The HORN

Bulletin

SPECIAL EDITION

The HORN Bulletin is a bi-monthly publication by the HORN Institute. It contains thematic articles mainly on issues affecting the Horn of Africa region.

INSIDE

About the HORN Institute

The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-profit, applied research, and policy think-do tank based in Nairobi, Kenya. Its mission is to contribute to informed, objective, definitive research and analytical inquiry that positively informs policies of governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Its vision is a progressive Horn of Africa served by informed, evidence-based and problem-solving policy research and analysis.

AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS
Interests, Strategies, Interventions, and Impact

2010–2019 | An Appraisal

ABRIDGED VERSION

Executive Summary

This study investigates the contemporary Middle East-Africa relations in order to increase understanding of the existing matrix of geopolitics, ideology, security, and economics. This was partly informed by the sense that the Middle East has increasingly been engaging Africa over the last decade, informed by changing realities both in the Middle East and Africa. Using mixed methods, the study seeks to dissect the interplay between geopolitics, ideology, security, and economics in the wake of recent developments in both Africa and the Middle East. It covers the period from 2010 and 2019.

The investigation established that although Middle East-Africa engagements have been increasing; interregional trade has been limited; relations are mostly bilateral, ad hoc, and personalized; humanitarian programs accompanied with built-in subtle, covert and obvious ideological orientations have caused instability and conflicts; lack transparency; and are generally asymmetrical.

With regard to engagements with Africa, in general, Qatar is focused on survival, expansion, and diversification; Turkey on power projection, dominance, control and sway over the Muslim world, economic opportunities; Iran on increasing its foreign influence, spread of Shia Islam, elimination of external interference, and economic survival; Saudi Arabia is keen to maintain its leadership of the Sunni Muslim world, containing Iranian influence, preserving its say among OPEC countries, and freedom of navigation across the Red Sea and finally, UAE policy is focused on maintaining stability for its increasing geopolitical and commercial Interests as well as countering perceived ideological and security threats from the Gulf and surrounding areas.

Overall, while the expansion and deepening of relations holds potential for mutual economic growth and enhanced security, and has done so in some cases, the nature of prevailing climate in the Middle East international relations, notably, the Gulf crisis and a web of conflicts in the Middle East have complicated Africa – Middle East relations with inevitable repercussions in ways that are inimical to the security and stability of the continent and the future of Middle East-Africa relations. Thus, the study recommends the following: more open multilateral engagements and investments that are mutually beneficial and sustainable; purposeful engagements geared towards promoting mutual stability and collective security; and an establishment of a framework of engagement informed by shared values and interests devoid of ideological adventurism. In particular, the study recommends scrupulous attention is paid to important aspects of Africa-Middle East relationship to limit or eradicate conflict-causing ideological or sectarian triggers and orientations as well as reactionary adventures that are neither informed by successful precedence nor are they guided by evidence of their viability.

This study was conducted by the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies to establish the nature, extent and impact of Africa–Middle relations. The study focuses specifically on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. It reveals a number of findings that inform the current engagements, the pitfalls inherent in the interactions, and makes recommendations on the courses of action to be taken by countries in both Africa and the Middle East regions, to achieve common interests in security, development, political stability and diplomacy.

Introduction

This document summarizes key findings, provides trade statistics, discusses the nature of engagements, analyses dynamics of these relations and offers recommendations for consideration in reworking the Africa–Middle East relations, in a way that is mutually beneficial in advancement of strategic, collective, and shared interests of the affected countries.

> UAE policy is focused on maintaining stability for its increasing geopolitical and commercial Interests as well as countering perceived ideological and security threats from the Gulf and surrounding areas

Middle East

Source: HORN Institute

KEY FINDINGS

Political

- The Middle East is more engaged in Africa than Africa is in the Middle East.

- Over the last 10 years, Turkey, UAE, and Qatar have significantly increased their political presence in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa and North Africa.

- The primary drivers of Middle Eastern countries the study reveals, are to advance specific geostrategic interests ranging from Islamist political ideological orientations to trade and the diversification of oil and gas dependent economies.

- The Middle East powers employ both 'hard' and 'soft' power approaches in their power projection in various spheres in Africa. These range from the support for armed state and non-state actors to employment opportunities and student scholarships, to the development of social amenities (schools, hospitals), and infrastructure.

However, these approaches appear to follow carefully planned and choreographed long-term political and ideological orientations.

- Africa is driven by the desire for economic and humanitarian assistance to support their growing economies. It is increasingly looking to the Middle Eastern countries for economic support, and for political and security cooperation.

- Africa–Middle East relations are generally asymmetrical, ad hoc, and personalized.

- The 'new scramble for Africa' by the Middle East is largely informed by internal struggles in the region, such as the Yemeni civil war, the 2017 Gulf Crisis, and the politically–motivated religious and ideological tensions in the Middle East.

- Much of these tensions are as a result of politically motivated ideological subterfuges. The contest is

> "The primary drivers of Middle Eastern countries the study reveals, are to advance specific geostrategic interests ranging from Islamist political ideological orientations to trade and the diversification of oil and gas dependent economies

between Turkey, Qatar and Iran on one hand, and Saudi Arabia, UAE and their allies (Egypt, Jordan and others) on the other hand of the ideological and geopolitical spectrum.

- Middle Eastern engagements in Africa tend to increase, especially in areas of geostrategic importance, in the run-up to and aftermath of crises.

- Tensions in the Middle East have 'spilt over' to Africa, creating additional fault lines in already volatile and fragile countries.

- Although very active in developing social, cultural and economic ties, many countries, both Muslim majority and minority in Africa, have an uneasy relationship with Iran.

- Competition within Gulf countries and Turkey has contributed to destabilization and insecurity in some African countries especially Libya and Somalia.

Economic

- After the European Union (45 per cent), the Middle East (17 per cent) is Africa's biggest investor, both by number of projects and by capital investment.

- The Middle East often adopts the flagship model (as opposed to the one-project-at-a-time model), and has initiated flagship projects in Africa in the fields of energy, infrastructure, and agriculture.

- Fracturing of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bloc combined with a lack of a strong African bloc has resulted in an emphasis on bilateral relations instead of multilateral relations, as was the case prior to 2017.

- In areas of less geostrategic importance, Middle Eastern engagements focus on investment,

especially in the extraction, energy, and services sectors.

- Countries in the Middle East seek stability (economic, political, and security), but have varying ideas of what stability means and approaches in advancing it.

- Trade and investments are critical tools for Middle East policy towards Africa. For instance,

Between 2010 and 2017:

o Turkey's exports to Africa totaled USD 102.96 billion, or 8.31 per cent of Turkey's total exports (on average). Turkey's imports from Africa amounted to USD 67.83 billion, or 4.16 per cent of total imports to Turkey (on average).

o The UAE's exports to Africa totaled USD 70.66 billion, or 5.35 per cent of UAE's total exports (on average). UAE's imports from Africa amounted to USD 65.51 billion, or 4.38 per cent of total imports to the UAE (on average).

o Qatar's exports to Africa totaled USD 10.1 billion, or 1.73 per cent of Qatar's total exports (on average). Qatar's imports from Africa amounted to USD 3.7 billion, or 1.85 per cent of total imports to Qatar (on average)

o Iran's exports to Africa totaled USD 17.37 billion, or 1.68 per cent of Iran's total exports (on average). Iran's imports from Africa amounted to USD 4.46 billion, or 1.1 per cent of total imports to Iran (on average).

o Egypt was Turkey's most important export partner, amounting to USD 24.15 billion, or 1.96 per cent of Turkey's total exports (on average). Algeria was Turkey's most important import partner, worth USD 22.09 billion, or 1.38 per cent of Turkey's total imports (on average).

o South Africa was UAE's most important trading partner on the continent. The UAE's exports to South Africa amounted to USD 9.1 billion, or 0.69 per cent of total exports (on average). The UAE's imports from South Africa are worth USD 12.90 billion, or 0.86 per cent of UAE's total imports (on average).

o Egypt was Qatar's most important trade partner. Qatar's exports to Egypt totaled USD 4 billion, or 0.81 per cent of Qatar's total exports (on average). Qatar's imports from Egypt amounted to USD 2.1

Middle East Countries Investment Across Africa

	Agriculture Investments	Telecom Investments	Marine Terminals	Extraction	Military Base
UAE	●	■	▲	✳	◆
Saudi Arabia	●	■	▲	✳	◆
Qatar	●	■	▲	✳	◆
Turkey	●	■	▲	✳	◆
Iran	●	■	▲	✳	◆

Source: HORN Institute

billion, or 1.24 per cent of Qatar's total imports (on average).

o South Africa was Iran's most important trade partner in Africa. Iran's exports to South Africa totaled USD 8.2 billion, or 0.83 per cent of Iran's total exports (on average). Iran's imports from South Africa amounted to USD 493 million, or 0.1 per cent of Iran's total imports (on average).

• The engagements do not always produce desired results. Sometimes, the opposite result is realized. For example, engagements aimed at stabilizing a target country, often times destabilizes it or the region instead, as evidenced by the cases of Somalia, Sudan and Libya.

• The Middle East is interested in securing food for its citizens. In 2017, the UAE made the most significant agricultural investment in Ethiopian sugar manufacturing, of approximately USD 3 billion.

• Africa has the largest infrastructure investment gap in the world.

• Gulf countries and Turkey have realized China's growing dominance on the African continent, and are vying to be China's best partners for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

• Capital from remittance flows (USD 64.6 billion) from African migrants has rivalled Foreign Direct Investment (USD 66.5 billion) in Africa since 2015.

UAE

• Of the Gulf countries, the UAE is most assertive throughout Africa. UAE currently is Africa's largest investor after China, investing around USD 11 billion in capital in the continent in 2016 alone.

• UAE–Africa relations are based on UAE's quest for economic diversification, influence and stability, its efforts to counter terrorism and insurgencies in Africa, and to insulate its foreign investments on the continent from the threat of instability and violence.

Qatar

• Qatar is still a marginal player in most African countries compared to other important Middle Eastern countries in this study.

• Qatar's relations with Africa have been defined by the rift with other Middle Eastern countries, especially following the 2017 GCC crisis.

• Qatar's security engagements in Africa have been characterized by support for allied states and groups through investment in infrastructure, religious institutions, financial support for state and non-state actors.

• Real and perceived support to groups such as *Muslim Brotherhood* has caused tensions and instability in several countries in Africa.

Two of the 24 armoured personnel carriers donated by Qatar to Mali to help the country fight terrorism (Photo Credit: Sahel Intelligence)

Turkey

- Turkey and Iran have tried to fill the Middle East's power vacuum created by the 'Arab Spring'.

- Turkey supports ideologically allied groups to enhance its influence informed by its own 'Islamist' political ideology.

- With a total of 39 state visits in nine years, Erdogan is one of the most politically assertive heads of state in the Middle East. Erdogan's visits have often been followed by visits to Ankara by his African counterparts.

- Turkey currently has 32 embassies on the African continent, while the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Council is represented in 19 countries.

- Turkey-Africa relations have been driven by Turkey's quest to become a strategic player and problem-solving country in Africa, albeit with mixed results.

- Some countries view Turkey's involvement, especially the underlying ideological undertones, with deep suspicion.

- Turkey is the Middle East's largest provider of humanitarian assistance in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia.

Iran

- Iran's foreign policy to Africa is ambivalent, characterized by suspicion, 'friendliness' and cooperation.

- In 2010 and 2011, Iran's total export to Africa amounted to USD 15.08 billion. In 2012, Iran's total exports to Africa dropped by USD 7.37 billion to USD 1.47 billion as Iran's *Rial* depreciated in value.

- The suspicion is most intense on Iran's perceived aggressive state-sponsorship of sectarian agenda (around *Shia* ideology)

- Between 2010 and 2019, international trade and military sanctions have weakened Iran—Africa relations.

Saudi Arabia

- Saudi Arabia's foreign policy mostly entails cooperation. It focusses more on *Sunni* Muslim communities in Africa.

- Saudi Arabia's thrust in Africa is imbalanced with Riyadh concentrating more in the Horn of Africa, North Africa and the Sahel, where Muslim majority countries are.

- Saudi Arabia's investments in Africa are comparatively minimal, *vis-à-vis* those of other Middle Eastern countries such as the UAE.

Ideological

- Historical ties between the Middle East and Africa include religious ideology.

- There are different and divergent interpretations of key Islamic religious ideas and ideologies. This creates confusion and room for abuse and misuse by actors especially violent extremist groups.

- Activities of most violent extremist groups in Africa are religiously motivated. However, some groups' activities are driven by a mix of religious and political, or religious and socio-economic motivations.

- There has been a marked increase in violent extremist activities on the continent in recent times. Around 2010, Nigeria-based Boko Haram and Somalia-based al Shabab were the most significant Africa-based violent extremist groups in Africa. By 2019, there were at least 10 active violent extremist groups.

- The number of main terrorist theatres in the continent increased between 2010 and 2019 from two (Somalia and Nigeria) to seven (Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo and to a considerable degree, Egypt and Kenya.

- There was a notable increase on the number of violent extremist groups based in countries such as Somalia (from one to three), Nigeria (from one to three), and Burkina Faso (from zero to two), for example.

  o Somalia: 2010: Al Shabab 2019: Al Shabab, Islamic State in Somalia, and Jabha East Africa

  o Nigeria: 2010: Boko Haram 2019: Boko Haram, Islamic State's West Africa Province, and Islamic Movement of Nigeria

  o Burkina Faso: Around 2010: None 2019: Ansaroul al-Islam, and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

- Niger's experience with violent extremism is the most unique in Africa for two main reasons. First, in addition to Al Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), Niger also hosts the jihadist groups that are the "most feared" (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, ISGS), "most dominant, deadliest, and one of the most powerful" in the Lake Chad region (Boko Haram), and the "most powerful jihadi group in the Sahel" (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, JNIM). Secondly, ISGS and JNIM work together creating a tactically stronger unit than when either one works alone.

- The increase in violent extremist activity in Africa seems to correspond with the decrease in similar activity in the Middle East following the 'defeat' of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or IS). It also seems to be associated with the continent's increasing

A Turkish military personnel walks past the Turkish military base in Somalia. Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 (Credit Image: Reuters/Feisal Omar)

Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi inspecting a guard of honor when he visited Ethiopia (Photo Credit: Crown Prince Court, Abu Dhabi)

states' fragility as a result of factors such as armed conflicts, environmental degradation, and political instability. For these reasons, Africa is emerging as the next significant theatre of terrorist and extremist activity.

- Most violent extremist groups in Africa are affiliated with al Qaida or ISIS (which are based in the greater Middle East), giving the impression that the region is 'exporting' violent extremism to Africa even though the ideology of jihadism emerged in both the Middle East and (North) Africa in the 1930s.

- There is a tendency of violent extremist groups on the continent to seek affiliation or collaborate with al Qaida, ISIS, or with each other (with varying degrees of success) to advance their goals, remain relevant, gain credibility, and/or gain or maintain their influence in a country or region.

- Owing to territorial proximity, mergers, collaboration, and group fragmentation, there is some overlap in the areas of operation of some violent extremist groups especially in the Sahel, Maghreb, North Africa, and West Africa. This has created a complex web of violent extremist actors in the Sahel-Maghreb-West African region that has, overall, a destabilizing effect.

- With at least 12 jihadist groups active in North Africa, this is the region most affected by violent extremist activity in Africa.

- The web of violent extremist groups is more complex in the Sahel than in the Maghreb.

ENGAGEMENTS

The Middle East invests in flagship, years-long projects in infrastructure, extraction, and agriculture for several reasons. These include: increasing influence in the international arena, power projection, and food security. First, the Middle East wants to improve its global image as a reliable partner, and has used its excess liquidity and flexibility to engage with existing and potential partners. Thus, the Middle Eastern countries use their investments in Africa in part to demonstrate to the world that they are capable of playing as major actors.

Secondly, the Middle Eastern countries' power (both 'soft' and 'hard') is projected in the region through its ability to engage with its partners in critical areas related to security, politics, and economy. For instance, in 2015, Qatar promised a total of USD 2.22 billion to *incentivise* Sudan to terminate its existing relations with Iran. By 2017, Iran's influence in the Horn of Africa had been reduced significantly. Today, Iran's power in the region has waned.

Lastly, to ensure food security for their populations, Qatar, and the UAE have invested in large tracts of arable land in parts of Africa. In Sudan, UAE is planning to develop more than 28,000 hectares of land through Jenaan Investment. In 2017, the UAE made a significant investment in Ethiopian sugar manufacturing worth

around USD 3 billion, the single largest investment made between 2000 and 2017.

Qatar was in negotiations with Kenya to develop more than 40,000 hectares of arable land. Additionally, UAE investment in Ethiopian agriculture has the potential to upset its partner Egypt, which has been in a long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over access to water from the Nile. The UAE's continuing agricultural investment in Ethiopia demonstrates efforts that UAE (and Qatar) takes to address one of its potentially existential threats. Unmanaged, large-scale agricultural investments can lead to exploitation and infringements of land rights, which is a volatile issue in Africa.

For their economic engagements to succeed, the Middle East needs stability. However, they have varying ideas of what stability means, and which actor or state should be the one to create and safeguard that stability. For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, stability means that a strong centralized government which can create economic prosperity to keep the citizenry content and thereby prevent possible civil disobedience, civil strife, or a revolution.

Turkey and Qatar consider Africa as a crucial battleground to support local allies and limit Saudi-UAE influence. Both countries view Islamist parties as an alternative for strong centralized (militaristic) governments. For Turkey, stability in Africa means supporting allies who can assist it in its quest for increased geopolitical influence and power projection capabilities. To that extent, Turkey is broadcasting a message of Islamic leadership, vying with Saudi Arabia to fill the Middle East's power vacuum created by the 'Arab Spring' and the Syrian war.

For Qatar, stability means promoting and diversifying its economy and trading partners, countering UAE and Saudi political and economic influence, and reducing the influence of the two countries.

For Iran, upholding stability is less interesting than survival, both economically and ideologically. Iran's economy has been battered by sanctions, which have resumed after the US withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018. It continues to invest in local official and non-official community networks in advancing its soft power foreign policy on the continent.

	Saudi Arabia	United Arab Emirates	Qatar	Turkey
Main Target in the Horn of Africa	Sudan	Eritrea, Somaliland	Sudan, Somalia, exploring options in Ethiopia	Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia
Dominant Political Interest	Containing Iran, Qatar, Turkey	Leverage against it's competitors	• Leverage vis a vis Saudi Arabia, UAE • New diplomatic partners	• Ideological • Challenge Saudi dominance • Establish foothold
Dominant Economic Interest	Food production	Regional trade, port's expansion	• Financial diversification • Diplomatic leverage	Trade, Investment opportunities for Turkish firms, resources extraction (oil/gas)
Key Policy Instruments	• Aid and grants • Support of Islamic Institutions	• Budgetary support, DP World • Aid and grants	Central Bank of Qatar, Qatar Foundation	Budgetary support, grants for construction of roads and ports
Military Presence	Assab Djibouti	Assab, Berbera and Mogadishu	None (presence on Eritrean Djibouti border withdrawn)	• Military base in Somalia • Intent to build a military outpost in Sudan

EFFECTS AND CONSEQUENCES

Africa is increasingly looking to the Middle East for economic support, political and security cooperation. Africa's decision to shift away from its traditional development partners, such as the European Union, to other partners the Gulf Middle East, has been informed by the perceived current partners' excessive liquidity, less bureaucracy, and fewer and simpler protocols.

Africa's traditional partners such as the EU and US are often cumbersome and have numerous rules, regulations, and strings attached to aid, loans, and investments, making them incapable of adequately responding to Africa's many rapid changes and needs over the last ten years. Africa's other main partner, China, has witnessed a major economic slowdown, resulting in reduction of funding for projects throughout the continent. Additionally, African leaders are becoming increasingly apprehensive about the economic burden of Chinese loans, which often come with significant interest rates or guarantee requirements involving strategic national assets. These burdens have made Middle Eastern countries—themselves looking to diversify their economies, exert geopolitical influence, and access booming upcoming markets, to look to Africa as logical alternative partners.

Skewed Relations

However, Africa–Middle East relations is skewed to the extent that the Middle East, especially the Gulf, determines the nature and direction of this relationship. The Middle East can take quick decisions, fund projects, negotiate agreements, send troops, whereas most African states cannot. The Middle Eastern countries are capable of doing so because of their economic resources and superior capacity to conduct foreign policy compared to Africa. Therefore, the Middle East—Africa relations is fundamentally skewed in favor of the Middle East.

> " The 'new scramble for Africa' by the Middle East is largely informed by internal struggles in the region, such as the Yemeni civil war, the 2017 Gulf Crisis, and politically motivated religious and ideological tensions in the Middle East

Increased State-to-State Relations

The imbalanced relations are often bilateral, generational, and on an ad hoc and personal basis. A reduction of bloc-to-bloc ties since the fracturing of the GCC in 2017 has contributed to an increase in state-to-state relations. These bilateral relations play out at the highest level, often directly between heads of states.

Weakened Institutions

Personalized bilateral engagements allow for deeper and broader relations. However, the lack of transparency and checks and balances can hollow out and weaken institutions, leading to more fragile states. Fragility creates overdependence on other states. Additionally, it creates room for governments to ignore necessary domestic reforms. One consequence of this is that collective regional security is compromised.

Threat to Regional Security

Finally, a major threat to regional security, especially in the Horn of Africa is the hosting of foreign military bases. This can invite different foreign conflicts into Africa and draw African countries into foreign military adventures, which undermines military independence, territorial integrity, and national security architecture of African countries.

IMPACT

Africa: A Theater for Geopolitics

Over the last 10 years, the Middle East has been engaging Africa, most notably, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Chad, Djibouti, Tunisia, Algeria, Eritrea, and Morocco has had tremendous impact. These engagements bear the hallmarks of geopolitical power plays. Due to the asymmetrical power relationship between African countries and their Middle Eastern counterparts, the threat of Middle Eastern countries imposing their political, economic and security vision on Africa, either through 'soft' or 'hard' power, is significant.

Increased Intra-state Instability

In areas of greater geostrategic importance, Middle Eastern engagements in Africa tend to increase in the run-up to and aftermath of crises. Their intervention at critical points of crises has resulted in the deterioration of various African states. In Libya, foreign competition

and meddling resulted in a continued political stalemate, leading to a resurgence of violence.

This is exemplified by the continuing instability and insecurity in Libya since 2011. In Sudan, Middle Eastern engagements contributed to the drawn-out nature of the conflict in that country. In Somalia, tensions are being created and intensified between Somaliland and Somalia, and between the FGS and the federal member states. In Egypt, challenges emerged after the Muslim Brotherhood-led government failed to deliver, and subsequent coup, in which different Middle East countries supported opposing sides. In Djibouti, the 'spill over' of tensions in the Middle East led to withdrawal of Qatari troops from the border with Eritrea, and the annexation of territory by Eritrea.

MIDDLE EAST MILITARY FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA

Illustration of Middle East Military Footprint in Africa

Source: HORN Institute

Economic Boost for Some Countries

In other areas, Middle Eastern countries try to acquire strategic ports and infrastructure through a combination of investments, diplomacy, and security assistance. Throughout West and Southern Africa, significant investment and large-scale infrastructure, energy, or extraction projects create jobs, economic development and critically needed infrastructure. In West Africa, financial and military support from UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar assists in combating extremism and terrorism in the region.

The engagements have not necessarily resulted in a significant improvement of economic development of African countries. In fact, trade between Africa and the Middle East represents a fraction of both Africa and the Middle East's total trade volumes. While UAE is Africa's biggest Middle East contributor of foreign direct investment (FDI), Turkey is Africa's biggest Middle East trading partner, followed by the UAE, Qatar, and Iran.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the Middle East

o   Address ideological manipulation of political and sectarian differences that have a destabilizing effect on the continent.

o   Resist the temptation to sectarianize the religiously factional and schismatic orientations they find in Africa.

o   Work to prevent destabilizing effects of their engagements, within states by prioritizing mutual security and prosperity.

o   Halt and address trafficking of weapons to conflict-prone areas through Middle Eastern countries. Such weapons hurt both local and Middle East interest in the long term owing to perpetual conflicts they cause in both regions.

o   Avoid military adventurism into Africa, as it extends the already complicated Middle East security environment into the continent, thereby worsening Africa's security and conflict environment. This threatens Africa's stability and security as well as that of the Middle East.

o   The Middle East should be careful not to transfer tensions and conflicts in their region to the African continent. North and Eastern Africa are suffering from 'spill over' effects of Middle Eastern tensions, especially along the Saudi Arabia–Qatar fault-line. This has the potential to spur conflict within, between, and among African countries.

o   Create transparency in direct investment, political agreements, and security cooperation. Opaque deals and agreements are viewed with skepticism on the African continent. The Middle East should ensure that their financial assistance are used for intended purposes and not diverted to malign activities.

o   Halt and address any illegal activities related to the extraction industry. Specifically, Middle Eastern countries should address contentious import of charcoal from Somalia that is partly providing a lifeline for terror groups.

o   Commit to the common goal of creating a stable and prosperous Africa, and work to harmonize differing individual views on what constitutes stability, and who should create and uphold that stability for mutual benefit.

o   In their economic engagements, Middle East should try to adhere to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Paris Principles, and UN Human Rights Council Resolutions

o   Engage with African institutions, civil society organizations, and governments to mitigate risks flowing from foreign engagements in Africa and allows for more enhanced people to people diplomacy that is more enduring.

o   Economic and social due diligence should become obligatory for conducting business in Africa.

o   Develop open-source Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning frameworks for economic engagements in Africa to effectively monitor and evaluate projects, and learn from mistakes, obstacles and unintended negative effects.

o   Promote multilateral bloc-to-bloc relations instead of bilateral country-to-country relations to profit from the economies of scale.

o   To reach Africa's growth potential, governments and investors need to prioritize targeted infrastructural development, reduce high nonperforming loans,

prevent corrupt practices in their engagements, and be transparent in their financial flows.

o Increase trade relations with Africa through purchasing Africa's finished products, removing trade barriers, and allowing for free movement of labor.

o Address the zero-sum mentality with regards to 'scramble' for African states, that forces African states to pick sides in Middle Eastern affairs.

o Disengage ideological foreign policies in Africa to avoid further destabilizing countries and regions on the continent.

o Middle Eastern powers especially the Gulf powers should establish a joint financial taskforce with African countries to help monitor, prevent, and cut terrorist financing.

Recommendations for Africa

o Focus on gaining capital income from remittance flows.

o Develop strong continental and regional frameworks through the AU or regional organizations to address foreign engagements on the African continent, based on Pan-African ideals.

o Develop sound public investment management systems, which increases the likelihood of more private investment.

o Carefully assess, before accepting political, security or economic support from some of the Middle Eastern countries that may risk undermining internal (African) democracy and stability.

o Strive for neutrality in Middle East regional conflicts, but focus attention in working with Middle Eastern countries in fighting terrorism and other common threats.

Map of Africa's Four Regions
Source: HORN Institute

Promote mutually beneficial economic engagements and political cooperation that enhances both regions' prospects for development, security, and stability

o Promote multilateral cooperation and relations instead of bilateral country-to-country relations. Bilateral relations have the potential to pit one country against the other and undermine sovereignty, while multilateral relations mitigate that risk.

o Africa should be careful to avoid religionization and sectarianization of politics, especially along *Sunni – Shia* lines.

o Resist the establishment of extremist religious and political ideologies in different parts of the continent and/or Africa as a theatre for global terrorism.

o Through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), adopt common positions against ideological foreign policy engagements by Middle Eastern powers in Africa, and create a global Islamic network against violent extremism.

o Increase investment in individual and collective capacity of African states to deter and combat jihadism and reduce reliance on the support of more capable, non-African states.

General Recommendations

o Avoid ideologically based relations that have the tendency to be fractious and likely to widen geopolitical fault lines that may push both regions further into instability.

o Promote mutually beneficial economic engagements and political cooperation that enhances both regions' prospects for development, security, and stability.

o Strengthen partnership and collaboration in engaging the global north

o Adopt common positions on issues on mutual interest in international fora.

o Conduct relations based on mutual respect.

The Illicit Economy and Armed Groups in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Regions: From Somalia, DR Congo to the Central African Republic

By Edmond J. Pamba

Abstract

The Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa have experienced violent conflicts and political instability but none has been so enduring as armed groups and militancy in these restive regions of Africa. Armed groups conducting insurgency have dominated the political history of countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (C.A.R), and Somalia. This article explores how armed groups have exploited state failure to build lucrative illicit economies that despite military operations and peace efforts, the armed groups have sustained resistance, plunged the respective countries into permanent fragility, and continue to pose a great risk to regional security due to their transnational presence and operations. To diminish the impact of illicit economies on the regions' security and stability, efforts should thus be made by regional governments to establish financial monitoring capacities and formalize the financial sector (to limit armed groups' taxation schemes), mining and mineral trade. Further, sustained efforts to reclaim territories from armed groups, and secure critical trade routes are important in limiting opportunities for armed groups to gain entry and establish control over lucrative economic sectors. International sanctions and action against international markets for illicit minerals, and trade in ivory should be intensified to address the demand side.

Background

The illicit trade in minerals and ivory, and extortive collection of taxes by armed groups continues to form a lifeline for many armed groups in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region. Such developments significantly undermine international and regional efforts including the African Union's 'Silencing the Guns' initiative which aim at eliminating armed groups, small arms and light weapons, and ending violent conflicts in Africa. Notable groups benefiting from the illicit economies in the region include the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), al Shabab, rebel groups in Central African Republic (CAR), and a multitude of armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

However, underlying the armed groups' intricate relationship with illicit economies are three factors: (a) governance challenges which affect territorial control and market regulation failures, (b) the incentive role played by natural resource endowment in fragile or war-torn countries of the region continues to attract armed groups to abandon peace efforts for violent pursuits of control, and (c) proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in the region. Various national, regional and international policy efforts have been made to eradicate armed groups in the Great Lakes such as the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and Bordering States of 2004. Other mechanisms include the international Small Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2013, the African Union's Agenda 2063 and Silencing the Guns – Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa's Development. Military efforts have also been sustained through the African Union Mission in Somalia (against al Shabab), African Union Regional Task Force (RTF - against Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), and United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

At the international level, in 1989, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) reached an agreement to ban trade in ivory. The international markets for diamonds further adopted the Kimberly Certification on diamonds, effectively banning exports of rough diamonds from conflict-torn countries especially in Africa. Further, a raft of embargoes and sanction regimes have been placed on countries such as Somalia (arms, charcoal, sanctions on individuals), Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Sudan. This article will thus demonstrate how despite national, regional and international efforts to eradicate armed groups in the Great Lakes Region, the armed groups in the respective regions remain resilient and continue provoking instability and benefiting from illicit economies.

1. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

LRA emerged in 1987 as a rebel group founded on heterodox Christian-Acholi (ethnic) nationalism against the government of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in Uganda. The group operates between the ungoverned spaces of northern DR Congo, western and southern South Sudan, southern Sudan and eastern CAR, and northern Uganda. While LRA is now reportedly weaker compared to early 2000s, it has survived for three decades now, and has further survived several military operations by the Ugandan government and lately, a

Ugandan-led military operation in cooperation with the United States. LRA is now believed to maintain a force strength of about 120 fighters down from thousands, and the force is distributed in three countries: DR Congo (Group Aligatch), Central African Republic (Group Owila), Sudan (Group Kony).

Poaching elephants mainly for ivory remains one of the main sources of finance, and supplies for LRA. The group led by a soldier known as Aligatch which is based in DR Congo district of Haut Uele, is responsible for killing elephants in Garamba National Park for meat and Ivory; group members feed on the elephants' meat and fat, while the Ivory is prepared for transportation outside DR Congo to Kafia Kingi in Sudan (Cakaj, 2015). From DR Congo, LRA through the Group Aligatch transports Ivory into Central African Republic, especially in the country's southeastern region (Haut-Mbomou) to another of LRA groups. The LRA group of 20 armed men in Central African Republic is under a fighter known as Owila, who transports Ivory from Central African Republic to Kafia Kingi in Sudan. At Kafia Kingi, the ivory is handed over to another LRA group under Kony and his two sons (Salim and Ali) (Cakaj, 2015). The Salim and Kony's personal bodyguard (Otim Larwedo) take the Ivory for batter trade at Kafia Kingi in exchange for supplies and cash from Sudanese merchants for Asian markets.


Figure 1: Operational areas of LRA and countries affected

Source: *Conciliation Resources, 2015*

2. Al Shabab

Al Shabab is an Islamist militant group operating in central and southern Somalia since 2006 after the fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) government in Mogadishu. Al Shabab had operated as part of ICU's military wing, Al Ittihad Al Islamiyya (AIAI) which had led insurgency operations against the government of President Siad Barre between 1980s and 1991. Siad Barre's government fell in 1991 plunging Somalia into instability for 30 years. In that space of time, civil war and instability in Somalia have created vast ungoverned spaces in conjunction with a sustained political and military power vacuum in the country. Subsequently, extremist and militant mobilization for the 're-organization' of the Somali state, have dominated the late years of instability. Political Islam, which found legitimacy in the imperfections of the collapsed secular state of Somalia in 1970s, forms the basis for al Shabab Islamist movement. The enduring structural challenges of governance, administration and development in the country provide a conducive ecosystem for al Shabab's persistence (Menkhaus, 2014).

The Puzzle of Al Shabab's Resilience

With things changing for al Shabab militarily and politically, the group engaged a tactical shift for survival and to reclaim its space in Somalia and reduce any further advances in the country's foreign-aided stabilization and governance, and AMISOM's advances. First, the group embraced decentralization, thereby establishing fragmented structures for decision-making and operations. According to Menkhaus (2014) and Bryden (2020) al Shabab established various "brigades" in its military organization (*Jaysh al-Usra* – the army of hardship) in central and southern Somalia as follows:

- *Sa'aad Bin Mu'aad* for Gedo region

- *Ali Bin Abu Daalib* in Banaadir, for Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle regions

- *Abu Dalha Al-Sudaanil* for Lower and Middle Juba regions

- *Saalah Nabhaan* for Bay and Bakool regions

- *Kalid Bin Waliid* for Hiiran, Mudug, and Galgaduud

- *Liwaa'ul Qudus* for eastern Sanaag and Bari regions

Afterwards, al Shabab embarked on massive recruitment of foreign fighters to replenish its dwindling number of fighters moved from recruitment inside Somalia to regional countries and other foreign countries in Western

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Europe, Australia, and North America, where Somali populations (most came as asylum seekers following the civil war) and Muslim minorities live. However, its recruitment base became the Horn of Africa, especially Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The group embarked on radicalizing mostly the regional Muslim youth, especially in Kenya's predominately Muslim regions (coast and north eastern). Initially, al Shabab recruited from among the Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia, but expanded the scope to recruiting from non-Somali groups in the region, further complicating regional counter terrorism efforts.

In recruitment of fighters, agents and recruiters for the group, al Shabab started involving women and girls in its activities and membership. Women as it emerged to the group, were strategic assets since less suspicion is placed on them by security agencies and the general public, but also had the advantage of smuggling weapons to the group nicely hidden in their robes. Women were similarly found to bear stronger affectionate influence and special roles in families and communities, which al Shabab found useful for resource and personnel mobilization purposes. However, women were also given frontline roles as suicide bombers and spies. However, women are reported to be lured into al Shabab to serve as Jihadi brides where they are sexually exploited by the group's fighters (The HORN Institute, 2021).

Secondly, after assessing its growing weakness, al Shabab shifted from its nationalistic Islamism and joined global jihadi movements and agenda, especially al Qaida's global ideologies for establishment of a global caliphate. Thus, al Shabab announced ideological allegiance to al Qaida in 2012, with the then group's leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane pledging allegiance to al Qaida's Ayman al-Zawahiri. The group hoped for operational, tactical, and strategic support from al Qaida, and also to complicate the war against terrorism in Somalia (*BBC News*, 2020).

The third tactical shift engaged by al Shabaab was with regards to combat and military strategy. The group moved from direct confrontation with the AMISOM troops, to ambush missions on AMISOM barracks, car bombing, suicide bombing, grenade attacks, and assassination of political figures in the country. Furthermore, the group adopted the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), especially vehicle-borne improvised devices and person-borne improvised devices (VBIED and PBIED). Similarly, al Shabab increasingly employed guerrilla tactics in battling and pushing back advancing AMISOM military campaign (Bryden, 2020). The move complicated AMISOM's war against the group by increasingly making the war asymmetrical and unconventional.

Another rather strategic shift al Shabab made was opening up alternative sources of financing to offset the depleting financial streams. The new methods developed for raising financial resources for al Shabab were further designed to evade the international monitoring agencies for illicit financial flows (Kambere, 2020). As such, al Shabab begun raising financial support from businesses in Somalia and Somali businesses in diaspora, some Muslim charity organizations, the Somali diaspora community, other terrorist groups and some state sponsors in the Muslim and Arab world (Keatinge, 2020). Most of the remittances to al Shabab were being done through the unregulated Somali money transfer system, known as *Hawala*. Lastly, al Shabab started carrying out terrorist attacks in AMISOM's troop contributing countries, especially Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, thereby taking the war into the domestic theatre of individual countries, partly as a move to push the public in these countries to pressuring their governments to withdraw troops from AMISOM and from Somalia.

Al Shabab's Illicit Economy

a. Taxation

Al Shabab is reported to be collecting more taxes from Somali citizens than the Government of Somalia. The group collects in the range of USD 15 million monthly which translates to USD 180 million per year, as opposed to the government's collection of USD 141 million annually (Woodroofe, 2020). Al Shabab has developed a complex taxation system categorized into income tax on businesses, toll taxes, custom duties at sea ports and airports, and extortion, and religious tax (*Zakat* – Islamic obligation for Muslims to donate a fixed portion (2.5 per cent) of their income or wealth to charity and *Infaaq* – Islamic form of charity not pegged on expectations of returns) (Hiraal Institute, 2020). The group targets the lucrative sectors of the Somali economy and prominent business figures for taxation and extortion.

Al Shabab agent counting a farmer's livestock at a market for taxation, 2018 (Photo Credit: Hiraal Institute)

Al Shabab has expanded to cover nearly all high value imports and exports, by pegging tax per shipping containers, with 40 feet containers receiving a tax of USD 160 each and the 20 feet containers USD 100 each. A toll tax of USD 555 is collected on each truck each time a truck is on the road, and large trucks pay USD 1150. Agricultural produce is taxed 10 per cent of its market value, personal cars USD 200 for registration, while camels and cows are charged USD 5 and USD 2 each to be sold at the market. Alternatively, al Shabab takes one out of every 25 camels and one out of every 40 goats (Hiraal, 2018). Other items such as heavy-duty tractors are charged USD 200 for operation license, minivans are charged USD 200 and the water well drilling machine USD 3000 for registration (Hiraal Institute, 2018). Al Shabab group has developed extensive business intelligence gathering through its intelligence arm, Amniyat. However, Amniyaat further plays a significant role in tax enforcement, through monitoring and zeroing in on tax defaulters. Amniyaat's valuation of especially import and export products in sea and air ports helps al Shabab to develop an inventory of volumes of imports and exports going through the Mogadishu Port upon which to exact tax.

The rate of businesses paying tax to al Shabab in Somalia's cities, 2020

However, the unregulated or under-regulated financial services sector has helped al Shabab to receive and channel the taxes raised into the group's activities. Banks, mobile money transfer platforms and the Hawala money transfer system mostly used by the Somalis and the Arabs in the Middle East, are the main conduits of al Shabab tax collections from businesses, aid groups at checkpoints and roadblocks (Hiraal Institute, 2020). Another parallel system of taxation or revenue collections by al Shabab thrives in the name of Zakat, which is paid as an Islamic 'religious' obligation annually. Zakat has been enforced by al Shabab upon businesses and individuals across southern and central Somalia, in fixed denominations according to one's status and business size to be paid annually (Hiraal Institute, 2020). Al Shabab only resorts to *Infaaq* whereupon businessmen and clans pay to help the group stabilize its finances in the events of serious revenue shortfalls (Hiraal Institute, 2020).

b. *Sugar, Charcoal, Weapons, Drugs and al Shabab*

Al Shabab have identified and been running a taxation scheme on sugar and charcoal entering and leaving Somalia respectively. Harper (2020) estimates that al Shabab has put a tax of USD 1050 on each truck leaving the port with sugar and entering the port with charcoal, and across the country at checkpoints. Al Shabab thus makes for instance USD 8 to 18 million annually from Badhaadhe District on the border with Kenya on charcoal taxation, and 33 per cent of the charcoal value going through the ports of Kismayo in Jubaland and Bosaso in Puntland to a tune of USD 38 to 56 million annually (Harper, 2020; Brown, 2014). Around 2014, charcoal was the primary source of revenue for al Shabab with an estimated USD 350 million worth of charcoal being exported to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and

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Egypt (Brown, 2014). However, the charcoal trade in Somalia is declining due to the UN Sanctions Committee on Somalia placed embargoes on charcoal trade in 2012.

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3. Rebel Groups in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), minerals have fueled conflict since 1990s especially in eastern parts of the country. The main minerals whose mining and trade have instead sustained armed groups and armed conflict in eastern DRC, are Tantalum and Niobium, Tin, Tungsten, and Gold (3TGs) (Cook, 2012). Areas prone to armed group activity include North Kivu and South Kivu provinces and the district of Ituri since the fall of Mobutu Seseseko's government to rebels from eastern DRC in 1997. While eastern DRC is increasingly become ungovernable and fragile due to armed groups proliferation, several other factors such as historical marginalization by the Mobutu's government (1965-1997), discrimination against minority groups, widespread poverty, and inequitable resource distribution which provoke armed competition for state power and resources (Cook, 2012).

In the increasing ungoverned space in eastern DRC, and incidental rich deposition of precious minerals, an illicit economy emerged in these parts of the country whereupon armed groups a criminal enterprise of arms proliferation and control of minerals and trade in minerals (*Free The Slaves*, 2011). Armed groups in eastern DRC thus forcefully lay control over mines and mining operations, and carry out mining through forced labor, child labor and other human rights abuses and dangerous mining methods. The motivation for armed groups' penetration in the mining sector is mostly the commercial benefits or profits from cross-border black markets in which they sell the minerals as a source of finance to the groups (*Free The Slaves*, 2011).

The Industrial Value of eastern DRC 'Conflict Minerals'

According to Nicolas Cook in the 2012 Congressional Research Service report, the conflict minerals in eastern and DRC's share of world trade in the minerals is as below:

i.   Tantalum (Coltan)

Tantalum may be described as malleable and non-corroding conductor of both electricity and heat. The mineral is used a component in electronic products especially as a capacitor in auto electronics, cell phones, digital cameras, computers and other electronic devices. The mineral is also used in carbide alloys of hard metals used to make jet parts, cutting tools and rocket engines among other products. DRC's share of the world's market of Tantalum has been increasing at an average of 11.4 per cent every year between 2006 and 2010 from 1.6 per cent to 20.5 per cent (Source).

ii.   Tin (Cassiterite)

Tin being highly resistant to corrosion, is often used to make solders, tin-plating, electric circuits and bronze alloys as well as mixed in chemical compounds. Eastern DRC thus accounts for between two per cent and three per cent of global supplies in tin, mostly consumed in Asian markets as a result of restrictions against Tin in Europe and Japan, and exponential industrial growth across Asia.

iii. Tungsten

Tungsten is used as a cemented carbide compound in manufacturing of metals, construction metals and machines, cutting tools and mining and oil sector machines. The mineral is further used as an alloy for high density, hard and high melting point metal products, and variously in electrical products such as semi-conductors and cell phone vibrators. DRC market share of Tungsten has grown from one per cent in 2006 to five per cent in 2010.

iv. Gold

Gold is mainly used as an ornamental mineral but as a precious metal, it has attracted industrial use in coinage, electronics manufacturing, and other industrial applications. While DRC is a marginal source of world Gold (0.2 per cent), it produces 90 per cent of world's artisanal Gold from artisanal mines in North Kivu, Ituri and South Kivu. Lezhnev & Swamy (2020) find that about 10 to 20 tons of gold mined in DRC is smuggled out the country annually, earning about USD 300 to 600 million to groups involved in the smuggling.

Mapping Armed Groups in Eastern DRC (North Kivu and South Kivu)

The two Kivu territories cover 67,000 square kilometers, and border Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. Over 4.1 million people are displaced in this region alone. This region has over 132 militia groups which are small and ethno-centric but form coalitions for political and business interests (including over 15 Mai Mai militias). Below are the main armed groups according to the 2017 report by Africa Center for Strategic Studies (Paul Nantulya):

North Kivu (capital, Goma)

Armed groups in this region include the March 23 Movement (M23) which is affiliated with the Banyamulenge ethnic group. The group operates in North Kivu, and briefly held Goma, the capital of the province between November 2012 and November 2013. Mai Mai Militias operate in various positions in North Kivu. Mai Mai militias emerged during the Second Congo War (1998-2002) as nationalist forces fighting incursions by Uganda, Burundi, and Rwandan forces. Most of these militias maintain the nationalist identity and are against immigrant communities and Rwandan ethnic groups.

However, Mai Mai militias engage in control of resources to extortion, illegal taxation, and banditry, and also function as private militias for political and business interests. Mai Mai militias include Mai Mai Kifuafua, Mai Mai Nyatura ('hit them hard') which targets Tutsi communities in North Kivu in alliance with FDLR, Raia Mutomboki ('outraged citizens') a self-defense outfit for Tutsi communities in North Kivu. *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD - Congolese Rally for Democracy) was formed during the Second Congo War and backed by Rwanda (RDC-Goma) and Uganda. This group has factionalized into Rwanda and Uganda backed factions.

South Kivu (capital, Bukavu)

Armed groups in South Kivu include Mai Mai Yakutumba formed in 2007 to protect the Bembe community from other communities in the region. The group operates in Fezi territory in South Kivu and has a force capacity of a few hundreds. In 2016, *Coalition nationale du people pour la souverainete du Congo* (CNPSC) under the leadership of a veteran militia commander, William Amuri Yakutumba. This grouped seized several important gold mining areas from government control and launched attacks on Uvira, the second largest town in South Kivu.

Ituri

Ituri province was the epicenter of the Second Congo War. Estimated 50,000 civilians were killed while 500,000 others were displaced. The province erupted in 2017 and 2018, with fighting between Hema pastoralist community (750,000 – one million in number) and Lendu agriculturalist community (300,000–400,000 in number) militias. Another armed group in Ituri, is the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), founded in 2002. It is mainly composed of members from the Ngiti ethnic group, with a force capacity of about 1000.

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4. Rebel Groups and Mining in Central African Republic (C.A.R)

While Central African Republic has had a long history of armed conflict, coups and political instability, its recent history is not quite a departure for the past. The country has been under constant armed violence and armed group activity at least since the 2003 coup led by Francois Bozize and the 2004 Bush War which ended in the 2007 ceasefire agreement. The simmers of the Bush War, poor implementation of the 2007 peace agreement which had integrated rebel groups into the national army, and sectarian tensions among other factors, led to another rebel overthrow of the Bozize government in 2013 by the predominately Muslim rebel movement, the Ex-Seleka. Another militia group, the predominately Christian Anti-Balaka, emerged to counter the sectarian implications of Ex-Seleka's violent sweep to power, thus drawing the country into violent ethnic, religious and political conflict.

The country remains torn along sectarian lines and fragmented into fiefdoms of armed groups with constant conflict turning the resource-rich country into one of the world's poorest. The 2019 peace agreement signed in Khartoum is severely strained by renewed fighting as some signatories have reneged on it and rejoined fighting groups against the government. The renewed fighting comes after the ousted President Francois Bozize was denied candidacy in the December 2020 elections, thus chipping off peace agreement signatories into a coalition (Coalition of Patriots for Change) of six armed groups (of the 14 groups) with him as the leader, to undermine the territorial control and political legitimacy to the incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadera's government (Kum, 2021). Armed groups in C.A.R now control more territory than the government in Bangui, with about 75 - 80 per cent of the territory falling to rebel and militia groups (Losh, 2018; Beevor, 2019; World Vision, 2021).


Source: *The Enough Project, 2018*

The more the conflict lasts, the more armed groups splinter, fight against each other and the against the government to maximize power and status as consequential actors in the country's politics. For instance, by 2019 when the peace agreement was being signed, the country had 14 strong rebel groups fighting and controlling the territory separately but coalescing into two major politico-sectarian alliances to increase their power in peace negotiations and horizontal political power and control. John Prendergast in Dukhan (2018) aptly describes the situation in C.A.R as one in which

"[..] war is more lucrative than peace. The perpetrators of mass atrocities have been elevated as legitimate political leaders. Profiteers and crime bosses with no incentive to end conflict have taken a seat at the table in peace processes thus doomed to fail." (para.2)

Underlying the political objectives of the militia groups, was the interest to seize control of Gold and Diamond mining areas and trade. Expectedly, the conflict in C.A.R continues to prove intractable as armed groups find incentive in the illicit economy of illegal mineral trade, taxation and money laundering. While the country had been illegally exporting about 30 per cent of its Gold and Diamonds before the 2013, C.A.R now exports about 90 per cent of the Gold and 82 per cent of Diamonds are smuggled out of the country. The Kimberley Process responded by imposing embargoes and bans on sale of Diamonds and Gold from C.A.R in 2013 but the embargoes did not stop mineral smuggling nor did they limit armed groups' control of mining sites. As Searcey (2020 para. 2) observes, "some gems are sold legally […] but many are trafficked by rebels who fight over the mines, adding fuel to a six-year uprising […]". Searcey sees the mining industry and mineral trade as a key factor driving the conflict in C.A.R.

A study by Jaillon and Brier (2019) established about 2,560 mining sites across the country's territory, with 73 per cent of the sites producing Diamonds, 16 per cent Gold, and 12 per cent being of mixed production of Gold and Diamonds. Lezhnev & Swamy (2020) put the country's annual production of Gold at about 5.7 tons which is valued at about USD 235 million. The mining of Gold and Diamonds is now almost exclusively artisanal (small-scale) and to a lesser extent semi-artisanal (especially by Chinese companies) after most of the foreign mining companies fled the country since the 2013 uprising. In the article by Katarina Hoije of the *Voice of America*, a miner says "[N]ow it's the rebels who buy our gold. They also control the mine and the workers", which demonstrates the immediate thrust into artisanal mining in the country since the conflict broke out in 2013.

Nathalia Dukhan in the report '*Fear, Inc.*' writes that

Mass violence is a billion-dollar business in the Central African Republic. Unscrupulous political and economic actors, including foreigners, fuel and perpetuate warfare for personal gain. By capturing the country's rich resources with the complicity of perpetrators of mass atrocities […], these networks have sunk the people of the Central African Republic into a terrifying realm of deep injustice, crushing poverty, and overwhelming fear".

Mining sites in Central African Republic
Source: *Jaillon & Brier, 2019*

In the years after the 2013, rebel groups have fighting for control of key mining regions and towns especially in the western parts of the country and specifically the town of Bria (Hoije, 2014). About 140,000 carats of diamond with a market value of USD 24 million had been smuggled out of the country by 2014 (Fynn, 2014). Apart from engaging in illicit mining and trade of gold and diamonds, rebel groups have further imposed taxes on coffee and livestock and issued mining licenses in areas under their control to fund their operations (Flynn, 2014).

Conclusion

Intractable conflicts and proliferation of armed groups in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, threaten the stability of fragile countries in these regions, and security and livelihoods of millions of people. The rich deposits of minerals and government dysfunction in hot-spots such as Somalia, DR Congo, Central African Republic, and sections of Sudan and South Sudan, make it possible for armed groups to derive incentive from the illicit economies such as illicit trade in Ivory or minerals and illicit taxation of people and goods, which ensure financial resources for fighting groups in these regions. As such, efforts to eliminate armed groups in the affected regions should focus on limiting illicit financial flows and illicit trade in minerals or Ivory.

Regional governments should establish financial monitoring and intelligence task forces for joint cooperation and action. Strategies to disincentivize armed groups and encourage defection including through deliberate and sustained disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs should further be pursued. With international development cooperation, the affected countries should effectively formalize mineral trade and the financial sectors to seal out seepage of resources into the illicit economies run by armed groups.

Efforts should be made at regional and international levels, to identify the markets, actors and business entities of minerals and Ivory from the conflict-torn countries in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, for international sanctions or cooperation towards limiting the illicit economies from flourishing. The 2020 Report by Lezhnev and Swamy (the Sentry), *Understanding Money Laundering Risks in the Conflict Gold Trade From East and Central Africa to Dubai and Onward*, adversely mentions Dubai (the United Arab Emirates) as a market for 95 per cent of Gold from DRC, C.A.R and by extension South Sudan and Sudan. The report further mentions that about USD 3 billion of Gold is sold annually to markets in the United States, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Lastly, since aspects of the illicit economies covered are territorial in nature, regional governments should make invest more in recovering territories from armed groups' control. Such efforts will help to effectively liberate mining areas and secure trade routes from armed groups' control and territorially limit illicit economies from thriving at the expense of regional security and stability.

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The Dearth of Content on Radicalization in Kenyan Universities Academic Curriculum

By Prof. Beneah M. Mutsotso, Ph.D.

Abstract

The problem of radicalization and terrorism remains a contemporary social concern. Universities being the citadels of knowledge creation still have the opportunity to resolve this problem through generation of knowledge. Unfortunately, the universities, which have provided spaces of freedom have also become places of recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism. This article analyses the inclusion of the content on radicalization, and terrorism in the curricula of universities. It reports that only 0.9% of the curricula addresses the problem in question. The article concludes that universities in Kenya are yet to use their core mandate to contribute towards solving the problem of radicalization in Kenya. Among the key recommendations is a curriculum review to incorporate content on radicalization, organized crime, and terrorism.

Introduction

This article delves into the extent to which radicalization content is incorporated in the curriculum of select public universities in Kenya. This approach recognizes that universities are deeply affected by aspects of radicalization and as centres of radicalization and or social spaces for anti-radicalization efforts (El-Muhammady, 2018).

There is a growing amount of literature on the role of learning institutions in the fight against radicalization in Kenya but there is scarcity of empirical studies on the extent of public universities infusing radicalization into the formal curriculum. It, therefore, remains unclear whether the lack of radicalization constitutes conclusive evidence that preventive methods through curriculum are effective. All universities and other institutions in Kenya have been affected and have subsequently revised their ways of operation in the wake of increased radicalization and terrorism. So, to what extent did the revision and change of operations reflect on the formal curriculum? As earlier observed by Lindekilde (2012), there are methodological challenges in attempting to prove the absence or presence of radicalization in universities. This article does not attempt to provide a causal link between university curriculum and the presence or absence of radicalization that leads to terrorism in the university campuses in Kenya. Instead, it seeks to explicate the extent to which radicalization has been formal curriculum taught in the public universities. This article is informed by relevant academic programmes in eleven universities that have social science academic programmes.

Brief History of Terrorism in Kenya

Kenya's first brutal interaction with terrorist activity goes back to the December 31, 1980 bombing of the Norfolk Hotel, Nairobi in which 20 people died and 87 wounded. The blame was put on the pro-Palestinian groups who were ostensibly out to punish Kenya for allegedly supporting Israel in the hostage crisis in Entebbe town of Uganda (Mogire & Agade, 2011). Approximately 18 years later, on August 7, 1998, Kenya experienced yet another terrorist attack, this time on the United States of America Embassy, leading to the death of 213 people. More than 4,000 people were also injured in the attack (Krause & Otenyo, 2005). On November 28, 2002, there was an attack on Paradise Hotel in Kikambala in which 15

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Former President of USA, Barrack Obama reflects as he participates in a wreath laying ceremony at the Memorial Park in Nairobi on July 15, 2015 in honor of the victims of the 1998 US Embassy bombing (Photo Credit: AP/Evan Vucci)

people lost their lives. There was also a missile attack on a chartered Israeli airplane but missed the plane narrowly (Aronson, 2013). Between 2011 and 2012, the Kenyan army entered Somalia and later on joined AMISOM. This led to a myriad of terrorist incidents leading to the death of hundreds of people. Although most of the incidents occurred in the north-eastern part of the country that borders Somalia, others occurred in the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa. Churches, police infrastructure, night clubs, public transport and religious gatherings became the main targets. These were followed by the West Gate Mall killings of September 21, 2013 in which 67 people lost life, and later on the Mpeketoni attacks (Gender, 2014; *Daily Nation*, June 16, 2014). Perhaps, the most tragic and explicit interaction between a public university, radicalization and terrorism in Kenya involved the massacre of more than 140 students of Garissa University College in April 2015. On January 15, 2018, there was another attack on DusitD2 Hotel complex in which twenty people were killed (Breidlid, 2020). Kenya faces internal vulnerabilities ranging from a long porous border to corruption especially in the security, law and order section. These, among other factors, make it easy for terrorists to easily surveil, prepare, transport equipment, and launch attacks in the country (Goldsmith, 2018).

Following the increasing threat of terror, especially from al Shabab, the government of Kenya devised a series of counter measures - military, institutional and legal but none in education to address the problem. The most prominent legal response was the enactment of several laws: The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 9 of 2009) which focuses on the identification, tracing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, and the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act No. 6 of 2010 which provides for the prevention and punishment of organized crime, recovery of proceeds of organized crime and proscription of known organized criminal gangs. The institutional component involved the establishment of the Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Kenya Defence Forces Nairobi Command and the National Counter Terrorism Centre which were, in particular, realized through the Security Law Amendment Act 2014 – all these reflective of the "hard" approach (IGAD, 2018). This approach, especially implemented by the police was dubbed "*Operation Usalama Watch*" was launched in the quasi-residential and commercial section of Eastleigh, a neighborhood of Nairobi city favored by the members of the Somali ethnic group and other Cushitic communities of Kenya. The purpose of the operation was noble: to rid the area of al Shabab members and illegal weapons (Wairuri, 2018). However, there were allegations that the

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operation had inhumanely carried out leading to outrage (Hansen, et. al. 2019). Despite all these governmental interventions, it is apparently clear that there was lack of focus on educational institutions particularly public universities. The potential for universities to confront radicalization and violent extremism through the formal curriculum was not explored by the government, therefore, a useful opportunity was missed.

Universities and Radicalization

The link between universities and radicalization and terrorism has been less studied although there exists scholarly productions on youth vulnerabilities (Steitwieser, et al. 2019). Some of the terrorist acts have been committed by university students, and other well-schooled people. In the case of Malaysia, university lecturers were found to be involved in propagating radicalization (El Muhammady, 2018).

In Kenya, one of the masterminds of the Garissa University student's massacre was a university law student from a well-off family in north eastern region (obtained orally from a credible respondent on August 21, 2021). The 2016 Brussels airport attacks (Rubin 2016); the London bombings in 2005 (Glees, 2005); increase of crimes of hate on USA campuses, (Jones and Baker, 2018) all demonstrate that universities are incubators and vulnerable to violent crime. The complicity of some students in the Garissa University massacre has never been investigated up to now (obtained from a credible respondent on August 21, 2021). Therefore, there is evidence that universities have something to do with radicalization and terrorism. Whether university campus radicalizes students or fails to realize its development among its most important stakeholders still remains a concern begging for investigation. Why would universities produce its opposites? Since civilization, institutions of higher learning have retained the reputation for positive or negative criticism of the events in the larger society or within their universities. Universities have remained and retained the mark of freedom of speech and engagement. However, the recent change to engage in anti-society

acts now puzzles many today. Do universities need to be securitized? In the case of the UK, the government introduced a raft of legislation aimed at taming university students. The laws faced a myriad of criticisms and pessimism. Some of them include an increased focus on Muslim students, infringement of civil liberties, curtailing academic freedom, one third of all referrals under the new law involved students in the period 2016-2017, and the securitization of universities (Streitwieser, et. al. 2019). Nevertheless universities need to be alive of the fact that under academic freedom, radicalization can easily dovetail into violent extremism and terrorism. Universities need to be cognizant of the existence of radical thoughts on campus and the possibility of acting violently on those thoughts. El-Muhammady (2018) notes that in Malaysia, students and lecturers supported radicalized movements and Malaysian students had a long history of participating in radicalized activities in and out of the country. Further, he concluded that universities and schools have a role to play in addressing violent extremism as they were active spaces for recruitment. Universities play several roles including detector, educator, preventer and producers of ideas to counter violent extremism. The extent to which universities in Kenya have played this cardinal role as preventers and counters of radicalization using academic programmes remains unknown.

Methodology

Data was collected between April-August 2021. In order to establish the extent of radicalization content in the university curriculum two main approaches were used. The first was review of university websites for academic programmes and course units offered. Focus was directed towards social science programmes with a bias towards the disciplines of sociology, criminology, political science, anthropology and international relations. Initially, the method was promising as the eleven universities focused on had very impressive websites. However, this approach did not yield much. Although the websites promised the academic programmes and particular course units offered were online, this finally proved futile as there were either no course units, scanty units or out rightly not

available. This forced the researcher to change approach and rely on Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with members of the academy and academic administrators as the second approach. The new approach yielded richer information and offered more insights on the process of curriculum development with a focus on academic programmes or course units on aspects of radicalization, de-radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Out of the twelve informants from the eleven universities ten were knowledgeable about the curriculum content in their areas of study. The researcher obtained permission to manually peruse the hard copy curriculum. In the process, the hardcopies of twenty five approved academic programmes in the social sciences and humanities in eleven universities were reviewed. This approach was the most productive as it enabled the researcher to make sense of the extent of the inclusion of radicalization and terrorism content in the curriculum. All the twenty five academic programmes had been taught for the last eight years but none had been reviewed since inception. All the universities were purposively sampled on the basis of the presence of academic programmes in the social sciences. The sampled universities differed greatly in terms of history, size, experience of radicalization, student population, number of academic programmes and resources.

Theoretical Framework

Why do some individuals choose to be radicalized, or to be terrorists? This question has eluded the careful explanation by scholars. However, its persistence and evolving forms have defied current and ongoing attempts to debunk the phenomenon that is so richly entrenched among the youth. All existing theoretical attempts to unmask the phenomenon demonstrate that the problem of radicalization and terrorism is broad and defies existing knowledge. The hard approach initially favored by governments, and which was meant to hammer them was massive but produced moderate results (IGAD, 2018).

In addition, there is no agreeable definition of radicalization embraced by all practitioners and scholars. The absence of an arching definition implies that there is still work to be done to bring this to rest. The hazy nature of some of the prescriptions preferred by some actors points to the fluidity of the problem. In its response to the problem of violent extremism in Africa, UNDP (2017) proposed a raft of recommendations on policy intervention and programming implications. Most relevant of them was the need to upgrade school curricula and teaching quality to enable the development of critical thinking, social cohesion, peace education and civic engagement values from childhood.

Competing theoretical frameworks, all seeking to explain the causes, drivers and motivators of radicalization, exist as part of the response to the problem. However there is still no consensus and the need for granularity of the facets is still required (UNDP, 2017). Radicalization remains a complex phenomenon involving a multiplicity of intertwined factors. Some scholars consider *Rational Choice Theory* as best placed to explain the problem of radicalization. The individual actor weigh means, ends, costs and benefits in order to make a rational choice (Hagan, 2017). Resource mobilization theory begins from a critique of those theories that look at social movements as motivated by conditions of deprivation, strain or disorganization and finding recruits among the isolated and alienated (Morris, 1992). However, to Dalgaad – Nielsen (2008), organizations (universities) operate in a dynamic environment that draws on different types of manpower and continuously recruit new members. Therefore, universities offer good spaces for the recruitment and mobilization of new members into the organization. In other cases, universities being places of youth concentration present attractive environment for recruitment (Schmid, 2013). *Social Network Theory* is a useful construct in the study of relationships between individuals, groups and organizations. Social network theory has its origins in the works of Emile Durkheim (1893) and Tonnies (1887). Later analysis shows that university settings are places where individuals, small and large groups freely associate exchange and build social networks. Hence, these networks are channels through which radical ideas emanate and spread. In universities, therefore, are found recruiters and the networks for recruitment of those vulnerable (Sageman, 2004). *Framing Theory* has its origin in the writings of Erving Goffman in frame analysis. The theory suggests that how something

> " Later analysis shows that university settings are places where individuals, small and large groups freely associate exchange and build social networks. Hence, these networks are channels through which radical ideas emanate and spread

Croatian students lie on the ground for 147 seconds in front of the Zagreb University building in Croatia, on April 16, 2015, to voice solidarity with the victims of Garissa University attack in Kenya. One of the masterminds of the attack was a university law student from a well-off family in north eastern region (Photo Credit: CNN)

is presented to the audience influences the choices people make thereafter. Therefore, individuals can frame a situation to fit what he/she desires and justify what they choose within the frame (Dalgaad-Nielsen, 2008). In the hierarchy of needs, human beings are motivated by different needs which occur in a pyramidal structure. In the structure of needs, the basic ones are satisfied first before the higher needs. These needs are physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem, cognitive, self-actualization. Transcendence need was added following later revisions from the original five needs. In the transcendence needs, a person is motivated by values and ideals that transcend the personal self such as aesthetics, service to others, pursuit of science, religious faith etc. Initial explanations for the cause of radicalization and terrorism rested on the lack of fulfillment of the needs at the bottom of the pyramid. However, a considerable number of individuals who have been involved in terrorist activities were from well-to-do backgrounds. Hence, this puts into question the authenticity of explanations focused on lack of fulfilment of the base needs. Recent writings appear to stress the desire to fulfill the higher needs in the hierarchy (Rutledge, 2011).

Key Findings and Discussion

It was apparently clear that the level of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism-related academic programmes in the content of the curriculum was considerably too low or soundly absent. In one university for instance, there was one course unit titled "Terrorism and Counter Terrorism." It was the only course unit out of forty six units students were expected to cover in the four year undergraduate academic programme. The course was 'elective' which implies that students were at liberty to take it or not. Therefore, there was a high possibility that a student would cover four years without having any academic knowledge related to the problem. In another university, the nearest course was criminology but did not have explicit course units on radicalization or violent extremism. The next relevant course unit was "Organized Crime." A perusal of the course description for this unit did not find any mention of known terrorist groups in Kenya, the region and the world. On why there was no course unit on the subject of interest, one academic said:

> *"These courses were developed much earlier than the problem of terrorists came to us. And as you know the process used to develop and approve new course units is very lengthy. This probably explains why there is fatigue in developing a new course. In fact the process requires that the whole syllabus is approved not just the individual course unit"* (interview on July 13, 2021).

At the postgraduate level, radicalization content was subsumed under "International Security" and often treated as a single topic. Why would a contemporary

social problem that has affected interactions across the world not be an issue of concern in university curricula? In an in-depth discussion, one of the informants attempted to explain as follows:

"You see terrorism has been seen more as a police issue than an academic one. In addition the government has not created the need for academic institutions to expose students to the problem. This is the contrary to the way the government addressed the problem of HIV/AIDs. HIV/AIDS became part of the curriculum from primary to university. In fact in all universities there is a common course on HIV/AIDs taken by all students irrespective of the programme . The vigor has not been seen in violent extremism. In addition violent extremism has been seen as more sectional even though its effects are national (interview on August 2, 2021).

The universities focus on non-academic measures and response to violent extremism was more apparent. In all the universities visited the gates and entrance to all buildings were manned by electronic detectors supplemented by physical searching of all students, staff, visitors and cars entering or leaving. This was the most explicit aspect of prevention of radicalization and terrorism quite evident. Another key informant was critical of the operations of the university:

"The emergence of violent extremism and terrorism provided an opportunity for universities to engage in massive procurement of equipment. This in my view blurred the university's central role of using academic knowledge to solve society's problems. Nobody talks of addressing the problem using academics. The priorities are different. It is therefore not a wonder that there is little or none in the core mandate of the university (Interview on July 16, 2021).

In all the universities whose academic programmes were reviewed there were only seven courses 0.9% of 810 courses at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Hence there is little or no content on radicalization, violent extremism, terrorism or organized crime in the curricula of universities in Kenya.

Table 1: Academic Programmes on Criminology and Terrorism

UNIVERSITY	PROGRAMMES		
	Diploma	Bachelor's Degree	Postgraduate
University of Nairobi	Diploma in Criminology and Social Order	BA Sociology and (Criminology and Social Order) Bachelor Degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice	International Security Master of Arts in Sociology. Masters of Arts in Sociology (Masters in Criminology Master Degree in Diplomacy and International Relations Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration
Kenyatta University	Diploma in Crime Prevention and Management	BA (Criminology) BA (Sociology)	Masters in Criminology
Moi University	Diploma in Crime Management and Prevention Diploma in Criminology	BA Sociology BA in Penology and Security Studies	X
Egerton University		BA Sociology BA Security Studies	-

UNIVERSITY	PROGRAMMES		
	Diploma	Bachelor's Degree	Postgraduate
Masinde Muliro University	Diploma in Criminology and Criminal Justice	Bachelor of Arts in Criminology	MA Criminology with specialization unit in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism
Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology	X	X	X
University of Embu	X	Bachelor of Arts in Criminology and Security	X
Kisii University	Diploma in Criminology and Penology	X	X
Garissa University	X	X	X
Dedan Kimathi University of Technology	Diploma in Criminology and Security Management	Bachelor of Science in Criminology and Security Management	X
Pwani University	X	Bachelor of Arts in Sociology	

Source: *Respective Universities and websites July 2021*

Drawing from the table above, universities in Kenya have academic programmes in criminology and sociology which are ideal fora to house courses on radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Two universities had a course unit titled 'Deviant Behaviour'. Perusal of its course description found no mention of radicalization. Similarly the course 'Abnormal Psychology' did not mention the word radicalization in the course description.

Two universities had a course unit titled 'Deviant Behaviour'. Perusal of its course description found no mention of radicalization

Conclusion

The problem of radicalization, terrorism and organized crime remain contemporary issues of concern in Kenya today. Universities remain too thin or out rightly not involved in using their academic programmes to confront the problem. The current curriculum does not include and therefore does not address the problem. The problem of radicalization and terrorism remain viable areas of academic inquiry. Hence universities in Kenya need to rise to the occasion in line with their core mandate to address this problem. This may or certainly calls for curriculum review.

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The HORN Institute Study: *Africa-Middle East Relations: Interests, Strategies, Interventions, and Impact – An Appraisal*

Africa-Middle East Relations: Interests, Strategies, Interventions, and Impact – An Appraisal dissects the interplay between geopolitics, ideology, security, and economics in the wake of recent developments in both Africa and the Middle East. It covers the period from 2010 to 2019, and it seeks to increase understanding of these dynamics. The study was launched at the International Conference on Africa-Middle East Relations held by the HORN Institute on August 24-26, 2021 in Nairobi, Kenya. The popular version will be published on the Institute's website at www.horninstitute.org towards the end of Quarter Four of 2021.

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Editor's Note

Dear Reader,

We are excited to release our 20th bi-monthly issue of *The HORN Bulletin* (Vol. IV, Iss. V, 2020). We bring to you well-researched articles and analysis of topical issues and developments affecting the Horn of Africa. We welcome contributions from readers who wish to have their articles included in the HORN Bulletin. At HORN, we believe ideas are the currency of progress. Feel free to contact the Editor-in-Chief for more details at communications@horninstitute.org.

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