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Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa Region

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Abstract

This article contends that each of the Horn of Africa countries comprising of Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya responds to geopolitical dynamics differently and, depending on the personality of the leadership, has to take into account or attempt to balance three determining factors: domestic challenges, regional interests, and pressures from aid donors or extra-continental powers. It discusses the individual country's social and political eccentricities and their impact on diplomatic relations at the regional and international levels. It is noted that the Horn of Africa is a unique cluster of conflict in Africa vulnerable to external forces and unable to

control its own fate in part because it is of strategic value to competing external forces. The article recommends that the Horn of Africa should collectively reassess its geopolitical value to itself and to the world in addition to addressing internal political and security challenges.

Introduction

The Horn of Africa region, one of the clusters of conflict in Africa, is unique in that it is triangularly hemmed by large bodies of water; the Nile River in the West; the Red Sea in the North, and the Indian Ocean in the East. With the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean defining the cluster's maritime limits (Munene, 2015, p. 124) two forces, external and internal, determine its geopolitical fortunes. With a potential combined market population of over 280 million people, the cluster suffers from the attention of extra-continental powers mainly because it is strategic to their interests. It seemingly was not ready for the attention in part because its landward orientation made it ignore sea threats. It, therefore, did not develop worthwhile navies; it could not defend itself from invaders who had powerful battleships (Ferguson, 2011, p. 37). Superior naval technology, for instance, enabled Portugal methodically to subdue local rulers along the African coast (Strandes, 1971, p. 1).

This region has over time attracted grandiose imperial schemes. Starting with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 that linked the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, the region acquired geopolitical importance mainly to European powers as they competed to grab geo-strategic territories on the Red Sea. Britain took Egypt and Sudan, France acquired Djibouti, and Italy snatched Eritrea. They also shared the long Somali coastline thereby creating colonial entities called British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and French Somaliland. With an obsession to keep other powers from the Nile River, Britain became the dominant imperial force in the Horn by restricting the use of the waters in such Nile tributaries as the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, Atbara or Black Nile in Eritrea, and the Great Lakes region (Fellin, July 2013; Tekuya, March 2020; Okoth-Owiro, 2004; Ferede and Abebe, 2014, p. 55). It thus controlled territories from Egypt southwards through Sudan to Uganda and then eastwards to Kenya and parts of Somalia.

During and after World War II, there were several dreams of turning the Horn into an imperial extension. Italy's Benito Mussolini, having conquered Ethiopia, dreamt of creating a huge Italian empire during World War II to embrace the entire Horn of Africa. Although he did not succeed, the idea was revisited by the British when



Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (middle) and Somalia's president, Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed 'Farmajo' (left) at a past event. (Photo Credit: AFP)

they helped to defeat the Italians with Ernest Bevan suggesting a 'Greater Somalia' entity and giving rise to the Somali Youth League (SYL) which took power in 1960 and had an irredentist agenda. In the 21st Century, the rise of Neo-Ottoman dream targets Somalia as a possible southern end to Turkey's Neo-Ottoman aspiration (Ahmed, December 2020). Turkey is only one external power that is interested in the Horn.

Competing powers, staking claims to the region, have turned the Horn of Africa, comprising Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya, into an imperial playing field. In doing so, the powers are generally disdainful of the Africans. They like the region fragmented and incapable of projecting interests. This disdain was visible in one of President Barack Obama's economic advisors, Larry Summers, who seemingly advocated "garbage imperialism" (Kimani, 2009, p. 46; Milmo, 2009; Abdullahi, 2008), to dump all types of wastes including nuclear, expired medicines, outdated technology, and even contaminated foods in Africa. He, in December 1991, while advising the World Bank, suggested the export of 'dirty industries' to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and argued that parts of Africa were 'under-populated' and 'vastly under-polluted' (Vallette, 1999).

Other than disdain, imperial powers assume they are right in doing anything including changing governments because they have might and technology on their side (Chan, 2005, p. 21). The United States, Edward N. Luttwak argued, can take action because "it does have widespread responsibilities that call for appropriate military means" (Luttwak, 1996, p. 43). Being big, it does not need a solid reason for taking military action against small countries that fail to adhere to America's agenda.

When big powers want regime change, they engage in extreme operations ranging from pushing the doctrine of legitimating insurgency in order to delegitimize legitimate governments. They propel internal debates to render states fragile and thereby affect internal political and economic well-being (Ikpe, 2007, p. 86). The effect is to downsize states, make them ineffective in delivering services (Rivero, 2001, p. 55), and then emphasize the failure of states to provide those services. In turn, this justifies calling for privatization of services within the state and subject countries to racist impatience that justifies the return of "imperial over lordship" (Darby, 2006, p. 46). This makes the rulers in a state lose legitimacy in the eyes of citizens whose sense of loyalty then shifts to

new centers (Munene, 2001, p. 49, p. 54, p. 94). And the call for privatization made in the name of globalization, seemingly aimed at destroying the state's ability to provide services to ordinary people (Shivji, 2000, p. 25).

Security and commercial angles add to the cluster's strategic value. Much of the world trade between Asia and Europe passes through the Red Sea and the volume increases every year. Countries in the Middle East that seek to diversify their economies from reliance on oil and gas increasingly turn to the Horn of African states as possible outlets for agricultural ventures. The African side of the Red Sea thereafter seems like an extended launching pad for the interests of others. Among those interested in the Red Sea are rival teams of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on one side, and the Turkish Neo-Ottomans and Qatar on the other. Various countries try to make their cases against each other in the region in order to settle new and old disputes.

They also borrow tactics from each other on how to deal with Africans, among them being the holding of "summits" for African leaders to promise aid. In giving aid, they turn African countries into aid addicts, easy for aid peddlers to manipulate (Munene, 2007, p. 181). Holding summits for Africans started with Japan and the others followed. India, the United States, France, Britain, Turkey, and Russia have all held summits for African states to increase global political leverage and to access resources and markets. China, having decided to boost its sea power as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is the most successful. Besides developing large sea commerce, China projects power through port constructions that give it entry to many strategic places in Asia, Europe, and Africa (Odea, 2019). At the Horn, it is in Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya.

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on the personality of the leadership, has to take into account or attempt to balance three determining factors; domestic challenges, regional interests, and pressures from *aid* donors or extra-continental powers. The most important factor is the leader's ability to handle domestic challenges as they relate to the interests of aspiring political rivals to power, institutional competence, socio-economic wellbeing, and the ability of citizens to express themselves freely.

Country Focus

Djibouti

Djibouti, a former French colony located at the actual meeting point between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, is virtually a global colony. It has a small mixed population of one million people, mostly of Somali, Afar, and Arab lineage. Currently the only rail outlet for Ethiopia, it accommodates more foreign bases in its tiny size than any other country in the world. These include the United States, France, China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Italy. With over 10% of world trade passing through Djibouti, it is strategic to many power players.

Djibouti, open to all sorts of pressure relating to the interests of external forces, is comparatively stable. It balances the political personal interests of its rulers within Djibouti, the regional interests within the IGAD, and the competing extra-continental forces. It has a protective treaty with France, mainly against Ethiopia and Somalia, which accounts for its relative stability. Its governance, since independence in 1977, is a family affair which makes it both vulnerable to external pressure and also adept at manipulating the international environment. The current president, Ismael Omar Guelleh, for instance is nephew to the first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who ruled for 22 years. Guelleh, a candidate for April 2022 election, has already out-ruled his uncle in terms of longevity in power and has ensured opposition silence and ineffectiveness (DW, 2021; Lanfranchi, 2021).

There are, however, limits to what Djibouti and its rulers can do and big power competition is an issue which at

times forces it to change positions. When the Russians wanted to have a base in Djibouti, for instance, the United States vetoed the idea. It did, however, allow China to build its large military base to protect its large trade in Africa thereby raising Sino-US competition notches high. Occasionally, there are confrontations between US and Chinese soldiers (DW, 2021; Gebremichael, 2019; Lanfranchi, 2021). Similarly, in the campaign for the African slot in the United Nations Security Council. UNSC, Djibouti flip flopped on accepting AU's choice of Kenya, mainly due to external pressure.

Eritrea

Next to Djibouti on the African side of the Red Sea is Eritrea with 4 million people that are mostly of Tigray and Afar lineage that are also found in Ethiopia and Djibouti. Its colonial identity is Italian and had to fight to free itself from Ethiopian control. Separated from Ethiopia through a 1993 referendum, its other neighbor besides Djibouti and Ethiopia is Sudan. Isaiiah Afwerki runs the country with a strong hand. He attracts external geopolitical interests and tries to make Eritrea assert itself beyond its size in three layered ways (de Waal, 2021; Hagos, 2021; Ahmed, 2020). These are domestic, regional, and global.

At the domestic level, Afwerki cultivated the messiah imagery of having liberated Eritrea from Ethiopia which then makes him unquestionable. He runs the country as if it is personal property although political opponents have unsuccessfully tried coups. The failed coup attempts just strengthen his hold, imposing forced labor which the UN called 'tantamount to slavery'. This generated a lot of Eritrean refugees, many of them trying to go to the Western countries. He craftily ignores sanctions and cleverly tries to cover domestic problems by engaging in regional/IGAD trouble making.

Afwerki's Eritrea knows how to create regional troubles for IGAD to deal with. It funded the al Shabab terror group to cause havoc in the region which made it a pariah state. It in the process picked up quarrels with other IGAD members. It went to war with Ethiopia over currency differences, presented as a border conflict, to

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force Ethiopia to accept its terms. Eritrea has tried to rehabilitate its pariah image in three ways. First was by ending hostility with Ethiopia led by Abiy Ahmed in 2018 and succeeded in getting the UN to lift sanctions. Second, Afwerki is an example to leaders of Ethiopia, Abiy, and Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, on how to centralize power and undercut potential political challengers. Abiy and Farmajo have tried to centralize power by undermining federalist structures in their respective countries. Third, Afwerki managed to bring together Ethiopia's Abiy and Farmajo in what seemed like a short-lived anti-Kenya alliance labelled Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) (Muller, 2021; Ahmed, 2020).

In search of recognition as a regional power man, Afwerki played diplomat between Ethiopia and Sudan to reduce tensions between the two neighbors. He also entered the Ethiopian conflict in Tigray to help Abiy's declining military fortunes. Initially, his troops fought as Eritreans then under intense world pressure, they simply changed badges and continued fighting as Ethiopian troops in a war that might end up splitting Tigray into three with Eritrea probably taking part of fragmented Tigray.

While playing regional power man, Afwerki tries to play hardball politics with extra-continental powers to concede to his wishes. He ignored accusations of human rights abuses and demands by Western powers that Eritrean troops leave Tigray. Since helping Abiy to withstand the Tigray challenge enabled Afwerki to advance Eritrean interests in Ethiopia, he would not pay attention to the demands. His adamancy and oppressive rule makes Eritrea generate refugees escaping to Europe and forces the European Union to pay attention. As a result, the EU tones down human rights rhetoric and funds development projects to discourage Eritreans from fleeing to Europe.

Sudan

In terms of territory, Sudan is a big country with the River Nile running through it northwards to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. One of the African countries that experienced multiple colonialism, under the British and the Egyptians, and has shrunk in territorial size, it is geopolitically caught between Egypt and Ethiopia. It has had volatile leadership that fluctuates between religious zealotry and military muscle flexing. From 1989 to April 2019, Sudan had one strong ruler in General Omar al Bashir whose tactics in Darfur earned him a UN-inspired ICC indictment. He had also harbored terror mastermind

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Osama bin Laden, which put Sudan on the US list of countries supporting terrorism. After persistent street protests, Bashir's own soldiers deposed him and created a leadership vacuum in Khartoum.

Before the coup, Bashir appeared to pursue a rehabilitation agenda and to balance engagements with local and extra-continental forces. Sudan's relations with Egypt proved difficult partly because President Al-Sisi's expectations did not tally with those of Bashir's regional hopes. They disagreed on the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood and the civil war in Libya. In Libya, Darfur rebels worked closely with Cairo supporting General Khalifa Hafta. He closed the border with Eritrea following stories of Egyptian troops in Eritrea. To counter Egypt, Bashir also befriended Turkey by allowing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to restore and use Suakin Island port on the Red Sea (Ahmed, 2021; Taylor, 2018; Kasmatis, 2021).

He tried balancing acts with big powers. Under pressure from US President Donald Trump, Bashir started the process of normalizing relations with Israel. He also turned to Russia, while visiting Moscow in 2017, for security help on food, military modernization, and for internal security assistance to control uprisings. In return, he offered Russia a base in the Red Sea. His balancing act, however, did not save him from uprisings and eventual ouster in April 2019 by his own military.

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Council with General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan as chairman and Commander in Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces. Pressure forced the military to accommodate civilians in the person of Abdallah Hamdok as prime minister but the relations turned out to be one of tension and acrimony since the two are competing and do not have a common vision. Civilian Prime Minister Hamdok, with little stamina, was ousted, restored, and then resigned. And the Sudanese Professional Association and 'neighborhood resistance committees' continued to intensify pressure to reduce military rule.

In the midst of chaos, Sudan still had to respond to regional and the world challenges. General Al-Burhan complained of foreign diplomats "making porridge which burned me" to enable them to interfere with the running of the country. There were initial mixed reactions when Burhan dissolved the transitional government, as each power weighed its geo-strategic interests. Egypt, with its eyes on Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam reportedly tried to influence events in Sudan and to isolate Ethiopia where a civil war had broken out in Tigray, sending refugees to Sudan. Unlike Egypt in the north, however, Sudan does not consider Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam, a big threat to its interests. Since the dam has potential benefits in terms of flood control and irrigation, Sudan no longer opposes the dam and is seemingly intent on escaping the clutches of Egyptian influence.

Ethiopia

The one country that Egypt is extremely unhappy with mainly because of the use of the Nile waters is Ethiopia. Ethiopia has the second highest population in Africa after Nigeria and boasts of having resisted European colonization in the 19th Century when empire building Menelik II defeated the Italians at Adowa. The Europeans, mainly Britain and Italy, cut Menelik's ambition to extend his empire to the Indian Ocean by colonizing what is currently Somalia. The Europeans, especially Britain,

tended to ignore Ethiopia in calculating imperial moves in Africa. Britain was then in control of the entire Nile Valley from Egypt to Uganda and sought to impose restrictions on the use of the Nile River waters. In 1891, with Italy having colonised Eritrea, Britain and Italy agreed that Italy would not interfere with the flow of the Nile by constructing anything on the Atbara River (the Black Nile) that flows northward to the Nile in Sudan. Then in a 1902 border treaty between Ethiopia and British Sudan, Ethiopia agreed not to interfere with the flow of Blue Nile waters. And in imposing a Nile River Treaty on its colonies in 1929, Britain did not bother to consult independent Ethiopia where the Blue Nile starts (Tekuya, March 2020; Okoth-Owiro, 2004; Ferede and Abebe, 2014, pp.55-67).

Ethiopia's current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed imagines he is a reincarnation of empire building Menelik without Menelik's sense of geopolitical realism. Things have not gone well with him despite engaging French President Emmanuel Macron in trying to develop a 'navy' for landlocked Ethiopia. A beneficiary of Ethiopia's crisis in governance in April 2018 that followed the death of Meles Zenawi, he appeared and talked like a democrat, peace maker, and a man of vision. He ended the feud with Eritrea, for which he received a Nobel Peace Prize, and helped to rehabilitate Afwerki globally. He then seemingly fell under Afwerki's geopolitical spell in two ways. First, like Afwerki, he attempted to centralise power which offended resisting federal states. Thus, as he made peace with Afwerki, he started picking fights with his own federal states such as Oromo, Afar, and Tigray.

Second, his desire to revive the Menelik imperial dream and to have a direct access to the Indian Ocean, as an alternative outlet other than the rail to Djibouti, encouraged him to pick a quarrel with Kenya over Jubbaland in southern Somalia. Until 1925, when the British donated the territory to Italy's Mussolini, Jubbaland was part of colonial Kenya; it is of strategic interest to Kenya's security and commercial interests. In so doing, Abiy linked up with Afwerki in Eritrea and Farmajo in Somalia in the HoAC but the effort failed in that power centralization and attempts to dislodge Kenya from Jubbaland backfired. In the regional election in Jubbaland, Abiy joined Farmajo in rejecting Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe's 2019 electoral victory. Abiy was not sure he could control Madobe and the access to the Indian Ocean.

Abiy's power centralization effort, combined with his dream to be a new Menelik, landed Ethiopia in trouble



A boy walks past an abandoned tank in Mehoni town, Ethiopia, on December 11, 2020. (Photo Credit: AFP)

starting in Tigray that became a civil war. His attempt to use the Grand Renaissance Dam as a nationalistic rallying call in February 2020 did not produce the desired effect as accusations of dictatorial behavior increased with the jailing of political opponents. His image changed from that of a peace maker to that of a war monger as the war displaced roughly two million people and generated many refugees. His reliance on Afwerki Eritrean troops to survive and to quell disturbances in Tigray and Oromo eroded his claims to being in charge and attracted negative attention that made him regionally ineffective. He sidelined his own Menelik dream.

Somalia

In the Horn cluster, Somalia leads in being a proxy for extra-continental forces. With a long coastline along the Indian Ocean, it is of strategic interests to many powers. A country that suffers multiple colonial identities of both Britain and Italy, it initially unsuccessfully tried to suppress internal differences by adopting an irredentist Pan-Somali ideology that advanced the idea of state elasticity which threatened the survival of other new states who then argued for the doctrine of in-contractibility of states. The failure of that ideology, the Greater Somalia dream, led to the fragmentation of the country. With no ideology to hold them together, competing identities based on different colonial experiences emerged and deteriorated into a civil war that fragmented the state (Munene, 2010). During the Cold War, Somalia tended to fluctuate

between Moscow and Washington. In excitement at a seeming victory of weaning Mogadishu from Moscow's embrace, Washington blundered into supporting Siad Barre's irredentist invasion of Ogaden presumably because Addis Ababa claimed to be Marxist. The support for Barre's extreme adventure in Ogaden was one of US President Jimmy Carter's short sighted follies. As a result the failure in Ogaden, Somalia disintegrated after the 1991 ouster of President Mohammed Siad Barre (Zewde, 2006: 21-22). Many Somali elites, led by dethroned Barre, fled the country, and created a power vacuum that made Somalia vulnerable and attractive to external interests.

These included powerful countries and terror groups such as the Al Shabaab who derived their inspiration from Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda which had turned its wrath on the United States and its allies in his 1996 "Declaration of War" on what he called the "Crusader-Zionist Alliance" (Armstrong, 2014: 345-347). Some elite escaped to Western countries where they became 'citizens', and were sent back to Somalia as 'aid' workers, nation builders, and proxies for powerful extra-continental forces that destabilize the region.

As a fragmented entity, Somalia is under external pressure to play proxy. Federal Republic of Somalia, FRS, President Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed alias Farmajo, for instance, has to rely on Turkish private security rather than Somali ones. Turkey has the largest

embassy building in the world as well as a large military base to protect Somalia but this does not deter the Al Shabaab from repeatedly attacking Mogadishu. Russia sells arms to Somalia and China supports Somalia on the question of autonomous Somaliland which it equates to Taiwan.

Coming to office in February 2017, Farmajo appeared to need Afwerki's guidance in centralising power and undermining regional autonomies. The effort has not worked in that his government is seemingly isolated in Mogadishu. Along with Abiy, Farmajo, refused to accept Ahmed Mohamed Islam 2019 Madobe's electoral victory in Jubbaland and although he seemingly organised new election in which Madobe lost, his hold on Jubbaland is limited.

As a proxy, Western countries pushed Somalia to adopt maritime irredentism. Having failed in its land irredentism in the 1960s and 1970s, Somalia turned its irredentist proclivities to the sea, as egged on by imperial powers to target the wealth at the Kenyan coast (Munene, 2019; Bichache, 2019). Somalia, as proxy, took Kenya to a political court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

which had a Somali national as presiding judge. The cabinet in the Somali government comprised citizens of such Western powers as the United States, Norway, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, and Netherlands; the deck was stacked against Kenya right from the beginning (Goldsman, 2019). The former Somali Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Khaire is a Norwegian citizen who had worked for such British and Norwegian interests as Soma Oil Company and Norwegian Refugee Council. Foreign Minister Yusuf Garaad Omar is British and former BBC employee (Sheikh, 2017). Canada's share of Somali ministers was at least six, on top of MPs and Senators. This reality made the validity of the ICJ opinions questionable and ignorable (Munene, 2019). The ICJ opinion in 2021 purported to create a sea boundary that favored the Europeans, through Somalia.

Somalia, fragmented and caught between external power rivalries, attracts intervention. Not able to protect itself on land or the sea, it is vulnerable to manipulation to serve external interests that include being proxy to maritime irredentist aggression. Kenya is a victim of concerted Western aggression using Somalia as the proxy.



An army soldier takes a position in Mogadishu, Somalia following an attack by al Shabab on a European Union armoured convoy on October 1, 2018. (Photo Credit: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

Kenya

The country most affected by instability in Somalia is Kenya. It has strategic value to other countries in and out of Africa and has to contend with its geopolitical realities that put it at the top of calculations by other countries. To its immediate neighbors in Eastern Africa, it is the region's economic engine and also the gateway to the sea for the landlocked African states. To Asian power houses such as China, Japan, and India Kenya is the entry point to the resources of the region. Besides, being located on the Equator, it has satellite value which explains the satellite station, San Marcos, near Malindi which tracks global weather patterns. It is also the financial and communication hub of Eastern Africa, hosts the only UN agency outside North America and Western Europe, and has some of the largest embassies in Africa.

Aware of its strategic position to other countries, Kenya tries to balance assorted interests that involve the region and extra-continental forces. Within the region, it hosts refugees and plays a stabilizer role and worries about instability in Somalia, in Ethiopia, in Sudan, and in South Sudan. It, in 2011, led an incursion into Kismayu initially to flush out al Shabab and later to become part of the AMISON peacekeeping mission. It has, as commented by CDF Robert Kibochi, 10,000 troops in active operations, 5,000 in Somalia and 5,000 others in other security zones in Kenya (Wambui, 2021). It differed with Ethiopia over Jubbaland and was concerned with the evolving Ethiopian civil war centering on Tigray.

Kenya often collides with Western powers, acting as the *master states*, mostly over perceptions of interests. Some powers believe they have the natural right to hurl insults and that, more than Kenyans, they know best what is best for Kenyans (Warigi, 2005). It refused to support the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq (Bosire, 2003) to exempt Americans from criminal prosecution, and to pass an anti-terrorist bill even if Kenyans did not like it (Editorial, 2003; Kinyanjui, 2003; Kelley, 2003). In the process, the wrath of the *master states* on Mwai Kibaki's government became open (Munene, 2005, p. 120). The ambassador of the United States, for instance, enjoyed inciting people to violate laws by declaring, "I am very happy that ... I am violating the ban because I do not agree with it" (Bartoo, January 2008). That ambassador, wrote Makumi Mwangiru, "broke the rules of diplomacy by violating a rule of law in the receiving state, and doing so deliberately" (Mwangiru, 2008, p. 79).

In acting independently on global matters, Kenya tried to find its niche in the evolving global realignment but then collided with powerful global interests. It became a global activist as it tried to espouse a Pan-Africanist agenda as a way of warding off hostile extra-continental forces. It contributes immensely to the UN peacekeeping ventures. It managed to win a UNSC two year rotating seat to advance its and African interests. It stayed in good books with the competing powers of the United States, starting direct flights from Nairobi to New York, and with China which dominates the infrastructure and housing industry. Kenya, with the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) project, is part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Horn of Africa is a unique cluster of conflict in Africa. It acquired geopolitical prominence after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 that linked the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea thereby shortening the travel distance from Europe to Asia. Competing European powers then acquired territories on the Red Sea. Britain acquired Egypt and Sudan, Italy grabbed Eritrea, and France took Djibouti. The dominant imperial force, however, was Britain with its obsession to control everything about the Nile waters. The region also suffers layers of divisions that are internal to each member state, among the states in the cluster, and in confronting global challenges. These layers complicate the cluster's ability to unite and confront regional and global threats. Subsequently, internal and external forces determine its geopolitical fortunes; not always to the best interests of the cluster.

The cluster is vulnerable to external forces and does not control its own fate in part because it is of strategic value to competing external forces. It was subjected to European territorial colonialism which created colonial entities that became independent countries with strong reliance on external players. Colonialism created new identities mostly based on British, Italian, or French imperial thinking which also limited Ethiopia's territories and sense of being. Ethiopia ended up as a pod in imperial power play.

On becoming independent, the countries responded to geopolitical dynamics differently. There were those with irredentist desires and others were protective of the inherited colonial state territories. Tiny Djibouti, run as a family affair, is a virtual global colony because of

its strategic location linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It willingly accommodates many external powers by permitting them to have military bases on its soil. In the case of Somalia, the grandiose Greater Somalia dream served as a glue or cement to hold together people with serious colonial identity differences; it camouflaged the differences. When the glue melted, Somalia fragmented into various colonial entities, and evolved into a terrorist arena and a proxy state for extra-continental players. Eritrea, on becoming independent from Ethiopia started as a pariah state by picking up quarrels with neighbours and supporting the al Shabab terror group but then evolved to be a regional influencer in Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia, in the last two years, has blundered itself into a civil war to become a refugee generator.

In all of the countries, the personality of the leaders affected the responses in which they tried to balance three types of challenges. These were domestic, regional, and extra-continental. It was the leader's ability to handle and balance domestic challenges that affected

his handling of the cluster and global issues. While some show far sightedness, others allow themselves to be proxies of external forces. The proxy propensity ensures that countries end up quarrelling rather than adopting a common stand on possible threats that are externally driven. The inability of the Horn of Africa cluster to adopt common positions on any global issue, therefore, reduces its ability to determine the fate of its geopolitical interests.

This article recommends that the Horn of Africa should collectively reassess its geopolitical value to itself and to the world. There is also a need to address the conflict between perceived 'national interests' and 'cluster interests' so as to create common approaches in responding to extra-continental challenges. Leaders in the cluster need to separate their personal political survival from the welfare of the country and stop changing constitutions to suit their particular whims. The tendency for some leaders to equate their personal interests with national interests fosters instability within each country.

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Deepening Governance as an Option for Somalia's Stability

By Patrick Kasyula, Ph.D.

Abstract

The Federal Republic of Somalia has been politically unstable in terms of its administrative, legislative and judicial institutions, with little prospect of reconstruction. While there have been efforts to strengthen these institutions, perpetual conflict and weak transitional governments have stifled the processes. This article provides alternative ideas in approaching the 'dawn' of Somalia – deepening its governance systems. The article explores the need for the country to abandon its fixation on external interventions and plough through local ideas, capacities, options and structures by utilizing available options at home. This is mostly about mobilizing the local citizens, local warring groups, clans and the leadership to build the internal trust of the political processes and structures to engender political legitimacy. It is this trust that would create the foundation for the establishment of governance that in turn would midwife the much-desired stability in Somalia.

Introduction

Governance encompasses the process of decision making and the methodology of implementing these decisions. It engenders participation, consensus, accountability, transparency, responsiveness effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive processes grounded in the rule of law (Hendricks, 2009). Governance encompasses the states leadership ability to explore its political, legal and administrative power and function by operationalizing them in various alternatives of methodologies, processes, and structural layers to guarantee access of goods and services alongside affording the owners of the sovereign an opportunity, space and framework to make contributions to the way they are governed, the people who govern them and how to make choices on who governs them (World Bank, 1994; United Nations Development Programme, 1997).

Governance is mostly a phenomenal concept associated with reforms in the public sector, where private sector ethos and processes were replicated in public entities in an effort to engender efficiency. This transfer of private-sector ideas and techniques to the public sector, and especially the modes of management and low cost of production for maximum efficiency has affected the conceptualization of governance to be a reserve of private firms in most of its applications. The concept of governance has thus been the domain of public administration and government. Managerialism is what began as an effort to do things

differently in the public sector, and it reflected a phase in which management had become a central concept that dominated change (Pollitt, 2013; Common, 1998). The managerialism was closely replaced by a phase referred to as New Public Management, in which market forces, privatization and public sector partnerships were the key themes (Radin & Romzek, 1996). This phase handed over its philosophy to the integrated governance phase, in the 2000's. This phase is characterized by performance-based management to demonstrate results. Its impact on public sector service delivery remains its drive for a responsive government, which seeks to respond to the aspirations of the citizens. Service delivery and implementation of performance targets of deliverables is the hallmark of governance.

Governance has a traditional view which conceptualizes it in terms of a governing process linked to the official hierarchy of government. Governance also has a society-centric conceptualization that perceives governance on its network web of public and private interactions (Rhodes, 1997). Osborne (2006) posits governance as:

Plural state, where multiple inter-dependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services and a pluralistic state where multiple processes inform the policy making system. As a consequence of these two forms of plurality, its focus is very much upon inter-organizational relationships and the



A voter casts his ballot on November 16, 2016, in Baidoa, southern Somalia. (Photo Credit: Simon Maina/AFP)

governance of processes, and it stresses service effectiveness and outcomes.

Governance and the Somalia situation

Literature has placed the Republic of Somalia as a state whose state of affairs are below the expectations of a nation-state. This article holds that just like a firm undergoing a structural challenge, Somalia can overcome its challenge if there is a political will to push the country from its current political abyss. Governance is being proposed as a methodology of returning the country on track and managing the relationships of all actors involved. Somalia has lacked a strong central government and the legitimacy of the central government has been mostly held in shreds by the federal states. Clearly, any move by the central government to sleep on the job in its legitimacy will pave way for the country to further disintegrate into sub-states as they already seem too resolved to stand on their own and hold their destiny in their own hands.

In tracing the governance turbulence facing Somalia to the collapse of Mohammed Siad Barre leadership, it is not much about the collapse of the state than the seeds that had been planted by the harsh and repressive regime of the leader that bred so much fear and resentment to the

central government of Somalia. The regime was at best hinged on divide and rule antics that pitted clans against each other. Just like the colonial Africa scenario, upon the collapse of the colonial powerhouse, societies had to overwork their structures to regain their nationhood. This is at best reflected by Kenya's independence efforts to consolidate and unite the country with little success as vested interests saw the country adopt a *majimbo* constitution that continued to sustain regional rather than national interests. Two major parties emerged to pull the country to different national themes that almost cost Kenya timely independence. The post-Barre governance in Somalia was faced with a reality of clan animosity that could not engender peaceful coexistence of various clans together, let alone formation of a united federal state to manage Somalia.

Rawson (1993) traces the fountains of weak governance in Somalia to the foreign aid tapped from the cold war spoils that fueled a huge but unsustainable civil service in Somalia that could not focus on strengthening institutions that could form a firm foundation of a Somalia state. Instead, the bureaucrats thrived on patronage dividends that were short-lived. When the external funding withered in 1988, the national government was left dry and holding on strands of the former self. With the national purse

owned and maintained by foreign aid, Somalia had not assembled local sustainable revenue streams and any discourse that sought to salvage Somalia for the Somali people was doomed as it could not get funding from neutral external actors. State failure has mostly been conceptualized as an absence of government, but in Somalia, it had begun while before the actual absence of the government leadership strata as it cannot be denied of state failure where an existing state leadership fails to raise to the primary duty of providing the basic functions associated with statehood and still claim the legitimacy of stability.

Laitin (1979) contends that with that state of public financing model that was founded on external donations, Somalia technically became 'a ward of the international aid community'. As such, the central government became a pad for the acquisition of external funds and locally, the funds were employed to exploit and suppress the civil society, the Somali people by the ruling class. The funds were diverted from national coordination, development and security of the Somali state and redirected to the self-interests of the bureaucrats who had intense international links and networks that were at the call of international interests in Somalia. When governance structures are weak due to the absence of citizen participation in their affairs, external interference takes a toll on all institutions and instruments of governance.

Poor management of state affairs in Somalia led to massive deaths due to famine and starvation, exacerbated by the warfare state of the country. This scenario was closely followed by the secession outcomes in Somaliland. Governance scholars have, however, held that this state of affairs was mostly rooted in war crimes and deep-rooted inter-clan grievances that dominated the period between 1988 and 1992. The clan wars were fueled by stolen economic variables, unresolved boundary

“The post-Barre governance in Somalia was faced with a reality of clan animosity that could not engender peaceful coexistence of various clans together, let alone formation of a united federal state to manage Somalia

disputes and the rise of warlords and other merchants of impunity. Soon, Somalia become a source of flights of refugees out of the country. The 1992 intervention by the United States sought to secure some safe haven for the preservation of humanitarian action in Somalia. The duty to revamp Somalia's national governance was taken over by a multinational peace enforcement operation – United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) which was anticipated to pave way for peace enforcement and national building in Somalia. Unfortunately, these externally driven efforts did not yield much as they gave in to armed conflict which was mostly orchestrated by Farah Aideed. It is this conflict that will permanently puncture the assembled momentum to reclaim peace and stability in Somalia. Herbst and Clarke (1998) argue that the UNOSOM has never made any meaningful progress in establishing state reformation and national reconciliation.

Decentralized governance has been projected to engender development and stability in the management of states. Formal self-governing authorities in Somalia have saved the country from total collapse. Two sub-national entities in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland have excelled in representing the dividends that decentralized systems can offer all over the world. Bay, Benadir and Bakool regions have struggled to reflect a semblance of stable governance but caught up in the governance mist that the central government has found itself in. mobilization of the state towards nationhood has been hampered by clannism and the seeds of discord sowed by the collapsed regime of Somalia in 1991 poisoned the environment for national building. International Crisis Group (2003) report evaluates the role of the decentralized units in Somalia to preserve Somalia peace and stability with a mixed bag of fortunes. The local governance structures are careful to stay away from a central government that is dominated by a clan that seems to front a different lineage from their safety of thoughts and philosophy. This has given leeway to other interests to wade to the local scenario and especially Ethiopia which seemingly thrives in scuttling the accumulated momentum of prosperity in Somalia and marketing the orientation that decentralization of Somalia will balkanize Somalia. The clan wars, therefore, need redress and guarantee Somalia's fairness and equity of land, political power and regional sovereignty in a method that does not compromise national security, integrity and legitimacy.

This article considers strong governance structures that regulate the federal states and harmonize their regional

aspirations and nationalism towards constructing sub-national themes that cushion the federal states from degenerating into armed conflict and ethnic cleansing. Instead, local citizens must be integrated into the decision-making arc and their input and contributions accorded much attention and space in the decision-making process. This comes with several dividends of channelling the scarce resources to those programs that citizens have direct control, influence and participation in Somalia. It must be recalled that the financial public administration in Somalia has not given much thought to allocating funds sourced from external funding to the municipalities, where locals have more ownership of the budgeting process.

It is certain that governance of Somalia is viable and especially if grounded in the existing council of elders forums which are dominated by alliances of clan leaders from different regions and lineages, as well as other professionals. This is not far-fetched considering how locals embraced the sharia law courts. The success of the sharia law has several lessons to offer for the preferred governance spirit and philosophy to the federal republic of Somalia. The hybrid judicial process could form a strong foundation of reclaiming governance structures in Somalia and offer the country an array of hope for a better and secure Somalia. Kaplan (1994) reflects on the emerging commercial city states and villages separated by pastoral statelessness, giving hope that this can still be remedied by reigning on the pastoral entities that seem ungoverned by the existing state control.

This article holds that what Somalia needs most is consolidating state management of security by offering the Somali citizens a semblance of rule of law and a responsive governance model to the actual needs and aspirations of the Somali people. This will be a departure from the long-held theory that the current state is inspired to be a tool of accumulation and dominance of the ruling elites who exploit the low in the economic ladder in Somalia.

Somalia in Retrospect

Present-day Somalia is an amalgamation of British Somaliland and the former Italian Somaliland, which occurred in the euphoria of independence in 1961. The period between 1960 and 1961 gave Somalia a constitution, which was founded on a parliamentary model of governance. The military takeover in 1969 by Major General Mohammed Siad Barre overthrew the

constitution, with the countries institutions becoming invalid. This situation was sustained until the 1979 new constitution was adopted. The new system anchored governance on a presidential system, which was adversely characterized by growing clan-based internal conflict and consequently led to the internal rebellion that saw Barre overthrown in 1991. The nation fell under the inexperienced hands of clan centred governance structures, with divergent nationalistic priorities and herein laid the end of Somalia nationhood. This was closely followed by the North West region which was previously under the colonial administration of Britain cessation to form the Republic of Somaliland. Puntland followed suit and also declared itself an autonomous state.

Efforts by the international community to return peace and stability in Somalia intensified with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) taking the lead. Pressure for returning Somalia on its governance tenets was made under the regional body which comprised member states such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

The IGAD initiative sought to activate Somalia's institutions of governance through seeking a constitutional order in the federal state. The 2000 initiative of a Transitional National Charter (TNC) was such an output of the regional peace and stability efforts which was a culmination of the Arta Peace Conference. It is noted that the charter espoused a devolved model of governance with regional autonomy as the hallmark. The charter spelt out a Transitional National Government with a power allocation strategy. The governance sharing strategy gave the four dominant clans of Darood, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanwein/Digil-Mirifle a fairly distributive representation, as well as a mild consideration of the other minority. It is in this charter that formal recognition of autonomous states was done.

A new constitution was midwived by Kenya in 2004, the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) established a federal system for Somalia and gave birth to a Transnational Federal Parliament and a Transnational Federal Government. Notably, the Somali Constitutional Commission Act espoused the principles of Islam, democracy and social justice and a commitment to establish a governance system in the republic that promotes public participation, transparency and accountability to the people, accommodates the diversity

The federal republic of Somalia has had weak central government institutions, which would otherwise not have held the republic together were it not for some of the stable regional states within it.

of Somalis and their opinions and promotes stability, peace and reconstruction. After a long struggle, the new constitution dawned in 2012 and outlined a National Constituent Assembly of 825 members that incorporated all groupings in Somalia.

The Federal Republic of Somalia has not had the likeness of functional institutions of governance since 1991, with elusive and shaky political structures, not founded on what conventionally can be referred to as stable and consistent state processes. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992-1995 made a very promising statement of mobilizing international actors towards a viable peace code that could hold the country together, without much dividends of peace and stability in the country. The long-held conferences were not matching the domestic expectations and yardstick of the various actors and as such, the efforts remained alien to the Somali nationals. Governance has always focused on the participation of all actors in a political process in order to facilitate an all-encompassing approach and methodology of handling national political and developmental processes.

Somalia has sustained the record of being the host of the most externally established governance institutions in the world, with their state structures most externally funded, inspired and motivated. The executive and legislature in Somalia have been philosophically and externally imposed institutions, which should otherwise be inspired and motivated by the needs, aspirations and dreams of the Somalia nationals. The federal republic of Somalia has had weak central government institutions, which would otherwise not have held the republic together were it not for some of the stable regional states within it. The October 2004 fruition of a two-year held negotiations had built up immense faith and hope that Somalia would be reclaimed. The resultant agreement on a Transnational Federal Government (TFG) has neither propelled the state to the much-needed graph tangent of a stable self-governing Somalia. The time taken for the government structures to move from Kenya to Somalia

betrays the tenacity of Somalia to be on its feet soon, with local solutions for local problems, the fulcrum of governance as an alternative management philosophy of this fragile state.

Serious internal rifts in Somalia have destabilized all projected indicators of progress, with many internal actors dissenting on the agenda of striving Somalia towards peace, security and prosperity. The greatest among all has been the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts. It has become an area of focus on whether Somalia problems emanate from the Somalia actors or on the external actors mobilizing the peace efforts in the country and this article seeks to point a finger at the absence of governance as a process towards peace and security in Somalia. This article seeks to reconcile the emerging of fairly organized informal structures in Somalia, which ought to be mobilized by the central government to assist in the search for the sought security of the region. The inability of the informal systems to accord legitimacy to the central government suggests some tangible gap in the political processes in Somalia. It has been assumed that the existence of these informal groupings in the adaptation, security and management of Somalia affairs has been orchestrated by the desire or intent of the said groups to dominate Somalia affairs, yet the actual motivation has been the sustained absence of central government in the lives and processes of the Somalia nationals (Menkhaus, 2007).

The Somalia Governance Prospects

Governance in Somalia must be conceptualized within the context that Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004) argue as a strategy for local citizens and legitimate political actors in the state have been deliberately cut off from effective state authority due to possible private enterprises interests or major disagreements to marginal territories or even due to a war that has some advanced protrusion. This has resulted in an environment that provides for private groupings and entities to accord themselves the reserved functions of the state, and in particular, monopolizing the instruments of security. It,

therefore, becomes of critical focus for scholars to seek to recast their orientations to the Somalia experience, where peace and security have been elusive concepts, despite the available resources, power and legitimacy to bank them in. Governance and security scholars have responded to this situation in Somalia with the assertions that they expected the locals to do better than they have; if at all they were keen and resolute about security and stability in their country, a matter that needs to be appropriately analyzed vide the governance lenses rather than mere rationality determination. Menkhaus (2007) has put this bluntly and observed that it must not be lost to anyone that locals are never passive whenever confronted by situations of statelessness and absence of security as they innovate various ways to mitigate the resultant risks therein and enhance predictivity of their unforgiving socioeconomic and political layouts.

Stedman (1997) has underscored this probable scenario in the Somalia governance gap by looping in the factor of private interests in protracted crises, the type that defines Somalia. He introduces the concept of spoilers who undermine the progress of any meaningful political

and security breakthrough, and in this case, what can be shelved as successful implementation of peace accords in Somalia.

This article obliges to cite active participants in the peace process in Somalia and calls on vetting and scrutiny of various business people who seem more focused on a safe, predictable business environment that does not threaten their business empires and the business interest regimes that afford them their profits, prosperity and fame in Somalia. Whereas justification for their fears emanates from their experiences of previous states repressive and predatory tendencies of governance, a balance must be struck to bring forth a possible equilibrium of governance that benefits all actors in Somalia, business people included. Included in this point of analysis is the need to reconsider the governance spectrum represented by the Somali Islamists and purpose to analyse why their sustained control of the south-central parts of Somalia and make a deliberate move to give chance to local conceptualizations of the governance structures that we are currently doing in the present phenomenon analysis of peace and stability in Somalia.



Somalia's Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble attends the Somali election negotiation in Mogadishu, Somalia May 27, 2021. His suspension by President Farmaajo over corruption claims in late 2021 has deepened the political and electoral crises in Somalia (Photo Credit: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

Governance does not prescribe the artefacts of governing tools and methods of dismantling regional and municipal authorities in Somalia, neither does governance deepen by suffocating and strangling civil society or even substituting customary law with sharia law

It is obvious that the otherwise emerging powerhouse of the Islamic nation within Somalia threatens the adherents of secularly oriented governance structures, as well as those rooted in the traditional shreds of governance modules. It however must be appreciated that the Islamic adherents in Somalia are well intended in their position to oppose the proliferation of local groupings and mobilizations that continue to engender loose governance elements that do not contribute to a strong centre at the national level.

Governance does not prescribe the artefacts of governing tools and methods of dismantling regional and municipal authorities in Somalia, neither does governance deepen by suffocating and strangling civil society or even substituting customary law with sharia law. It must be appreciated that the governance module that engenders prosperity in Somalia must characterize established security patrol structures that report to the central government and supervise all regional security efforts to nationalize security and peace as a top priority of the central government. In the same breath, efforts must be internalized to bring the supreme council of Islamic courts to the table to negotiate for a governance partnership that projects a workable and implementable security governance model.

The next focus that must be addressed is the governance architecture that has dominated the political persuasions in Somalia. The type and nature of crafted governance infrastructure have resulted in a sustained malfunction of the Somalia state. All the proposals in the past have been incognizant of the hot potato that territorial occupation has become in southern Somalia. This is where administration and governance construct a divergence. It is no longer about what external actors and the central government brokers consider moral or legitimate, but it

must as of essence put into strong consideration what the owners of the sovereign in the south desire and aspire. Governance lies unparalleled emphasis on local citizens and group's involvement in decision making, rather than some entities in Somalia having perceived resoluteness to talk for and on behalf of the gods of Somalia nation. It behoves all actors in the peace accords in Somalia to consider injecting the missing link of consultative leadership that touches the deeper nerves of functional leadership among communities.

It follows that local governance structures in Somalia have achieved great dividends in the management of their subnational entities and that the national government must be ready to settle for a lesser control since much has been well articulated in the sub-national entities governance visions and agenda. The central government must identify the unoccupied space in the Somalia governance matrix and fill it as a national focus rather than considering micromanaging the sub-national entities. This goes without saying to the phenomenal public financing processes that are being contested in unison by the sub-national entities. Relying on external funding is no longer fashionable. It must be desired by the central government of Somalia to establish an environment of sustainable national revenue with public participation and involvement as a central bolt. Claims have been attached to the external funding of mismanagement and unaccountability of external funds. It could be argued that financial accountability is much attached to local revenues than to externally funded projects the world over. The attachments that come with external funding seem to induce some levels of comfort zones that breed an absence of desire for domestic prosperity and self-dependency in Somalia.

It must be recalled that the governance tenacity in Somalia intersperse across the federal state and its absence in others can at best be comprehended by the abetted insecurity in Jubaland, Gedo and Kismayu, where al Shabab militia group dominated the region and orchestrated raids, kidnappings and mass killings of neighboring states nationals. The absence of a national governance structure could only deepen the governance crisis as regions could not be effectively coordinated for overall security governance. This scenario must have motivated the Kenyan security leadership to launch 'Operation Linda Nchi' to secure their state from the militia incursions into their territory.

Any state without effective governance encourages its territories to become domains of illicit trade, insecurity, and crime planning hotspots. Kismayu, for instance, was the dungeon of piracy activities, and a hideout for criminals who dominated the Somali Basin. Notably, between Kismayu and Mogadishu, there were small ports under the direct management of the piracy merchants. The ports of Marka, Erlye, and Kismayu were instrumental in sustained crime in the Eastern neighbor of Kenya (Menya, 2021). The effects of piracy in the region saw an increase in ransom-seeking kidnappings and hijackings of sea vessels that had not been experienced before. Further, there was an increase in international crime which was very organized. The slowing down of commerce and marine insurance set in and what followed was a down spill of the economy.

Deepening Governance

Governance has concerned itself with the assemblance of rules and protocols of recruiting political actors, as well as bureaucratic participants by the citizens. Huge dividends are tied to the input that citizens make in this process. The federal republic of Somalia leadership must awake to the reality that potentially, the sum total of the bureaucratic processes, the depth of integrity and accountability indexes of the state structures, applicability and feasibility of the economic regime as determined by the President and his cabinet has a net effect on how the federal-state leadership manage or fail to respond to domestic conflicts in the state. It suffices to say that the conflicts inherent in the federal state can and will by a large extent be determined by the national states actions or its absence.

Gur (1983) links governance to conflict prevalence by injecting the theoretical grounding of a psychological state of relative deprivation. In his postulations, Gur opines that relative deprivation mutates to intergroup conflict. This is a position sustained by Davies (1962). Relative deprivation largely speaks to the citizens' perceptions of the disconnect between their value of expectations and the resultant actual delivery of service by the federal state. It follows that the president and his cabinet should appreciate that various sub nations in the federal state will not keep calm when and if the deviation from the expected gains of nationhood is far below the expectations, the state cannot hold together and conflict is an omnipresent phenomenon. The more the citizens of Somalia feel the federal state is undeforming, the more

emboldened they will grow in rebellion spirit and with time maximize the rebellion into intolerable levels.

Participatory Governance for Prosperity

Bourgon (2007) opine that participatory governance is founded on the feeling of the ideal of democratic citizenship. The federal republic of Somalia must invest in mobilizing all clans towards rebuilding the republic and guaranteeing each of them a sense of ownership of the destiny of their state. This will incorporate a program of sharing all available dividends of statehood equally for all nationals. This must include the available infrastructure funds to all parts of the state, available economic cake among all nationals and allocation of state and political positions across the country without any bias of unscrupulous methodologies that may obnoxiously sustain a sense of alienation of some Somalia nationals from their own country. This will generate collaborative relationships among the Somali nationals and her neighbors outside the borders and induce a sense of shared responsibilities that ushers an environment of information sharing to better improve the civic duty.

Leadership

Leadership to reclaim Somalia must be conceptualized in the spectrum of collaboration, cooperation and collective collegiality to the pursuance of citizen-centred policies. This is more about driving leadership from the Centre and fueling its ideology from the bottom upwards. Shergold (2006) postulates that there is an increasing acceptance by leaders that they need to engage at the lower community levels as well as appreciate that there is an encroaching demand by participatory governance that interactions have to move from consultations to collaborations. It must be reminded of the leadership of Somalia that unless there is commitment by the government leadership to engender effective participation, there is no guarantee that the citizen participation will be impactful in assisting the bureaucratic processes desired to rebuild the federal



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Somali women carry a Somalia national flag at a past national event (Photo Credit: InternationalAffairs.org).

republic of Somalia. Enabling environment for building capacity for the Somali nationals to catch up in assisting in redefining their future must be engendered by the state leadership. Certainly, where there is political will on empowering the citizens, the exercise of public participation will rid of the impediments to effective participation.

Trust and Governance

A trusting relationship shall be the essence of any successful collaboration in Somalia. Trusting relationship is the glue and the lubricant that can engender peaceful national cooperation towards mobilizing lasting governance structures and processes in Somalia. It has been argued that trust is a vague concept but whose dividends are invaluable, and that they vary in context and meaning. The Somalia government must work overdrive to win the trust of its people and that is the only time they shall allow the state to monopolize force as they will have overcome their mental vulnerability, due to their history and experiences (Seldom, 2009; Blind 2006). Trust and governance are intertwined with the engagement of citizens. Good governance and trust are fundamental in leadership to the extent that in its absence, citizens and government pursue different inspirations (Hunt & Smith, 2006).

Power Sharing

Sharing of power is the other process of deepening governance that Somalia must undertake. Sharing of decision making power which is also referred to as decentralization is a critical pillar of deepening governance in Somalia. Historically, there has been a tendency of public leaders to be reluctant to centrifuge power away from the Centre and encourage citizen engagement. Total public participation with stakeholders in resolving national crises and challenges requires of government to cede some formal control over the services that it provides and reduces the direct accountability of government to citizens. The Federal Republic of Somalia has to make a deliberate decision to allow citizens to be the centre of focus for all the programs that shall be funded either locally or externally, in order to walk along with them, rather than walking for them. Unfortunately, it has been evident public service is 'fumbling around with citizen engagement models.

Reconstruction and Governance

Peace, security and reconstruction of Somalia remain a critical pillar of stability and governance in the federal state. Political reconciliation must be prioritized by the federal government to pave way for national development. The political, social, economic and

administrative reconstruction of Somalia needs internal and external support by all stakeholders to give the republic a shot in the arm of its prosperity. Disarmament efforts must also be considered in the most objective methodology affordable for the state. Disarming must be undertaken evenly without the selective amnesia that has been demonstrated by the applicable agencies in the past. It has been experienced that partial disarmament has resulted in the disarmed factions becoming vulnerable to attacks by those yet to surrender their arms. Administratively, it has become fashionable for disarmament to be implemented, but for deepening of governance ideals in Somalia, a scheduled disarmament program must as of necessity embrace all factions and where this is irredeemably impossible, consideration must be done to delay the disarmament process until such a time it can be done comprehensively. This will engender trust and confidence among the locals and intensify local support for the disarmament initiatives.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Rule of law: Somalia has to engender a strong judicial system at the national level that engenders justice to all stakeholders who seek it. Rule of law is not just a good governance indicator but the defining nature of governance in a nation-state. It guarantees that property rights are implemented and secured as well as facilitates the separation of judicial processes from the interference of the executive. Taydas, Peksen, and James (2010) concur that states that uphold rule of law experiences less social conflict. This governance approach is capable of affording Somalia a huge dividend of peace if and when operationalized. This aspect of governance is related to government institutions and how the doctrine of separation of powers is employed in managing state processes, as well as the provision of the institutions to allow citizens to elect representations to the institutions. It is the elected leaders by the citizens who influence lawmaking.

Corruption: Claims of unaccountability and integrity gaps in Somalia are not remote. Integrity is a key indicator of governance and that to deepen governance, this must be addressed. Corruption has a heavy dent on the integrity of governance and that it is a war that can be won. Evidence in literature points great lessons for Somalia on integrity. Corruption has been found to be closely linked to political instability (Le Billon, 2003; Mauro, 1995; Taydas, Peksen and James, 2010). The import of this governance indicator is that it affects allocation of resources and it follows that this vice may sculpt demand for political change. Le Billon (2003) contents that the corruption dividends may induce an award for some obscure or benefactors wishing to risk using violence to seize political power. The sum total of this vice is the reduction of the amount of public coffers available for expenditure, which is diverted and puncture delivery of services and economic growth derivative from the well spend public wealth to expand the economic investment base.

Economic Regime: The Somalia government must revisit their economic blueprints and philosophy and reevaluate the country's public finance management systems to ensure that they are not central to the conflict that has dominated the fragile state. This is because certain economic relations can easily be perceived to be unfair and poison relations among the federal states or various regions and groups within the state. Policies that influence economic prosperity are known to dampen spirits of those quarters who perceive themselves on the losing end of the bargain. This easily fuels discontent that can otherwise be averted by aligning all economic policies to equity and distributive justice. This can be easily related to what Przeworski et al., (2000); Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Gates et al. (2006) asserts on positive economic growth influencing stability of political institutions and narrowing the gap of armed conflict. Literature has vindicated the relationship between economic growth and armed conflict and Somalia has to be wary of this reality.

The Federal Republic of Somalia has to make a deliberate decision to allow citizens to be the centre of focus for all the programs that shall be funded either locally or externally, in order to walk along with them, rather than walking for them

Demilitarizing Politics: Somalia must be alive to the undesirability of having military participation in politics and generate a focus where demilitarization of politics becomes a deliberate target of democratic delivery. The military approach must be mitigated and instead, broaden the networks and incentives for civil society to thrive and independent institutions to become bolder and more in charge of the democratic discourse in Somalia. This must be done as a deliberate governance option for the sake of deepening democracy and stabilizing Somalia. Military leadership has its attributes and generally, it has not fared desirably for economic growth (Wintrobe, 1998; Knutsen, 2011). This is not the only worry for the economic cost of the military as in such a military structured leadership, more funds are spent on military accessories rather than on civil priorities.

Political Exclusion and Repression is yet another key recommendation that Somalia is being asked to watch in its strive to reclaim governance of the state. Any grouping in Somalia that feels excluded from the decision-making process, economic empowerment and political representation are likely to turn against the authority of governance (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Such feeling may arouse a cloud of rebellion or opposition irrespective of the magnitude thereof. Such elements in Somalia will find a haven with networks of emancipation enthusiastic groupings which are not in scarcity in the region and poison the existing democratic gains in the country.

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The Central African Republic Armed Conflict and the Elusive Peace

By Mariah Faridah

Abstract

The conflict between rebel groups in Central African Republic that has left the country in a state of seemingly endless violent chaos since 2012. The CAR conflict has permeated every facet of society: led to loss of lives, crippled learning institutions, destroyed the infrastructure and government institutions, brought the health care system to its knees, and forced citizens out of their homes. President Francois Bozizé who came to power through a coup d'état in 2003 and subsequent leaders have been unable to bring the conflict to an amicable end. This article traces the evolution of the armed conflict in the landlocked nation since 2012. It argues that the conflict resolution approaches have either lacked credibility or substantive support from relevant institutions in their efforts to promote reconciliation. Among others, it recommends the establishment of a financial monitoring and intelligence task forces by regional governments for collective collaboration and action.

Introduction

The Central African Republic (CAR) is endowed with natural resources including gold, crude oil, uranium, cobalt, timber, and diamond. Yet, with all these resources, the country is classified as one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. The most important economic sectors in CAR are agriculture, forestry, and mining, all of which are in disarray. The farming cycle and other livelihoods have been significantly disrupted by population displacements, resulting in crisis-level food insecurity across the country. The migration of persecuted Muslim populations, who once dominated trade networks across much of the country, may have contributed to the country's economic downfall (Lombard & Picco, 2021). The economy is highly dependent on agriculture and all resources are exported and processed abroad which makes it difficult for the country to economically grow (Reuters, 2021). Also, instability of the country and illegal exploitation of its resources especially in the northern and southern parts of the country has contributed to high levels of poverty. Moreover, the northeast of the country has experienced poaching and hunting of its highly endangered animals further impoverishing the beautiful nation.

Illegal economic networks have also emerged and thrived, prompting some to label CAR a "warlord" economy. Armed groups in the CAR profit through coercive taxes and illicit trade with gold and diamonds

transported across international borders or sold to Central African diamond firms (Enough Project, 2015). Armed organizations also employ violence, attacks, and threats to extort money from citizens, companies, and government institutions, as well as engage in widespread looting. Elephant ivory poaching is said to be another valuable source of cash for the armed groups. Further, to support their operations, the rebel groups have imposed taxes on coffee and livestock and given mining licenses in regions under their control, in addition to participating in illegal gold and diamond mining and trafficking (Flynn, 2014). In 2013, Seleka armed group troops are said to have been involved in many massive elephant massacres, and while in control of the capital Bangui, Seleka soldiers robbed the Ministry of Water and Forests of firearms and previously confiscated ivory tusks. The armed groups are said to have dominated mining locations in central

Following the insurrection, the Anti-Balaka armed group, an opposing coalition of local Christians and animist self-defense groups, launched reprisal attacks, leading to ethnic cleansing of the Muslim community



Artisanal diamond mining in Boda. Boda is a government-controlled area in the Central African Republic. (Photo Credit: Ashley Gilbertson for The New York Times)

CAR, and UN sanctions monitors stated that between May 2013 and by October 2014, almost 140,000 carats of diamond worth over \$24 million were smuggled out of the country (Fynn, 2014).

CAR has faced decades of conflict and turmoil since obtaining independence in 1960. After rising to power through a coup d'état in 2003, President Francois Bozizé showed little variation from his predecessors, plunging the country into further chaos, literally creating the foundation for the current chaos. While Bozizé faced armed opposition and a conflict-torn northeast from the start, the CAR only entered a period of extraordinary violence after the formation of the rebel movement Séléka, a coalition of primarily Muslim armed militia, representing historically disadvantaged areas in northern CAR. The movement was formed in 2012 after Bozizé's troops carried out 'a scorched earth policy' in the northeast prompting the group to cover more than a thousand kilometres to Bangui on foot with little resistance. The majority-Muslim group would eventually take over Bangui and force Bozizé into exile and terrorized citizens.

Following the insurrection, the Anti-Balaka armed group, an opposing coalition of local Christians and animist self-defense groups, launched reprisal attacks, leading to

ethnic cleansing of the Muslim community. As a result, the predominantly Christian Anti-Balaka militia arose to protect non-Muslims from the Seleka's predatory tendencies. The former Seleka and Anti-Balaka factions have fragmented since the crisis, while new ones have emerged. As they compete for territory and influence with government forces, these armed groups have caused widespread insecurity across the country. The armed groups in CAR currently control more territory than the government in the capital Bangui, with rebel and militia groups controlling 75-80 per cent of the territory (Losh, 2018; Beevor, 2019; World Vision, 2021). The country is still divided along sectarian lines and broken into armed group oligarchies, with persistent violence plunging a resource-rich country into one of the poorest in the world. To date, about one-quarter of the nearly five million population has been displaced (Reuters, 2021).

Despite efforts to restore stability, including the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in 2014, the country has been beset by violence over the years. With the election of the incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in February 2016, the CAR returned to constitutional democracy after a two-year transition managed by a transitional administration (The HORN Institute, 2021).

The following sections explain the rise of armed conflict in the Central African Republic with a particular focus on the formation and activities of the main armed rebel groups. It also highlights efforts to bring normalcy to the resource-rich but conflict-ridden country.

Armed Conflict in CAR: A Brief Background

Since the 1990s, the Central African Republic has seen an influx of armed groups with varying allegiances and conflicts centred locally and or on a broader national objective. Many of the fighters that took part in the 2013 putsch come from these backgrounds. The Séléka armed group included fighters and commanders from the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour la Rassemblement (UFDR), Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP), Front Populaire pour la Redressement (FPR), and the Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ). The anti-balaka movement of 2013/14 arose from the reorganization of frequently pre-existing self-defence and anti-bandit militias formed under former president Bozizé era and afterwards the movement allied with Bozizé-aligned security forces (IPIS Report, 2014; Losh, 2018).

The dimensions of the conflict in the Central African Republic reflect complex confrontations over resource access, trade and financial network dominance, and national identity (Lombard, 2014). Prior to the conflict of 2013, the population of the Central African Republic was reported to be 15 per cent Muslim and 85 per cent Christian or indigenous believers. Following the group's splintering in 2013-2014, the Seleka revolt was created in northeastern CAR in 2012, and that region—home to numerous Muslim communities with cross-border linkages to Chad and Sudan—remains the key bastion of ex-Seleka forces. Seleka leaders initially looked to be unified by little more than a passion for power,

plunder, and vengeance. Despite this, the movement drew on Muslim and northeastern frustrations about real or perceived political isolation, bad governance, and mistreatment under consecutive central administrations led by Christians from the south or northwest (ICG, 2015).

Key Actors

The Séléka Group

The Séléka group was in December 2012 “with an agreement between several rebel groups that had previously fought against the government in Bangui. These groups included: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Patriotic Convention for the Salvation of Kodro, Union of Republican Forces, and the Alliance for the Rebirth and Rebuilding Their grievances included decades of political and economic persecution and marginalisation, impunity of violence, and broken promises from years of skirmishes and peace deals” (Mellgard, 2015, para. 2). The Séléka had approximately 6,000 fighters in its rank by the time they were formed. In December 2012, Seleka fighters started an offence against the CAR government, seizing the capital Bangui, and staging a coup in March 2013. In reaction to Seleka troops' brutality, Christian 'anti-balaka' groups emerged to carry out retaliatory violence against Seleka combatants, adding a religious element to the conflict (Beevor, 2019).

By October 2014, the Séléka had already begun to split up. After being rebranded the Front Populaire pour la renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) in August 2014, the ex-Séléka alliance saw its first major splinter group with the creation of the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC). This division arose as a result of tensions between fighters, primarily over territorial control and rent seeking, as well as disagreements over FPRC demands for a country partition and rejection of the Brazzaville ceasefire. Some of the group militia later rejoined the FPRC, and others splintered off to form another armed faction, the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), in 2015 (Losh, 2018). However, since 2015, these groups have experienced significant internal wrangles along increasingly factions' lines. Despite the fact that the ex-Séléka have been divided into distinct groups since 2014, their frequent collaborations and complexity have led to them being referred to simply as “ex-Séléka” in media reporting.

“The dimensions of the conflict in the Central African Republic reflect complex confrontations over resource access, trade and financial network dominance, and national identity”

Although religious doctrine does not appear to be at the heart of the CAR conflict, violent collective punishment based on sectarian identification has been one of the consequences of these tensions

Anti-Balaka Movement

The Antibalaka group is said to have been formally established in 2013. However, in 2009, President Bozizé, “established loosely organised village self-protection groups that would combat bandits and other sources of insecurity on a local level. These groups took on the moniker ‘Antibalaka’ (Mellgard, 2016, para. 2). Antibalaka forces launched major retaliatory attacks against primarily Muslim civilians in September 2013, driving tens of thousands of people to Seleka-controlled areas in the north. The government disbanded Seleka forces soon after revenge attacks began, but many ex-Seleka members began launching counterattacks, plunging CAR into a state of chaos and a humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people were killed and about 575,000 people have been displaced since the commencement of renewed war in 2013, the bulk of whom have fled to neighboring Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (The New Humanitarian, 2014).

Although religious doctrine does not appear to be at the heart of the CAR conflict, violent collective punishment based on sectarian identification has been one of the consequences of these tensions. Seleka commanders led attacks on Christian communities in 2013, including massacres in Bozizé’s home region and political stronghold, the northwest (HRW, 2013). By mid-2014, antibalaka militias had gotten the upper hand in most of the south and west, when they initiated assaults on Muslim populations in religiously mixed areas, after the Seleka had been forced out of power and the national military had essentially disbanded. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims were forced to flee their homes, Muslim-owned businesses and properties were robbed and confiscated, mosques were destroyed, and Muslim religious activity was allegedly suppressed, including through forced conversions.

Popular Front for the Rebirth of Central African Republic (Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC))

The FPRC is made up of ex-Séléka factions loyal to the warlords who form its core leadership. Since

2014, departure of some group militia, fatalities, and marginalization have further concentrated that leadership. From 2015 to 2018, the FPRC controlled one of the largest operational zones in the CAR, with virtually unrivalled control over Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran, and much of Haut Kotto. In areas where its territorial reach overlaps with that of other groups, it has typically engaged in revenue sharing, with only minor conflict with other groups occurring between 2014 and June 2016 (HRW, 2017). During this time, the FPRC strengthened its grip on its existing territory while shifting its focus to key economic concerns. This has necessitated its gradual reinforcement in key transhumance locations such as Kaga Bandoro, where it shifted its stronghold in 2015 and mining centers such as Bria, where it has been present since late 2014. Early in 2016, the group expanded its operations south of Bria into mineral-rich zones along the Bria-Yalinga axis, as well as Nzako and Bakouma (Hojje, 2014).

Central African Patriotic Movement (Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC))

The MPC, founded in August 2015 and is primarily made up of Arab fighters although it also has a sizable Fulani contingent. Its leadership is thought to be well connected to Chadian “big men” in charge of driving herds between Chad and the Central African Republic, and as such, its primary zone of operations has focused on the northern border area between these two countries. Despite its split from the FPRC, the MPC has maintained functional relations with the group in areas of mutual interest. In 2015, FPRC and MPC groups entered into resource-sharing agreements and even joint military training around Nana-Grébizi, as well as tactical alliances to counter common threats, particularly UPC expansion into their spheres of influence. While the MPC has traditionally maintained its independence in the face of FPRC attempts to reform the Séléka, a recent change in political leadership has seen the group express support for the FPRC’s recent strategy in relation to the Central African government and international forces. (HWR, 2017)

Union pour la Centrafrique (UPC)

The UPC was formed following the intense inter-communal clashes of 2013/14, and it initially included a number of factions. The group, made up primarily of Fulani and Arab fighters, claimed to be open to anyone who wants to work for peace in CAR, outlining its commitment to the Brazzaville ceasefire and its opposition to the FPRC's partitionist agenda. However, the withdrawal of Arab UPC factions in mid-2016 appears to have made the group more homogeneous. This withdrawal was the result of internal wrangles within the group over what appears to be a progressively segregationist approach to group operations, as well as of an apparent prioritization of Fulani protection over the Arab interests (HWR, 2017).

In spite, the UPC's democratic demagoguery, the group has long engaged in systemic and diverse economic predation, focusing primarily on taxation and security provision for livestock, coffee, sugar, agricultural goods, and general merchandise, as well as in diamond and, in particular, gold taxation, production, and trade.

More extensively, in the Central African Republic, cycles of violence are centered in patterns in which successive governments have co-opted rebel leaders by offering them government positions, thus providing an opportunity for resistance movement, weakening civilian-led political movements, and contributing to a sense of impunity. According to some experts, these behaviors are linked to favoritism and nepotism structures that have allowed presidents to wield extended personal authority across a vast, diversified, and unpopulated country. Generally, the patterns of violence have made it impossible to distinguish between combatants and civilians, as well as between armed militia leaders' declared and legitimate goals. Observers worry that the conflict in CAR has hardened ethno-religious identities, deepening the societal schisms that contributed to the rise of the crisis. The violence has spawned armed communities separated along religious lines and has reopened the grave question of who has the right to reside in CAR (ICG, 2015).



A picture showing a rebel in the Northern Central African Republic (Photo Credits: Creative Commons)

Transition Attempts and Escalation of Conflict

The first glimmer of improved security in the CAR occurred in early 2015, with the departure of most Central African Muslims from western CAR and an increase of operations by French Sangaris forces and UN Peacekeepers under United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The Ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka hardliners, as well as their inner circles, were involved in contentious negotiations in Nairobi, mediated by CAR mediator Sassou Nguesso, in January 2015. The Bangui National Forum ultimately sabotaged the talks, which were not endorsed by the transitional authorities and were denounced by other political actors, including the UN (Chonghaile C.N., 2016). These talks resulted in the approval of a Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation, and Reconstruction, as well as the signature of a Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Repatriation (DDRR) accord by nine out of ten armed factions in May 2015. With a constitutional referendum and the preparations for the much-delayed presidential and legislative elections, the political transition process gained significant boost in the subsequent months.

Regrettably, in June 2016, clashes erupted in capital Bangui, the north, and the center of the country, resulting in over 6,000 refugees from the northwest alone. Following the violent evacuation of PK5's ex-Séléka commanders from Bangui in August 2016, anti-balaka and ex-Séléka battles erupted in Kaga Bandoro in September and October, prompting the FPRC7 to initiate yet another ex-Séléka coven in eastern CAR in October 2016 in an attempt to reunite the former alliance. From late 2016 to late 2017, the FPRC formed a military coalition with the MPC and anti-balaka militias to undertake a military campaign against UPC locations (DW, 2014).

The conflict between the FPRC-led Coalition and the UPC continued into 2017, increasing in the center and east in February and March 2017 as the Coalition attempted to push the UPC out of its stronghold of Bambari. The strong protection of people in the city by MINUSCA slowed the advance while ousting the UPC from Bambari to allow the municipality to stabilize. The UPC dispersed farther into the south east when the coalition seized important diamond-producing locations in Nzako and Bakouma in March 2017, despite intense attacks from self-defence groups loosely linked with the anti-balaka. While the Coalition and the UPC did not sign a formal truce until

Observers worry that the conflict in CAR has hardened ethno-religious identities, deepening the societal schisms that contributed to the rise of the crisis

October 2017, active warfare between the two began in April 2017. Furthermore, from June 2017, through the end of the year, tensions between the FPRC's Rounka and Gula factions, as well as the FPRC and its former anti-balaka collaborators, exploded in bloodshed, disrupting the FPRC's activities (IPIS, 2014).

New Dawn and Challenges

Following general the elections in December 2015, President Touadéra was elected in March 2016, with over 60 percent of the vote in a February 2016 run-off against Anicet-Georges Dologuélé. Observers from the African Union (AU) found both polls to be transparent, with registered voter turnout of 78 percent in the first round and 63 percent in the second round, respectively. Touadéra was previously a math professor, and Prime Minister under former President Bozizé. During the transition, he kept a low profile, and ran as an independent candidate. Touadéra's triumph has been attributed by some to his relative obscurity, which may have helped him to evade organized opposition. Touadéra is well positioned to utilize international and domestic goodwill as the first president elected in a democratic transfer of power since 1993 (Reuters, 2021).

Despite President Faustin Archange Touadéra's election in 2016, the crisis has not abated. While violence between Muslim and Christian forces slowed as a result of a de facto territorial separation, fighting between ex-Seleka factions increased (Reuters, 2021). Most armed groups have refused to participate in President Touadéra's efforts to de-escalate the situation through disarming, leaving the government impotent outside the capital. Armed groups have thrived in the rest of the country, and warfare has escalated in the central, western, and eastern regions. The violence has also had a negative impact on the economy, with the private sector being crippled.

President Touadéra began a DDR trial in September 2017 after initial consultative meetings with the 14 armed

groups, with the goal of integrating 560 militants from 14 armed groups (40 each) into mixed battalions. The Central African President also reshuffled his cabinet, appointing four armed group representatives as well as five Muslims, bringing the total number of Muslims in the government to eight. The UN Security Council decided in October to extend MINUSCA's mission until November 2018, bringing the total number of troops and police to almost 13,000 people. (UNSC Report, 2017)

A Vicious Circle of Violence

In April 2018, violence erupted in the eastern and western parts of the county and extended to new regions, demonstrating Bangui's government's inability to extend control outside the city. Ex-Seleka and anti-balaka militias, as well as hundreds of other localized organizations, operate openly and control as much as two-thirds of the CAR's territory. This is despite a peace accord signed in June 2017 between the government and thirteen of the fourteen main armed factions. (CFR, 2021). MINUSCA and the government security forces initiated an operation in Bangui's PK5 area, a largely Muslim enclave in the majority Christian capital, in April 2018 to disarm a paramilitary organization. Heavy fights erupted after rumors spread that the peacekeepers planned to disarm all Muslims, leaving them open to attacks by armed Christian groups. More than twenty people were killed, including a UN peacekeeper, and almost 150 were injured. Demonstrators lay the bodies of sixteen persons murdered in the violence in front of MINUSCA's headquarters in Bangui a few days later, accusing peacekeepers of human rights violations (Abdullahi, 2018).

In 2019, a peace deal was signed between the government and the 14 Rebel groups but the violence did not end instead intensified killings thousands and displacing millions. Meanwhile, around that period in and around Bambari and the southeast of the country,



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UPC and anti-balaka forces continued to clash for control over economically and strategically important locales. This saw a further spike in violence with armed group and intercommunal retaliatory attacks targeting civilians, peacekeepers, humanitarians and government authorities, following the circulation of rumors of the killing of Muslims in mid-May. The armed groups expressed their frustration with the government's refusal to fulfil sections of the deal, such as merging their militants into special mixed brigades, since 2019. They've also expressed rising dissatisfaction with the Touadéra regime (CFR, 2021).

On January 4, 2021 Faustin-Archange Touadéra, was re-elected for a second term after the country's electoral commission announced that he had defeated 16 other candidates and received 53.9 percent of the vote, effectively eliminating the need for a runoff. Following the Constitutional Court's rejection of former President François Bozizé's candidacy on December 3, 2020 the elections was marred with violence due to an international warrant and UN sanctions against him for his suspected involvement in assassinations, torture, and other crimes during his reign. The court highlighted his failure to meet the constitution's good morality criterion. After the announcement, Bozizé joined the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a coalition of armed militias, some of which were previously members of the Séléka coalition that ousted him in 2013. (Kum, 2021) They attacked numerous villages outside Bangui in an attempt to postpone the election and kick off a new round of peace talks. Hundreds of civilians were killed with 30,000 having to flee to neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and another 185,000 internally displaced. The conflict also claimed the lives of three UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA) peacekeepers (CFR, 2021).

The election, which was only the country's second in history, was expected to be a major turning point. The violence witnessed, on the other hand, exposed the peace process's deep inadequacies and threatened to reverse the timid progress toward stability made since the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in February 2019.

Foreign Actors

The large number of international and regional actors with interests and influence in the CAR complicates efforts to find a long-term political solution to the conflict.



President of the Central Africa Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, former president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, African Union Chairman, H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat at a past African Union peace talks in Khartoum (Photo Credit: African Union)

Over the last decade, Chad, Angola, and, most recently, Sudan have all hosted political talks between armed groups and the CAR government, ostensibly for their own geostrategic interests. Because of the porous borders between the CAR and its neighbors, ethnic groups with strong cultural allegiances and economic ties outside of the country have flourished.

In recent years, Russia has increased its efforts to support Touadéra's government through the Wagner Group, a private security firm closely linked to the Kremlin and frequently used by the Russian state as a proxy force when nefarious intent is required. The head of the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic has been appointed national security adviser, providing personal protection to President Touadéra, and also some training to FACA. The Russian interests in the CAR appear to be both financial gaining access to diamonds, gold, and other mining contracts and part of the country's broader African strategy aimed at countering American influence and gaining greater African support for Russian UN initiatives (Clarke, 2021).

France, which has historical connections with the CAR as well as economic and security interests in the country, opposes Wagner Group's activities in the country. Before

December 2020 elections, rival French and Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing CAR internet users surfaced (Clarke, 2021). Today, armed groups control the majority of the land, and there is nothing in the way of a social contract between citizens and the government making peace a mirage but not an impossibility.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Central African Republic is stuck in a cycle of conflict and underdevelopment. The conflict has become intractable with the proliferation of the armed groups who illegally benefit from rich mineral deposits. Also the government dysfunction in hotspots in the CAR has allowed armed groups to profit from illicit economies such as illicit ivory or mineral trade, as well as illicit taxation of people and goods, which provide financial resources for fighting groups in the fragile country. Going beyond CAR poses threat to stability of the fragile government as well as the security and lives of millions of people. The several peace agreements have not addressed these fundamental structural issues, and some have even helped to incentivize several actors who profit from instability.

Additionally, the French colonial administrators leased the CAR's lands to private corporations to administer

at their own profit or loss, and struck labor and security accords with the locals. Unfortunately, this system has been effectively maintained, with political elites in Bangui granting mining concessions to a variety of multinational actors who rely on private military companies (PMCs) to provide transportation and security without building out local government or infrastructure. Local leaders, clans, and militias have privatized security in a haphazard manner, allowing people to fend for themselves. It has also given non-state actors plenty of opportunities to build illicit businesses in order to profit from the country's huge natural resources.

The financial monitoring and intelligence task forces should be established by regional governments for

collective collaboration and action. With international development assistance, the affected government of CAR should adequately legalize mineral trading and financial sectors to prevent resources from flowing into armed organizations' illicit economies.

Lastly, the current government of CAR should consider having a coalition government and see if the crisis will end and hence bring peace in the country since all the peace agreements signed previously have not yielded any fruits. The CAR might devolve into imminent genocide unless international and regional actors act quickly to address shortcomings in the peace process as well as some of the country's major structural drivers of conflict.

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The Impact of the Global War on Terror: Militarized Policing and Mass Surveillance

By Patrick Maluki, Ph.D.

Abstract

The militarization of law enforcement agencies has been a long-term trend globally. Law enforcement agencies have grown increasingly militarized. These militarized methods are often supported by the state, resulting in an enforced “law and order” which treats individuals as potential threats to national security. This article discusses how the global war on terror has led to increased militarized policing and unfettered mass surveillance on populations after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. It argues that these approaches risk eroding fundamental liberties and may not be productive in deterring terror attacks, arguing for intelligence collection rather than mass surveillance.

Introduction

The United States’ war on terror, which began following the attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, has lasted till now. The war on terror has become a new lexicon in world politics and international relations, influencing the relationship between the United States and other nations. The assault had a substantial influence on US foreign and defence policies in other parts of the world. According to Sukma (2004), if terrorist acts had not occurred in the United States, their consequences would not have had a significant global influence. As a result, because the United States is a global leader with immense influence, other nations ought to conform to its diplomatic and defence policies enacted in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks.

The war on terror is also having an impact on developing nations, development policy, and development practice. Aid allocations and the type of donor cooperation with developing nations have been impacted by the worldwide focus on counter-terrorism and security. It has been argued that counter-terrorism is being used to justify policies that are undermining development goals and violating international human rights obligations. In many regions of the globe, increased military aid and weaponry exports are compromising human security and livelihoods (Tujan, Gaughran, & Mollett, 2004).

Perhaps the most important aspect emanating from counter terrorism is the militarization. Militarization

is intimately related to the study of Special Forces in Homeland Security because the former is a multidimensional process that produces the necessary circumstances for the latter to function. Militarization can be conceptualized as a state-led process that emphasizes the use or threat of force to deal with existing or future security risks. This aspect has become increasingly important to civilian police tactics in the wake of the war on terror. A major component of militarization is the inclusion of military aspects, equipment and technology, culture, command, and control (C2), and standard operational procedures (SOP) into the whole organization of the police force (Kraska, 2007, p. 3; Kohn, 2009).

This article assesses the impact of the global war on terror, focusing on militarized policing and mass surveillance. The data on militarized policing and mass surveillance was obtained using the desktop research method. In this regard, the study adopted the secondary data technique, obtaining data from relevant journal articles, government reports, United Nations publications, and policy documents from international organizations and agencies.

The State and Terrorism

The likelihood of state complicity in terrorism can be inferred from patterns that 1) reflect the reasonably anticipated likely consequence of an act (Jarvis & Lister, 2014), such as a militarized police force that leads to a presumption that “suspected” citizens are a threatening



Blasts rock the World Trade Center after being hit by two planes on September 11, 2001, in New York City. (Photo Credit: Getty)

body; and 2) by noting that the longer it takes for state agencies to respond to a terrorist attack, the more likely it is that the state is regarded to be complicit (Jarvis & Lister, 2014). As Blakeley (2009, p. 42) points out, the longer abuses persist, the more likely it is that the perpetrators of the violence will be identified as state officials.

Terrorism research that takes a critical look at the state can reveal movements in institutions such as the military and police that are mobilized for certain purposes while also proving that these goals are attained through state-sanctioned terrorism. This regard is emphasized in Doty's (1993) demand for asking "how-possible" questions to comprehend not just how state terrorism may occur, but also how "relevant subjects, objects, and interpretative dispositions were socially formed in such a manner that particular behaviours were made feasible" (Doty, 1993, p. 298). Furthermore, Jarvis and Lister (2014) suggest that rather than concentrating on who committed certain acts of terrorism, it is more essential to consider how ordinarily illegal activities become conceivable when individuals are discursively believed to be national security risks.

The Post-9/11 Police Militarization

In October 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to vanquish al Qaida who were behind the September 11 deadly terror attack and punishing the "Taliban for

providing safe haven to al-Qaida leaders. It took little effort on part of the US to dismantle the Taliban regime" (Shams, 2021, para 2). While Osama bin Laden managed to escape, the former founder of the militant Islamist was finally killed by US forces in his home in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011. The invasion was largely a success, even though Taliban and al Qaida fighters remained evasive and managed to reorganize over the years (Shams, 2021). In April 2021, the US administration made the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan following nearly 20 years in the country despite its internal fragilities. Following this announcement, in August 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul, Afghanistan capital, "completing a rapid takeover over the country with a speed that surprised many Afghans and Americans alike. The Taliban's advance came as the United States was completing the military withdrawal to which it agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord" (Congressional Research Service, 2021, p.2). The impact of the war has been devastating, the war has claimed 2,448 American service members; 3,846 U.S. contractors; more than 66,000 Afghan national military and police; 1,144 allied service members, including from other NATO member states; 47,245 Afghan civilians; 51,191 members of Taliban and other opposition fighters; 444 aid workers; and 72 journalists (Knickmeyer, 2021).

As the global war on terror continued, the federal government provided local law enforcement with military weaponry and experience as the U.S. security state mushroomed. The police received billions of dollars in equipment and grant funds to tackle domestic terrorism. Across the country, dozens of fusion centres have sprouted, serving as hubs for exchanging intelligence across all levels of police enforcement. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other organizations began giving police training on bioterrorism and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Counterterrorism training was conducted in various nations, including Israel (Speri, 2017).

According to the federal government, the 9/11 attacks “injected new urgency” into border security, which led to a massive expansion of immigration enforcement infrastructure (Coleman & Kocher, 2011). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was created as a result of this presumed urgency, and it began working with local police, with ICE’s being to “protect America from the cross-border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security and public safety. This mission is executed through the enforcement of more than 400 federal statutes and focuses on immigration enforcement and combating transnational crime” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2022, para 1). In essence, ICE was established to shut down any pathway that terrorists could use to get into the US and conduct terror attacks.

On the other hand, municipal agencies began to use surveillance equipment intended for the military. “Intelligent policing” methods are widely used by many officers, who collect and share information, sometimes with state and federal agencies to avoid criminal activity and possible terror threats rather than to respond to them (Price, 2013). According to the Obama administration, police agencies received millions of dollars in government funds to recruit post-9/11 veterans, further integrating military training and perspectives into domestic law enforcement.

Police Privilege

Despite significant advances and improvements in surveillance technology, police monitoring remains an inefficient and even dubious activity. Police have been accused of harassing civilians whom they suspect to be guilty of committing a crime (Bryant-Davis et al., 2017). Not only has the police budget increased, but so has

the quality and quantity of specialized equipment accessible to them.

The United States ‘peacekeeping’ soldiers have been exposed to indirect militarization, defined as “the process through which domestic police forces acquire military characteristics over time” (Balko, 2021). In the United States, “the increased militarization of police has occurred alongside a significant decline in public trust for law enforcement agencies. While the public continues to respect their own community’s law enforcement agencies, public confidence and trust in law enforcement as an institution have decreased since the early 2000s” (Stand Together Trust, 2018, para. 2). Instead of carrying out their normal role of enforcing laws to protect property, police begin hunting for criminals ahead of time and utilize military strategy, equipment, and tactics.

These new and often expensive privileges allow the police to extend and fine-tune their techniques of public policing, but one could ask why such powerful equipment is provided to them with the right to use it as they see fit, rather than being utilized only for a specified function or cause. This can be easily solved by looking at who holds the police accountable. Currently, they can only be held accountable by the courts, and the only institutions that can influence or direct their funding, aside from the departments themselves, are federal and state government agencies (Neocleous, 2014). Although the police have some authority, their power relationships with other institutions and agencies hold them in check or help them. This issue must be divided into specific organizational reciprocities and their exchange of favors considered in the proper context to better understand how these relationships affect police officers’ duties and privileges, as well as their public image and the facilitation of law-bending in their favor.

“Despite significant advances and improvements in surveillance technology, police monitoring remains an inefficient and even dubious activity. Police have been accused of harassing civilians whom they suspect to be guilty of committing a crime

Militarization in Law Enforcement Agencies

Since 9/11, state security agencies and networks at all levels have shifted from a hegemonic military pedagogical culture in their implementation of social control to a militarized pedagogical culture (Giroux, 2008). Using this lens, police militarization can be seen as a process by which civilian police acquire and apply the military's major educational cultural components (Lieblich & Shinar, 2018). Because of the "War on Terror" of George H.W. Bush, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden's administration, militarized police have persisted uninterrupted (Giroux, 2008). However, it is important to note that the trend toward a more militarized domestic police force began well before September 11, 2001 (Balko, 2014).

Indeed, the ongoing police militarization may be attributed to the "war on drugs" of the late 1970s, which forced state and local law enforcement to cooperate with federal drug policy. Neither Nixon nor Reagan declared a "war on terror," but both referred to illicit substances as a national security threat. Department of Defense's (DoD) access to military sites, research, and equipment was

encouraged and permitted by the Military Cooperation Law Enforcement Act of 1981, which was passed in 1981 (Balko, 2013). In 1988, Congress enabled the National Guard to assist local police in drug interdiction, according to Balko (2014). It was established by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in 1994 that the DoD may provide surplus military equipment to local police departments. 8,000 local law enforcement agencies participated in the re-utilization project, which has transferred \$5.1 billion in military equipment from the DoD to local law enforcement agencies in the United States as of 2014 (Poynton, 2014).

Military and police power are based on the same state-sanctioned capacity to use physical force to achieve their respective goals (Kraska, 2007). After 9/11, the increasing militarization has become normalized in the sense that it now acts as a major educational force shaping "lives, memories, and everyday experiences while eliminating everything critical and emancipatory about history, justice and the meaning of democracy" (Giroux, 2008,



Agents from different components of the Department of Homeland Security in military camouflaged uniforms deployed to protect a federal courthouse in Portland (Photo Credit: Doug Brown via AP)

Military weaponry has been slowly transferred to local civilian law enforcement organizations under the pretext of fighting terrorism, according to the Defense and Homeland Security departments

p. 60). Because of 9/11, militarization has made war the organizing principle of society and has changed the state's purpose from "welfare" to "fighting" (Giroux, 2008, p. 60). To illustrate this, the federal government spends billions of dollars on military equipment while producing militarized subjects to combat the supposed terrorist threat. The result is an incredible militarization of the police force (McLoughlin, 2014). Military weaponry has been slowly transferred to local civilian law enforcement organizations under the pretext of fighting terrorism, according to the Defense and Homeland Security departments (McLoughlin, 2014). Although they can use physical force, police officers are intended to "use the least amount of violence feasible in the maintenance of peace and internal security, limited by law, and accountable to civil society" (McLoughlin, 2014, p. 90).

According to Levy (2013), a citizen-soldier army is allowed to implement the state's exterior will and has unrestricted authority to use violence against its designated targets. The military, on the other hand, is bound by the Republican compact (Levy, 2013). It is a shame that the border between civilian police and the state military has become blurred since 9/11. In time, the borders between the military's ideological and material culture and the police law enforcement network began to blur (McLoughlin, 2014).

For law enforcement agencies and their firmly ingrained political agendas since 9/11, it is all about battling terrorism and social concerns. These discussions have prompted law enforcement agencies throughout the world to begin patterning their police units after the Paramilitary Police Units (PPU), also known as SWAT teams. Approximately twice as many police agencies in the United States had a PPU by the late 1990s (Kraska, 2007, p. 6). Overall police paramilitary deployments increased by 1400 per cent between 1980 and 2000. This means that over 40,000 police paramilitary units (PPUs) deploy every year (Kraska, 2007). Their appearance, tactics, attitudes, and beliefs all come

from a military mentality (Kraska, 2007, p. 6). According to their website, the PPU culture is distinguished by distinctive techno-warrior attire, heavy armament, sophisticated technology, hyper-masculinity, and lethal function (McLoughlin, 2014). There is a distinct difference between their use of conventional camouflage and their use of all-black Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) to emphasize a military warrior mindset (Balko, 2011). Also according to the ethnographic research conducted by Balko (2011), police officers' view of their status in the community can be influenced by wearing more military attire.

Like any military operation or fight, law enforcement groups require intelligence about the suspected adversary. United States surveillance and data collecting infrastructure have accelerated militarization of law enforcement after September 11, 2001. "Several domestic intelligence collecting entities could operate with greater power" after the DHS was formed in 2002, McLoughlin writes (2014, p. 88). Due to this convergence, the Department of Homeland Security has developed fusion centres, which mine citizen information facilitated by DHS to state and local police enforcement organizations (McLoughlin, 2014). When analysts work at these facilities, they create threat profiles based on information collected by law enforcement authorities, such as passive or soft data from the internet, mobile phone activity, and proactive surveillance (McLoughlin, 2014). This information is then used by law enforcement agencies to conduct pre-emptive counter-terrorism operations against national security issues.

It's no secret that since the Patriot Act was passed in October 2001, the demand for rules that regulate domestic monitoring has grown exponentially, much like the spread of state-authorized military equipment to law enforcement agencies (Bentley, 2012). In any case, these two factors operate in concert to underscore the tragedy of state-sponsored terrorism. Intelligence fusion centres build threat-based profiles by gaining access to government and private information databases. This is

a police squad that will target individuals suspected of being terrorists or insecure bodies (McLoughlin, 2014).

It is believed that police militarization creates a false sense of security, which may lead to the justification of state-sponsored terrorism through a narrative that characterizes these operations as pre-emptive counter-terrorism (Lieblish and Shinar, 2017). When persons being policed are considered to be hazardous to the extent where the deployment of combat-ready soldiers is justifiable, a state of war has been established. Instead of the rule of law, terrorism has replaced the social state, and the prospects of democracy are now confronted with violence instead (Giroux, 2008).

Defensive policing has evolved into a proactive rather than reactive approach, with shared rather than personal accountability. The surge in PPU deployments in the first case suggests that police “expected” major violence that would necessitate a military response. In the latter case, however, police militarization has the drawback of thinking that everyone is potentially violent and poses a threat to national security. Lieblish and Shinar (2018) emphasize the danger of police militarization presuming citizens to be threats a priori, stating that when militarization becomes normalized, the presumption of the threat becomes normalized, and when the police become militarized, the presumption of the threat becomes even more normalized because the police, unlike the military, are subject to civilian authority (securitized). Military power is a biopolitical force that creates identities, products, knowledge, communication, and effective investments while exerting pressure on all other elements of social life and the social order, undermining the liberal democratic battle for a better future (Giroux, 2008, p. 60).

Mass Surveillance

Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and its allies were perceptibly under immense pressure to ensure the security of their civilians. The law enforcement and

Over time, governments have expanded to accommodate various forms of mass surveillance in which they can capture fundamentally any aspect of a person’s life

intelligence community were heavily criticised for not preventing the deadly attacks which can be inferred as ‘as a classic case of hindsight bias’. However, terrorists were growing in sophistication and their highly complex forms of violence required countries to take decisive measures to defend themselves, including mass monitoring of communications. Gunaratna notes:

The scale and audacity of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, spurred sweeping changes in the way the United States, its partners, and adversaries used the machinery of state and technology to respond to threats...To address the common threat, military forces, law enforcement authorities, and intelligence services built common databases, exchanged personnel, conducted joint training and operations, shared intelligence, technology, expertise, and experience. The driving force behind the effort—the United States—now faces a new set of daunting threats (Gunaratna, 2021, para. 2).

In mass surveillance, experts use a range of systems and technologies to collect information, evaluate it and generate specified data on indeterminate or large numbers of individuals. This departs from the norm in which surveillance is limited to individuals about which there is reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Over time, governments have expanded to accommodate various forms of mass surveillance in which they can capture fundamentally any aspect of a person’s life (Davis, McGarrity, & Williams, 2014; Walker & McKay, 2015; Stepanović, 2015).

The idea behind this approach is that more data will increase the quantity and quality of intelligence and put law enforcement agencies in a position to pick out likely suspects way before committing attacks. Kreissl (n.d.) argues that “Keeping an eye on hundreds or even thousands of individuals, identified as potential suspects, will help to prevent future terrorist attacks. Collecting information about violent extremist groups will produce hints about future terrorist events” (p.3). For instance, after the Boston bombing, intelligence officers looked at more than 10,000 videos and 120,000 photos taken near the scene of the bombing in which they found a video that appeared to reveal the perpetrators, “they were the only people who didn’t look surprised when the first bomb went off. The FBI then released the video, asking for the public’s assistance in locating the men” (Granick, 2017, para. 4). However, Farhad Manjoo argues that



'Stop watching Us,' the Anti-Surveillance Rally in Washington, D.C., (Photo Credit: Reuters)

the Boston Marathon bombing makes a good case for broad surveillance and not mass surveillance. The FBI's access to so many videos and still images is what helped them identify and eventually catch the bomber and not mass surveillance.

In the broadest sense, mass surveillance has significantly improved security in various ways, but it is also subjecting a large population to indiscriminate monitoring that involves a systematic intrusion with an individual's right to privacy and all the rights that privacy enables. Increasingly, intelligence agencies and law enforcement conduct mass surveillance through a diverse and range of means and methods of surveillance. These include the direct mass interception of communications, access to the bulk communications stored by telecoms operators and others, mass hacking, indiscriminate use of facial recognition technology, indiscriminate surveillance of protests using mobile phone trackers, and more.

In systematically monitoring an individual's life in his or her private space, this approach paves the way for unbridled power and control over people. Mass surveillance rides on the supposition that all data could be valuable to address a hypothetical threat such as terrorism, which is incompatible with the fundamental values and principles of democratic societies that seek

to limit the information a state knows about its people in order to moderate its power. In terms of productivity, Granick (2017) argues that mass surveillance may not necessarily be fecund as there are a number of instances where the intelligence community in the U.S has not utilized already collected intelligence to avert a terror attack. Grancik strongly contends that "we should not conflate massive surveillance with broad data collection used to investigate crimes that have already occurred" (2017 para. 4).

Conclusion

This article focused on assessing the impact of the global war on terror: militarized policing and mass surveillance. Threat rhetoric may change over time, but institutionalizing the militarization of state and local law enforcement has serious implications. Many aspects of how we conceptualize a law enforcement officer are changing both in the thoughts of police and the public, leading to a shift in how both groups view one other. Based on this, we risk undermining civil liberties that should be protected by the Constitution. This transition occurs when an officer integrates military training and tactics into civilian life. Equipment and training that mirrors that of a soldier might change an officer's assumption and view on his or her tasks. According to an officer, the public is no longer a group of fellow citizens,

but an adversary. When the police are confronted with citizens as enemies, their traditional duty of “protecting and serving” the public disappears.

Surveillance technology is widely used in today’s society, sparking heated discussions between proponents and opponents. Government surveillance, in particular, has come under increased criticism, with proponents claiming that it improves security and opponents claiming that it violates people’s privacy. Governments have been accused by critics of using surveillance technology to collect enormous quantities of data and intrude on the privacy of millions of people, yet with little to no proof of success.

Recommendations

Mass surveillance technologies should be focused on gathering data only from very particular parts of the internet where prospective terrorists are likely to frequent. It must gather information from terrorist chat rooms, propaganda videos, and extremist training videos. Furthermore, the rules regulating national security investigations must be amended. Preliminary terrorist investigations should be extended from six months to three years with pre-emptive actions when necessary. This would provide intelligence operatives enough time to thoroughly examine data and plan stings and the use of informants. Terrorist investigations are much too vital to squander due to time restrictions. Time is needed for

“Governments have been accused by critics of using surveillance technology to collect enormous quantities of data and intrude on the privacy of millions of people, yet with little to no proof of success

the intelligence community to conduct a comprehensive job that leads to terrorists being apprehended. Finally, the intelligence community should be split into two separate entities.

To prevent giving the executive complete control over the battlefield and, as a result, importing war paradigm features into specific countries, the judiciary must demand greater openness from the executive and undertake more fact-finding and rigorous examination in national security concerns. Failure to do so risks legitimizing state and local law enforcement’s militarization and, as a result, altering how police personnel and civilians see one other. Dismantling the crucial separation of police and military units on which our society was founded risks undermining many of the core constitutional safeguards inherent in the countries’ criminal justice system.

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Editor's Note

Dear Reader,

We are excited to release our 22nd bi-monthly issue of *The HORN Bulletin* (Vol. V, Iss. I, 2022). We bring to you well-researched articles and analysis of topical issues and developments affecting the Horn of Africa. We welcome contributions from readers who wish to have their articles included in the HORN Bulletin. At HORN, we believe ideas are the currency of progress. Feel free to contact the Editor-in-Chief for more details at communications@horninstitute.org.

Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.
Editor-in-Chief, The HORN Bulletin

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
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THE HORN INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORT 2021



TAKING STOCK OF DEVOLUTION IN KENYA

From the 2010 Constitution, Through Two Election Cycles, to the BBI Process



The book *'Taking Stock of Devolution in Kenya: From the 2010 Constitution, Through Two Election Cycles, to the BBI Process'*. This book volume takes stock of devolution in Kenya with specific reference to theoretical, legal, constitutional and policy, leadership, governance, and development debates as well as experiences in the 47 counties.



Its scope falls within the 2010 Constitution, through two election cycles in 2013 and again in 2017, up to the transformative change proposals presented by the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) and the ramifications that all these issues, events and processes portend for the future of devolved governance in Kenya.




The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: An Analysis and The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Policy and Practice.

These books contain chapters derived from researched and peer-reviewed papers presented at the international conference on terrorism and violent extremism.

The volumes' contributors comprise of leading scholars and practitioners who examine the subtleties and complexities of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa today. Some of the topics in the books include political and religious extremism; ideological dimensions;



state responses to terrorism; preventing and countering violent extremism; gender and terrorism; role of schools in countering extremism; media and terrorism; terrorism financing; terrorism and human rights; critical infrastructure protection; conflict dynamics in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, and their impact in Africa; global trends in terrorism and violent extremism; terrorism, trauma and counselling; radicalization and deradicalization; and case studies from Somalia, Nigeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, among others.



Globalization of Terrorism: From Sicariis, Assassins to ISIS is an analysis of terrorism from both historical and international relations perspectives. The book sheds light on the contentious subject of terrorism, tracking its beginnings from antiquity, to the middle ages, and its subsequent globalization in contemporary times.

The focus on contemporary terrorism intersects the dizzying pace, frequency, religionized and globalized nature of recruitment and attacks that have become major threats to national and international security.



About the HORN Institute

The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-profit, applied research, and policy think-do tank based in Nairobi, Kenya. Its vision is a progressive Horn of Africa and the African continent, served by informed, evidence-based and problem-solving policy research and analysis. Its mission is to contribute to informed, objective, definitive research and analytical inquiry that positively informs policies of governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and spaces.

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