

Special EDITION

Comprehensive Border Security Critical to Stability in the Horn of Africa Region

June 2020

By Roselyne Omondi

Abstract

Some states in the greater Horn of Africa region have not yet policed and secured their physical and virtual spaces efficiently and effectively. There is also the tendency of the states to approach border security independently - as opposed to collaborating with other states in the region – which creates state absenteeism in the states’ frontiers. Different merchants of violence have taken advantage of the various defective border management scenarios to achieve their economic, military, political, or socio-cultural goals, creating the insecurity and instability that characterize the region. At the same time, the management of bio threats such as locusts’ invasion, and the emerging COVID-19 has also been wanting. This article argues that the adoption of a comprehensive approach to border security by member states in the Horn of Africa will decrease armed conflicts and terrorism, improve the management of bio threats, and help to stabilize the region. Such an approach may involve, among other things, the continuous training and equipping of security officers, and multi-agency, inter-state disaster management that employs relevant, up-to-date technologies. The states should act jointly with other states, and secure borders constantly and simultaneously to ensure peace, safety, and stability in the region.



Introduction


The almost simultaneous invasion of the greater Horn of Africa region by locust swarms, and the emerging threat of the fast-spreading COVID-19 (a new viral disease) on the back of increasing terrorism not only threaten the stability of the region, but also exemplify the cross-border nature of modern day threats, and the difficulty of managing the same at regional and global levels. On February 24, 2020, the Locust Watch desk of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sounded the alarm on the ‘widespread breeding’ of the swarms from the Persian Gulf in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and warned of ‘new swarms’ in the near future). FAO has also sited swarms in Uganda, South Sudan, and DRC. The swarms have already destroyed vegetation in areas largely inhabited by the region’s pastoralists that are already largely food insecure on account of prolonged droughts that were followed by flooding in the period immediately before the arrival of the swarms, in December 2019, and January 2020. No individual in the region has tested positive for COVID-19, which has


the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported to have been confirmed in Asia (China, Japan, South Korea), Africa (Egypt, Nigeria), Europe (especially Italy), parts of the Middle East (Iran). The threat of COVID-19 remains high as nationals of the greater Horn of Africa region still interact with those from the affected regions albeit in limited ways.

Towards end of February 2020, the US government warned of possible terror attack in Kenya’s capital, increasing the capitals terror risk the highest level. This followed a US-Africa Command report of the death of an al Shabab planner and his spouse in a drone strike in Somalia. Al Shabab activity has increased in recent weeks in Somalia and Kenya. On January 5, 2020, the Somalia-based terrorist group attacked a US-Africa Command Centre in Manda, Lamu County, Kenya, that is also a base for US’s Special Operations Force in Somalia. The attackers were reportedly repulsed by members of both the Kenyan Defence Force and the US Army, according to representatives of the two

 @HISS2017
 @Horninstitute

 info@horninstitute.org
 www.horninstitute.org

 +254 720 323 896
 +254 735 323 896

 Durham Road, Kileleshwa
P.O. Box 25632 - 00100
Nairobi – Kenya

HORN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

forces. Al Shabab said it had targeted this security installation because it has been used as “one of the many launch pads against us [al Shabab]” (*The Standard*, 2020). The US’s reaction, through the Centre’s Director of Operations, Maj. Gen. William Gayler, was a reiteration of its commitment to helping its allies to degrade the group’s ability to occupy territory and propagate violence in region. The targeting of the US, a foreign state actor, by al Shabab, a Somalia-based non-state actor, in Kenya, encapsulates the security landscape in the greater Horn of Africa region. It also highlights: the porosity of Kenya-Somalia-US borders, motivations of state and non-state actors for violence, and the challenges of securing different kinds of borders. Further, it invites discussion on border security in the region, a topic that is currently occupying the minds of many security officers and citizens in the greater Horn of Africa.

In the following sections, this article will provide a general overview of different kinds of borders in the region, focusing chiefly on the porous nature of these boundaries. It will then discuss the difficulties that states encounter in their quest to police and secure the same. Suggestions for improving security, safety, and stability in the region will be offered.

Border porosity in the greater Horn of Africa region

It is an open secret that most of the physical and virtual borders in the region are porous and/or not fully secured. Several explanations have been offered for the same. Key among these are the Partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, the technology-initiated compression of time and space, and the inability and/or unwillingness of some states in the region to police and secure their borders effectively and efficiently (Pakenham, 1990; Scholte, 2005; Hansen 2019).

The Europeans that divided up Africa were driven by the desire to gain territory on the continent while maintaining peace with each other. What they did not pay attention to is the nature of the boundaries that they were creating. The results include

the generally straight borders that still define the continent (Pakenham, 1990; Stearns, 2012; Yoon, 2009). These borders cut through the communities that existed at that time, creating patchworked nation states. A key consequence of the Scramble for Africa is that the exercise inadvertently provided some ‘nations’ with some sort of unofficial dual or multiple nationality status in the host state. The drawing of Kenya’s southern border, for example, cut across the territory that the Maasai nation had occupied before the arrival of the Europeans, placing the Maasai in two states: Kenya and Tanzania. Other examples include the Somali nation which ended up in parts of Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, and the Teso nation that exists in both Uganda and Kenya.

On achieving independence from their colonial masters, most African states retained the existing borders. Select states, such as Eritrea, and South Sudan, expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation, and seceded from their ‘parent’ states, in 1991, and 2011 respectively (Yoon, 2009). Others, such as Ethiopia, have adopted nation-sensitive governance models that allow nations in the states to exist somewhat independently but also alongside other nations within the nation state. Ethiopia’s ethno-federalism model, for example, allows the Amhara to occupy the Amhara region, the Oromo to occupy the Oromo region, and so forth. These regional governments work with the federal government to keep project Ethiopia intact (Kefale, 2013).

By accepting pre-independence borders, the states inherited the porous borders that the Scramble had created. Such borders are porous to the extent that the boundaries blur the lines between internal and external borders of nations (Bigo, 2014), as the aforementioned examples demonstrate, as well as the extent of the external borders. This in turn makes it difficult to define the jurisdiction of the security officers who are mandated to secure a state’s internal and external borders. Further, because individuals from the resultant cross-bordered communities often find acceptance in two or more of the host states, blurred borders can camouflage some of them. This makes them somewhat invisible in their host states, compromising security in one or more states. The emergence of advanced technologies in recent times has increased the permeability of both internal and external borders (Feenberg, 2005; Ceyhan, 2008) in two main ways. First, it has blurred inter-state borders further. Today, there are different kinds of virtual communities for whom the protocols that relate to accessing physical borders are irrelevant and/or non-existent. In other words, although these communities exist across state borders, the communities are not necessarily defined by the

The Europeans that divided up Africa were driven by the desire to gain territory on the continent while maintaining peace with each other


Today, there are different kinds of virtual communities for whom the protocols that relate to accessing physical borders are irrelevant and/or non-existent.

same. The second explanation, which relates to the first one, is that technological advancements have created new kinds of territories; virtual spaces. These technology-enabled territories cannot be accessed, and policed and/or secured in the same way as physical territories are.

The inability to police and secure borders fully is a factor of nature, power (influence, money, personnel too) and knowledge (Foucault, 2008; Ritter, 2018). The extent to which a physical or virtual border can be secured is dependent on, among other factors, access to and ability to use the relevant technology (Ceyhan, 2008; Ritter, 2018), the kind of government that a state has, the nature of cross-bordered nations that the state has (Feenberg, 2005), a state's budget, the quality and quantity of security officers, and the availability of cross-border security arrangements (Bigo, 2014). The nature and quality of a state's knowledge industry also impacts border security. Countries that invest in and employ both experts and security practitioners and up-to-date technologies that improve surveillance generally police and secure their territories better (Ceyhan, 2008). Many states in the Horn of Africa, for example, depend on the hardware (arms and ammunition) and software (expertise) of other states to help secure their borders; most notably the US, and China.

These include aerial sprayers, bombers, drones, and biometric identifiers such as voice recognition software. This gives states such as the US more power over the other states.

Several merchants of violence have emerged, grown, and/or thrived in the Horn of Africa on account of the existing power and knowledge gaps that impede the policing and securing of borders. Many of them occupy or attempt to occupy territory, particularly in the frontiers (Hansen 2019), and exploit these to achieve their economic, political, social, or military goals (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Hansen, 2019)). The Allied Democratic Force (ADF), for example, operates with seeming abandon in parts of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). So do their sympathizers, as well as actors who masquerade as members ADF. These actors may or may not be wary of state presence. On June 4, 2019, for example, ISIS claimed responsibility for the incident in DRC which ADF fighters had been suspected of (see timeline of ADF activity). These groups operate in the area, the presence of local, cross-border, and international security forces notwithstanding (Hansen, 2019; Institute of Economics and Peace [IEP], 2019. Brooks, 2017)). In the past two years, for example, ADF killed hundreds of people (including troops and civilians) as indicated in the following timeline.



In the same breath, al Shabab continues to operate across borders, particularly in Somalia and Kenya, but increasingly also in Tanzania and Mozambique, as well as across seas (Hansen, 2019). That members of the group have crossed the Kenya-Somalia border severally, and transported goods across it is well documented (UN, 2018; Mohammed, 2020). Proceeds from such cross-border trading activities have helped to fund the group's activities. In 2017, for example, UN monitors reported that al Shabab sold more than three million bags of charcoal to the Middle East, bagging an estimated USD 7.5 million despite the existence of a United Nations Security Council ban on the same (UN, 2018). Al Shabab carried out 286 attacks in Somalia in 2018, killing hundreds of people. Some of these occurred in Mogadishu, which is secured with the help of AMISOM (IEC, 2019) suggesting that they breached several internal borders. The group also uses virtual spaces to announce its presence and exert its influence. Somalia's capacity to police cyber space is still limited.

Sometimes, state actors launch campaigns to flush out non-state actors from the territories that the non-state actors occupy. Such actions often send the displaced group(s) across borders; porous borders allow them to cross into other territories. State actors in one state do not usually have jurisdiction over territories in other states (Hansen, 2019; Bigo, 2014). To this extent, porous boundaries allow for translocation, and with it the movement of violent actors to another territory. Such actors may adapt to the changing circumstances by seeking alternative activities. These may or may not be violent. When Ugandan security forces' actions displaced LRA from parts of northern Uganda (Hansen, 2019), for example, the group crossed the porous boundary that separates Uganda from the Central African Republic (CAR). Once there, the group resorted to armed robbery and wildlife poaching to survive (Brooks, 2017). States in the region have also experimented with temporary closure of shared borders, to curtail illegal migration, or trade, for example. It should be noted that border closure does not necessarily take its permeability away. This is particularly true in cross-bordered environments such as the Kenya-Somalia, Uganda-DRC, or the Uganda-Rwanda borders.

Non-state actors are not the only ones who merchandize violence in the region to achieve their goals. DRC, for example, is awash with state actors such as the US, France, and China, and foreign multinational corporations interested in accessing some of DRC's vast highly-valued natural resources. These include coltan and related metals, cobalt, copper, and timber (Burgis, 2015; Mukwege, 2018). These actors have been known to use

violence, or hire the hands of the more than 100 armed groups in country to obtain resources (Stearns, 2012). Iran has imported al Shabab exported illegally produced charcoal from a zone that is policed by African Union's multi-national peace-enforcing force in Somalia [AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia] (UN, 2018; *Daily Nation*, 2018). Peter de Clercq, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, has noted the sale of this charcoal not only degrades the natural environment, but also stagnates the economy, "funds insecurity and conflict," and worsens "an already delicate humanitarian situation" (UN, 2018).

Violence management aside, most of the region's countries lack the adequate capacity to manage threats that have no regard for borders, such as swarms of locusts, and the spread of diseases. Despite FAO warnings of possible invasion last year, many countries in the region did not take the warning seriously. Experts and politicians lost valuable time they could ill afford to respond to the problem, allowing the swarms to spread to at least six countries.

Analysis

The region that is now vulnerable to bio threats remains invested more in the more 'traditional' security threats such as terrorism than in threats to human security. To be sure, locust swarms, and COVID-19 are border blind, and not norms in this region. As such, the region's capacity to respond to cross-border bio threats such as these ones remains limited. It is also difficult for one state to pursue the swarms in another state. Many countries in the locusts' path missed FAO's early warnings, but also allowed lay knowledge interspersed with cultural leanings, to water down the trust in the authority of experts such as entomologists (insect experts); some communities in the region think of locusts in terms of a food source as opposed to a food threat. Schisms between experts also appeared when the plan to destroy the 'pests' with pesticides emerged. Some experts think of pesticides as a solution, while others see it as a problem that will worsen the outcomes of other species in the shared ecosystem, such as bees, and birds. With more hatching swarms expected in the coming weeks, the region can expect some level of food insecurity. This could occasion hike in food prices, and precipitate violence, especially in the food-insecure arid and semi-arid regions of states such as Kenya. While the collateral damage of the pesticides is not immediately clear, diminished agricultural productivity in the affected areas on account of the now degraded soils, and destroyed species can be expected, at least in the short term.

Even with this asymmetrical investment in 'traditional' security, many of the states in the greater Horn of Africa still struggle with the insecurity that border porosity occasions as a result of the insensitive placement of 'nations' across multiple states. This struggle seems to be unending because it is extremely difficult to redraw existing state borders. The difficulty arises from the fact that because states exercise sovereignty over their territories, ceding some territory threatens the same. Secondly, redrawing boundaries is a complex and potentially tedious and time-consuming process that involves bilateral and/or multilateral negotiations, adjudication, and agreements. However, as South Sudan has demonstrated in the almost nine years that it has existed independent of the Sudan, there are no guarantees that attempts to redress the wrongs of the said Scramble will stabilize a region, and/or yield peace. In fact, peace continues to elude Africa's youngest state.

States in the region have also found it difficult to curtail illegal activities that fuel insecurity and conflict by closing borders (Buzan, 1991). This is because the region is fairly integrated, and happenings in one location tends to affect those in another location. Consequently, states have to weigh the costs of the closure against the benefits of keeping it open to forestall unnecessary suffering. Additionally, closing a border does not make the boundary imporous. This explains why some states are increasingly using technology, including special imaging software, drones, and biometric data reader to help police and secure borders (Ritter, 2018). They are doing this by either establishing modernized operations centres, or hiring the expertise of more technologically advanced states.

Modernizing security operations is an expensive endeavor that many of these states can ill afford. Many states' budgets cannot accommodate constant investments in modern policing and border security hardware, or sudden need to secure borders in response to emerging bio threats. The result is the use of out-of-date equipment and infrastructure that is useless, unreliable, or inadequate. To make matters worse, many of these states struggle with the recruitment of committed, adaptive individuals. Consequently, many of the forces are staffed by individuals who have been compelled, by personal circumstances or existing laws, to join the security profession for as long as is necessary. The result is often demotivated personnel who could be easily compromised. The deployment of demotivated individuals wastes limited state resources, and does not result in improved internal or external security.

Many states' budgets cannot accommodate constant investments in modern policing and border security hardware, or sudden need to secure borders in response to emerging bio threats

The option of hiring the expertise of security, environment, or health personnel from other more technologically advanced states is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows the hiring state to concentrate on other affairs relating the wellbeing of the state, such as the education of citizens. This may accelerate development in the hiring state. On the other hand, the hiring state allows the hired state to operate in the target state. This gives the hired, knowledgeable state some power over the hiring state, creating the possibility for non-aggressive interference by the more knowledge-empowered state in the affairs of the hiring state. It also creates dependency of the hiring state on the more advanced state. The overall effects of this, particularly when agreements arise, may be insecurity, and with it, stalled development.

Technology, states in the region are realizing, is not a silver bullet. In addition to the attendant costs of updating the chosen technology and supporting software and hardware as is appropriate, there are no guarantees that its use will yield the intended result(s). The technology may fail, exacerbating a compromised security situation. Unauthorized persons may access it and misuse it. The authorized users may also miscalculate its execution. Innocent people have been harmed in such situations. Such an occurrence provides reason (grievance) for disgruntled groups to launch revenge attacks. The January 5, 2020 attack on the US base is one such example.

States must also consider how the blurring of boundaries, and the consequences of the same (as has been discussed in this article), complicates the policing and securing of states. This is primarily because blurred borders make it difficult for both police (who secure internal borders) and the military (who secure external borders) to identify and exercise their jurisdiction. As security operations in DRC show, it is difficult to draw the line between the jurisdiction of the Congolese police and army, especially in eastern DRC where the army, not the police, tend to launch operations against the insurgent group, ADF. The same can be

said of the arrival and subsequent clearance of a 239-persons strong airline from COVID-19's source country, China, to Kenya in February 2020 that called the wisdom of the government to question. With the responsibility for this event lying in several government ministries, determining with whom the buck stops has not been a straightforward matter. Dealing with such opaque security situations often introduces several command chains, and lengthens response times when the need to secure borders urgently arises. This explains why hundreds of Congolese civilians have died in the ADF-related attacks there in the past.

The inability of one state in the region to pursue an illegal group across a shared border demonstrates the tendency of the

states to approach border security in a simplistic, single-country manner. Joint cross-border operations are a factor of bilateral agreements, and call for the cooperation of the leaders of the countries in question. Signing agreements does not mean that agreements will hold however. Or that the threat of violence that exists across borders will be dealt with decisively. In a complex, networked world, states are better off betting of the goodwill of neighbouring states to help secure the shared borders than on going it alone. Arguably, al Shabab would have gained more territory in Somalia if Somalia would have rejected forces such as AMISOM's, and of states allied to Somalia, and/or neighbouring states.

Conclusion

Border security preoccupies many states in the generally unstable and insecure but interconnected the greater Horn of Africa region in part because many borders in the region are porous, and/or unsecured. Most of the states in the region secure internal, external, and virtual borders independent of neighbouring states. This has created border policing and securing gaps that different merchants of violence, including al Shabab, ISIS, and ADF have been exploiting.

Securing internal borders may complicate security command chains as a result of overlapping policing and securing jurisdictions in a given state. That said, as technology is a security enabler, states in the region harness it to improve the policing and securing of their borders. However, they should so after considering the pros and cons of doing need so carefully to avoid investing in potentially counter-productive processed. This is because the acquisition, access and use of certain technologies can create dependency, room for non-aggressive interference, and violation of human rights, which may result in more or a different kind of insecurity.

Recommendations

To police and secure the borders in individual countries and in the region better, states in the greater Horn of Africa region should:

- Shun the tendency for reactive, piecemeal security arrangements. Such arrangements do not usually meet the security needs of citizens adequately, and often exposes the state to threats unnecessarily.
- Embrace comprehensive approaches to border security. This will involve securing all relevant kinds of borders, including those that exist intra-state (internal borders), cross-state, and those that relate to virtual spaces. It will also entail anticipating different kinds of threats (physical, biological, virtual, and so forth) and preparing adequate responses to the same.
- Consistently invest in technologies that will help them to secure borders without compromising local, national, or regional security. Such investments should limit the possibilities for the interference of one state by another, but allow for pre-emptive as opposed to reactive security arrangements.
- Ensure security personnel are well trained, and equipped with up-to-date equipment. This will improve their response to attacks by other armed groups.
- Cooperate with other states to reduce gaps such as those created by budgetary limitations and inadequate

access to modern technology. This cooperation could take the form of joint cross-border operations, or joint border patrols. Existing initiatives, such as the African Union Border Program, should be expanded to accommodate other boundary-related issues such as border porosity that compromise the continent's stability. At the moment, this program is mainly focussed on resolving border disputes that emerged from the Scramble for Africa.

- Carry out security operations in ways that do not export problems to neighbouring countries or violate the rights of civilians. This will reduce the emergence of grievances that other state and/or non-state actors could use against a state to mete violence.

References

- Aljazeera. (2020, February 26). 'US Air Strike Kills Telecom Worker in Somalia.' Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/air-strike-kills-telecom-worker-somalia-200226065434331.html>
- Berdal, M. & Malone, D. Eds. (2000). *Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars*. Ottawa: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bigo, D. (2014). 'The (In)Securitization of Practices of the Three Universities of European Union Border Control: Military/ Navy, Border Guards/Police, Database Analystst.' *Security Dialogue*. 45(3). P209-225.
- Brooks, K. (2017). '*The Last Animals*' documentary. Retrieved from <https://thelastanimals.com/>
- Burgis, T. (2015). *The Looting Machine – Warlords, Tycoons, Smugglers, and the Systematic Theft of Africa's Wealth*. London: Williams Collins.
- Buzan, B. (1991) *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. 2nd ed. Sussex: Wheasheaf Books Ltd.
- Ceyhan, S.A. (2008). 'Technologization of Security: Management of Uncertainty and Risk in the Age of Biometrics.' *Surveillance and Society*. 5(2). pp.1-2-123
- Feenberg, A. (2005). 'Critical Theory of Technology: An Overview.' *Tailoring Biotechnologies*. 1(1). pp. 47-64
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2020, February 24). 'Desert Locust Situation Update.' Retrieved from <http://www.fao.org/ag/locusts/en/info/info/index.html>
- Foucault, M. (2008). *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Lecture Series. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hansen, S. J. (2019). *Horn, Sahel, and Rift – Fault-lines of the African Jihad*. C. Hurst & Co. Ltd.: London.
- Institute for Economics and Peace. (2019). '*Global Terrorism Index 2019 – Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*.' Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace.
- Kefale, A. (2013). *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia – A Comparative Regional Study*. New York: Routledge.
- Mohammed, A. (2020, January 7). 'How Smuggling at the Kenya-Somalia Border Fuels Terror.' *The Standard*. Nairobi: The Standard Group. p.16.
- Mukwege, D. (2018). Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech. Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Committee. Retrieved from <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/mukwege/lecture/>
- Nation Media Group. (2018, November 16). 'Charcoal Still Smuggled from KDF-controlled Somalia Zones.' *Daily Nation*. Nairobi: Nation Media Group. Retrieved from <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Inside-Shabaab-s-Sh770m-illicit-charcoal-business/1056-4854186-4q053xz/index.html>

- The Standard Group. (2020, January 6). 'Four Terrorists Killed in Raid on US Military Base in Manda Bay.' *The Standard*. Nairobi: The Nation Media Group. p.8
- Pakenham, T. (1990). *The Scramble for Africa: The White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*. New York: Random House.
- Ritter, E.J. (2018). 'Drone Warfare and the Principle of Discrimination.' In, May, L. (Ed.) *The Cambridge Handbook of the Just War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-215
- Scholte, J.A. (2005). *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. London: Red Globe Press.
- Stearns, J. (2012). *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. Public Affairs: New York.
- United Nations. (2018). 'Building Partnerships to Curb Unsustainable production, Use, and Trade of Charcoal in Somalia.' May 2018 Conference. Mogadishu: United Nations. Retrieved from <https://unsom.unmissions.org/international-conference-illegal-charcoal-trade-opens-mogadishu>
- United Nations. (2018). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. New York: United Nations.
- Yoon, M.Y. (2009). 'European Colonization and Territorial Disputes in Africa: The Gulf of Guinea and the Indian Ocean'. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. 20(2). pp. 77-94

About the Writer

Roselyne Omondi

Roselyne Omondi is the Associate Director, Research, at the HORN Institute. She holds Erasmus Mundus Master's degrees in Journalism, Media, and Globalisation from Aarhus University, Danish School of Media and Journalism (DMJX) (Denmark), and Swansea University (UK), specializing in War, Conflict, and Terrorism, and in International Humanitarian Action, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (the Netherlands), specializing in Comprehensive Security. She also holds a Bachelor's degree in Sociology and English Language from Kenyatta University (Kenya). She is also an experienced writer-editor who works at the intersection of Peace, Conflict, and Terrorism Research; International Development; and Media and Communication.

She can be reached at roselyne@horninstitute.org or r.omondi@outlook.com
