases of diseases such as Cholera, Measles and Dengue Fevers. Civilian protection remains at its lowest. The conflict in Sudan is a regional crisis with Eastern Chad increasing with refugee influx from Sudan of 1000 arrivals per day on average. This situation is similarly experienced in hard-to-reach and under-served areas in South Sudan and Ethiopia.



Challenges to Humanitarian Response

The main challenges to humanitarian response in Sudan are bureaucratic impediments such as unclear security processes (visa issuance and travel permits), changing roles and responsibilities, changing high level interlocutors, parallel government institutions and poor funding. The other challenge is limited access due to floods and heavy rains, active hostilities, delays in permit issuance, attacks on health facilities, violations of international human rights law, blockades/blockages of access especially to RSF controlled areas.

Conclusion

In terms of humanitarian response so far, Médecins Sans Frontier (MSF) and other humanitarian organizations are working in 10 states in Sudan and delivering emergency medical assistance and food. Both RSF and SAF controlled areas are receiving medical emergency assistance. She highlighted that 3000 surgeries, 94000 medical consultations, 20000



measles vaccinations have been administered. However, there is an urgent need to scale up humanitarian response and facilitate access.



Exploring Political Instability and Regional Dynamics in the Wake of the Sudan Crisis, Rashid Abdi, Chief Analyst, Horn of Africa and the Gulf, Sahar Research (Kenya)

Introduction

The presentation on political instability and regional dynamics of the Sudan Crisis, by Rashid Abdi, Chief Analyst, Horn of Africa and the Gulf, Sahar Research (Kenya), reflects on the prospects for peace in Sudan. Rashid further addresses the local and regional conflict dynamics of the crisis in Sudan.

Prospects for Peace

Rashid Abdi began by highlighting that peace prospects in the Sudan conflict will only become clear when military dynamics change on the ground. He explained that only when a hurting stalemate is achieved, the peace prospects will be high as it will provide the entry point for diplomatic efforts and peace negotiations.

Local Conflict Dynamics

RSF which was built for urban warfare, has consolidated its positions in the urban areas and made it difficult for SAF to counter without atrocities. SAF is struggling to dislodge RSF due to its embeddedness in the urban and civilian population centres. The conflict is a grinding stalemate as territorial positions increasingly become clear and forces are unable to make further advances. SAF has retreated to Port Sudan and neighbouring northern regions to re-strategize, while RSF remains in control of southern regions. The conflict has evolved into ethnic mobilization which has replaced political mobilization as the two military factions increasingly appeal to their political bases in their respective regions of control. In terms of capabilities,

RSF is battle-experienced given its involvement in conflict theatres in Chad, Yemen and Libya. RSF's powerful external interests are rooted in the control and trade in minerals such as Gold, influence over financial systems in Sudan, and the links with powerful political patronage systems of the Gulf region. SAF is similarly a major player in Sudan's economy, with immense control over natural resources and role in external markets. SAF is linked to powerful patronage systems outside Sudan just like RSF.

Regional Conflict Dynamics

Rashid Abdi argued that the geopolitical dimensions of the conflict in Sudan have made it intractable. Sudan's neighbours Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Chad as strongly interested in the course and outcomes of the conflict. Egypt views Sudan as a security and strategic concern. Ethiopia is in dispute with Sudan and Egypt over the use of the River Nile and construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), while Chad and Sudan share cross-border ethnic groups. Yet, eastern Chad is likely to be hard-hit by spill-over effects of the conflict in Sudan especially West Darfur. South Sudan which has positioned itself as a peacemaker in Sudan, is concerned about the prospect of peace agreements previously negotiated with ousted Sudanese



Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok collapsing and the subsequent volatility of the unstable frontiers between Sudan and South Sudan. However, protracted armed conflict, risks fragmenting Sudan (between northern and southern territories) along the current military-territorial lines of the warring parties.

Conclusion

Currently, the peace processes are fragmented with no one actor wielding the leverage to resolve the conflict. There is need for a credible regional actor to lead a unified peace process backed by other powerful actors with leverage over conflict parties. Kenya is naturally poised to lead the process but its success depends on how Nairobi will manoeuvre and build diplomatic support from the rest of the players especially, in the Gulf or Arab League, African Union, IGAD region, and others such as the USA.

Assessing the Effects of the Sudan Conflict on Refugee Populations (Displaced Populations, and Migrant Influx), Mumo Nzau, Ph.D., Head of Programs, National Defence College/University – Kenya

Introduction

The presentation on effects of the Sudan Conflict on refugee populations by Mumo Nzau, Ph.D., Head of Programs, National Defence College/University – Kenya, provides an overview of the refugee crisis in Sudan. Mumo Nzau further provides a disaggregated impact of the conflict on displaced population and discusses aspects of refugee response plan and gaps in Sudan.

Refugee Crisis

The fighting in Sudan is happening in population centres including Khartoum, El Obeid, Omdurman among others and is spreading to West Darfur, East Darfur, Nyala and South Kordofan. The hotspots border countries such as Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The conflict has created new stocks of Internally Displaced persons (IDPs – 4.3 million) and refugees (1.1 million in neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, South Sudan and Chad. Such spill-overs which are adding pressure to already strained countries in Sudan's neighbourhoods, inspires competition for resources in the cross-border host



communities and breeds new peace and security threats in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions.

Implications on Displaced populations

The conflict is worsening instability in areas where peace was delicate such as the Darfur region, North and South Kordofan, which are part of the traditional displacement and conflict epicentres in Sudan. Returnees in these regions have been forced back into IDP camps and refugee camps across international borders hence creating new waves of displacement. The conflict has further entrenched the vulnerability of over 800,000 refugees hosted in Sudan before the conflict in April 2023. Refugee influx in Sudan has subsequently dropped from 109,014 in 2021, 56,072 in 2022 to 5,749 in 2023. The instability has been felt from 2021 and sharply in 2023. More people are thus trapped in conflict, poverty, rights abuse and violence in neighbouring countries who would have fled to Sudan.

Conclusion

The spreading instability in Sudan further risks elevating Sudan's status as a transit hub and source of migratory waves into the European Union (EU) zone. In fact, 116,995 new asylum seekers from Sudan in the EU zone have been recorded. The asylum applications have grown from 18,000 in 2022 to 36,000 in 2023 few months to the conflict, to now 116,995. As a transit hub, Sudan is now likely to increase the illegal migrant stock flowing into EU if instability and violence protract. The conflict has further negatively affected livelihoods, plunging 24 million people in urgent need of food and livelihood assistance. The people in need of protection against gender-based violence stands at 4.2 million with only 1.3 million being targeted by humanitarian agencies and 9.3 per cent having been reached. About 4.3 million

children require protection with only 2.0 million being targeted for protection and 1.5 per cent having been reached. General protection is needed by 5.4 million displaced persons with only 3.4 million being targeted by aid agencies and 6.5 per cent having been reached.



Comments and Q & A

Comment: There is a risk of the conflict in Sudan escalating and spilling over into the Sahel or the Sahel – Sudan historical cross-border relations playing into the conflict given that a significant component of the fighters in RSF are from Darfur and Chad.

Question: Who is in lead in coordinating the humanitarian efforts in Sudan and how is the African Union involved?

Response: The UN has taken lead in coordinating humanitarian responses in cooperation with Sudan because the government in Sudan is fragmented. African Union has mainly a political role in the conflict.

Question: What confidence building measures should the region take to engage the parties to fast-track the peace efforts.

Response: Confidence building measures are carrots which are thrown at a later stage of a negotiated process and not before the parties have agreed to dialogue. It is not the right moment for confidence building measures since the conflict dynamics have not also produced a hurting stalemate.

Session Four

Moderator: Dr Canan Atilgan, Head of Middle East and North Africa Division, Department of European and International Cooperation, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)

IGAD's Forum on Sudan (The Quartet) Mediation Efforts: Evaluating Progress and Challenges, Walter Ochanda, Ph.D., Office of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia

Introduction

The presentation on IGAD's Quartet process by Walter Ochanda, Ph.D., Office of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia, analyses the IGAD's regional mediation efforts in terms of milestones and challenges thus far.

The Quartet

Walter Ochanda began by attributing the current conflict in Sudan to the transition crisis which resulted from a fall-out between SAF and RSF over security sector reforms. The cause of the conflict transpired from disagreements on the approach for the integration of forces whereby SAF preferred a 2 year timeframe while RSF preferred 10 years. He went on to outline steps taken by IGAD towards resolving the conflict as follows:

- o Activation of IGAD Extraordinary Summit within 24 hours of the break-out of violence, which called for ceasefire and cessation of hostilities to allow

for peaceful resolution and a humanitarian corridor.

- o On June 13, 2023, IGAD set up another meeting whereupon Ethiopia joined and formed the IGAD Quartet made of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and South Sudan. This was two months after the initial fighting broke out and when initial IGAD diplomatic efforts proved unavailing. The Quartet engaged the conflict parties directly through the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan.
- o IGAD adopted the IGAD Roadmap for Peace in Sudan in the June 13, 2023 meeting in which facilitation of face-to-face talks between SAF leader General Fattah al Burhan and RSF leader General Mohammed Hamdan was top of the agenda.
- o On July 10, 2023, IGAD meeting in Addis Ababa, began the implementation of the IGAD Roadmap by adopting the agenda, settling on the venue, and defining a clearly Sudanese-owned peace process.





Conclusion

The resolution of the conflict in Sudan is hampered by several challenges, with the multiplicity of decision-makers, peace actors and peace processes being a major set-back. The lack of adequate funding to support the IGAD

peace process and the perpetual violation of ceasefire arrangements are other significant challenges. He ended his presentation by suggesting that there are active efforts to harmonize peace processes, as a result of which the AU-IGAD mechanism has been expanded to include external actors or Sudan’s partners such as USA, Norway, UAE, Australia, United Kingdom (UK), and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in what is known as “The Expanded Mechanism”.



Quad and Troika (Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States) Mediation Efforts: Evaluating Progress, Shortcomings, Challenges, Rahel Hassan, Programme Head, East Africa Peace Security Governance Programme, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS)

Introduction

The presentation on Quad, Troika and by extension the Jeddah process, by Rahel Hassan, Programme Head, East Africa Peace Security Governance Programme, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), provides an assessment of the capabilities and prospects of QUAD (US, Norway, UAE, UK and Saudi Arabia) and TROIKA (Norway, UK and US) and the Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) processes.

Process Capabilities

Rahel Hassan in her presentation, argued that Norway’s diplomatic repertoire, Saudi Arabia and UAE’s regional influence and financial support to Sudan, UK’s historical ties and USA’s diplomatic influence and resources for peace and security are significant leverage for QUAD. She added the Juba Peace Agreement of 2022 which formed the basis for security sector reforms in Sudan is in fact a milestone achieved by QUAD. However, she underscored that meaningful progress for the peace processes is undermined



by the multiplicity of stakeholders whereupon there is no complementarity and singularity of vision. She described the Jeddah Process as narrow on objectives, exclusive to military factions and political elites, and lacking the leverage to fully resolve the conflict hence its futility thus far.

Conclusion

The lack of consensus at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) level and compelling leadership at the higher levels of political decision-making weaken the peace process in Sudan.



Other International and Regional Mediation Efforts: Evaluating their Progress, Shortcomings, and Challenges, Prof. Peter Kagwanja, Ph.D., CEO Africa Policy Institute

Introduction

The presentation on international and regional Mediation efforts in Sudan, by Prof. Peter Kagwanja, Ph.D., CEO Africa Policy Institute, is a critical evaluation of the current mediation processes within Africa, IGAD region and from the international community.

The Mediation Trap

Prof. Peter Kagwanja began his presentation by describing the peace processes in Sudan as caught up in a “mediation trap” where the mediation process is delicate and the mediators are only opportunistic. The lack of meaningful progress in the mediation efforts is due to the lack of understanding of how complex and protracted the conflict in Sudan is among mediators. The armed conflict in Sudan involves informal (RSF paramilitary force) and formal violence (the regular SAF) which have created an unconventionality for peace actors to grapple with. However, the peace process is captured by narrow interests and exclusionary initiatives such as the Jeddah Process (solely led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and the initiative by Egypt. In fact, the process by Egypt is part of the problem since it seeks to export the 2013 Egyptian transition model to Sudan, whereby the military coup



leader morphs into a civilian head of government and maintains military control over politics. The impartiality of African Union (AU) in conflict resolution in Sudan is questionable given that the AU Commission Chair is the former Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad, which is a naturally interested party in Sudan.

Conclusion

The path to peace in Sudan can only be imagined in two scenarios:

- The Expanded Mechanism adopts division of labour and allocates responsibilities to the Jeddah Process to address the military elements of the conflict, AU-IGAD to address the civilian components of the conflict, and QUAD to address the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. Such a process should be AU-IGAD led (African-led).
- Military Solution at which parties interested in the resolution of the conflict monitor military dynamics on the battleground and back the winner on the battleground. In such a case, the victor's peace may highly influence the future of Sudan.

Comments and Q & A

Question: Given the multiplicity of initiatives, who should take the lead and how the peace process look like?

Response: An African-led process should take the centre stage through a panel and the conflict parties should be engaged from the point of their endgames as an entry point. Alternately, the United Nations (UN), African Union and IGAD may endorse a mediator and lead the process of forming a panel to be supported by the rest of the parties concerned about Sudan's conflict.



Question: Is IGAD reaching out to the other initiatives?

Response: Yes. IGAD is part of the Expanded Framework together with the AU. It is also part of the Secretariat of the Expanded Framework, and has been part of the Trilateral Initiative.



Session Five

Moderator: **Prof. Fred Jonyo**, Chair of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi.

The Role of Civil Society and other Key Groups in Sudan Mediation, Ayan Nuriye, Program Officer of the Mediation Support Unit, Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)



Introduction

The presentation on civil society in mediation in Sudan, by Ayan Nuriye, Program Officer of the Mediation Support Unit, Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), provides an assessment of the efforts, initiatives and strategies by civil society organizations in supporting mediation efforts in Sudan. She underscores the need to expand mediation processes to ensure civilians and civil society organizations participate.

The Civil Societies' Role

Ayan Nuriye began her presentation by highlighting that the relationship between authorities in Sudan and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) has been improving since the fall of former president Omar al Bashir in 2019. While CSOs mostly play a major role in peace and development at the community or sub-national levels in Sudan, they have increasingly gained a direct involvement in the political process. The CSOs are now part of the critical first responders providing humanitarian assistance, pushing human rights advocacy and responding to the needs of the displaced persons. The CSOs are involved in community empowerment and steering

stakeholder consultations to help facilitate dialogue. CSOs are actively calling for ceasefire, peaceful resolution of the conflict, regional and international partners to strengthen coordination of humanitarian and peace efforts for effective intervention. However, CSOs are often brought into the formal peace processes at the end towards the implementation stage. In fact, in a tokenistic manner despite that CSOs have public trust at national and local levels.

Conclusion

While CSOs were centrally engaged in the political transition process in Khartoum before the conflict broke out, they are currently disunited and lack a clear agenda and entry point in the ongoing formal peace processes. Among other challenges, CSOs face logistical difficulties in terms of movement in and out of Khartoum, the safety and security risks against their own personnel and equipment due to active hostilities. The resource limitations for emergency assistance, support and the fragmentation of CSOs bring up additional strain on CSO-led efforts in Sudan.



Responses and Strategies by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Walter Ochanda, Ph.D., Office of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia

Introduction

The presentation on responses and strategies by IGAD in the wake of conflict in Sudan, by Walter Ochanda, Ph.D., Office of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia, gave a systematic analysis of IGAD's diplomatic efforts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan.

The Conflict Situation

The conflict has displaced millions, killed 4000 people and pushed 20 million people into acute hunger. The conflict is spreading across Sudan into regions such as Nyala, South Darfur, Al Bashir, South Kordofan, with other armed movements joining the conflict. In response, there is a proliferation of peace efforts and initiatives by regional and international actors.

IGAD's Response

In the region, IGAD supports a Sudanese-owned and African-led process in collaboration with other international partners, hence there are active efforts driven by IGAD to harmonize the approach for the resolution of conflict in Sudan under the *Expanded Mechanism* in which IGAD is a Secretariat member. Dr Ochanda proceeded to outline systematic steps taken by IGAD as follows:

- Heads of State and Government (HoSG) Summit Decision to commission a high-level delegation to Sudan, form the Quartet and adopt the IGAD Roadmap for Peace in Sudan.

- Activation of the Quartet Council of Ministers to fast-track the implementation of the IGAD Roadmap.
- Deployment of IGAD Special Envoy Ismail Wais to support IGAD efforts in the *Expanded Mechanism*.
- Activation of the Peace and Security monitoring mechanism through the Continental Early Warning Network (CEWARN) which produces regular analysis and reports to inform IGAD response.
- Establishment of a humanitarian coordination focal office in Port Sudan to streamline coordination of humanitarian response with other humanitarian entities.
- Initiation of back-channel diplomacy with members of the Quartet through South Sudanese President Salva Kiir.

Conclusion

IGAD has capacity to handle the conflict in Sudan given the precedence set in the resolution of the civil war in Sudan (1989–2006), the civil war in South Sudan (2013-2018) and the armed conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region among other cases. As a shortcoming, AU (on May 2023) and IGAD (on June 2023) adopted different Roadmaps for Peace in Sudan, hence there is need for the two roadmaps to be harmonized, and for AU and IGAD to collaborate in the spirit of complementarity. However, the AU-IGAD cooperation framework has developed a parallel process to include the non-belligerents (civilians) into the formal peace process. The process to bring civilians on board is at its preparatory phase where IGAD is mapping out possible participants, before jointly agreeing on a Program of Work, Inclusion Framework and Principles, plus ensuring Transparency and Accountability.





Responses and Strategies by the United Nations (UN), Joanina Karugaba, Senior Inter-agency Coordination Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Introduction

The presentation on responses and strategies by the United Nations, by Joanina Karugaba, Senior Inter-agency Coordination Officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), provides an overview of humanitarian coordination and assistance efforts in Sudan by UNHCR.



Humanitarian Coordination

Joanina Karugaba began her presentation by highlighting that UNHCR has first established coordination mechanisms (refugee system, cluster system and development system), accountability and reporting lines, leadership structure (UNHCR Representative, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator), Inter-Agency Strategic Planning/Workplan, Inter-Agency Coordination and Resource Mobilization Mechanisms. UNHCR has activated the Refugee Coordination Model (RCM) which is predictable, transparent, effective and inclusive. It has also launched the Sudan Emergency Refugee Response Plan (May–December, 2023) which was revised in August, 2023 to capture growing humanitarian needs and intimated that the plan might be revised again in view of continuing escalations which are likely to increase population displacement in current and new areas of fighting.

Comments and Q & A

Question: What advice would you give to the civil society organizations in Sudan and is there a realistic way to include the grassroots civil society organizations in the formal peace process to not let the established ones crowd out the space for civil society organizations?

Response: There is an urgent need for the CSOs to develop a common vision and objectives given their currently fragmented state. Mediators should engage CSOs through a layered approach in the negotiations as a transfer mechanism between government and communities. Currently CSOs are driving public consultations to consolidate

Conclusion

UNHCR is coordinating humanitarian response with 64 partners including private sector companies, the media, International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), UN Agencies, International and Regional Financial Institutions, and development actors. She highlighted that the conflict has created 4,232,840 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 1,086,510 refugees. The refugee response plan (RRP) requires USD 1.005 billion funding for protection, child protection, food assistance, education support, health and nutrition, livelihoods and resilience, shelter, Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), and protection against Gender-Based Violence (GBV). The current budget is however 27 per cent funded (USD 266,363,770). The Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) which targets 18.1 million of the 24.7 million people in need of emergency assistance requires USD 2.6 Billion and is 31.7 per cent funded. She finished her presentation by highlighting that limited funding and active hostilities are critical challenges to the implementation of Refugee Response Plan and Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan.



their views to transfer them into the political space hence they need recognition and meaningful inclusion in the formal peace process.

Question: What happened to IGAD's early warning and response mechanisms?

Response: IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) produces regular reports including the events monitoring reports, situational monitoring reports and combined data streams reports covering security, governance and social, economic and environmental issues. The reports are shared with the IGAD Secretariat and the AU through the CEWUs (Continental Early Warning Units) and CEWERUs (Continental Early Warning and Early Response Units) in member states. The consumption of the reports is however up to the individual member states; how the member states use the reports to respond to or diffuse the threats is in their sovereign space.



Session Six

Moderator: **John Mwangi, Ph.D.**, Senior Research Fellow for Security and Defence Pillar, The Global Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS)

Reflections on Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union (AU), and United Nations (UN) efforts, Duncan Ojwang, Ph.D., Dean School of Law, Africa Nazarene University

Introduction

The presentation on Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union (AU), and United Nations (UN) efforts in Sudan by Duncan Ojwang, Ph.D., Dean School of Law, Africa Nazarene University, is essentially a critical appraisal of the various peace processes in Sudan. He stressed the importance of peace processes taking into account the external interests and other intricate realities of the conflict.

Intricate Realities

Duncan Ojwang began by instructively arguing that the conflict in Sudan will not be resolved until internal and external actors come out of the shadows and be part of the resolution process. The current peace processes are fixated on local actors alone and jettisoning external actors. The pre-occupation with the warring factions is not likely to lead to durable peace without factoring in the proxy interests in the conflict. Genuine mediation processes should be alive to the fact that there are other actors involved in the conflict, influencing the dynamics of the conflict, calling shots and purporting to lead the peace processes too.



Conclusion

The conflict is a layered one and the geopolitical and external forces must be considered to make the peace processes realistic. It is time for mediators to reflect on the true situation in Sudan and honestly acknowledge the true dynamics and actors of the conflict. The international community and the peace actors in Sudan should nonetheless give the peace processes good will. However, the mediators should reflect on whether they are working towards conflict settlement or conflict resolution, because if they are working in the interest of lasting peace, they should appreciate that peace processes do not end at the negotiating table. He finished by urging that mediation processes should provide an in-built mechanism for national ownership of the peace processes for sustainability.



Key Recommendations and way forward for Sudan, Prof. Zakaria Ousman Ramadan, Ph.D., President, Chadian Centre for Strategic Studies and Prospective Research

Introduction

The presentation on key recommendations, by Prof. Zakaria Ousman Ramadan, Ph.D., President, Chadian Centre for Strategic Studies and Prospective Research, provides a background analysis of the conflict s in Sudan and provides the way forward in resolving the crisis in Sudan. Prof. Zakaria makes key recommendations for relevant stakeholders such as the African Union.

Conflict Dynamics

Prof. Zakaria Ousman Ramadan began by reflecting on the urgency of collective security, by which regional and international organisations and actors are morally and strategically compelled to act and help resolve the crisis in Sudan. The country's fragility stems from security sector challenges including insufficiency of well trained and equipped security agents to control its various regions. There is less presence of the military in most rural areas (large ungoverned areas) which provide a safe haven for bandits and criminals. Socio-economic conditions in Sudan are similarly dire where education is misaligned with job markets, there is lack of secondary and tertiary economic sectors in rural as well as urban areas and no access to credit capital. The

job market is underdeveloped, and the economy is mainly informal sector driven. There are low agricultural yields and subsistence agriculture is highly vulnerable to climate change. Water scarcity and competition over natural resources have been exacerbated by climate change, which is partly drives resource-based conflicts.

Conclusion

Prof. Zakaria closed his speech with the following recommendations:

- Primary focus: Confidence and peace building takes time and should be done on the basis of complementarity and division of labour among all stakeholders.
- Partnership with local civil society organizations should be in the front line in humanitarian response, and empowerment of citizen insight and interaction.
- AU-led-and-driven peace process for local ownership.
- Proper coordination of regional and international efforts (political and humanitarian) to resolve the crisis in Sudan.



“ The way ahead: Peace in Sudan should not be seen as only the absence of war: confidence and peace-building take time and should be done on the basis of complementarity and division of labor among all stakeholders ”

— Prof. Zakaria Ousman



Comments and Q & A

Question: How does the peace process in Sudan look like and what recommendations would you make for the peace process?

Response: There are multiple actors, interests and players. At the epicentre of the conflict, we have to admit that it cannot be resolved until all actors find a place at the table given the complexities.

Question: What regional implications of the conflict in Sudan, do you see in the Sahel going forward, given the accusations that Chadians and Nigerians are involved as fighters for Janja Weed (RSF)?

Response: Despite the human and institutional continuities between Sudan and Chad, there is less likelihood of the conflict affecting the Sahel given the low levels of interference and participation of entities from the Sahel. It is an unfounded assumption that these continuities will play into the conflict.



“ How can we contribute to the continent (Africa) we want to see? By saving Sudan, we are saving the region. We should also involve youth leaders in the peace process ”

— Angella Kasekende

Closing Remarks

Angella Kasekende, Project Manager at Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Regional Programme Security Dialogue for East Africa, in her closing remarks, expressed satisfaction for Konrad Adenauer Stiftung having provided a platform and partnership with the HORN Institute for presenting and considering strategic issues in the region towards sustainable resolution. She urged the participants to continue reflecting on the theme of the conference “From Crisis to Resolution” and reiterated that “by saving Sudan, we [the conference participants and

interested stakeholders] are saving the region”. She finished by thanking the contributors, moderators and other participants as well as Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the HORN Institute for the success of the conference.



Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D., Director, HORN Institute, in his closing remarks, thanked all the conference participants for making time and insightful contributions towards the discussions at the conference. He appreciated

the urgency, relevance and timeliness of the conference. He pointed out the consensus that the region has its own challenges but Sudan is too big to let it fail. If Sudan should fail, it would be a failure for Africa’s *Ubuntu* spirit (I am because we are, we are because I am). He noted that the multiplicity of resolution efforts is making the conflict intractable, and the problem of failing multi-nations and its impact on statehood, peace and security. He finished by urging for continuous efforts towards the resolution of the Sudan conflict.

Recommendations

Having gathered from the submissions by various presenters, the following recommendations were made by the plenary to the respective stakeholders:

Kenya:

- Ensure utmost neutrality and impartiality in its efforts to mediate the resolution of the conflict in Sudan.
- Build support from regional and international partners and actors including development agencies for African-led mediation processes.
- Actively engage the regional mechanisms and international efforts to ensure cooperation among diverse diplomatic efforts for effective mediation.
- Increase the sensitivity of the humanitarian and security impact of the conflict in Sudan, to the international community.

African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development:

- Push for a permanent ceasefire agreement and humanitarian access.
- Advocate for a unified African-led formal Peace Process under the *Expanded Mechanism*. Other actors and international partners should support this process.
- Harmonize the AU and IGAD Roadmaps for Peace in Sudan to provide a common regional approach for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan.
- Lobby for an inclusive and comprehensive Peace Process, with larger participation of civilians and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).
- Consider humanitarian intervention through the deployment of a regional protection force should a ceasefire agreement prove difficult to achieve or sustain.


United Nations:

- Support the push for a permanent ceasefire agreement and humanitarian access.
- Support new arms embargo and sanction regime-targeting spoilers. Such measures will limit the violent capabilities of the warring parties, secure a hurting stalemate and promote peaceful resolution of the conflict.
- Support unified African-led formal Peace Processes under the *Expanded Mechanism*.
- Lobby for increased funding towards humanitarian emergency response.
- Support humanitarian intervention through the deployment of a regional protection force should a ceasefire agreement prove difficult to achieve or sustain.











Dr. Hassan
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