

# Special EDITION

## Maximizing the EAC's Revitalized Vision and Increased Joint Dividends Following Democratic Republic of Congo's Admission

June 2022

By Roselyne Omondi

### Abstract

The admission of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - sub-Saharan Africa's largest and Africa's most-natural resource-endowed state - into the East African Community (EAC) on March 29, 2022, injected a dose of significant, tangible, and unmatched economic, and social assets; several security challenges; and optimism into the Community. This paper advances that DRC's assets are sufficient to improve her and EAC member states' development outcomes, but DRC's integration into the Community is not a magic bullet. The paper assesses the extent to which the 'rebranded' Community can maximize its joint dividends and realize its aspiration to shared prosperity. It finds that DRC is a country of stark contradictions. It also finds that DRC's EAC entry has revitalized the bloc; reset its geopolitical, economic, and security identities, and realities; and placed it at the crossroads of prosperity. DRC's EAC membership has increased the number of the bloc's high-value minerals by at least a score; French speakers by at least 50 million; multidimensionally poor individuals by about 70 million; and insurgent groups and violent extremist groups by more than 100 insurgent, and two, respectively. Further, marginalization is rife in the EAC. These challenges blight the Community's ambition and prospects of continued, dynamic, and sustainable development, but are surmountable. The paper thus advises member states to replace the exclusivity and lackluster collaboration that plague their domestic policies and interstate engagements with an intentioned, inclusive, whole-of-bloc approach to their joint progress. It also recommends the creation of a new blue print to operationalize the Community's vision of shared progress, and concurrent investment investment in peace and development. Then, DRC's EAC membership will be worthwhile.



**Key Words:** *Democratic Republic of Congo; integrated development; East African Community; whole-of-bloc approach; sustainable development; joint dividends; prosperity; geopolitics; economy; armed militancy.*


### Background


Even though the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) only lodged her East African Community (EAC) membership application in June 2019, EAC's admission of DRC on March 29, 2022, and DRC's accession to the EAC Treaty on April 8, 2022, elicited the kind of sentiments that a long-awaited homecoming of a highly-regarded big brother raise. DRC is, after all, big by several measures. For a start, DRC is sub-Saharan Africa's largest country. This means it is also now EAC's largest country by landmass. Secondly, DRC keeps

the enviable company of China, Saudi Arabia, Canada, India, Russia, Brazil, United States of America [the US], Venezuela, and Australia in the top 10 countries with the most natural resources in the world, and is Africa's natural resource-richest country. This makes DRC EAC's wealthiest country in this regard. That DRC also holds at least 70 per cent of the world's primary, mined cobalt - one of the highly-prized currencies of the digitalizing world - is worth a mention here, not in the least because DRC's cobalt places

 @HISS2017  
 @Hominstitute

 info@hominstitute.org  
 www.hominstitute.org

 +254 720 323 896  
 +254 735 323 896

 Durham Road, Kileleshwa  
P.O. Box 25632 - 00100  
Nairobi - Kenya

**HORN**  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL ECONOMY

DRC's integration into the EAC has therefore increased the number of multidimensionally poor individuals in the EAC by almost 70 million, from 102,150,350 to 172,073,330

her at the front and center of negotiating tables of emerging digital and renewable energy technologies of the contemporary world. DRC's EAC membership gives the Community access to these tables. Then there is that matter of human capital. DRC's 100-million plus population make her sub-Saharan Africa's third most populous country. DRC is now EAC's most populated state. Her entry into the EAC has swelled the Community's population to more than 300 million people. As more than 70 per cent of them are aged between zero and 30 years, the EAC has a potential demographic dividend waiting to be exploited. Further, thanks to the addition of DRC's French-speaking people to the Francophones in Rwanda and Burundi, EAC is now also one of the world's largest French-speaking blocs. (EAC, 2022; World Atlas, 2022; World Fact Book, 2022; World Bank, 2021). Notably, DRC's entry has changed EAC's predominant Anglophone dispensation to an Anglophone-Francophone one.

This is not the first time the EAC is admitting a new member since its re-establishment in July 2000. Then, the Community consisted of three countries: Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. In mid-2007, Rwanda, and Burundi joined the EAC. South Sudan followed suit in September 2016 (EAC, 2022). Neither is it the first time that DRC is joining a regional economic bloc. DRC is also a member of the 16-country South African Development Community (SADC), which she joined in 1998 (SADC, 2022). EAC's admission therefore strengthens the EAC-SADC bridge, and gives DRC access to two of Africa's three anchor states (Kenya, South Africa). However, this is the first time that the EAC is integrating a state as unique as DRC. EAC's seeming over-the-top reaction to DRC's entry, compared to those of Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, is therefore unsurprising, and not misplaced. DRC's EAC membership is a *big deal* worth the fanfare and celebration that accompanied and marked the event, and more.

In spite of her extraordinary standing, and SADC membership among southern Africa's high-GDP countries such as South Africa,

and Angola, there are several problematic packages among DRC's valuable assets. These include the estimated 64 per cent of DRC's population (69,992,980 people) that is multidimensionally poor. DRC's integration into the EAC has therefore increased the number of multidimensionally poor individuals in the EAC by almost 70 million, from 102,150,350 to 172,073,330. Further, more than 55 per cent of DRC's labor force is unskilled. Additionally, internet penetration is also low. Only about 8.6 per cent of the population uses the internet (World Fact Book, 2022; World Bank, 2022; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2022). DRC's security profile complicates these development challenges.

At the moment, more than 100 insurgent groups, and at least one violent extremist group (Allied Democratic Force, ADF) are active in DRC (Kivu Security Tracker, 2022; Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2022). These, added to the two active violent extremist groups in the EAC (al Shabab, and *Al-Sunna wa Jama'a* [ASWJ]); troops of neighboring, regional, and extra-regional states; and peacekeeping troops present the EAC with a complex security dilemma. DRC's membership also makes DRC's militia challenge a regional one. In the lead up to DRC's EAC entry, DRC witnessed the resurgence of M23 rebel activity. M23 is one of the largest insurgent groups in DRC (Kivu Security Tracker, 2022). The group has reportedly "attacked government army positions, captured villages in Rutshuru, and displaced civilians" (BBC, 2022). Little wonder then that DRC is desirous of more integrated development and peace that, in her calculation, EAC membership best offers.

Thankfully, just as DRC's admission to the EAC has adjoined the central African state to East Africa, Africa's fastest growing region, EAC Heads of State have begun deliberating the mobilization and deployment of a joint military force to confront insurgent groups in DRC (World Fact Book, 2022; World Bank, 2021). On March 1, 2022, SADC launched Regional Counter Terrorism Centre (RCTC), based in Dar es Salam, Tanzania, to, according to SADC's Ministerial Committee Chairperson, Hon. Minister Dr. Naledi Pandor, "... support member states to address the challenges posed by terrorism, violent extremism and associated transnational organized crimes" (SADC, 2022). In May 2021, to minimize militia-militia fighting and restore peace, DRC president Felix Tshisekedi imposed a "state of siege" on North Kivu and Ituri Provinces (France 24). These, as the ink of this historic event dries up, are reasonably good points for the newly expanded Community to kick-start the pursuit of its aspirations.

Following the foregoing background, this paper – which advances that DRC's assets are sufficient to improve her and EAC member states' development outcomes, but DRC's integration into the Community is not a magic bullet - will now present its key findings. It will then assess the extent to which the 'rebranded' and revitalized EAC can leverage its joint dividends for shared prosperity. After that, the paper will conclude, and proffer its recommendations.

## Key Findings

### DRC is a Country of Stark Contradictions

DRC has four key double-faced identities. It is concurrently: rich, and poor; at the front, and back of modern-day digital technologies; peaceful, and conflicted; and her EAC membership is a geopolitical anomaly, as highlighted in the following section.

- *DRC is Rich and Poor*

On the one hand, DRC, with her impressive and unmatched natural resource portfolio, is one of the top-10 richest countries (by natural resources) in the world. This wealth includes a variety of metals such as cobalt, tantalum, tungsten, gold, diamond, aluminum, and copper, and among others; 108,407,721 people, about 70 per cent of whom are aged between zero and 29 years (in April 2022, according to the World Fact Book [2022]); numerous water bodies; vast farm land; rich biodiversity; and the world's second largest rain forest. Much of these resources, including the potential demographic dividend, is still untapped. On the other hand, DRC has poor development outcomes. An estimated 64.5 per cent of her population is multidimensionally poor, and live on less than three US dollars a day. Despite her wealth, DRC's 'poor outlook' is comparable to that of other states in the region whose resources are a far cry from DRC's. In Burundi, for instance, an estimated 75.1 per cent of the country's population (9,535,054 people) is multidimensionally poor. About 91.9 per cent of South Sudan's population (10,609,767 people); 57.1 per cent of Tanzania's population (36,460,001 people); and 57.2 per cent of Uganda's population (26,429,770 people) are similarly poor (UNDP, 2021; World Bank, 2022). DRC has world-class resources, but most of her peoples' lives are poor.

- *DRC is at the Front and Back of the Emerging, Digital Technologies*

On the one hand, DRC has the globe's largest deposits of primary (unrefined) cobalt, a highly-valued currency of the digitalizing and electrically mechanizing worlds. It also has deposits of tantalum, tin, and tungsten that drive mobile, computer, mobile phone, aeronautical industries around the world. In addition to these, about 70 per cent of her population is aged between zero and 29 years. Given the place of young people as targets and drivers of emerging and digital technologies, and DRC's large development window, this 'youth bulge' has demographic dividend potential, which is still untapped. On the other hand, only an estimated nine (9) per cent of DRC's population uses the internet. Only an estimated 19 per cent of them have access to stable electricity supply (World Bank, 2022). Thus, DRC has the potential to be at the front and center of emerging and digital technology sectors, but is at its rear instead.

- *DRC is a Peaceful Conflicted Country*

While DRC is not a country at war, more than 100 armed insurgent groups are active in her territory. These include M23, one of the largest groups that has reportedly resurged in the past few weeks attacking positions of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), "capturing villages in Rutshuru, and displacing civilians" (France 24). Most of these groups operate in the countries eastern region, in locations such as Beni, and Ituri (Kivu Security Tracker , 2022). Curiously, DRC is EAC's second least peaceful country, after South Sudan, which a war-ridden country (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2022).

Another such group is the Allied Democratic Force, an insurgent-turned-terrorist group. ADF's reportedly killed (including through beheading) more than 1,200 people in 2021 alone. In 2020, Kenya arrested Salim Mohamed, a Kenyan-Islamic State fighter over terrorism charges. January 29, 2022, FARDC arrested the escaped jailbird and ADF member. These activities have increased ADF's notoriety. DRC is now the country with the highest likelihood of terrorism in the EAC (BBC, 2022; France 24, 2022; IEP, 2022). Salim's arrest and the DRC's integration into the EAC have increased the Community's spotlight on ADF's activities, the

Given the place of young people as targets and drivers of emerging and digital technologies, and DRC's large development window, this 'youth bulge' has demographic dividend potential, which is still untapped

interconnection and networks of the Community's terror groups. In addition to DRC's 100-plus armed groups, security forces of some neighboring, regional, and extra-regional are also active in the country, alongside peacekeeping and peace stabilization forces such as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The EAC is also reportedly mobilizing an EAC for deployment to the DRC (UN, 2022; France 24).

- **DRC's Membership: a Geopolitical Anomaly**

Geographically, DRC is a central African country (alongside: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé & Príncipe). Despite this, DRC is a member of the South African Development Community (SADC), which DRC joined in 1998 (SADC, 2022). Her EAC membership has expanded DRC's geographical footprint.



*Location, Links of IS-related Terror Groups in the EAC. (Credit: Omondi, 2021/HORN)*

DRC's is thus now concurrently a central, eastern, and southern African country. This multi-region identity is an anomaly. DRC's entry has undoubtedly reset EAC's geopolitical and economic realities. This entry into the EAC is expected to bolster ongoing bilateral negotiations for a Grand Free Trade Area between EAC and the 16-member SADC, and among EAC, SADC, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

### **The DRC-EAC Association is Complementary and Mutually Reinforcing**

As has already been indicated in this paper, DRC has increased, enriched, and diversified the offerings on EAC's natural resources table in terms of landmass, natural resources, and human capital (with more French speakers, and a 'youth bulge'). At the same time, DRC now has six additional accountability partners with whom she can navigate the integrated development terrain better. These realities have placed DRC and the Community at the crossroads of prosperity.

It is worth noting here that contrary to expectation, the Community's assets and liabilities are joint, but not co-owned by member states. Thus, DRC's natural resources are not suddenly

**70** per cent of her population is aged between zero and 29 years

available for the taking of other EAC states simply because DRC's entry into the bloc. However, member states can utilize EAC's infrastructure to establish new bilateral and multilateral agreements to access and exploit the expanded resources and minimize new or increased threats.

### Marginalization is Rife in DRC, the Community

In addition to the previously mentioned economic marginalization of DRC, and the Community, both entities have high numbers of unskilled workers. In DRC, for example, about 57 per cent of her labor force is unskilled. Compared to other EAC member states, DRC's workforce is most skilled. For instance, 59.5 per cent, and 97.5 per cent of the labor force is unskilled in Kenya, and Burundi, respectively, for instance (UNDP, 2021; World Bank, 2022). Further, the Community has a 'youth bulge.' More than half of the population in each of the seven EAC member states is aged under 29 years. In Kenya, about 62 per cent of the population is aged between zero and 29 years. The estimated percentages of population of individuals this age bracket are 72, 66, 63, 66, and 65 in Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, respectively (World Bank, 2022; UNDP, 2022; World Fact Book, 2022). Most of these youth are largely invisible in DRC's and the Community's political affairs. Primarily as a result of the mutually reinforcing economic exclusion, unskilled labor, and political underrepresentation marginalization is rife in the bloc.

In sum, DRC's assets as well as her stark contradictions have reconfigured EAC's economic, geopolitical, and security realities.

### Analysis

As the case of DRC shows, regardless of the nature and quantity of resources that a country possesses, there is little value - to a country and its people - in having unused, underused, or misused resources. This applies both to natural resources, and human capital. DRC's population is comparable to Russia's, and the bloc's to the US. All three countries are among the world's top-10 natural resource-richest countries, but unlike Russia, for instance, DRC is a comparatively poor state. The EAC, compared to the US, is also poor. In this regard, DRC's riches have not yet inoculated her people against poverty. It seems that the major differences between these countries and groups of states are generally structural. Most of the other countries that DRC pools with in the said top-10 list, have mechanisms and frameworks to explore natural resources. This involves the (re)skilling of the labor force, and investment in the frontiers of the future, such as renewable energy. These countries also tend to do so primarily

DRC's riches have not yet inoculated her people against poverty

for the benefit of and not at the expense of their nationals, which appears to be the case with DRC. As has been well documented, DRC's minerals have fanned and funded armed conflicts, and benefit DRC's elites, neighboring and extra-regional countries and foreign multinational corporations more than ordinary DRC nationals. DRC's inability to improve her development outcomes sufficiently despite rising commodity prices and her expanded production capacity could point to poor economic management, geopolitical interference, and protracted political crises. The result is that DRC's and Burundi's development outcomes are not too dissimilar.

The 'importation' of tens of armed groups into the EAC has increased the 'rebranded' Community's security concerns so much so that EAC's heads of states have set a joint plan to mobilize and deploy an EAC force to quell DRC's rebels' activity. Regardless of whether the concerns are real or perceived, these fears are not misplaced. Take the case of Salim Rashid Mohamed, a Kenyan, a foreign fighter, and a member of ADF, and IS, for example, who was arrested in DRC on February 1, 2022, by security officers in a joint Uganda army-DRC-army operation dubbed Operation Shujaa (*Uganda Radio Network*, 2022). Salim's profile and his activities simultaneously link him to Kenya (EAC), ADF (DRC, Uganda), IS (ADF, IS in Mozambique, as well as Somalia, and Turkey), and DRC (EAC, and SADC). Further, Salim's IS connection places him in the network of other IS members such as IS in Mozambique's (ASWJ's leader, Abu Yassir Hassan, a Tanzanian (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 2021; *The Economist*, 2021). Again, links to EAC, SADC, Somalia, Syria, and Iraq emerge. The pursuit and/or protection of the often-competing interests of local populations; the government; regional, continental, and extra-continental actors; multinational corporations; development partners; and peace keeping troops have created a security dilemma. This has allowed for the growth of armed militant groups in the North Kivu province - which is one of the country's resource bedrocks. More than 100 militia groups are known to be active in eastern DRC. The change in the Allied Democratic Force's (ADF's) identity from a militia group into a militia-terror group has also complicated DRC's security challenges. Unsurprisingly, DRC's set of complex

security challenges is one of misgivings about DRC's entry into EAC that some of those opposed to DRC's entry into EAC have. To be clear, DRC's entry into the EAC will not introduce anything that the other six member states (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) are not already accustomed to. With or without DRC, armed militant groups, terrorism, illegal migration, political turbulence, underdeveloped economies, youth unemployment, poverty, and poor infrastructure are realities that EAC has contended with for much of the time since July 2000 when the Community came into being. In 2021, Rwanda offered her troops to support counter terrorism efforts in Mozambique. These concerns should translate to more proactive joint efforts such as Operation Shujaa. However, it will recalibrate the bloc's peace and security considerations.

DRC's multi-regional anomaly is a double-edged sword. If harnessed well, DRC's linkages to central, East, and southern Africa can provide markets to a potentially wide range of goods and services. Exploring these markets can gainfully employ millions of DRC and other EAC nationals. However, 'dragging' around so many countries effectively requires visionary and strategic leadership, and a sea of bilateral and multilateral agreements. It also requires the formalization of such agreements, in multiples, regularly, which is tedious. Notably, DRC's membership in SADC did not suddenly improve the fortunes of either DRC or SADC in 1998 or the year after that. While the jury on the impact of DRC's 24-year engagement with SADC members on SADC is still out, it is fair to say that by and large, although relations between SADC member states have mostly been cordial, SADC has not yet become the most progressive bloc in Africa, the presence of DRC notwithstanding. There is little reason to believe that

if EAC approaches DRC the way SADC has, DRC's entry will suddenly transform EAC's fortunes in any significant way. In other words, DRC's entry into the EAC is not a magic bullet for economic, social, or political ills. Poorly managed, multi-regional membership or regional integration is meaningless.

DRC's admission to the EAC and the subsequent increase in the number of politically, economically, and socially excluded individuals have spotlighted the country's and EAC's inequalities. It has also made it clear that integrated development is a positive but deficient step toward continued, dynamic, and sustainable development. This has renewed focus and interest in the new bloc's youth, and on their involvement. Although the bloc's 'youth bulge' is a potential demographic dividend, this asset can suffer one of two fates. The bloc can choose to embrace the youth, enhance their capacities (through education, for example), and include them in decision making at grass roots, national, and bloc levels. A skilled and engaged workforce will be more inclined to economic and political activities such as infrastructure development and innovation to improve their and their community's standards of life. Then there is the issue of infrastructural underdevelopment. Compared to other less-endowed countries in EAC or SADC such as Kenya, or South Africa, there is room for DRC to develop her mining (high value minerals), agricultural, transport (roads, railways), energy (solar), financial (banking), and telecommunication sectors further. Alternatively, the bloc can opt to turn a blind eye toward them. This will maintain the *status quo*. DRC's development will remain unequal at best, or stunt at worst. Improved access to DRC's assets with the aim of achieving joint progress will be of no significant consequence.

## Conclusion

The 'rebranded' East African Community (EAC) is oozing with resources and vision to achieve joint prosperity. The Community has significant untapped potential, and a natural resource portfolio which is rich, impressive, and unmatched. However, DRC is a country of stark contradictions. DRC's simultaneous rich, and poor; at the front, and back of modern-day digital technologies; peaceful, and conflicted; and geopolitical anomaly identities. Additionally, unlike any other time in EAC's history, there are now millions of politically and economically excluded individuals in the bloc, thanks to the admission of DRC's 100 million-plus people into the community. More than 65 per cent of the bloc's population is aged under 30 years. In these ways, DRC's entry has reset its geopolitical, economic, and security realities, changing the Community outlook. Thus, simply integrating the economies of the seven member states will not suffice, integrated development must by necessity also be intentioned, inclusive, and participatory. The challenges of unequal access to resources, presence of unexploited resources, and rampant widespread marginalization are not insurmountable though. On the contrary, the joint dividends can be maximized, and challenges minimized through inclusion; shared vision; and intentioned, visionary leadership at domestic and EAC levels.

DRC's admission to the EAC and the subsequent increase in the number of politically, economically, and socially excluded individuals have spotlighted the country's and EAC's inequalities

## Recommendations

Given the foregoing, this paper recommends:

- Given DRC's asset capacity and impact of her EAC entry, helping DRC overcome the contradictions of her double-faced identities will enhance her assets and minimize, and where possible, eliminate her liabilities. This help could be in the form of an EAC capacity-building campaign of DRC's nationals, technical support for infrastructural development, and enhanced intra-EAC trading.
- Shoring up of the envisioned integrated development up with intentioned, inclusive, and whole-of-bloc approach. The involvement and participation of the bloc's youth at all levels in this regard should be encouraged as a first step to harnessing the bloc's potential demographic dividend, which is significant.
- The co-creation of a new blue print to operationalize the Community's vision of shared progress. This blue print will specify the 'rebranded' Community's development priorities, joint development milestones, and related timelines. The blue print will also have mutually-reinforcing pro-DRC and pro-EAC policies.
- Investing in peace (an integral sustainable development lever) and development (a desirable peace dividend) concurrently. This could entail expanding joint security initiatives, including counter terrorism efforts in EAC and SADC. For instance, EAC could lend its support to SADC's newly-launched Regional Counter Terrorism Center, building on lessons learnt counter terrorism approaches adopted by EAC member states such as Kenya. SADC could also consider expanding its security programs to include other EAC member states besides Tanzania and DRC, and build on joint counter terrorism operations such as Operation Shujaa involving Ugandan and DRC army officers.
- Modelling EAC's aspiration on other relatively successful contemporary multinational unions such as the European Union, for instance, and lessons learned.

---

## References

- BBC. (2022, April 22). East African Force to be Deployed to DR Congo. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cvenzmgylgwt/democratic-republic-of-congo>
- East African Community. (2022). Member States. <https://www.eac.int>
- Institute for Economics and Peace. (2022). Global Terrorism Index. Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace.
- Institute for Economics and Peace. (2022). Peace Index. Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace.
- France 24. (2021, May 4). 'DR Congo Imposes Military Rule in Regions Under 'State of Siege''. *France 24*. <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210504-dr-congo-imposes-military-rule-in-regions-under-state-of-siege>
- Kivu Security Tracker. (2022). Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. <https://kivusecurity.org>

- Omondi, R. (2021). 'Cabo Delgado: Countering Mozambique's ASWJ Terrorism is Critical to Horn of Africa's Security.' *The HORN Bulletin*. 4(3). pp.11-22
- South African Development Community. (2022). Member States. <https://www.sadc.int>
- South African Development Community. (2022). SADC Launches Regional Counter Terrorism Center. <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-launches-regional-counter-terrorism-centre-advance-counter-terrorism-prevention/>
- Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. (2021). Islamic State Central Africa (Wilayat Wasat Ifriqiyah / ISCA) - Mozambique and DRC. Retrieved from <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ahlu-sunnah-wa-jamoansar-al-sunna-shabaab-cult-islamic-state-sentral-africa-wilayat-wasat-ifr>
- Uganda Radio Network. (2022, February 1). DRC Authorities Confirm Arrest of ADF Propagandist Salim Rashid Mohammed. *Uganda Radio Network*. <https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/drc-authorities-confirm-arrest-of-adf-propagandist-salim-rashid-mohammed->
- United Nations Development Programme. (2022). Human Development Index. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- World Atlas. (2022). All Countries. Quebec: Reunion Technology Inc.
- World Bank. (2022). Access to Electricity in the Democratic Republic of Congo <https://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep>
- World Bank. (2022). Countries and Economies. <https://data.worldbank.org/country>
- World Fact Book. (2022). The World and Its Regions: Africa. Washington D.C. Central Intelligence Agency.

---

## About the Writer

### Roselyne Omondi

Roselyne Omondi is the Associate Director, Research, at the HORN Institute. She is also an experienced writer-editor who works at the intersection of peace, conflict, and terrorism research; international development; and media and communication. Her research interests include armed conflict, terrorism, forced migration, climate change, and food (in)security. Her work has been published and/or cited by, among others, *The New Humanitarian*, *The East African*, *Swansea Post*, and the *Jutland Station*.

She can be reached at [roselyne@horninstitute.org](mailto:roselyne@horninstitute.org) or [r.omondi@outlook.com](mailto:r.omondi@outlook.com)

---