

The

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## Countering Daesh/ADF in Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda



The HORN Bulletin is a bi-monthly publication by the HORN Institute. It contains thematic articles mainly on issues affecting the Horn of Africa region.

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### Abstract

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has transformed from an insurgency or rebel group targeting power in Uganda to a regional terrorist organization with a goal of establishing a caliphate in Central Africa. This article describes the nature of ADF operations and argues that to counter the group's capabilities and de-trans-nationalize it, the East African Community (EAC) member states must focus on ADF's strengths, such as ideology, illicit economy, strategic networks with regional and global jihadist organizations, governance failures in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and neighboring countries, militancy in DRC, and vast ungoverned spaces. The author further notes that understanding and unlocking these complex features require sustained



Congo's FARDC soldiers conduct patrols near Beni in North-Kivu province to combat ADF and NALU rebels. (Photo Credit: Reuters)

intelligence-led security operations and greater regional cooperation and coordination. The article also recommends that EAC should help DRC de-militarize mining areas, increase state presence in ungoverned spaces, and cut ADF's supply lines.

## Background

The mineral rich and conflict-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) joined the East African Community (EAC) on April 8, 2022. Two weeks later, EAC held a Special Regional Heads of State Conclave on DRC in Nairobi to discuss on peace, security and development in Eastern DRC and the region. The conclave was attended by the Heads of State of Burundi, Uganda, DRC and Kenya. Rwanda was represented by its Foreign Minister; EAC is a regional intergovernmental organization of six Partner States, comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania (EAC, n.d.). A resolution by EAC authorized the deployment of a multinational (regional) force in eastern DRC along other non-military initiatives, to sustainably end armed violence and security threats in eastern DRC which risk the region's security, stability and greater peace. The entrance of DRC into EAC, despite being celebrated regionally and hoped to bear especially economic and regional integration prospects to the region given DRC's,

the newest member state inarguably tagged along concerns for the region's security, peace and stability.

Besides DRC's history of civil wars, coups and general political instability, the country's eastern region which borders Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi has been plagued by armed violence since 1960s. Eastern DRC has over 120 armed groups which are mostly militia groups and several DRC rebel groups and rebel groups from neighboring Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The refugee crisis along eastern DRC's borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and cross-border flows of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) is yet another concern for EAC. Above all, a new regional security threat has emerged in eastern DRC in form of transnational terrorism through the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) terrorist group.

The EAC second April Conclave on DRC was mainly focused on ADF, counter terrorism in eastern DRC and stabilization of the region (among other peacekeeping roles). ADF was formed in the late 1995 as a rebel group fighting against the Ugandan government of President Yoweri Museveni (Congressional Research Service, 2022); ADF fled Uganda into eastern DRC from where it has operated and morphed in a jihadist group (Al Jazeera,

2022). Between late 1990s – 2012, ADF was a lesser security threat in the region, but quickly gained notoriety with indiscriminate killing of civilians and rampant violence especially from 2013 when the global wave of jihadi terrorism sprung. Having suffered military defeats by joint Uganda-MONUSCO military operations in 2014 and the arrest of its leader Jamil Mukulu in 2015, the ADF re-emerged in 2017 from when it has sustained terror attacks inside DRC and across the border in Uganda. Regional notoriety aside, ADF joined the galaxy of global jihadi terrorism by establishing itself as an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The group therefore seeks to establish Central Africa as a province of the global ISIS caliphate, with DRC as the epicenter of the ISIS-jihadi-Islamist infestation in the region. Various individual-country and multinational military operations and security initiatives (to be discussed later) have been carried out in eastern DRC targeting ADF between 2014-2022 but ADF had remained resilient, adaptive and expanding territorially, ideologically, operationally and organizationally; ADF's tactics and impact has also been increasingly lethal. The questions worth asking is, given the existing vulnerabilities and predisposing historical grievances that make youth in the region susceptible to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism across the region and growing strength of Daesh as newest jihadi entrants into already terror fatigued region, what can countries in the region reflectively learn from each other's approach to addressing the challenges of terrorism?

How can East African Community effective counter terrorism and countering violent extremism interventions that builds on lessons from some of its members most affected by similar phenomenon and forge strategies that takes cognizance of changing nature of terrorism

“

The refugee crisis along eastern DRC's borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and cross-border flows of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) is yet another concern for EAC

and its intractable embeddedness in violent ecosystem in eastern DRC? Key findings and policy recommendations are articulated for regional governments and East African Community for consideration.

## The Allied Democratic Forces; The Ideology, Organization and Kinetic Activities

ADF was established in 1995 under the leadership of Jamil Mukulu as an insurgency movement (*Al Jazeera*, 2021a; 2021b). Jamil converted into Islam from Christianity and embraced Salafi doctrines while in Saudi Arabia for studies; he joined the Ugandan rebel group National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) upon his return to Uganda (*Al Jazeera*, 2021b). Jamil through loosely organized militants fled Kampala to Hoima in 1994 after a failed attempt to control the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council culminated in the imprisonment of Mukulu and 400 of his followers earlier in 1991. In 1995 therefore, he formed ADF and led the merger between ADF and National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) to form ADF-NALU (*Al Jazeera*, 2021b). ADF-NALU operated along the West Nile region of Uganda along Uganda's border with DRC and exploited the Rwenzuru ethno-nationalist (irredentist) passion of forming a state across Uganda-DRC border for recruitment.

However, due to military pressure from the Ugandan government, ADF-NALU fled into eastern DRC to establish an operational base and to rebuild (*Al Jazeera*, 2021a). Eastern DRC's volatile and armed groups-infested ecosystem provided ADF-NALU a strategic base after fleeing military pressure in Uganda. Eastern DRC also suffers significantly weak state presence and control, a proliferation of militia activity, armed groups and insurgency, and bears major mineral resource deposits which strongly combine to serve ADF's tactical, military, organizational and territorial objectives. The rugged mountainous Rwenzori region allow it access to trade routes and supply lines, blend with the local community, and access to opportunities to exploit the long-standing tensions on both sides of the (DRC-Uganda) border. ADF's operational area stretches across Eringeti, Beni and Bunia corridor with an attack zone along the Rwenzori column in Ituri (*Congressional Research Service*, 2021). The group also operates in North Kivu, which links it to other local and foreign militias.




Figure 1: ADF Operational Area.  
Source: Congressional Research Service, 2021

Having failed to sustain its Islamist insurgency campaign in Uganda, ADF-NALU increasingly adopted the ideologies of Tablighi Jamaat, a global Sunni Muslim revivalist sect of which Jamil was a member. Increasingly, the secular-multiethnic components of ADF-NALU declined as jihadi Islamist (Salafist) streaks hardened; in fact, the ethnic-secularist NALU wing was disbanded. The transition into full violent extremism as a *modus operandi*, was partly a strategic shift for ADF as it allowed the group to re-invent itself and gain traction especially in the era of rising jihadi terrorism across the world between 2001 and early 2010s. ADF targeted Ugandan Muslims for radicalization and recruitment before beginning to recruit from DRC, having established ties and pervasive influence among sections of the local population. Between early 2010s – 2017, ADF has increasingly recruited from the border ethnic groups on both sides of DRC-Uganda borders and among DRC communities after having established presence and influence among local communities.

ADF's activities and operations can be divided into two waves: 2010 – 2015 and 2017 – 2022. In the first wave, ADF emerged with the global jihadi trends and committed major civilian killings or massacres mainly in eastern DRC. New global jihadi organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda affiliates and even Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin were significantly active during the period; Somalia-based Al Shabaab group was also notoriously active. ADF had thus positioned itself as in Central Africa given all other sub-regions of Africa were experiencing at least one terrorist group or more

except Central Africa. A 2015 joint military operation by the United Nations (through MONUSCO) and DRC forces responded to ADF's violence and significantly diminished the group's capabilities. In fact, ADF splintered in 2015 when its leader Jamil Mukulu was deported to Uganda (imprisoned in Uganda for mass murder, terrorism and crimes against humanity by the Special War Crimes Division of the Ugandan High Court - ASC) after arrest in Tanzania. Seka Musa Baluku took over as his successor and adopted ISIS inclinations. Baluku inspired the hardening of the group's ideology and influenced the change of goal from Islamist insurgency in Uganda to the quest for Caliphate in Central Africa; ADF began to seek the establishment of an Islamic State in DRC as a watershed for 'Caliphate'. ADF's new leadership also wanted to strengthen the capabilities of the group.

The 'Baluku-effect' can thus be explained by ADF's increased violent attacks, territorial expansion, transnational operations in neighboring countries, links with the Mozambique-based Ansar al Sunnah, and allegiance to ISIS in 2017 (ADF began to rebrand as *Madina at-Taaheed wa-Mujahideen* – MTM or "The City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors" in Arabic); ISIS acknowledged ADF allegiance in 2019 (Candland et al, 2022). Effectively, the Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP) emerged as the Central Africa 'territory' of the global ISIS caliphate; ADF had thus given ISIS a nest in Central Africa. In April 2019, Islamic State for the first time claimed responsibility for attacks committed by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Democratic Republic of Congo (Candland et al., 2021). ISIS claim for the

ADF attack was a mark in the transition of ADF from a Ugandan-led rebel movement to a violent extremist group affiliated to ISIS and global jihadist organizations (Titeca, 2016).

The transition further introduced a fresh dimension to understanding of the ADF’s identity, a group perceived to be a very secretive movement; the group was now seeking publicity and staging acts that draw attention from the regional and global public, media and security agencies (Titeca, 2016, Congo Research Group, 2018). Therefore, perhaps with a few exceptions (see Fahey & Verweijen, 2020), ADF has now been widely acknowledged as having umbilical connections with ISIS (Candland, 2021). Ellenberg and Speckhard (2021) clearly indicate that ADF is the DRC wing of the Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP). Notwithstanding, ADF subsequently continues to carry out attacks and ISIS claims responsibility for some of them (Fahey & Verweijen, 2020). For instance, the Kangbaya Central prison attack in 2020 in DRC, in which over 1300 prisoners were freed. In October 2020, ISIS flagship newspaper *al-Naba* released a “special infographic flaunting ISCAP operations over a period of 12 months, highlighting attacks in DRC and Mozambique” (Bahati & El-Bay, 2021). The newspaper

for instance claimed the abduction of the three Catholic priests who are yet to be released or found in DRC, and more expansionist propaganda claiming attacks in Tanzania and West Africa (Bahati & El- Bay, 2021).

In terms of operations and kinetic activities, there was a lull after the arrest of Mukulu in 2015 and ADF bounced back from 2017 with more radicalization and recruitment in DRC. The group exploits trade, marital and other social relationships as well as strategic alliances to recruit among local communities, rebel groups, and soldiers (*Congressional Research Service*, 2021). Between 2013 – 2022, ADF has killed about 6,000 civilians and swelled across Ituri and North Kivu territories in eastern DRC (*Al Jazeera*, 2021b). In 2021, ADF violence escalated even further claiming lives of 1,200 people, which was 50% increase from 2020 figures (*Congressional Research Service*, 2021; Candland et al., 2022). ADF killed about 400 civilians in 2019, 782 in 2020 and 1,275 in 2021 mostly through massacres in clusters (Candland et al, 2022); the most affected areas or common clusters include Mamove along Ituri-North Kivu border, Rwenzori, Route Nationale 4 (RN4), Boga, Mambasa, Bashu territories and to a lesser extent, urban areas such as Goma, Beni, Ituri (Candland et al, 2022) among others as shown below:




Figure 2: ADF operations and clusters of civilian casualties. Source: Candland et al, 2022

## ADF has committed atrocious war crimes, killed thousands of civilians and hundreds of soldiers in DRC, and led to internal displacement of about 6 million Congolese and forced millions more to seek refuge in neighboring countries

ADF has committed atrocious war crimes, killed thousands of civilians and hundreds of soldiers in DRC, and led to internal displacement of about 6 million Congolese and forced millions more to seek refuge in neighboring countries (*Congressional Research Service, 2021*). ADF has also began to conduct its activities outside its traditional base in DRC as it becomes more expansionist and transnationality, by making forays into Uganda and several unsuccessful attempts in Rwanda. The offensive campaigns especially in Uganda, includes raids in villages, suicide bombings in population centers and ambush guerilla attacks on security agencies and personnel.

In Uganda, despite government constantly blaming ADF for the several sporadic cases of insecurity including murders of Muslim clerics, a Ugandan prosecutor, and the attempted murder of a Ugandan minister in 2020, ADF or even ISIS had never claimed responsibility. The narrative changed when ISIS claimed responsibility the attack at a pork restaurant in a Kampala suburb on October 23<sup>rd</sup> and an earlier attack on October 8th (*Al Jazeera, 2021b*). The most recent ADF attacks linked to ISIS occurred on November 16, 2021 in Kampala (suicide bombings at the Police Headquarters and Parliament buildings) and in December 2022 in Ntoroko District. The November attack left seven people dead including the three suicide bombers, and wounded 37 more including 27 police officers (*Al Jazeera, 2021b*). The fourth bomber was neutralized before he detonated himself in north-western Kampala. The Islamic State through its media (Amaq), claimed the attack and attributed it to its Ugandan operatives belonging to the Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP). ADF also attacks villages along Uganda's border with DRC.

### ADF as a Threat to Central and Eastern Africa

#### *i. The Transition to a Jihadist Terrorist Organization and Trans-nationality*

ADF had existed as an insurgency movement with the principal goal of overthrowing the Uganda government

of President Yoweri Museveni between 1995 – 2015 under its founder and leader, Jamil Mukulu. The group's initial identity, nature and operations were thus limited and its means to power would also be limited to conventional armed resistance, which it was not well equipped for. Further, the overwhelming capabilities by the Ugandan military and security agencies against ADF which had led to the latter's shift of operational base from Uganda to eastern DRC, as well as the expansion of legitimacy of President Museveni since 1986, and significant achievement of political stability and eradication of militant political environment in Uganda, dealt ADF strategic blows. ADF's threat level to the region was therefore minimal and security operations by countries such as Uganda and DRC were basically limited counter insurgency operations.

However, the succession within ADF from Jamil Mukulu's leadership to Seka Musa Baluku, and the subsequent ideological and goal diversion from insurgency to global jihadism, also altered ADF's *modus operandi* from insurgency attacks to terrorism (*Congressional Research Service, 2021; Candland et al, 2022*). The emergence of ADF as a terrorist organization therefore raises the level of threat and subsequently changes threat perception by regional countries and foreign powers interested in countering global terrorism such as the United States, United Kingdom, the European Union, and Russia (and even the UN). ADF therefore begins to fly in the radar of counter terrorism and financial monitoring agencies on the one hand, and the sympathy of jihadist organizations and radicalized individuals which further escalates ADF's threat level on the other hand. The United States Department of State for instance moved with speed to designate the ADF or ISCAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended on 10th March 2021. The Department has also designated ISCAP as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) under Executive Order 13224, while also designating its leader, Seka Musa Baluku, as an SDGT (U.S. Department of State, 2021). The ADF has also been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the United Nations under the UN Security Council's DRC sanctions regime since 2014 for

its violence and atrocities. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also sanctioned six ADF members, including leader Seka Musa Baluku, in 2019 under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program for their roles in serious human rights abuse, with a subsequent United Nations sanctions listing for Baluku in early 2020 under the DRC sanctions program (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Regionally the trans-nationality of ADF's activities in Central and Eastern Africa further elevated the group's threat level. As opposed to threatening the security of host communities in eastern DRC, the group now threatens the region in two ways: the escalation of attacks outside DRC in Uganda and attempts in Rwanda, and the threat to the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states (Uganda, Rwanda and DRC). The first threat provokes counter terrorism responses by individual countries to curb ADF on their soils, while the second threat hits at the core of the region's integration efforts and provokes regional multinational response strategies and initiatives. By the latter, ADF evokes the collective security paradigm in regional security thinking, which is majorly informing

regional joint military deployment and counter terrorism operations in eastern DRC as demonstrated in the EAC deployment of troops to eastern DRC and joint DRC-Uganda military operations in eastern DRC between 2021–2022.

ADF is thus a threat to the security and safety of the civilian populations, the national security of regional countries and the greater regional security and peace. ADF's brand of Islamist insurgency and Islamization of politics threaten the secular-democratic political order in the region, and social stability across the region as the emergence of such organizations and the prominence of their ideologies deepens sectarian tensions. The group's radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable populations such as the youth especially the unemployed and Muslim youth (from mostly marginalized Muslim minorities in the region), are real national security risks for most of the regional countries given the disenfranchised socio-economic experiences in which the bulging youth population in the region finds itself and the already terror-affected and radicalization-infested Muslim minority regions in Kenya, Uganda, and DRC. Therefore, regional



An online photo depicting ISIS militants in Yarmouk Palestinian camp, located near Damascus, Syria. (Photo Credit: MSNBC)

countries not only perceive the military threat from ADF but also the politico-ideological security threat that the Islamist group poses.

## *ii. ADF's Allegiance to ISIS and cooperation among regional terrorist organizations*

Fundamentally, the jihadist threats in the region are attributable to Al Qaeda and ISIS branches in the region, which are effectively setting up cells or tilting the region's violent extremism landscape towards global jihadist terrorism and turning the region into another theatre of global jihadist terror and the global counter terrorism campaign. The Central and Eastern Africa sub-regions are for instance facing spreading and engulfing jihadist terror threats from the north in Somalia (the Al Qaeda-affiliate Al Shabaab and ISIS-affiliate Islamic State in Somalia) to the south (ISIS-affiliate Ansar Al Sunna in Mozambique). Al Shabaab mainly attacks Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, while Ansar Al Sunna attacks Mozambique and has links in Tanzanian and Zanzibari cells. The emergence of ADF as ISCAP would therefore imply the region's encirclement by Jihadist threats, which are not only militarily unpredictable and serious, but also territorially menacing since most of these organizations have seized territories in the region having taken advantage of the weaknesses of the state (poor basic services, unemployment, marginalization...) and the ungoverned spaces within it.

However, the greatest risks for the region perhaps are perhaps the links ADF and other regional terrorist organizations have established with global terrorist organizations, and the cooperation among regional terrorist organizations. ADF for instance pledged allegiance to ISIS sometime in 2017, which ISIS acknowledged in 2019, while the Somalia-based Al Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012 (Agbiboa, 2014). Osama Bin Laden's successor Ayman al Zawahiri acknowledged

Al Shabaab's 'union' with Al Qaeda in 2012 (Onat et al, 2021). ADF has also established links with Ansar al Sunna in Cabo Delgado, which is the Mozambiquan branch of ISIS. In fact, in September 2021, ADF planned attack in Rwanda was foiled by Rwandan security agencies and the attack had been planned as a revenge for Kigali's deployment of troops to Cabo Delgado to fight against Ansar Al Sunna (Karuhanga, 2021). Rwanda National Police Spokesperson confirmed the relationship between the two terror groups saying, "The ADF are a terrorist group in eastern DRC and are part of ISCAP ... They [ADF] are linked to the group in Cabo Delgado because they are affiliated to ISIS" (Karuhanga, 2021). In fact, in March 2021, the US designated both groups as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) and their respective leaders, Seka Musa Baluku (ADF) and Abu Yasir Hassan (Ansar Al Sunna) (Karuhanga, 2021). The two threats imply increased role and influence of foreign and global terrorist organizations in the region, and likelihood of regional terrorist organizations developing sophisticated networks for radicalization, recruitment, financial resource mobilization, and coordination of attacks. Such would lead to a regional security complex in Central, Southern and Eastern Africa which behooves regional states to commit to collective security arrangements and joint or multilateral approaches for counter terrorism in the region.

Kenya is seen to be spearheading efforts for EAC military response in eastern DRC against ADF but Nairobi is inspired by its own experience of terrorism and violent extremism from Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab. With the exception of Somalia, Kenya has faced the greatest threat of terrorism and violent extremism in the East Africa region, especially from al Qaeda affiliated elements, since the 1998 bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi. While there is presence of other smaller terror outfits in the Horn of Africa, Al Shabab attacks pose the greatest threat with their consistent attacks in the country. This peaked between 2011 and 2015, with the period between 2012 and 2014 recording 52 attacks. The deadliest of these attacks were the 2013 Westgate Mall attacks (claimed 67 lives), 2014 Mpeketoni attack (claimed 60 lives), Garissa University attack (claimed 147 lives), and Dusit D2 attack (claimed 21 lives). Kenya's efforts may also reflect the fact that it had robustly campaigned for the admission of DRC into EAC and may be pro-actively mobilizing the EAC membership to address prior security challenges feared on DRC's EAC candidature.

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## The War Against ADF; Key Findings

The deployment by the EAC of a regional force in eastern DRC to diminish or eradicate 'negative forces' (armed and militant groups including ADF) is not the only initiative taken by regional governments especially against ADF. Previous operations and programs were first led by joint DRC-UN force in 2014, followed by a Ugandan operation dubbed Tuugo in 2017 in Eringeti Triangle in North Kivu, a joint UN-DRC operation in 2018, DRC's *Operation Sukola I* and *Sukola II* in 2019, DRC military 'state of siege' backed by US troops (operating from Virunga and Garamba national parks) in May 2021 – November 2021 (Al Jazeera, 2021a; 2021b), joint DRC-Uganda military operation in November 2021 – April 2022, and now EAC joint deployment in April 2022. The first operation against ADF was the UN-DRC joint operation in 2014 which led to the arrest of the group's founder and leader Jamil Mukulu in 2015. However, while the 2014 operation reclaimed territory from ADF and dealt significant military defeats to the group to the extent of its leader fleeing to Tanzania, it did not eradicate ADF and unfortunately led to the splintering of ADF and the hardening or condensation of its remnant under the current leader, Seka Musa Baluku. It is the condensation process that has led to more violent and extremist ideological position by ADF to the extent of joining ISIS and shifting from insurgency goal in Uganda to the quest for an Islamic State in DRC and the caliphate in Central Africa. All military operations have decimated ADF's military capabilities and territorial control but have been short-lived thus allowing ADF to bounce back in between operations.

The re-emergence of ADF at least since 2017 is attributable to the group's success in radicalization and recruitment of more fighting forces, mobilizing revenues to sustain its operations, and networks with regional and global jihadi organizations. For its recruitment purposes, the movement has vigorously enforced strict Islamic law in its strongholds in the DRC and sought to radicalize and increase its recruitment of Congolese Muslims. The growing prominence of ISIS-inspired narratives in ADF propaganda videos are effectively used for online and multimedia radicalization of vulnerable youth in eastern DRC, western Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya (Institute for Security Studies, 2021) for recruitment. The ADF's use of ISIS narratives is an attempt to return to its Salafi roots so that it could exploit Jihadi-Salafi networks in East Africa and global resurgence of jihadism. Radicalization and recruitment campaigns by ADF have increased after its dramatic loss

“The ADF's use of ISIS narratives is an attempt to return to its Salafi roots so that it could exploit Jihadi-Salafi networks in East Africa and global resurgence of jihadism

of territory in the wake of a series of military offensives by Ugandan, Congolese, and UN forces and the capture of its charismatic leader, Jamil Mukulu, in Tanzania in 2015, to help the group rebuild and survive. ADF's recruitment from regional countries helps it to rebuild its force size after military operations by regional governments crush its military capabilities and force size from time to time. Three Tanzanians were arrested in February 2022 as fighters of ADF in Beni in DRC (Olukya, 2022), which is for instance proof of ADF's appeal to regional youth and ability to radicalize and recruit among them.

The group is also financed by its criminal syndicate; ADF is both a terrorist and transnational organized criminal organization (Daghar et al, 2022). For instance, the group collects illegal taxes on illegal logging in DRC especially in Eringeti and controls gold mines along Lesse River and other parts of Beni territory in DRC; the group also illegally exports minerals such as Coltan, Wolframite and Casserite (Daghar et al, 2022). Other revenues for ADF come from money laundering from Ugandan business persons as well as global ISIS funders and jihadist sympathizers especially after its pledge of allegiance to ISIS (Daghar et al, 2022). In 2021 for instance, three Ugandan businessmen in real estate and petroleum industries were arrested for funneling USD 114,000 and USD 400,000 to ADF on separate occasions through conduits middle-agents physically or through wiring into DRC where financial monitoring systems are poor (*The Daily Express*, 2021). For instance, Kenyans have been arrested for financing ADF including Waleed Ahmed Zein blacklisted by the US in 2017 for transferring thousands of US dollars to ADF (Candland et al, 2021), and Abdirizak Muktar Garad from Wajir in Kenya arrested in January 2023 by DRC security agencies (Wambui, 2023).

In fact, having established a global brand in the name of *Madina at-Taauheed wa-Mujahideen* (MTM) and launched its virtual presence on social media through

Facebook in 2016, helps the group to appeal to the global Muslim community (Ummah) and gain the financial, moral or fighting support from the sympathetic segments of the

Ummah. In a 2016 Facebook post for instance, ADF can be seen appealing for support from the global Ummah under its new name *Madina at-Tauheed wa-Mujahideen*.

**Madinaat Tauheed added 7 new videos.**

October 11, 2016 · 🌐

20yrs back,a group of people organised and isolated themselves deep in the jungle with the aim of forming a tauheed nation,a community where Allah is worshiped in his oneness,however this was not liked by the cross worshippers ,they called meetings and discussed on how to fight these people. plans were made and finally in 2014, the crusade was initiated with over 10 countries joining efforts and attacked the village of harmonous people of tauheed. These people were driven away from what they then called a home,children were murdered by the cross worshiper as the world kept a deaf ear and a blind eye. However,with the help of Allah,these muslim folks were able to look for survival. Being that revenge was prescribed to them[quran 2:178-179],they carried out numerous military operations in revenge of what was done to them in the first place but the world didnt like their revenge and so named the terrorists. Today, almost everyday, a UN gunship helicopiter kills a child and a mother through bombings carried out. missiles are dropped in villageS,a number of these people surfer deep injuries and death. This is a community where natural death is rare but death is elevated by people of the cross , wounds are dressed alive, no sterlizers but rather salt is used as moffin

This is their message to the world,

'WHERE IS THE MUSLIM UMMAH? WHERE IS THE BROTHERHOOD,WE SHALL WORSHIP ALLAH ALONE TO THE LAST MAN STANDING, WE ARE MTM[ADF], WE ARE MUSLIMS, WE SHALL REVENGE,COME OUR CHILDREN, COME OUR GRAND CHILDREN

Figure 3: ADF social media post (Source: Candland et al., 2021)

Further, what accounts for the ADF's resilience is its ability to integrate itself into the Rwenzori borderlands, understand and tap local grievances, and insert itself into the larger Great Lakes conflicts accounts for much of its longevity. The ADF's resilience also highlights the longstanding lack of government authority in many parts of the eastern DRC. In Uganda, the ADF has not been as successful in holding territory largely because the Ugandan Central government has relatively more control of its borders, and its local governments have been better at providing services to communities. It also observable that efforts by international community to support regional governments in war against ADF especially the support for the DRC and Ugandan government operations against ADF have registered mixed success. While military campaigns against the group often reduced its fighting capacity and the

territories it controls. These military successes are short-lived as the group re-emerges from its downfall through mass recruitment, brutality against civilians and retreat from its areas of operation. For instance, the Ugandan government has employed several different strategies to weaken ADF, including attempts at negotiation with ADF members, offers of position in its army, and Uganda's amnesty program. However, these initiatives have mostly failed.

## Conclusion

ADF is no longer an insurgency or rebel group targeting power in Uganda, but a regional terrorist organization with designs for caliphate in Central Africa. The group's operations and influence is however growing and affecting more countries in Central and Eastern Africa especially through terrorist attacks and radicalization

and recruitment of the youth in the region into its rank and file. To effectively counter and diminish the group's capabilities and de-trans-nationalize it, the EAC member states should focus on the group's strengths such as ideology, illicit economy or organized crime, strategic networks with regional and global jihadist organizations, governance failures in DRC and neighboring countries, militancy in DRC, and vast ungoverned spaces. This is because ADF's resilience also highlights the longstanding lack of government authority in many parts of the eastern DRC. In Uganda, the ADF has not been as successful in holding territory largely because the Ugandan Central government has relatively more control of its borders, and its local governments have been better at providing services to communities.

Efforts to make sense of this group and develop effective counter strategies should take into account its many faces and elements rather than using a singular template. Understanding and unlocking these complex features will require sustained intelligence-led security operations and greater regional cooperation and coordination. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region will have a role to play in this regard, as it provides a mechanism to address cross-border conflicts and joint security and intelligence operations. The AU-led Regional Task Force for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is a noteworthy example. The combined efforts of Ugandan, South Sudanese, and Central African Republic forces, supported by U.S. technical intelligence assets and advisors, played a major role in breaking the back of the LRA rebellion.

## Recommendations

1. The EAC should commit to counter terrorism (militarily and non-militarily) in DRC for the long-term as opposed to limited and time-bound interventions which put pressure on resources, the mission and set objectives.
2. EAC member states should initiate efforts to disrupt the networks between ADF and ISIS, as well as ADF, Ansar Al Sunnah in Mozambique and Al Shabaab in Somalia.
3. EAC member states should develop and help DRC to build capacity for financial intelligence and surveillance to help curb illicit financial flows to ADF.
4. EAC should help DRC to de-militarise mining areas, increase state presence in hitherto ungoverned spaces and cut supply lines of ADF.
5. EAC should adopt a permanent multinational joint taskforce by remodelling the Lake Basin Commission, G-5 Sahel and SADC multinational frameworks of combating terrorism to suit regional conditions.
6. DRC should expand its counter terrorism strategy to include counter violent extremism (CVE) and increase the number and diversify the nature of stakeholders to include civil society organizations. DRC should learn from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, which rolled out CVE strategies and policies and allowed civil society organizations to carry out CVE to complement hard-power counter terrorism efforts.
7. DRC should address governance challenges and largely, political stability and economic development gaps which make the youth and conflict-torn regions more vulnerable to terrorist or jihadist ideologies and penetration.
8. DRC should establish specialized counter terrorism institutional, policy and legal frameworks, to end overreliance on counter-insurgency instruments and tactics, to effectively manage the ADF threat. Regional countries within EAC have developed specialized police units, national counter terrorism centres (NCTCs), anti-terror legislations, counter violent extremism strategies and policies, and institutionalized coordinating mechanisms for the fight against terrorism.

DRC should address governance challenges and largely, political stability and economic development gaps which make the youth and conflict-torn regions more vulnerable to terrorist or jihadist ideologies and penetration.

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# Strengthening Climate Change Literacy in Africa Through Model Integration

By Daniel Iberi

## Abstract

Climate change impacts such as droughts, floods, heatwaves, desertification, and sea-level rise have become more frequent and intense in many parts of Africa, leading to food and water shortages, conflicts, displacement of communities, and loss of biodiversity. However, despite this impact, climate change literacy remains low in many parts of Africa, especially in rural areas where the majority of the population lives. This can be attributed to a multitude of factors, including but are not limited to, inadequate access to education and information, extreme poverty, deficient awareness and understanding, and inadequate resources and infrastructure. This complex interplay of factors has impeded the progress towards mitigating the impact of climate change and implementing successful adaptation strategies in many African countries. This article discusses the concept of climate change literacy; why these climate change literacy rates are still very low in Africa despite the devastating consequences of climate change; and how different actors can leverage science communication models such as Contextual and Public Participation Models to strengthen climate change literacy on the continent. By utilizing these models, stakeholders can help bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and public understanding; promote informed decision-making; and drive effective climate action in African communities.

## Introduction

Across the world, climate change is causing extreme weather events which have become more frequent and intense. Hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons are getting stronger, there is heavier rainfall and snowfall, and heat waves are more frequent and intense, leading to longer droughts. These events are resulting in disasters and food security impact. The global average temperature has risen by 0.74 degrees Celsius in the past 100 years, with an accelerated rate of increase over the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (NASA, n.d.; IPCC, 2007). The last 16 years have seen 14 of the hottest years on record (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2021). This is based on data from various sources, including weather stations, ocean buoys, and satellites, and has been confirmed by numerous scientific studies. This increase in temperature is largely due to the release of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, from human activities like burning fossil fuels and deforestation (NOAA, 2021).

The warming trend has also caused changes in weather patterns, sea level rise, and other impacts on the environment and human societies. The projections for the 21st Century range from 2 to 4 degrees Celsius (equivalent of 3.6 to 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit), may have

catastrophic consequences. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns that island such as the Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Majuro Atoll, Solomon Islands and Carteret Islands, will suffer from major storm surges and rising sea levels, leading to the disappearance of some of them (Climate Vulnerable Forum, 2018). Coastal flooding will affect millions more people, while changes in ecosystems will lead to food productivity decreases in low latitudes and rises in mid to high latitudes.

The poorest countries will suffer from malnutrition and infectious diseases, and up to 30% of species globally will be at an increasing risk of extinction. Greenhouse gas emissions, caused mainly by the burning of fossil fuels, land use changes, and deforestation, are likely to be the primary cause of this temperature rise. The concentration of CO<sub>2</sub> has risen sharply from its pre-industrial level of about 280 ppm to the current value of 380 ppm, exceeding the natural range over the past 650,000 years (NOAA, 2021). The correlation between the highest concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> and the warmest climate is clear. Glaciers worldwide are have been melting at a fast pace, and on average, have thinned by over 10



*A woman heads towards a water truck in Odweyne, Toghdeer District where water sources have become scarce due to a drought (Photo Credit: Concern Worldwide)*

meters since 1980. Changing rainfall patterns and glacier melting will put the water supply of millions of people at risk. Sea levels are projected to rise between 20 and 90 cm globally by the end of this century, and scientists expect the melting of Arctic ice cover to continue in the coming decades (World Glacier Monitoring Service, 2021; Vaughan, Comiso, Allison, Carrasco, Kaser, Kwok, ... & Zhang, 2013).

In the Horn of Africa, most parts of the region are battling the worst drought in at least four decades now. The greater Horn of Africa's seven countries comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda revealed that there were a total of 39 reported acute public health events, flooding, and other outbreaks between January 1st and October 30th, 2022 (United Nations, 2022). This number already represents the highest annual figure reported since the year 2000, despite having two months remaining in the year. The majority of the acute public health events reported were caused by outbreaks of infectious diseases such as anthrax, measles, cholera, yellow fever, chikungunya, and meningitis, accounting for over 80 per cent. Meanwhile, drought, flooding, and other natural disasters were responsible for the remaining 18 per cent (United Nations, 2022).

Despite the devastating impact of climate change-induced disasters and other disruptions, a survey conducted between 2016 and 2018 reveals that the average national climate change literacy rate in Africa stands at 37 per cent against 80 per cent literacy rate in Europe and North America (Johnston, 2020). An Afrobarometer study further states the level of climate change literacy in Africa is not uniform, with significant variations observed across countries and regions. The climate change literacy rates in Mauritius and Uganda are relatively high at 66 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively, while Mozambique and Tunisia have much lower rates of 25 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively. When examining sub-national regions, 37 regions in 16 countries (8% of the total regions surveyed) have a climate change literacy rate of less than 20 per cent, while only 2 per cent (8 regions) scored higher than 80 per cent. Furthermore, there are notable differences in climate change literacy rates within countries, such as Nigeria, where the rate varies from 71 per cent in Kwara to only 5 per cent in Kano, and Botswana, where it ranges from 69 per cent in Lobatse to a mere 6 per cent in Kweneng West. On average, the difference between the highest and lowest climate change literacy rates within sub-national units is 33 per cent (Afrobarometer, 2020).

From the foregoing statistics, there is significant variation in knowledge and understanding of climate change across countries and regions. While some countries have relatively high climate change literacy rates, others have much lower rates, with some regions having rates as low as 5 per cent. This disparity in climate change literacy poses a significant challenge in addressing the effects of climate change across the continent, as individuals with low literacy rates may not fully comprehend the causes, consequences, and potential solutions to climate change. This issue highlights the need for increased efforts to educate people about climate change and its impacts to ensure that individuals can make informed decisions and take appropriate actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

The core objective of this article is to highlight the significance of the increasing literacy related to climate change across the greater Horn of Africa using the contextual and lay expertise models. It also highlights the reasons behind the potentially low climate change literacy in Africa juxtaposed with other countries especially in the Global North. Accordingly, this study utilized desktop review of apposite literature in climate change communication. It entailed a review of Afrobarometer survey on climate change literacy in Africa – the first survey on the topic – as well as crucial documents from United Nations agencies focusing on climate change, journal articles, books, and other studies conducted in this area. A descriptive research design was used in this study to extensively understand the ‘what is happening,’ with regards to climate change in the Horn of Africa; the extent to which populations in this region have been affected; the current climate change literacy rate; and how to improve the literacy rates using Contextual and Lay Expertise Models.

## Climate Change Literacy

### *Climate Change Literacy: A Conceptual Understanding*

UNESCO (n.d.) defines literacy as the “ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate and compute, using printed and written materials associated with varying contexts. Literacy involves a continuum of learning in enabling individuals to achieve their goals, to develop their knowledge and potential, and to participate fully in their community and wider society” (para. 1). From this definition, the climate change literacy can be described as competence or knowledge in the area of

climate change, its impacts, and its solutions. Therefore, climate change literacy refers to the comprehension and knowledge of the Earth’s climate system, as well as the effects of human activities on it. It is considered an essential component of addressing the global challenge of climate change.

To shed light on the subject, five different definitions of climate change literacy have been provided. According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program, climate change literacy involves an understanding of how individuals impact the climate and how climate influences them and society (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2009). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) defines climate change literacy as the knowledge and understanding necessary to make informed decisions about climate, including comprehension of climate science, climate change impacts, and methods of adaptation and mitigation (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, n.d.). The National Wildlife Federation defines climate change literacy as the knowledge, skills, and values that enable individuals and communities to engage in informed decisions and actions about climate change (National Wildlife Federation, n.d.). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change literacy as a comprehension of the scientific foundation of climate change, the effects on ecosystems and societies, and options for adaptation and mitigation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Finally, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines climate change literacy as the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values required to understand, respond to, and mitigate the effects of climate change (UNESCO, n.d.).

From the foregoing conceptualization of climate change literacy, education is a critical agent in addressing the issue of climate change because it can equip individuals with the knowledge and skills necessary to understand



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the causes and effects of climate change, as well as the actions that can be taken to mitigate its impact. Education has the power to foster informed decision-making, responsible behavior, and advocacy for sustainable practices, which are essential in addressing climate change (UNESCO, 2019). Studies have shown that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors and support climate policies (Hornsey et al., 2016; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Education can also influence attitudes towards the environment and sustainability, and promote a sense of stewardship and responsibility towards the planet.

Education can help to build resilience and adaptive capacity in the face of climate change impacts. Education can provide communities with the skills and knowledge necessary to prepare for and respond to the effects of climate change, such as extreme weather events and sea level rise. Education can also facilitate the development and implementation of sustainable solutions, such as renewable energy and green infrastructure, which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase resilience to climate change (UNESCO, 2019). Education can also play a crucial role in raising awareness and fostering collective action on climate change. Education can promote public understanding of the urgency and importance of addressing climate change, and encourage individuals and communities to take action. Education can also provide individuals with the tools and

resources necessary to participate in collective action, such as community organizing, advocacy, and policy development (Boutillier & Thomson, 2011).

### The State of Climate Change Literacy

The state of climate change literacy in the world is mixed. While there have been efforts to improve climate change literacy through education and awareness-raising campaigns, studies suggest that many people lack a basic understanding of climate change (Maibach et al., 2019; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). A recent global survey found that only 40% of respondents could correctly identify the cause of climate change, and only 36% were aware of the Paris Agreement (UNESCO, 2021). Climate change literacy varies by region, with higher levels of literacy in developed countries and lower levels in developing countries.

Climate change literacy is crucial for effective action on climate change. Without a basic understanding of climate change, individuals and communities may not be aware of the urgency and importance of taking action, or may be unable to make informed decisions about climate-related issues. Moreover, low levels of climate change literacy can impede the development and implementation of effective climate policies and initiatives. A lack of understanding can also lead to skepticism or denial of the existence or severity of climate change, hindering collective action and progress towards mitigating its impacts (Maibach et al., 2019; McCright & Dunlap, 2011).




Figure 1 shows climate change literacy cycle and impact (Source: Nature Climate Change)



Efforts to improve climate change literacy are ongoing. Education and awareness-raising campaigns are key strategies for increasing climate change literacy, as are collaborations between governments, NGOs, and academic institutions. Climate change literacy can also be enhanced through the integration of climate change

information into various sectors and disciplines, including health, agriculture, and urban planning (UNESCO, 2021). The importance of climate change literacy is increasingly recognized, and concerted efforts are needed to improve it on a global scale.




Figure 2 shows climate change literacy rates in Africa as of 2019 (Source: nature.com)

### Leveraging Contextual and Public Participation Models to Improve Climate Change Literacy in Africa

According to a survey by Afrobarometer (2019), ‘about one in four Africans (28%) are fully “climate change literate,” that is, they have heard of climate change, they understand it to have negative consequences, and they recognize it as being caused at least in part by human activity’ (p. 3). There are a number of reasons that explain the low literacy rate. First, access to quality education is a major factor that limit the ability of many people in Africa to understand complex issues such as climate change. This is especially the case in rural areas, where access to education is often limited. According to a study by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), approximately 32 million children in sub-Saharan Africa were out of school in 2020 (UNESCO, 2021). This lack of education can make

it difficult for individuals to understand the causes and impacts of climate change, as well as potential solutions. Second, even when people have access to education, they may not have access to information about climate change. This is because information about climate change is often not widely available in Africa, and is often not presented in a way that is accessible to people with low levels of literacy. A study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that access to information about climate change was limited in many African countries, which hindered efforts to address the impacts of climate change (UNDP, 2010). Third, poverty is another factor that contributes to low climate change literacy in Africa. Many people in Africa are struggling to meet their basic needs, and as a result, they may not have the time or resources to learn about climate change. According to the World Bank, approximately 36% of the population in sub-Saharan Africa lived in extreme poverty in 2020 (World Bank, 2021).

Fourth, lack of awareness and understanding of climate change is yet another issue in Africa. Many people in Africa may not be aware of the extent of the impacts of climate change, or may not understand the science behind it. This lack of awareness and understanding can make it difficult for people to take action to address climate change. A study by the African Development Bank found that low levels of awareness and understanding of climate change were hindering efforts to address it in many African countries (AfDB, 2013). And fifth, limited resources and infrastructure are significant barriers to addressing climate change in Africa. Many countries in Africa have limited resources and infrastructure to implement climate change education programs and to develop and implement effective adaptation and mitigation strategies. This makes it difficult to build capacity and implement effective responses to climate change (Adekola et al., 2017).

### The Contextual Model

The contextual model highlights the importance of understanding the diverse needs, attitudes, and existing knowledge of various audiences in effective science communication. According to Lewenstein (2003), this model recognizes that individuals process information based on social and psychological schemas shaped by their experiences, cultural context, and personal circumstances. The context in which individuals receive scientific information, as well as societal and institutional circumstances, also plays a significant role in the communication process (Lewenstein, 2003). However, like the deficit model, the contextual model can be limited in its focus on scientists' power and the one-way communication flow from sources to recipients (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010). Thus, it is crucial to acknowledge the interactive nature of science communication and to consider the broader societal and institutional contexts that shape the transmission of scientific messages.

There are five ways that the Contextual Model can be used to improve climate change literacy and

awareness in Africa. First, policymakers, governments, regional economic communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should recognize and incorporate local knowledge. This involves working with local communities to understand their beliefs, values, and experiences related to climate change, and using this information to develop educational materials that are relevant and meaningful to them. For example, in rural communities where farming is a primary livelihood, climate change education can be tailored to the specific impact of climate change on agriculture. Indigenous knowledge systems which have also been developed over centuries and can provide valuable insights into climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. Incorporating indigenous knowledge into climate change education can help to contextualize the issue and make it more relevant to local communities.

Second, participatory approaches to improve climate change education which may involve such engagements as community meetings, focus group discussion, and participatory mapping are also valuable approaches to improving climate change literacy in Africa. These methods allow community members to actively engage in the learning process and provide feedback on the educational materials being developed. This not only promotes a more democratic and inclusive approach to education but also ensures that the educational materials are culturally relevant and effective. By empowering communities to take ownership of the issue and develop solutions that are grounded in their own experiences, participatory approaches can help to build resilience to the impacts of climate change and promote sustainable development in Africa. This approach has worked in Tanzania where the CARE International 'Adapting to Climate Change in Tanzania' (ACT) program engaged local communities in the development of climate change adaptation strategies. The program used a participatory approach, involving community meetings, focus group discussions, and capacity building workshops, to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change and build

From the foregoing conceptualization of climate change literacy, education is a critical agent in addressing the issue of climate change because it can equip individuals with the knowledge and skills necessary to understand the causes and effects of climate change, as well as the actions that can be taken to mitigate its impact

community capacity to respond to these challenges. As a result of this approach, communities were able to develop their own adaptation plans and strategies, based on their specific needs and priorities. In Ghana, the Ghana Youth Climate Coalition (GYCC) engaged young people in climate change advocacy and education. The GYCC used a participatory approach, involving young people in the development of climate change messages, campaigns, and educational materials. By engaging young people in the development and dissemination of climate change information, the GYCC was able to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change and build a network of young climate activists who were able to advocate for climate action at the local and national levels. In Kenya, the Kenya Climate Change Working Group (KCCWG) used a participatory approach to engage communities in the development of climate change adaptation strategies. The KCCWG organized community meetings, workshops, and focus group discussions to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change and build community capacity to respond to these challenges. Through these activities, communities were able to identify their own adaptation needs and priorities, and to develop their own adaptation plans and strategies.

Third, socio-economic factors such as poverty, inequality, and access to resources, play a significant role in shaping people's understanding of and response to climate change. Therefore, climate change education must address these factors to be effective. For example, climate change education can be integrated with livelihood development programs that provide training and resources to help communities adapt to the impacts of climate change. For instance, in Mali, the Aga Khan Foundation worked with local farmers to develop and implement climate-smart agriculture practices. Farmers were trained on how to adapt to changing weather patterns, conserve soil moisture, and improve crop yields through the use of drought-resistant crops, irrigation systems, and other techniques. The program also included climate change education to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change on agriculture and how to respond to them. In Kenya, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) worked with pastoralist communities to develop and implement community-based adaptation strategies. The program included training on sustainable land management practices, water conservation, and livestock management techniques that are better adapted to the changing climate. The program also included climate change education to raise awareness of the impacts

... the Ghana Youth Climate Coalition engaged young people in climate change advocacy and education. They used a participatory approach, involving young people in the development of climate change messages, campaigns, and educational materials

of climate change on pastoralism and how to adapt to these changes. In Ethiopia, the World Food Programme (WFP) worked with smallholder farmers to improve their access to climate-resilient agricultural technologies and practices. The program included training on crop diversification, soil conservation, and water harvesting techniques.

Fourth, it is important to foster local partnerships. The Contextual Model emphasizes the importance of fostering local partnerships and collaborations in climate change education. This involves working with local organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs) and government agencies to develop educational materials and programs that are tailored to the specific needs and contexts of the community. This not only ensures that the educational materials are culturally relevant but also helps to build trust and buy-in from the community. In Nigeria, the Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE) brought together government agencies, civil society organizations, and the private sector to develop and implement policies and programs that promote sustainable and green economic development. As part of this partnership, PAGE worked with local communities to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change and the importance of sustainable development. This included training on climate-smart agriculture, renewable energy, and other sustainable practices. In Tanzania, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) partnered with local NGOs, community-based organizations, and government agencies to develop and implement climate change adaptation programs. These programs included training on sustainable land management practices, water conservation, and disaster risk reduction, as well as climate change education to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change on local communities. In South Africa, the Climate Knowledge Brokers Group brought

together a range of organizations, including research institutions, NGOs, and government agencies, to share information and expertise on climate change. This partnership helped to improve climate change literacy by providing access to high-quality information and resources on climate change adaptation and mitigation. Fifth, the Contextual Model recognizes that climate change education must go beyond raising awareness to empower communities to take action. This involves providing communities with the knowledge, skills, and resources they need to adapt to the impacts of climate change and mitigate their carbon footprint. For example, community-based climate change projects, such as tree planting, sustainable farming, and renewable energy initiatives, can empower communities to take action and reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Local leaders and community members can be valuable resources for understanding climate change impacts and identifying effective responses. Engage with them to identify the most pressing climate change

issues in the community and work with them to develop locally relevant solutions. In Senegal, the Centre de Suivi Ecologique (CSE) worked with local communities to develop and implement climate change adaptation strategies. The CSE engaged with communities through participatory processes, including community meetings, focus group discussions, and capacity-building workshops. Through these processes, communities were empowered to identify their own adaptation needs and priorities, and to develop their own adaptation plans. This approach helped to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change and build local capacity to respond to these challenges.

In Uganda, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) worked with communities to develop sustainable land management practices that promote climate resilience. The IUCN engaged with communities through community mobilization and capacity building activities, which included climate change education and



Grade 11 learner Zenile Nggame of Masiphumelele High School raises her fist during a protest for action against climate change outside Parliament in Cape Town (Photo Credit: Ashraf Hendricks)

training on sustainable land management practices. As a result of these activities, communities were able to improve their understanding of the impacts of climate change on their livelihoods and the environment, and to develop effective strategies to adapt to these changes. In Ghana, the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) worked with communities to improve their access to water and sanitation services in the context of climate change. The CWSA engaged with communities through participatory processes, including community meetings and capacity-building workshops, which included climate change education and training on water and sanitation management. This approach helped to raise awareness of the impacts of climate change on water and sanitation services and build local capacity to adapt to these changes.

### Public Participation Model

Public Participation Model (PPM), like the Contextual Model, places the key stakeholders (public) at the center of the climate actions or any other problem. The PPM aims to increase public awareness, understanding, and participation in efforts to address climate change. Some of the main proponents of this model include United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a number of environmental non-governmental organizations, and a section of academic researchers. This model encourages pluralistic debates on issues that require the creation or upgrade of public or health policies. Unlike traditional top-down information delivery mechanisms, the PPM prioritizes democratizing scientific communication and blends experts and laypeople into a nonlinear delivery mechanism (Brossard and Lewenstein 2010; Secko et. al. 2013). One of its key strengths is that it stimulates public engagement through creative and attractive news coverage, infographics, and polls that embed science into culture and daily life (Secko et. al. 2013).

A typical PPM structure involves several key components. These include identification of stakeholders, information dissemination, consultation and feedback, collaborative decision-making, and implementation and monitoring. First, identification of stakeholders in the context of climate change literacy and awareness entails defining the scope, goals, and objectives of the project or program related to climate change literacy and awareness. It also entails identifying potential stakeholders who may have an interest or be affected by the project or program. This includes individuals, groups, and organizations

“... identification of stakeholders in the context of climate change literacy and awareness entails defining the scope, goals, and objectives of the project or program related to climate change literacy and awareness

who may have direct or indirect involvement in the initiative. Stakeholders may include, but are not limited to, community members, government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, industry, and media. This step also includes the analysis of stakeholder interests and level of influence in the project or program. This includes determining the stakeholder's level of involvement, their perspectives on climate change literacy and awareness, and their potential impact on the initiative's success. Once the analysis and prioritization of stakeholders is done, it is important to develop a stakeholder engagement plan that outlines how to engage each stakeholder group effectively. This plan should include strategies for involving stakeholders in decision-making, communication and outreach, and building partnerships and collaborations.

Second, information dissemination involves providing stakeholders with accurate and relevant information about climate change, its impacts, and potential solutions. The following steps are involved in this stage: identifying the types of information needed, developing a communication plan that considers different channels and strategies to reach stakeholders, using clear and concise language, providing balanced and unbiased information, and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of communication strategies by assessing feedback, measuring changes in knowledge and attitudes, and adjusting strategies as needed. By following these steps, stakeholders can be equipped with the knowledge necessary to promote behavior change and encourage action towards sustainable solutions to climate change.

Third, consultation and feedback step of the PPM involves gathering input and feedback from stakeholders regarding the project or program. This stage is important as it enables stakeholders to have a say in the initiative and provide valuable insights that can help shape and enhance the project or program. There are several steps involved in this stage. The first step entails the

## Climate change has had a significant impact in the world, particularly in Africa, leading to increased droughts, flooding, and erratic weather patterns which have resulted in food and water shortages, displacement of people, and conflicts over resources

identification of stakeholders who will be consulted and provide feedback, including individuals, groups, and organizations who may have direct or indirect involvement in the initiative. Next, determine the methods that will be used to consult stakeholders, such as surveys, public meetings, focus groups, online forums, and other engagement tools. This is followed by development of open-ended consultation questions to elicit feedback and input from stakeholders about their ideas, concerns, and opinions about the initiative. The final step is the analysis and evaluation of feedback received from stakeholders to identify common themes and areas of concern, which can then be used to refine and improve the project or program.

The fourth step in the PPM is collaborative decision-making. Collaborative decision-making means working with stakeholders to make informed decisions about the project or program. This stage is crucial because it allows stakeholders to be involved in decision-making and to contribute to the development of effective solutions that are grounded in their needs and interests. Several steps are involved. The first step is to identify the decision-making criteria that will be used to evaluate and select options. These criteria should be based on the goals and objectives of the initiative, as well as the values and priorities of stakeholders. Next, it is necessary to develop and evaluate options for addressing the issues related to climate change literacy and awareness. This involves generating a range of potential solutions that are consistent with the decision-making criteria and evaluating their feasibility, effectiveness, and potential impact. Stakeholders should then be engaged in the decision-making process by providing them with information about the options, their benefits and drawbacks, and the decision-making criteria. This allows stakeholders to provide input and feedback on the options and to ensure that their perspectives are considered. After evaluating the options and receiving input from stakeholders, the preferred option is selected based on the decision-making criteria. This option should be consistent with the goals and objectives of the initiative and the values and priorities of stakeholders.

Finally, the preferred option is implemented and monitored to ensure that it is effective and achieves the desired outcomes. This involves identifying the resources needed to implement the decision and establishing a monitoring and evaluation plan to track progress and make any necessary adjustments.

The fifth step is implementation and monitoring. The implementation and monitoring step in the context of climate change literacy and awareness using the public participation model collaborative decision-making involves putting the preferred option into action and tracking progress towards achieving the desired outcomes. By engaging stakeholders in the process, monitoring progress, and evaluating effectiveness, the initiative can be refined and improved over time to ensure its ongoing success.

### Conclusion

Climate change has had a significant impact in the world, particularly in Africa, leading to increased droughts, flooding, and erratic weather patterns which have resulted in food and water shortages, displacement of people, and conflicts over resources. These challenges have particularly affected vulnerable communities, including pastoralists, farmers, and refugees, exacerbating poverty and instability in the region. Despite this devastating impact, there is still low climate change literacy in Africa, in part, due to a combination of factors, including inadequate education and awareness campaigns, limited access to information, and cultural and linguistic barriers. Additionally, many African communities face more immediate and pressing concerns such as poverty, disease, and conflict, which can make climate change seem like a distant issue.

Enhancing climate change literacy in Africa holds crucial significance as it enables individuals, communities, and governing bodies to comprehend the far-reaching effects of climate change and adopt measures to minimize its detrimental impacts. Furthermore, augmenting climate change literacy can serve as a catalyst in fostering sustainable development, curtailing the exposure of

communities to climate-induced hazards, and bolstering their resilience in response to the evolving ecological circumstances. By combining the Contextual and Public Participation Models, communication strategies can be developed that are tailored to the specific needs of African communities, while also encouraging their active participation in the climate change discourse. This could help to bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and societal action, promoting more effective responses to climate change in Africa.

## Recommendations

### *Recommendations to governments in the Horn of Africa*

Governments, through their ministries, departments and agencies should:

1. Develop climate change education programs which will include integrating climate change education into their national curricula, from primary school to higher education. This could be done by developing standardized educational materials and teacher training programs to equip educators with the knowledge and skills to teach about climate change.
2. Facilitate access to information to citizens, particularly those in remote and underserved areas. This could be achieved through the development of accessible and user-friendly climate information platforms, including websites, mobile applications, and community radio programs. Governments could also work with civil society organizations to disseminate information through community outreach programs.
3. Encourage public participation in the climate change discourse by creating opportunities for citizens to engage in decision-making processes related to climate change. This could include establishing community-based organizations and platforms for dialogues between citizens and policymakers.
4. Collaborate with UNFCCC to organize conferences and workshops that educate people on climate change and its impact. This can be done in collaboration with local universities, research institutions, and civil society organizations.
5. Collaborate with UNFCCC, Green Climate Fund, and United Nations Environment Programme

- Climate Change (UNEP) to build capacity for climate action by training and supporting local communities, civil society organizations, and government officials. This can include providing technical assistance, sharing best practices, and promoting knowledge exchange and learning networks.

### *Recommendations to regional intergovernmental organizations and research organizations*

1. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU) can use their platforms to raise awareness about the importance of climate change literacy and its role in achieving sustainable development in Africa. Through public advocacy and awareness campaigns, they can help to sensitize policymakers and the general public on the urgency of climate change issues and the need for action.
2. IGAD, AU, and other intergovernmental organizations can also facilitate research and knowledge sharing on climate change issues by promoting collaboration among African governments, regional and international organizations, and academic institutions. They can create platforms for knowledge exchange and capacity building on climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, as well as encourage the sharing of best practices and lessons learned.
3. Research organizations should provide capacity building and training on climate change to policymakers, civil society organizations, and the private sector. This can include training on climate change science, policy, and adaptation and mitigation strategies.

IGAD, AU, and other intergovernmental organizations can also facilitate research and knowledge sharing on climate change issues by promoting collaboration among African governments, regional and international organizations, and academic institutions

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# Terrorism and Security Cooperation Efforts in The Horn of Africa: Forms, Successes, and Challenges

By Prof. Fred Jonyo, Ph.D. and Philip Kaudo

## Abstract

Despite the implementation and integration of numerous global initiatives aimed at curtailing and eliminating terrorist operations and groups, terrorism remains a major concern. The Horn of Africa has long been considered a battleground for global terrorism, making it a focal point for global counter-terrorism efforts. The “War on terrorism” has concentrated on the Horn of Africa and has involved various counter-terrorism measures such as the ATMIS (formerly AMISOM) presence, security transfer strategy, counter-terrorism laws, and conventions. However, terrorist attacks continue to occur in several parts of the region, including central and southern Somalia, where al Shabab is active. This has raised questions about the effectiveness of the current counter-terrorism initiatives and whether they are the best measures to combat terrorism. This article aims to explore why the Horn of Africa remains a sanctuary or battleground for violent extremist activities. It further evaluates the counter-terrorism initiatives in place and recommends that policymakers urgently shift their counter-terrorism approach from a militant/hard security approach to a soft/human security approach. The article concludes by identifying gaps in policy that characterize the security policy measures and frameworks integrated into the Horn.

## Introduction

Since the 9/11 terror attacks, international terrorism has remained a complex global phenomenon that poses significant bottlenecks to international peace and stability as well as development. The Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East states have come under intense scrutiny for global terrorism and are hence considered strategic focal points in the war against violent extremism. The United State Institute for Peace has specifically considered the Horn of Africa nations including Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan as major sources of terrorism. This is corroborated in the study findings as detailed in the African Union (2014) report that recognizes terrorism as one of the existential threats to international peace and security (African Union, 2014). The findings reveal that in the recent past, the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Africa at large has gained greater proportions. The report acknowledges that regions that were initially considered immune to violent extremism have recently become soft targets and operational bases of terror-affiliated groups.

The presence and coordination of terror-affiliated groups in the Horn of Africa are exemplified by the increasing rates of terror activities within the sub-continent. The Horn of Africa not only remains a haven for terrorist activities

but also a victim of terrorism. In 1998, terrorists bombed American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing more than 200 and injuring 4000 persons. In 2013, the Al Shabab militants claimed personal responsibility for an attack at Garissa University that claimed the lives of 148 students. Statistically, terror activities have been experienced in Uganda’s 2010 bombing that claimed 74 lives, Nairobi’s 2013 Westgate Mall attack that claimed 67 lives, Mpeketoni’s 2014 attack that led to a loss of 48 lives, Mogadishu’s 2017 truck bombings that claimed 512 lives, 2022 car bombing that claimed 120 lives and even 2019 truck bombing that claimed 82 lives.

The greater Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions have several listed terror groups. These include Harakat al Shabab al-Mujahideen (al Shabab), an Islamist militant group affiliated with al Qaida, based in Somalia. ISIS-Somalia, a regional branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), that operates in Somalia. Ansar al-Sharia (Somalia), a jihadist group that has pledged allegiance to al Qaida that operates in Somalia. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan Islamist group, operates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group, has been known to



*A United States soldier in Taji, Iraq in 2008 (Photo Credits: Christopher Landis/Shutterstock)*

operate in Uganda, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic and has been designated as a terrorist group by the US government.

The increasing terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa remain concerning with some of the Horn of Africa member states including Somalia and Sudan initially blacklisted for being considered state sponsors of international and domestic terrorism. In 2017, through an Executive Order, President Donald J. Trump imposed stringent immigration policies and travel bans for nationals from seven states including Syria, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya.

Despite several state-led counter-terrorism interventions and cooperation in the Horn of Africa, terrorist groups have remained resilient in the Horn of Africa and stand out as the principal security challenge for states in the Horn of Africa. The subregion has borne the full brunt of challenges associated with international terrorism including refugee influx, loss of lives, destruction of properties, and decline of the country's Gross Domestic Product. According to the African Union report (2014), the resilience of the terror groups is manifested in the increasing rates of terror attacks, the continued use of the Horn of Africa as a breeding ground and source of financing and recruitment of terrorists, the use of Africa

as hideouts or haven for targeted terrorists and the use of Africa as a transit point for terrorists and illicit activities such as drug and human trafficking.

It is based on this background that this report seeks to critically examine the presence of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, the drivers of terrorism, the different forms of security cooperation in addressing the prevalence of violent extremism, and policy gaps that define the counter-terrorism measures. The findings of the study are integral to widening the understanding of terror activities and coordination in the Horn of Africa and also can inform appropriate security policies, frameworks, and strategies for counter-terrorism.

### **Drivers to Terrorism in the Horn of Africa**

There exist diverse factors contributing to the increasing rates of violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. To understand the factors, it is necessary to conceptualize the socio-economic and political environment of the Horn of Africa. The United States Institute of Peace (2004) describes the Horn to be constituted of weak, warring, and fragile states. Consequently, the United Nations (2020) reports list Horn's states including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Somalia, as among the least developed states globally that need preferential access to the market, capacity building,

several forms of humanitarian assistance and other forms of concessions such as loans, grants, military assistance among others. This is corroborated by the findings of the Human Development Index that single out South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan in the bottom twenty states globally in terms of economic development. The World Bank (2020) report projects that 70 per cent of Somalis live below the poverty line, 80% of Sudanese in dire need of humanitarian assistance, and 69 per cent of the population in Eritrea are poverty-stricken.

Based on this background, it is evident that the sustainability and emergence of terror organizations in the Horn of Africa are economically founded. According to study findings as exemplified in the works of the African Union (2014), the terror groups including the Al Shabab, continue to take advantage of the region's economic vulnerabilities for purposes of recruitment of locals to the militia group. Economic vulnerability indicators including high poverty index, climate change variabilities, and high unemployment rates among others continue to serve as risk factors exacerbating terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Economic vulnerabilities make the

locals susceptible to joining terror groups as a means of livelihood. While providing the rationale for why the Horn of Africa remains a sanctuary for terrorism globally, Prof Ali Mazrui describes the region as being trapped in both "globalization and marginalization". As Kagwanja (2006) finds out, the Horn of Africa suffers chronic poverty, a deep sense of marginalization, and chronic underdevelopment exacerbated by the negative realities of globalization which have collectively provided an opportunity for Islamists to export their ideas and win allies through recruitment, especially among the desperate refugees and the impoverished members of the society.

This is corroborated by the findings of Menkhaus, (2007) who equally finds that the high poverty index in the Horn of Africa has the potential to produce a ready supply of terrorist recruits into terrorist cells. In Somalia for instance, economic vulnerabilities have eased the spread of terrorist ideologies and Islamic fundamentalism through the ability of the terror groups to offer a sense of belonging to the locals and provide opportunities including money as a strategy to lure them to Al Shabab. Therefore, economic vulnerability indicators including the high poverty index



*Women making a new house after moving from their homes due to drought in Wajir County (Photo Credits: Anna Ridout/Oxfam)*

provide the necessary environment for terrorism activities including recruitment, and radicalization to prosper. Studies conducted by Abioye (2019) find a positive correlation between economic vulnerabilities and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Using a case analysis of both the Al Shabab and the Lord's Resistance Army, the study finds that extreme unemployment and abject poverty, economic marginalization, high-income inequalities rates, and high illiteracy levels have resulted in locals engaging in terror activities as the only way to make a living. These conditions breed necessary grievances that terror groups exploit for recruiting, training, planning, and executing their terror activities. A study conducted by the United Nations Development Program (2023) aimed at assessing the main driving forces for terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a primary focus on Somalia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Sudan, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria links terrorism to economic desperation. The report indicated that 25% of all terror recruits identified lack of jobs as the main reason that influenced them to join the group while 40% indicated that they were in urgent need of better livelihoods at the time of joining the terror groups.

The other major contributing factor to the Horn of Africa serving as a hotbed of violent extremism is the existence of many "ungoverned spaces" within the region. The operational definition of ungoverned space entails a political condition within a political entity characterized by predatory or intermittent state presence (state collapse), the existence of state authority with no or limited control or writs in certain regions within its borders (partial state collapse), and a situation where state governments have ineffective presence and control in frontier zones including slums and towns (failed or weak states). The Horn of Africa member states depict the different variations of state failure including collapsed state, failed state and even partially collapse state. Before the regional interventions and security cooperation in Somalia, Somalia was considered a collapsed state. For instance, South -Central parts of Somalia, became ungovernable and the region enjoyed absolute control of the terror groups. With limited state presence, the region became an economic hub for illegal activities including arms proliferation and piracy. Subsequently, portions of Northern Uganda, most parts of Southern Sudan, and even the Eastern portions of Somaliland have for decades become beyond the control of democratically elected regimes, with the regions enjoying control from terror groups including the Lords Resistance Army and the Al Shabab militants. In the same vein, Kenya's

Economic vulnerability indicators including high poverty index, climate change variabilities, and high unemployment rates among others continue to serve as risk factors exacerbating terrorism in the Horn of Africa

Northern Frontier and its Coastal regions including Lamu County and the Karamoja regions of Eastern Uganda only enjoy a weak and, in some instances, nominal presence of government authorities and hence remain beyond the reach of effective policing and other security programs. Continued conflicts in Ethiopia as exemplified in the battle between the Oromo and the Ethiopian government, the political instability in Sudan further manifests garrison state presence in the Horn of Africa region.

As a result of ungoverned spaces, the Horn of Africa remains synonymous with political instability manifested in the form of electoral conflicts, coups and counter-coups, communal violence, warlords, and armed criminalities. Resource scarcity, climate change variabilities, ethnicization of regional and national politics, refugee influx, population influx, and other negative realities of globalization and economic dynamics present to increase the ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa has borne the brunt of the violence as exemplified in the Kenyan and Uganda's post-election outbreaks of violence, Ethiopian continued battles between the government and the Oromo, the battle for state control between the government of Somalia and the Al Shabab, political differences and disputes in South Sudan among others.

Terror groups operating in the Horn of Africa continue to exploit these ungoverned spaces to advance their terrorist philosophy and activities. As Abioye (2019) asserts, in Somalia, the failure of the government to show effective control of the Somali borders has eased the infiltration of terror activities in the Horn of Africa. As a result of the region's ungoverned spaces including weak political institutions, inability to provide political goods, and exert authority and influence within the regional borders, the terror groups present as an alternative government with the ability to fill in the gaps that the democratically elected governments are unable to do. This has made these groups remain fashionable among

...al Shabab has built an extensive racketeering operation inclusive of checkpoint tolls, taxation of imported goods, imposition of an annual religious tax, the ban on khat businesses, and even direct trading in charcoal within its areas of influence

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the locals. For instance, to achieve its general objective including establishing an Islamic state as defined in the Sharia law, the Al Shabab continues to claim legitimacy in Somalia through its ability to settle a majority of communal disputes, that the government has long struggled to deliver.

Evidently, as a result of ungoverned spaces including ineffective monitoring and control of certain regions, the terror groups continue to exploit the existing governance crisis in the Horn of Africa to run illegal activities. For instance, in Somalia, the al Shabab has built an extensive racketeering operation inclusive of checkpoint tolls, taxation of imported goods, imposition of an annual religious tax, the ban on khat businesses, and even direct trading in charcoal within its areas of influence. This has presented the regions as advantageous in terms of revenue collection. In Kenya, as a result of marginalization and ungoverned spaces, there has been an establishment of a bandit economy in the Northern region, a situation that compromises the country's national security and projects the region as a potential haven for terrorist coordination.

As the United Nations Development Program (2023) report highlights, weak governance in the Horn has resulted in the inability of the government to provide essential services including security, electricity, education, health care, welfare programs, water services, and justice among other essential and critical services. Government negligence in providing these services, especially in remote, marginalized, and peripheral areas presents the best opportunity for the violent extremist groups to serve as alternative service providers, making them fashionable and preferable among the locals and also challenging state legitimacy. By acting as alternative governments, these groups can draw loyalty and confidence from the locals hence ease in terrorism recruitment, training, and other terror activities.

The study by UNDP (2023) report highlights that in Somalia, there exists a positive perception of the role of the Al Shabab in service delivery. 57 per cent of the

respondents noted that the Al Shabab has recorded success in mediating local conflicts, 58 per cent acknowledges the good role of al Shabab in providing justice and 62 per cent noted that Al Shabab provides everyday security. Based on these findings, it is evident that the terror group's ability to provide services makes it appealing and presents itself as an alternative to the Somali government. The militia groups negotiate and solve disputes amicably in areas it influences, operate courts to settle the land, matrimonial and other forms of disputes, offer necessary security to its loyalists and locals, punish criminals, and operate roads including maintaining checkpoints and even providing receipts for road usage payments. It is therefore worth concluding that ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa accelerate terrorism by providing a necessary environment for the establishment of terror safe havens, recruitment of locals, arms smuggling and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the establishment of illegal businesses such as piracy and charity organization as sources of revenue for terror groups and as potential platforms for grievances against the state.

An additional rationale why the Horn of Africa remains fashionable to violent extremism is the region's history of government repression, human rights violation, marginalization, religious fundamentalism, and security actors' brutality among others that continue to aggregate local grievances against the government hence leading to distrust of government agencies and their capabilities and limited legitimacy of the state among the locals. Terror groups build on these grievances to boost their recruitment and rely on victims of human rights violations, government repression, and actors in wars as potential trainers for recruits. For instance, the rise and dominance of the Lords Resistance Army operating in Uganda and other Northern parts of the Horn of Africa are grounded on local grievances including the state's target to eliminate its members, land disputes, and government repression against criticism and the inability of the government to facilitate equitable distribution of the national resources. Concurrently, terror activities witnessed in Ethiopia as exemplified by the battle between the Oromo Liberation

Front are grounded on the inability of the current regime to address the existing grievances. It is worth noting that the Oromo Liberation Front was formed on different grievances including class-based oppression, political marginalization, and repressive politics. Therefore, the Horn of Africa is a home to several grievances which the terror groups easily capitalize upon for purposes of shaping favorable opinions in their favor and against the government hence ease in recruitment.

The Horn of Africa also remains a hotbed of violent extremism because of Islamic Jihadism. The region is divided between Christians and Muslims with an accumulated higher percentage of Muslims. Statistical analyses present Djibouti as 94 per cent Muslim, Ethiopia as 50 per cent Muslim, Somalia as 100 per cent Muslim, Tanzania, and Sudan as 35 per cent Muslim, Uganda as 16 per cent Muslim, and Kenya as 10 per cent Muslim (Kagwanja 2006). This has exposed the region to sectarian politics, especially in regions where sectarian groups have complained of marginalization. For instance, in both Kenya and Ethiopia, the Muslim community has complained of historic political marginalization. This has led to the rise of warlords in Northern Kenya that runs the bandit economy and to a larger extent serve as potential linkages to terrorist recruitment.

The Horn's strategic location also presents it as a breeding ground and source of global terrorism. Based on porous borders, Djibouti's attractiveness to global terrorism is premised on its transit capabilities. Somalia's geopolitics especially its closeness to the Indian Ocean and nearness to fragile states makes it a short-term transit point for terrorist activities including the movement of materiel and arms between Kenya and Somalia and to the rest of the world. The region's proximity and historic relations with the Middle East, coupled with porous borders have provided the opportunity for ease in the movement of terrorist agents and teachings and the exportation of ideas on Islamic fundamentalism hence facilitating radicalization efforts within the region.

These arguments are corroborated by the findings of Shinn (2004) that the geography of the Horn of Africa plays an important role in sustaining and facilitating terror activities and penetration in the Horn of Africa. His findings reveal that most of the Horn of Africa nations are located near or have longstanding ties and bonds to the Arab Peninsula, which is considered the major source of terrorism and organized criminal activities. It is also easier to move between the Peninsula Gulf State to the Horn of

Africa, either by sea or air as a result of porous borders. This is because the government finds it complicated to monitor the lengthy coastlines to Tanzania from Eritrea.

The African Union (2014) report on violent extremism in Africa summarizes the push factors for violent extremism in the Horn of Africa to constitute radicalization and violent extremism which is accelerated by the ability of the terror groups to capitalize on local grievances, unresolved conflicts including the Somali Civil Wars, the Ethiopian Civil Wars, the border contestations on the Northern Frontier Region, religious fundamentalism, history of marginalization, exclusionary politics, identity claims among other grievances that project the militia groups as agents of political, economic and social activism. The study also highlights that the Horn of Africa is very strategic in the war on terrorism because of the ability of the groups to develop favorable and working networks with transnational organized crime groups. These new trends continue to ease radicalization and recruitment efforts and serve as a potential source of financing. Institutional weaknesses manifested in the prevalence of ungoverned spaces as illustrated in the inability of the state to address prevailing issues such as development, strict adherence to democratic ideals, and establishment of strong borders continue to make the region much more vulnerable to terrorist penetration, radicalization, and recruitment.

## Forms of Security Cooperation and Strategies in the Horn of Africa

There has been a blend of security cooperation efforts in the Horn whose achievements remain questionable. The Horn of Africa member states have been home to foreign interventions both militarily and on humanitarian grounds, with the United States militarily and humanitarian intervening in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan,

Somalia's geopolitics especially its closeness to the Indian Ocean and nearness to fragile states makes it a short-term transit point for terrorist activities including the movement of materiel and arms between Kenya and Somalia and to the rest of the world



*ATMIS Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Diomedee Ndegeya, takes part in community tree planting activity in Somalia (Photo Credit: AMISOM)*

and other member states to help build local capacity to address terrorism. Apart from foreign interventions, the region has also experienced regional interventions led by both IGAD and the African Union, with the African Union, under the umbrella of AMISOM currently domiciled in Somalia. There have also been state-led initiatives including community policing and legislative responses aimed at dismantling the growing influence of terror groups in the Horn of Africa. In addition to regional-based military interventions, the regional frameworks, including IGAD and the African Union have also ratified legal instruments and counter-terrorism policies aimed at addressing the security challenge in the Horn of Africa. In the recent past, there have also been concerted attempts to shift the focus of the security strategy from state security to human security. Based on this background, this sub-section explores the different forms of security cooperation that inform the counter-terrorism approach in the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa member states hastily and with ease joined the “War on Terrorism” by ratifying the international convention instruments on violent extremism. For instance, in an attempt to curb the penetration of violent extremism on its border, in 2002, Tanzania already ratified seven of the twelve counter-terrorism instruments and ratified the Prevention of Terrorism Act that prohibited any form of assistance and support to terror groups and

even persons. Uganda in the same year not only passed the Anti-Terrorism Act that imposed the death penalty on involvement in terror activities but also ratified all the twelve international conventions on terrorism.

The Government of Kenya (2003), passed the Witness Protection Bill of 2003 and subsequently ratified all the twelve protocols and documents on terrorism. Subsequently, member states also ratified and adopted the regional frameworks statutes and conventions against terrorism. For instance, Horn of Africa member states have ratified the OAU Convention and Prevention and Combating Terrorism and its Protocol of 2004 and the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, which collectively focuses on strengthening the capacity of member states to responding to terror threats. The Plan for Action, for instance, emphasizes the need to enhance border controls, adoption of measures to curtail terror financing and harmonize legal and judicial measures on terrorism (AU Plan of Action, Section III). The African Union also established a research center called the African Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism, with a primary focus to work collaboratively with the African Union Peace and Security Council for purposes of investigating the trends, driving factors, and all other aspects that pertain to terrorism.



In 2006, after the realization that there exists a positive correlation between peace and stability and development, IGAD developed and ratified the Capacity Building Programs Against Terrorism aimed at building state capacity for an effective response to violent extremism. Through this convention, states were required to build their judicial, police, and military capacities, boost border controls, enhance intelligence, monitoring, and information on terror practices, and facilitate regional security cooperation.

As part of the global community response to global terrorism with a primary focus on the Horn of Africa, the United States created the Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa in Djibouti as part of its security transfer strategy aimed at combatting terrorism in both Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia. As Kagwanja (2006) highlights, the CTF- HOA, aimed to detect, defeat, disrupt, and counter-terrorist activities within the region. To achieve these objectives, the combined task force involved training the local security actors on response to terror threats, sharing intelligence with neighboring countries, and offering necessary assistance and support to boost local security infrastructure.

Member states have also adjusted their security policies and strategies to suit the new trends of violent extremism and terrorism. For instance, in Kenya, the government formed the anti-terror police unit, composed of those trained in counter-terrorism to thwart the growth of terror activities within its borders. The government also passed the Anti-Money Laundering Bill to curtail terror group financing. Kenya has also developed security cooperation with the United States as part of its efforts to enhance its capacity for global terrorism. Currently, there exists a USA military base at the Coast, and as of 2014, Kenya had gained more than \$3.1 million in military assistance aimed at countering violent extremism and more than 500 security actors had been trained on recent tactics on terrorism.

The African Union continues to play a very critical role in dismantling the growing influence of the Lords Resistance Army that operates in Uganda and neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic, and South Sudan among other states. For instance, in 2011, the African Union Council authorized the establishment of the African Union Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lords Resistance Army. This Initiative was tasked to improve the operational capacity of member states

“... in Kenya, the government formed the anti-terror police unit, composed of those trained in counter-terrorism to thwart the growth of terror activities within its borders

that are affected by the devastating effects of the LRA, create a viable environment for the stabilization of areas affected by the terror group and facilitate the mobility of humanitarian and military assistance to the affected regions. As the African Union (2014) report points out, the African Union Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lords' Resistance Army entailed 3 components, constituted of a Joint Coordination Mechanism composed of Ministers of Defense of the affected countries, a military component composed of 5000 troops and a Joint Operations Center and a Regional Task Force. Whereas the Coordination Initiative is yet to fully achieve its intended objectives, just like the AMISOM, it has helped in destroying several Lords' Resistance Army Camps, disrupted their supply networks, reduced their fighting capabilities, and also reduced the fatalities and sufferings associated with the militia.

According to Klobucista et al (2022), the role of the United States in countering violent extremism is manifold. For instance, Klobucista, et al (2022) asserts that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as part of the US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, Washington has offered billions of dollars to train and support AMISOM activities and Somali security forces, sustain its military bases in Kenya and even conduct security intelligence, monitoring, and information sharing. In 2017, as Klobucista et al (2022) finds out, president Donald Trump deployed an estimated 700 soldiers in Somalia to aid in the war on terrorism. Whereas he withdrew the soldiers due to massive fatalities especially in his final terms in office, Joe Biden redeployed the 700 forces upon assumption of office. The Trump administration reportedly fired more than 275 airstrikes in Somalia compared to the 60 fired by President Obama, as part of the American government's attempts to eliminate the growing influence of the militias. The 2017 USA fired airstrikes for instance claimed the lives of over 100 suspected terrorists.

## Why Terrorism thrives despite the security cooperation efforts

The different forms of security cooperation in the Horn of Africa continue to present mixed results. Most of the security cooperation measures have involved the establishment of transnational and regional armed forces to battle against terrorists. The measures have also involved the Horn of Africa states ratifying international conventions on the War against terrorism and commitment to enforcing the provisions of the conventions to enhance their state capacity to fight against terrorism. These measures have been successful to a certain extent. For instance, AMISOM and even the Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia have been very critical in waning the presence and the activities of the Al Shabab in Somalia. Through the interventions as supported by the American airstrikes, the security actors have dismantled some of the terror cells and even recovered some of the territories initially controlled by the terror groups. As Abioye (2019) asserts, the security actors including AMISOM remain unable to consolidate their victories and this explains the continued renewal of the contract of AMISOM's presence in Somalia. The Al Shabab have remained resilient, adopted new tactics, and continue to wage terror attacks in Horn of Africa member states despite these counter-terrorism measures. As the African Union (2014) reports, terrorism remains the continent's major existential threat to peace, stability, and even investment despite its multifaceted counter-terrorism measures. Noteworthy, terror activities continue to spread in other parts of the Horn of Africa, with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti recognized as soft spots of international terrorism, despite these measures. Against this background, this essay paper aims to discuss in detail some of the reasons why counter-terrorism measures have not been largely effective in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

One of the reasons why terror groups are yet to be defeated despite the intervention is the prioritization

of hard security/security-driven approaches to violent extremisms rather than human security-driven approaches/soft approaches to preventing terrorism. Immediately after the 9/11 attack, through the guidance of the United States, under the umbrella of the "War on Terrorism", regional and international frameworks enforced militant approaches to fight terrorism, with a primary focus on Somalia in the Horn of Africa. The hard security approach entailed military intervention and targeted assassinations. Recent findings reveal that addressing the complex security situation in the Horn of Africa cannot be the product of only military action but also the integration of soft approaches to securitization. Counter-terrorism measures have largely not focussed on soft security approaches. For instance, most of the support that the Horn of Africa member states have received continues to revolve around supporting military intervention rather than enhancing the human security of the region.

The regional frameworks and state governments have failed to design institutional and legal frameworks that focus on reducing the citizens' vulnerabilities. For instance, increasing rates of youth unemployment, corruption, poverty, ethnicity, lack of development, and other social cleavages continue to remain critical contributing factors to radicalization and terrorism despite the militant interventions. Therefore, limited counter-terrorism measures focusing on human security have largely contributed to the resilience of terror groups. This is supplemented by the study findings by International Peace Institute (2016) that aver that "unless the crisis in state-society relations is solved, violent extremism will continue". The development-oriented initiative aimed at addressing local grievances is key to limiting violent extremist recruitment and operations.

The Horn's many ungoverned spaces remain problematic. Most interventions in the Horn of Africa have largely focussed on building the subcontinent's security abilities but have fallen short in general nation-building

Horn of Africa member states have ratified the OAU Convention and Prevention and Combating Terrorism and its Protocol of 2004 and the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, which collectively focuses on strengthening the capacity of member states to responding to terror threats

and building the capacity of the member states to reactively respond to local grievances. This has provided the necessary ground for the locals to build on their grievances against their government hence presenting the militias as alternate service providers. This has made international and state-led efforts be met with resistance. In the same vein, as Menkhaus, (2007) finds out, the ungoverned spaces present logistics and communication challenges to the security actors. Similarly, it has also been a contributing factor to endemic violence, threats of blackmail, piracy, and kidnappings which accelerate terrorism. With limited government control, as evidenced in the case of Southern Somalia, these areas continue to serve as safe havens for terror militants, training camps, arms smuggling and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and potential sources of finances for the terror groups.

Institutional, lack of goodwill, and financial incapacity to enforce international, local, and regional regimes and conventions against terrorism also hinder the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures. The Horn of Africa has ratified a variety of counter-terrorism measures that they commit to enforcing to enhance their ability to fight against terrorism. Domestication of these conventional provisions remains problematic. For instance, countries such as Sudan despite ratifying international conventions have been on the receiving end for harboring terror activities and for almost a decade, was blacklisted as a state-sponsor of terrorism by the United States of America. Despite state presence and ratification of international conventions that advocate for strengthening of state borders, monitoring of water bodies and even prohibiting terrorist financing, most of the Horn of Africa member states' borders remain porous and there still exists reported instances of terrorist financing within the state. Therefore, compliance with international, state-led, and regional frameworks and conventions on terrorism remains a serious concern.

## Conclusion

This article discusses the challenges faced in the war against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The region is characterized by several ungoverned spaces, economic vulnerabilities, and political instabilities, which have contributed to the rise of terrorism. While various measures have been implemented to counter the influence of terrorist groups, such as adopting hard security approaches, the article argues that these efforts have been largely ineffective due to the changing

Most interventions in the Horn of Africa have largely focussed on building the subcontinent's security abilities but have fallen short in general nation-building and building the capacity of the member states to reactively respond to local grievances

tactics of terrorists and the lack of compliance with legal frameworks on terrorism. Additionally, the article notes that the politicization of terrorism has further diverted attention from the war on terrorism, hindering efforts to dismantle terrorist groups.

The article emphasizes the need for effective community resilience measures and the adoption of a human security approach to securitization. It also highlights the importance of the involvement of all players, including citizens and civil society, in the war against terrorism. The paper concludes by recommending security reforms that prioritize the soft approaches to securitization, emphasizing the positive linkages between development and security. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges faced in the Horn of Africa in the war against terrorism and offers insightful recommendations for effective security cooperation measures.

## Recommendations

Based on the study and findings, this article recommends the following measures to enhance security cooperation measures in the war against terrorism in the Horn of Africa:

1. Prioritize human security approaches to securitization - State, regional, and international actors should prioritize the adoption of human security approaches, which are development-oriented, over militant/hard-power approaches.
2. Fill "ungoverned spaces" - The Horn of Africa member states should enhance state-society relations through good governance practices, strengthen institutional capacities, strengthen counter-terrorism laws, and implement development-oriented policies that address local

- grievances, among other initiatives, to fill their “ungoverned spaces.”
3. Collaborate on counter-terrorism measures - There is a need for mutual collaboration between national, regional, and international counter-terrorism actors, especially in the enforcement of conventions and the integration of human security approaches. The collaboration should focus on building the security sector, poverty reduction measures, addressing unemployment, and cushioning member states from the negative effects of globalization and climate change.
  4. Invest in community resilience measures - Community resilience measures will be key to intelligence gathering and thwarting recruitment efforts. This may involve local engagement in counter-terrorism measures and trends conducted through training.
  5. Good leadership - Selfless, proactive, visionary, accountable, and development-oriented leadership is needed to address local grievances, exert state control, and disorganize the operations of terror groups.
  6. Establish a functional financial security system - Security actors should establish a functional financial security system that monitors financial transactions to cut the financing of terrorist groups and their affiliates.
  7. Strengthen state legitimacy - State legitimacy can be strengthened through improved service delivery and accountability of state service provision and embracing democratic ideals during political processes to limit social cleavages.
  8. Professionalize the security sector - The security sector should eradicate corruption, ethnicization, and brutal use of force to enhance its professionalism.

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# Assessing the Impact of Foreign Aid on Somalia: A Hit or a Mess

By Mariah Faridah

## Abstract

The effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa has been a subject of debate for many years, and opinions on the matter are divided. On one hand, some argue that foreign aid has helped to alleviate poverty and improve living conditions, particularly in the areas of health, education, and basic infrastructure. On the other hand, others argue that foreign aid has not been effective in addressing the underlying problems on the continent. In Somalia, foreign aid has not been effective in tackling political instability, corruption, and conflict. Some critics argue that aid has propped up corrupt and ineffective governments and fueled conflict by providing resources to armed groups. This article expounds on the concept of foreign aid to Africa, and Somalia in particular. It argues that the government must now focus on strengthening governance and institutions, including the judicial system, police force, and civil service. Second, policymakers should support economic growth and development, including investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and the private sector. Third, it should foster mutually beneficial partnerships with the private sector, civil society organizations, and international organizations to ensure that development programs are sustainable and have a maximum impact.

## Introduction

Somalia has been reliant on foreign aid since its independence in 1960, with grants from Britain and Italy comprising a significant portion of the country's budget in its early years. This dependence on aid continued under the military regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre, which was initially supported by the Soviet Union until a dispute over the 1977-1978 war with Ethiopia led to a breakdown in the relationship. Despite the loss of Soviet Union aid, Siad Barre was able to secure support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Western European countries, which helped to offset the impact of the loss of Soviet aid. Overall, foreign aid has played a critical role in the history of Somalia, particularly in sustaining its economy and political stability over the years.

In the aftermath of Siad Barre's regime, Somalia descended into chaos and civil war, and the international community provided humanitarian aid to the country. However, the lack of a functioning government and security challenges made it difficult to implement development programs. With the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government in the 2000s and the intervention of African Union peacekeepers, the situation in the country improved slightly, and the international

community began to provide development aid to support the rebuilding of the country (Mubarak, 1996).

In recent years, the situation in Somalia has continued to improve, with the establishment of a Federal Government of Somalia in 2012 and the gradual improvement of security. The international community has provided significant development aid to the country, and there have been positive developments in areas such as infrastructure, access to education and health services, and the re-establishment of a functioning banking sector. Despite these gains, Somalia continues to face numerous challenges, and foreign aid remains a critical component of the country's efforts to rebuild and develop (Hassan, 2010).

“Somalia has been reliant on foreign aid since its independence in 1960, with grants from Britain and Italy comprising a significant portion of the country's budget in its early years”



*A displacement camp in Baidoa, Somalia inhabited by individuals who have been affected by a severe drought (Photo Credits: UN/Fardosa Hussein)*

## Understanding Foreign Aid and Foreign Aid dependency in Africa

The origins of foreign aid can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II, with the establishment of the Marshall Plan in 1947. The initial goal of the plan was to aid in the economic reconstruction of Europe, but it soon became a humanitarian cause, as well as a political and economic development concern. The success of the Marshall Plan led to the expansion of foreign aid programs in other parts of the world, with the United States and other developed countries providing assistance to low-income countries in an effort to promote economic growth and development. However, there is ongoing debate among scholars and policymakers about the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting development. Some argue that foreign aid is essential in helping low-income countries to overcome the barriers to economic growth, such as lack of infrastructure and human capital. Others, like economist William Easterly, argue that foreign aid can perpetuate poverty and dependence, and that it often serves more as a tool of political influence than a genuine effort to promote development (Easterly, 2006).

Despite these debates, foreign aid remains an important tool for addressing poverty and underdevelopment in many parts of the world. In recent years, there has

been a growing focus on 'smart aid,' which aims to ensure that aid is targeted, effective, and sustainable, and that it promotes the capacity of recipient countries and communities to manage their own development. Through careful planning, coordination, and evaluation, foreign aid has the potential to play an important role in promoting economic growth and sustainable development, while also addressing humanitarian needs in times of crisis.

According to Easterly, foreign aid programs hold back nations and render them reliant, and there is strong evidence to support this claim. The author of this study report believes Easterly's reasoning makes sense because, without a doubt, foreign aid has made many African nations dependent. Without foreign assistance administered in the form of projects or technical assistance, several African countries are unable to perform any of their fundamental duties, including the establishment of newly established structures, the maintenance of fundamental systems and services, or the provision of necessary public services and infrastructures. Because donor countries have permitted a "cozy accommodation with reliance," many countries fail to fulfill half of their annual financial commitments. Although all of Africa's aid-dependent nations are low-income nations, some of these nations

are not as dependent on aid as others, proving that aid dependence is not a direct outcome of poverty as many people think (Deborah & Stephen, 2004).

Foreign aid to African nations has faced significant opposition due to concerns about its effectiveness and misuse. Critics argue that aid has often done more harm than good, with corrupt governments receiving the same amount of support as more transparent ones. This has led to calls for aid to be more targeted and conditional, and to be used as a tool to promote good governance and deter corruption. However, it is important to note that aid does not operate in a vacuum, and that political and institutional factors can impact its effectiveness. Despite these challenges, aid remains an important source of support for many African countries, and efforts are underway to make it more effective and sustainable. (World Bank, 1996; Juliette, 2014).

### The impact of foreign aid on African countries

Foreign aid can play an important role in strengthening institutions and improving governance by providing educational and technical assistance to develop legislative, executive, and judicial systems. This support can also help reduce corruption and improve management of government finances, leading to better respect for the rule of law. However, it is important to ensure that aid is used for its intended purposes and not diverted for personal gain by political elites and government officials (Kin & Diya, 2017). There is evidence to suggest that aid given to autocratic governments can exacerbate conflicts, political unrest, and other negative outcomes. As such, it is important to carefully consider the potential risks and benefits of foreign aid, and to design programs that promote democratic governance and economic development while minimizing the risk of abuse (Alberto & Beatrice, 2002; Kin & Diya, 2017; Stephen Knack, 2004).

Additionally, the provision of excessive foreign aid to African countries undermines good governance as

leaders may utilize aid as a means of consolidating their power, rather than using it for development purposes. This is because leaders who do not want to use the aid for growth or reform may work to maintain their position of power to control the money. The desire to control aid money can result in political instability and coup attempts, which can harm efforts to promote the rule of law and democratic governance. The political elites in African countries have little incentive to reform as the large amounts of aid provide numerous fringe benefits such as salary increases, luxurious vehicles, and houses. Therefore, rule of law reforms are avoided to maintain the status quo (Knack, 2004).

In light of the above discussion, it is believed that foreign aid increases corruption because many African leaders divert foreign aid to their personal foreign bank accounts or use it to fund projects that benefit the political elites. Despite claims that foreign aid can reduce corruption by managing a country's finances and reforming its public administration, empirical evidence suggests that countries that receive more foreign aid have higher levels of corruption. Furthermore, high levels of foreign aid are perceived to stymie rule of law reforms and governance improvement. For example, the high transaction costs associated with aid, multiple donors, and their disparate agendas and projects can cripple institutions rather than strengthen them.

### Somalia's Economic, Development and Humanitarian Aid

External aid has played a significant role in Somalia's history. During the Cold War era, Somalia was heavily reliant on foreign aid to sustain its government. However, aid began to decrease after the end of the Cold War, which coincided with the collapse of the Somali State in the late 1980s. Despite this, donor interest in Somalia increased throughout the 1990s, particularly after the collapse of the state and the deployment of foreign troops (Ibrahim, 2017).

In recent years, there has been a growing focus on 'smart aid,' which aims to ensure that aid is targeted, effective, and sustainable, and that it promotes the capacity of recipient countries and communities to manage their own development

## 1960s

After obtaining independence from Britain and Italy on June 26 and July 1, 1960, respectively, the former Somaliland British Protectorate and the Italian Somaliland (under UN-mandated Italian Trusteeship) merged on July 1. This fledgling nation's financial resources were extremely limited, and its own capabilities were insufficient to meet its needs. Additionally, skilled workers, specialists, and experts were in short supply. Because of this, certain British and Italian technical professionals had to stay in the nation after it gained independence to support the ongoing operations of the government.

During the first three years, the country could not function without the budget support of Britain and Italy, which contributed approximately 31 per cent of the national budget (Mets (Ed.), 1993), let alone financing development activities on its own. In fact, the government relied entirely on foreign aid for development projects and received significant development aid in the 1960s, which was invested in physical infrastructure and industries. Among these projects were the establishments of canning plants for fish and meat, milk and fabric factories, a national theater, a national airline, and public schools. Furthermore, between 1961 and 1963, Somalia received

an average of USD23.5 million in external assistance per year, which included grants, technical assistance, investment, and export subsidies (Farzin, 1988).

In addition to getting a lot of aid in the first decade after being independent, Somalia also got the most aid per capita in the continent: "Somalia received USUSD90 per capita in foreign economic support, roughly double the average for sub-Saharan Africa." Italy's economic assistance to Somalia in the 1960s was one-fourth of all foreign aid that Somalia received during this time, and it sponsored Somalia to build trade ties with the European Economic Community (EEC) (Mets; 1993; Laitin & Samatar, 1984). In addition to considerable financial support from Italy, Somalia also got support from other European countries and organizations, such as West Germany and the EEC, through the European Development Fund (EDF) 85.1 percent of Somalia's total development expenditures between 1963 and 1969 were supported by foreign sources; the Soviet Union was the greatest donor with 20.4 percent of the 85.1 percent, followed by the US with 17.2 percent and the European Economic Community with 12.9 percent in 1971. Although significant aid from the Arab World had to wait until the middle of the



*A Somali boy in Afgoye being helped to load food package by the UAE Red Crescent official (Photo Credit: AMISOM Public Information/Flickr)*



1970s, Egypt provided assistance to Somalia in the 1960s (Omer, 1992), and Saudi Arabia's assistance made up 0.8 percent of the foreign development money in the period from 1963 to 1969. In short, the aforementioned data demonstrates that Somalia continued to be a significantly aid-dependent nation in the 1960s. Assessing the general effectiveness of civilian governments (1960-1969).

### 1970s and 80s

On October 20, 1970, Mohamed Siad Barre declared that Somalia had accepted socialism and had become a socialist state, one year after the military had taken control. Somalia needed the Soviet Union's assistance, primarily military support, because it was caught in the Cold War and had a land dispute with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya. This was true even though Somali-Soviet relations officially began in 1961 when a delegation led by the then-prime minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke visited Moscow and certain credit was approved for Somalia (Lewis, 2008).

Despite its alliance with the East, Somalia still received substantial development assistance from the West and the Arab countries. This could be seen in the public spending, where the Public Investment Program (PIP), the major part of the public investment, was supported mostly by external loans and grants (Ministry of Planning, 2019). In order to meet its oil needs, Somalia, an oil-importing nation, mostly relied on the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, among other donors. Somalia thus built an oil refinery plant with a 10,000 barrel daily capacity with the help of Iraq towards the end of the 1970s. Interestingly but unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia, with the assistance of Iran, promised Somalia USUSD75 million in aid in exchange for lowering its connections with the Soviet Union. When Barre rejected this demand, Saudi Arabia quickly withdrew the offer.

In contrast to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations, Somalia had greater commercial ties and got more development assistance from oil-rich Arab nations (OPEC member states) in the 1970s. By 1979, OPEC's assistance for Somalia's development was roughly twice as great as that of the OECD. Additionally, in 1978, Saudi Arabia received about 90% of Somalia's exports. The Marerey Sugar Factory, one of the major development projects in Somalia's history, was funded in the same decade by the oil-rich Arab nations. Ali Khalif Galaydh, who was the governor of

Fighting between the Somali National Army and armed rebel movements intensified in the late 1980s, as did the regime's violations of human rights. As a result, the majority of donors halted aid to Somalia

the Marerey Sugar Factory in the 1970s and the Minister of Industry in the early 1980s, estimates the project fund at roughly USUSD400 million. Worrall claims the project received USUSD188 million in Arab funding (Moyo, 2009). Early in the 1980s, Somalia requested structural adjustment loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 1981 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) agreement, which the Somali government signed with the World Bank and IMF and invested in the banana industry, did more harm than good to the Somali economy because it increased banana exports and production while giving foreign interests a 75 percent share of the export proceeds. The World Bank and IMF provided guidance to the Somali government for economic management at this time. It has been questioned and criticized whether these institutions' technical aid to developing countries is reliable and effective. Fighting between the Somali National Army and armed rebel movements intensified in the late 1980s, as did the regime's violations of human rights. As a result, the majority of donors halted aid to Somalia. The United States, for example, ceased economic and military assistance in 1989. (ISCG, 2006)

### 2000s to date

According to the OECD/2010 DAC's Development Cooperation Report, total annual aid disbursements for Somalia ranged from USD200 million to USD380 million per year from 2004 to 2007, but increased to USD758 million in 2008. (MGS, 2010) The majority of the increase is due to a dramatic increase in humanitarian funding, which reflects both the increased number of people in need and Somalia's sharp rise in commodity and delivery costs. Actual humanitarian funding was USD476 million in 2008 and USD513 million in 2009, representing a more than 66 per cent increase between 2007 and 2009.

Using ODA data for aid volume in 2008, the average per capita aid for each Somali is around USD90 per year. However, the transaction costs, primarily in the form of leakages<sup>29</sup> caused by corruption, siphoning off by warlords and militias, and the high cost of aid delivery, mean that only a small portion of the total amount reaches the poor and vulnerable families. With 25.2% of the total, the United States of America is the top provider, followed by the European Commission (EC), Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (CISS Excom, 2009).

### Non-Economic Assistance

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Somalia also received a sizable amount of non-economic help, primarily in the form of technical assistance, scholarships, and military support. For instance, in the 1960s, the Soviet Union donated printing presses and scholarships for technical training to Somalia. Additionally, from 1961 onwards, the Soviet Union (providing a variety of scholarships) continued to be a popular choice for Somali students, notably those pursuing military training. Arab and Western nations both provided scholarships for Somali students. (Suarez, 2006) Since Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974, more Somalis have taken advantage of possibilities for higher education provided by Arab nations, and many more have found employment in projects supported by oil-rich Arab nations. Contrarily, many Somali students studied abroad in the US throughout the 1980s, and Somalia's alignment shifted from the East to the West might have caused this.

In 1980, Somalia and the US entered into an agreement that allowed the US to utilize its ports and airports in Berbera, Kismayo, and Mogadishu. As part of the deal, the US pledged to provide Somalia with USD 40 million in military assistance over the next two years. In subsequent years, the US continued to provide military aid to Somalia, with a total of USD 21.2 million in 1983, USD 24.3 million in 1984, USD 80 million in 1985, USD 40 million in 1986, and USD 37.1 million in 1987. Italy had been responsible for coordinating the military aid from Western nations to Somalia since 1978, and between 1985 and 1987, West Germany contributed DM 126 million to support the police and security forces (Ivanova, 2009).

### Efficacy of Foreign Aid in Somalia


According to the World Bank, Somalia received an estimated total of USD 17.8 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 1991 and 2018 (World Bank, 2021). Somalia has been heavily reliant on

foreign aid for many years. While foreign aid has played an important role in addressing humanitarian crises and supporting development in Somalia, it has also brought challenges to the country. For instance, the distribution of foreign aid has been linked to violent competition for control over resources, including large-scale food aid, which contributed to the collapse of the Somali government. Furthermore, foreign aid has sometimes fueled corruption and hindered the development of the local economy (Transparency, 2008).

Foreign aid is intended to transfer resources and expertise from wealthier nations to poorer nations such as Somalia, with the aim of accelerating their social and economic development. However, despite receiving foreign assistance, Somalia has not experienced the desired impact. The reasons for this range from a mismatch between the objectives of the donors and those of successive Somali administrations, to the ineffective implementation of aid programs due to incompetence on the part of program implementers (Nyambura-Mwaura, 2008). Furthermore, Somalia's previous governments have implemented economic policies that failed to address economic shocks and crises, resulting in an inability to stimulate economic growth.

Somalia's economic strategy plans have consistently failed under colonial, post-independence, communist, and IMF-led administrations. The misfortune was further compounded by the imposition of conditional loans from the West and the IMF, as well as the mismatch between the market and the incentives enforced by General Mohamed Siad Barre's government from 1969 to 1991. Aid funds were frequently spent on purchasing goods or services from donor nations rather than making more cost-effective purchases locally in Somalia. Consequently, the anticipated prosperity and progress that Somalis were expecting after receiving international aid did not materialize. The large food aid that accompanied migrants caused grain prices to plummet, to the point where local producers could not cover their costs, reducing incentives for home production. The most tragic consequences of providing food aid to Somalia were corruption, poor administration, and a lack of accountability and transparency (Ray Suarez, 2006)

Somalia's political instability, which has seen nine presidents, 18 prime ministers, and numerous government officials vying for power and foreign aid over the past 18 years, has hindered the implementation of sound economic policies. Successive governments'



*The Republic of China donates USD 1M towards providing humanitarian aid in Somalia. (Photo Credit: UNSOM)*

lack of expertise and strategic planning has resulted in policies that do not align with donor interests. This has contributed to Somalia's inability to benefit from foreign aid, as it has failed to foster economic growth due to mismanagement and corruption (UNDP).

Political instability in Somalia has led to a flagrant disregard for the proper utilization of aid funds. Oftentimes, corrupt leaders divert foreign aid for their own personal gain, resulting in the intended beneficiaries not receiving the assistance they need. This is a clear example of how foreign aid is misappropriated by ruling and political elites. Despite this issue, more international aid continues to be delivered to Somalia each year, further enabling the corrupt policies and actions of the government (Moyo, 2009).

After almost 50 years, Somalia's military government is no longer in power, but the challenges of providing aid persist. Food aid and non-food assistance have increased, but donors often use aid strategically. The United States is one of Somalia's largest aid providers, and it appears that the aid is currently driven more by strategic goals to combat terrorism and piracy rather than development or humanitarian goals. In 2008, 95% of all USAID funding was allocated for humanitarian relief, while only 1.2% was directed toward peace and security initiatives (Maren, 1997).

One may appreciate the strategic shift in aid to Somalia given that the Transitional Federal Government, which the U.S. supports, is attempting to stave off attacks by al-Shabaab, which the U.S. considers to be a terrorist organization. However, Somalis appear to be dissatisfied with the current Somali government's widespread incompetence. Most educated and informed Somalis agree that security support for the TFG, which appears to lack both the desire and the resources to combat al-Shabaab, should not come at the expense of humanitarian and development aid. These Somalis want to see more humanitarian aid provided to the southern regions of Somalia with a significant chunk of development aid going to Somaliland and Puntland, which are more stable regions of the country (Ingiriis, 2016).

Critics of U.S. and U.N. aid to Somalia argue that aid has not had a significant impact on Africa as a whole, despite the continent's annual aid budget of USD50 billion. Rather than improving living conditions, growth rates have decreased and poverty levels have risen. The result is a cycle of dependence, corruption, market distortions, and increased poverty. Critics claim that foreign aid primarily benefits corrupt regimes and the ruling class, with the majority of the funding failing to reach the intended populations. Some argue that foreign aid is driven by strategic and political objectives. Others suggest that

humanitarian aid to Somalia should be suspended and that efforts should be focused on combating terrorism. Providing aid to terrorist organizations only strengthens their grip on the population (Jallow, 2010).

## Conclusion

The existing literature suggests that Somalia's economic and development aid had little to no positive impact on the country's economy. Instead, it had adverse effects such as slowing down domestic production and altering consumption habits, which made the Somali people heavily reliant on food aid and imports. Widespread corruption, institutional problems, poor management, a lack of skilled employees, and low capacity for economic policy analysis plagued the Somali economy during this time. Many development projects failed, largely due to funding not reaching the intended recipient nation of Somalia. In the 1980s, Italy authorized over 100 projects for Somalia, organized primarily through a Chamber of Commerce Office in Milan, Italy. The Chamber earned a commission on every approved project, but the implementing partners who won the contracts to complete the work gave millions of dollars in bribes to Italian politicians. Millions of dollars were stolen before the relief money reached the government accounts. This situation highlights the significant challenge of ensuring aid reaches those who need it.

Today, Somalia is in a phase of restoration and reconstruction. Therefore, it is essential to draw lessons from the past in order to prevent the country's economy from becoming heavily dependent on foreign aid. Despite the fact that Somalia is a wealthy nation in terms of its mineral riches, oil, gas, livestock, and agricultural land, and would have a better future with better administration, it is obvious that the phenomena of assistance reliance consume the minds of the Somali leaders. Lastly, foreign aid alone in the absence of robust democratic institutions

will result in corruption, defeating the purpose for which it was given in the first place. Therefore, in order to have a good effect, aid offered to nations with weak democratic institutions must come with requirements.

## Recommendations

Based on the current situation in Somalia, the following are some recommendations for the effective use of foreign aid.

First, the government with the assistance of partners should focus on strengthening governance and institutions including the judicial system, police force, and civil service. This will help to create a more stable and secure environment for development to take place. Improving security: The security situation in Somalia remains fragile, and foreign aid should be used to support the efforts of the Somali security forces and African Union peacekeepers to improve security. This will help to create a safer environment for development activities and attract private investment.

Second, policymakers should work towards supporting economic growth and development including investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and the private sector. This will help to create jobs, increase economic growth, and reduce poverty. Providing basic services: Foreign aid should be used to provide basic services, including access to clean water, health care, and education, especially in rural areas where these services are lacking. This will help to improve the quality of life for the population and support long-term development.

Third, the government should promote gender equality including providing educational opportunities and employment opportunities for women. This will help to reduce gender-based violence, increase economic growth, and improve the overall well-being of women in Somalia.

Fourth, the government of Somalia should foster mutually beneficial partnerships with the private sector, civil society organizations, and international organizations to ensure that development programs are sustainable and have the maximum impact. These recommendations are intended to guide the effective use of foreign aid in Somalia and support the country's efforts to achieve long-term stability and development.

“... humanitarian aid to Somalia should be suspended and that efforts should be focused on combating terrorism. Providing aid to terrorist organizations only strengthens their grip on the population”

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## **Editor's Note**

Dear Reader,

We are excited to release our 30<sup>th</sup> bi-monthly issue of *The HORN Bulletin* (Vol. VI, Iss. II, 2023). We bring to you well-researched articles and analysis of topical issues and developments affecting the Horn of Africa. We welcome contributions from readers who wish to have their articles included in the HORN Bulletin. At HORN, we believe ideas are the currency of progress. Feel free to contact the Editor-in-Chief for more details at [communications@horninstitute.org](mailto:communications@horninstitute.org).

Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.  
Editor-in-Chief, The HORN Bulletin

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The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-profit, applied research, and policy think-do tank based in Nairobi, Kenya. Its vision is a progressive Horn of Africa and the African continent, served by informed, evidence-based and problem-solving policy research and analysis. Its mission is to contribute to informed, objective, definitive research and analytical inquiry that positively informs policies of governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and spaces.

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