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INSIDE

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Sub-Saharan Governments' Response to COVID-19 and the Second Order Crises

By Emmaculate Asige Liaga, Olga Menang, and Isaac Namango

Abstract

With the arrival of COVID-19 in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), governments struggled to mitigate the pandemic to avoid the catastrophic impact that was witnessed in Europe and Asia. The responses have had far-reaching ramifications beyond direct public health concerns. This article provides an account of various measures set to mitigate the COVID-19 and the ripple effects, what we call; second-order crisis, in Sub-Saharan Africa. The article demonstrates that some of the responses by the governments and non-governmental actors in SSA were largely adapted from interventions against the past Ebola virus outbreak and current global responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The delayed spread of COVID-19 to SSA presented an opportunity for early preparation in the region. However, as this article demonstrates, these emergency responses may result in second-order crises, which will negatively impact the economy of many African countries long after the pandemic.

Introduction

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) originated in Wuhan, China, where the first cases were reported on December 31, 2019 (Huang, C. et al, 2020). The virus then spread to Europe, Australia and the Americas before finally hitting African countries. The outbreak was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020 and declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020 by the World Health Organization. The COVID-19 pandemic has overwhelming consequences, with over 3,000,000

A busy street in Nigeria. Many Sub-Saharan economies are already seriously impacted by COVID-19 pandemic and it will take long to achieve pre-COVID-19 growth rate levels (Photo Credit Reuters and Juda Ngwenya)

people infected; a death toll of more than 200,000 people across the world as of April 20, 2020 (WHOa, 2020); increasing lockdowns, and a direct hit to the global economy. The COVID-19 pandemic is the defining global health crisis of our time and the greatest challenge we have faced since World War II. This is more so because COVID-19 is much more than a health crisis and affects every sector, with the potential to create devastating social, economic and political crises that will leave deep scars beyond the direct health implication of the virus (UNDP, 2020).

Since the initial outbreak, the virus has spread at different speeds across national borders and through the population at varying rates, within a given country. This high level of disparity led to considerable variation in how countries chose to respond to the crisis (Brahma, Chakraborty & Menokee, 2020). While the first case in Europe was reported in France on January 25, 2020, the first case in SSA was reported in Nigeria on March 25, 2020, two months later (Spiteri, et al, 2020). This delayed transmission should have presented an opportunity for SSA governments to adequately prepare their response to the pandemic, which if seized, would help improve public health emergency response and preparedness of the weak health systems of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Mansoor, 2020).

Despite the late arrival of the coronavirus in SSA, the rate of infections has and continues to grow exponentially,

mainly progressing through both clustered and sporadic spates of new cases each day. Clearly, the logistical and operational debilitation that has arisen from the urgency to contain imminent COVID-19 outbreaks has potentially suffocated many other programmes by SSA governments. Given such circumstances, and in view of the reality that most of SSA countries have weak health systems, resource-limited economic capacities, and frequent political fragility in a number of states; even marginal scales of the pandemic would pose far-reaching impacts (African Union Report, April 2020).

This article explores how the COVID-19 emergency responses are likely to impact the future of Africa. It will focus on the likelihood of second-order crises expected to take toll on the largely low-income economies of many African countries.

Situating the Preparedness and Response of SSA Countries to the Covid-19 Emergency

The measures to curb the COVID-19 pandemic by SSA governments can largely be drawn from two events; the first is the lessons learnt from the Ebola virus outbreak, and second is the early global responses to COVID-19 by countries that were affected earlier.

A parallel can be drawn from African responses of the Ebola crisis of 2014-2016 to the current COVID-19

pandemic. Although Ebola was most severe in Central and West African countries, particularly Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea and Sierra Leone, its impact was felt throughout the continent. The World Health Organization reported over 28,000 cases and 11,000 deaths before the international public health emergency ended in June of 2016 (WHO Ebola Response team, 2016).

The COVID-19 crisis presents familiar scenes for a lot of the African countries. As with the Ebola virus outbreak, there is no doubt that there is a need for a strong and fast response to COVID-19, which necessitates building on the positive and negative lessons learnt from the past. Swift detection, and rapid response of the Ebola outbreak required collaboration among directly and indirectly affected countries. This was further strengthened by strong sense of ownership and collaboration of neighboring countries and the support of the international community to combat its spread. The Ebola virus outbreak did uncover the cleavages in the health systems in the affected countries. For instance, WHO, in the 2019 global health security index, reported that one of the major problems in response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak was the "lack of proper personal protective equipment and workforce training, as well as individuals being dissuaded from seeking care at healthcare facilities due to fear of contagion" (Mansoor, 2020). The response to the 2014 Ebola crisis demonstrated the absolute importance for African countries to invest in more effective surveillance mechanisms and to make their health systems resilient enough to cope with epidemics.

According to WHO, the SSA countries that invested more in the preparedness during the Ebola outbreak developed more robust screening procedures for the COVID-19 at their entry points (Schneidman, 2020). For instance, a mobile app used during the Ebola outbreak has been repurposed to keep the population in Nigeria updated on the COVID-19 and symptomatic cases have been more effectively monitored and reported to health professionals (Givetash, 2020). Such local tailored interventions have achieved even greater impact under regional and international partnerships. International health organizations, such as CDC-Africa and WHO, have worked with governments across Africa to manage the COVID-19 outbreak with the main focus of increasing capacities of African countries in critical response areas such as "coordination, surveillance, testing, isolation, case management, contact tracing, infection prevention and control, risk communication and community

engagement, and laboratory capacity" (Subban, 2020). From the lessons learned from the Ebola crisis, the support in capacity building has led to an increase in testing capacity in Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, among others, for the more important decentralized testing of COVID-19 and patient care (WHOb, 2020).

The global responses to COVID-19 has also influenced reactions and measures of African countries in several ways. In addition to equipping health facilities to deal with the expected influx of cases, general measures and recommendations particularly targeting the public include; quarantine and isolation; encouraging work from home; adopting a mask culture; handwashing; and social distancing to prevent the spread of the virus. The intensities and patterns of containment programmes in most SSA have closely imitated the precedence set in European and Asian countries. For instance, in severely affected countries such as China, Italy, France, and Spain, a complete lockdown was implemented while in Switzerland, confinement was partial. Similarly, across the SSA, stringent measures have since been adopted in areas where the virus spread is predicted to have worse effects. Given the global exponential increase in the numbers of infection and deaths reported, and the overwhelmed health systems and distress among citizens, such measures have been set in an attempt to slow down the infection rate to a manageable rate.

The response to epidemics and pandemics must be implemented in a way that considers the capacity of the local health systems and a collaboration with other sectors within the country, region and the rest of the world. It needs to also take into consideration the social, economic, and cultural context of a given setting. From necessary preventive measures such as hand washing, social distancing (at least one meter), avoidance of touching of the eyes, nose and mouth and respiratory hygiene, to more constraining measures such as curfews and confinements, African countries have adapted

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measures as the pandemic has progressed. In Ghana, for example, travel restrictions were set; in Nigeria, religious gatherings and other social activities of more than 50 people were banned; in South Africa, there was an institution of a total lockdown (Sawlani, 2020).

Such adaptations to local context are particularly important in Africa, where measures implemented in other parts of the world may not be applicable, and alternative measures must be considered to prevent further adverse effects. For instance, where clean running water is unavailable, hand washing is a challenge and potentially can cause outbreaks of infectious diseases. Likewise, with an average household size of five or more people in Africa, social distancing is practically impossible. The tolerance of constraining measures such as curfews and social confinements for instance, in cosmopolitan and economically diverse livelihoods like most African cities, varies quite significantly at household levels. In most of these settings, the predominant majority of livelihoods are subsistence and largely rely on wages earned from semi-skilled, informal labors like construction work contracted on a daily basis and small-scale retail trade like hawking and others. This challenge may explain why facemasks for the public are strongly recommended and obligatory in some countries.

In Cameroon, face masks were made obligatory, finable, one month after the first case was detected contrary to many European countries, more than two months into the pandemic (UN News, 2020).

Implications of the response across various government sectors in the SSA

Given that countries devise their own emergency responses to situations like the COVID-19 pandemic, a broad range of possible repercussions affecting all sectors of governments are inevitable and these are expected to impact at the individual, community and national levels. The primary concerns for individuals would include the guaranteed safety of the healthy and proper healthcare of the patients. The tenacity of communities

is expected to be influenced by the collective measure of vulnerabilities or resilience to COVID-19-related effects in the populations.

SSA countries are in a tough position, caught between the balance of minimizing the spread of the virus and maintaining the functionality of their states. It is, therefore, imperative to carefully analyze some of the decisions made by the governments and its impact on these sectors at the moment and in the future. The following is an inexhaustive analysis of the expected ripple effects in key government sectors in SSA countries, likely to occur as a result of heavily taxing intervention measures towards the control of COVID-19.

Public Health

The COVID-19 pandemic brings additional frailty to already weak, fragile and overburdened health systems in Africa. With an already limited number of medical personnel, equipment, supplies and infrastructure, maintaining essential services is daunting. African countries must mobilize significant funds not only to pay for the increased costs linked to COVID-19 but also ensure the maintenance of other services. This is a significant challenge considering that many public health interventions are donor-supported, and a fair amount of attention and funds are reassigned to COVID-19 services. This may result in disruptions of some public health programs due to shortage of resources, including health staff. A halt in immunization services, for example, can lead to a resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases, potentially resulting in further outbreaks and epidemics. Closed borders and locked airports may result in a decrease or delay in importation and shortages of essential medicines, hospital supplies and personnel protective equipment. There is an additional risk of inflation of prices, making available medicines unaffordable to the majority of the population (WHO c, 2020).

One of the consequences of these disruptions and reorganizations is the aggravation of pre-existing conditions, communicable and non-

communicable *diseases. For instance, Africa is home to a disproportionately* significant global burden of malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis. The existence of endemic populations as we know it, relies largely on sustained intervention programs like the *en masse* routine distributions of the insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) to households and the prescription deliveries of antiretroviral therapies (ARTs) at healthcare points. There is a danger that there may be a shift of the public health away from these programs in favor of the COVID-19, posing major challenges in drug distribution and ability of patients to seek and receive healthcare because of the burden and prioritization of COVID-19 by health systems (Jack, & Dodd, 2020). The net burden of public healthcare in most SSA countries is now also increasingly exacerbated by regular outpatient care offered to other equally essential health needs including cancer treatment, renal dialysis procedures and others. Additionally, most health systems in the SSA feature struggling maternal and child healthcare components. The essential medical attention provided during antenatal, neonatal and postnatal care in the full measure with integrated programs such as guided nutrition, HIV/AIDS and malaria

control and others, face a threat under the distraction of the COVID-19 pandemic (Gregory, 2020).

The median age in most SSA countries is 19.5 years (Ritchie, & Roser, (2019), which could be an advantage, given that age is a risk factor for severe COVID-19. However, if prevention measures are not successful in pushing back the pandemic, infection rates may increase exponentially as seen in Europe, USA, and China. Then, the already fragile health systems may collapse, and hundreds of thousands could die from COVID-19 and other illnesses, especially infectious diseases.

During this pandemic, health systems must rapidly reorganize and expand service delivery to respond to COVID-19, while maintaining essential core services across the continuum of care. Some organizational changes recommended by WHO include: (i) to designate hospitals to receive COVID-19 patients and prepare to mobilize a possible surge in acute and ICU admissions; (ii) to maintain continuity of essential services while freeing up capacity for COVID-19 response; and (iii) to train, repurpose and mobilize the health workforce according to priority services; and review supply chains and

A young man wearing a mask looks on in an informal settlement in Kenya (Photo Credit: AP)

> Most African governments have emphasized health measures and physical distancing responses. With the immediate focus being managing the pandemic, most governments have shown little attention to their fiscal stability in the months to come

stocks of essential medicines and health technologies (WHO'd, 2020).

Socioeconomics

Over the past few years, Africa has demonstrated its capacity for strong economic growth. However, the economy of many SSA countries is still largely unstable and could strangle under heavy pressure from the COVID-19 pandemic. The African Union (AU) projects that up to 20 million jobs could be lost; prices will increase as global supply chains break down leading to the risk of currency devaluations; and a huge potential for social unrest (AU, 2020). This is even expected to be worse considering the typical large scales and heavy reliance upon the informal sector and small-scale retail entrepreneurships in most SSA economies. Many businesses, individuals and even national economies will be left vulnerable to external shocks (World Bank, a. 2020). In many countries, a huge proportion of the population rely on the daily business of buying and selling products for subsistence. In such circumstances, well-considered measures as opposed to blanket, copy-cat solutions such as "home offices" that take into account the subsistence nature of most SSA livelihoods would offer more favorable economic remedies.

Confinement becomes a major impediment to business, especially small businesses in countries like Nigeria and Ghana. In addition, the economy of African countries is extroverted and rely on the economies of Europe, Asia and America, who are themselves victims of economic downturn. This will affect both development aid and industrial demands that rely on importation almost solely from China. In their projections, the AU predicts a worst case scenario where these non-Africa countries would take up to eight months to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control, the accompanying economic struggle would surmount to more than 4.5% reduction of Africa's gross domestic product (Mansoor, 2020).

Apart from the informal sector, border lockdowns in many countries in Africa will affect large scale import and export in Africa. Over three-quarters of African exports are natural resources, and the economies of countries such as DRC, Zambia, Ghana, and Nigeria are particularly at risk. The reduction in the demand for these products will impact the economy of the continent. There is a projected annual global GDP drop of 2.4% in 2020, this will be a drop from an already weak 2.9% global GDP in 2019 as reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2020). Also, given that global economic growth is a key driver of commodity prices, it is expected that the global impact of this crisis will drive local prices of commodities up. This uncertainty will, in turn, affect investors who might wait on investing in Africa until the impact of COVID-19 is better understood (AU, 2020).

Another important aspect that will be significantly impacted by a lockdown is the alternative sources of the African economy, particularly the remittances. The worldwide economic shock may negatively affect friends and family abroad, impeding their ability to send money home to Africa. The AU report predicts that up to USD400 million of remittance income from South Africa to Zimbabwe is under threat. Zimbabweans may not be able to make these payments in the current situation due to the imposed lockdown orders and the fact that many workers have been sent home (Finnan, 2020).

Most African governments have emphasized health measures and physical distancing responses. With the immediate focus being managing the pandemic, most governments have shown little attention to their fiscal stability in the months to come. Most African countries already struggle with very high rates of unemployment, and it is expected that the COVID-19 crisis will increase unemployment rates by approximately 40%. This will have significant implications for the GDP of most countries. For the first time in 20 years, the World Bank estimates that due to COVID-19 crisis, there will be an increase in poverty rates, with 40 million - 60 million people being declared to live under extreme poverty (under USD1.90/day) depending on the magnitude of the economic shock, as the global economy falls into recession in 2020 (World Bank, b 2020).

Given the painful lessons on the impact of the Ebola outbreak on the economic progression of citizens, some governments, such as Namibia, are offering income grants to workers who have lost their jobs (Subban, 2020). Regionally, the Africa Centres for Disease Control

Doctors and nurses in Kenya preparing to attend to COVID-19 patients (Photo Credit: World Health Organization)

and Prevention are mobilizing a special anti-COVID-19 response fund and international economic support. However, COVID-19, unlike Ebola, has presented a worldwide catastrophe, affecting donors who are now looking to strengthen their own systems and economies. Most African governments are thus not able to maintain social security, a social grants system, or unemployment benefits. There is a risk that the already vulnerable populations will sink deeper into poverty. As countries fight the COVID-19 pandemic, there will be a need, immediately after the lockdown or shortly after, to have a look at more sustainable ways to recover the economy.

Security

Internal security, such as the military and police, have played a vital role in many countries. For instance, the military hospitals in Switzerland have been converted to COVID centers to relieve the civilian hospitals; the barracks in Romania and Mongolia have been transformed into quarantine facilities; in Italy, the army has been an essential player in the monitoring of quarantine measures set by the government, border control and disinfection campaigns; and the German air force has offered logistical support by providing transportation for various patients (Schnabel, 2020).

Similarly, the roles of security agencies including the police and military deployment of internal services across the SSA in reinforcing government directives such as the curfew, have been met by much criticism. Extrajudicial use of force on the public stimulate unnecessary unrest and disturbances such as mass cross-border migration, economic strife, and conflict and violence. These factors may only help spread the disease further.

In Africa, support from armed forces in the implementation of COVID-19 measures has been organized in an ad-hoc manner. The military and police have been accused of using heavy-handed techniques in forcing the public to comply with the rules and regulations set by the government. The brutality which was initially witnessed

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in these countries was done in an attempt to enforce curfews and lockdowns announced by governments. A significant issue in these settings is the circumstances under which arrests of persons violating regulations are made. As proven in countries such as China and Italy, minimizing movements and reducing congregations of a large crowd of people can help slow down the virus; the overall chaos unleashed in some African countries are counterproductive. Distancing measures are often not followed, and offenders are transported in large numbers without any protective measures for them or the police or armed forces; offenders and police run the risk of exposure and potential infection (Sperber, 2020).

During the 2014 Ebola crisis, various countries reported violence by security forces. The population in these countries found security forces' heavy-handedness punitive and coercive. In Liberia, there were reported riots which undermined disease control in Monrovia, and there were reports that one person died due to police brutality. Given the relationship between the security sector and society as well as the relationship between the government and society, African governments should have taken more precaution in the role their security sector would play towards a more productive outcome. As the rate of infections increases in these areas, and more stringent confinement measures and lockdown rules that need the heavy-handedness of the security actors are implemented, fear of distrust of the government and the security actors by the public will increase.

Conclusion

Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic has threatened the public health systems and overall organization and stability of national institutions and economies across the globe. Even the most developed countries have faced tremendous challenges in mitigating the spread of the virus and its devastating consequences. The second-order crisis generated will vary greatly from country to country and some countries will certainly recover faster than others from the COVID-19 recession. Sub-Saharan Africa should be prepared for a potentially longer mitigation and recovery period. A careful interrogation of the various strategies used by the African governments to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic is warranted. This examination will not only help to generate a better response to future epidemics or pandemics but will also bring to the foreground the importance of addressing the resulting second-order crisis. Moving forward, national and global measures implemented should directly address management of the public health crises whilst integrating parallel measures to mitigate the impact of the health crises on other sectors and on the society.

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COVID-19 in the Greater Horn of Africa:
Responses, Impact and Critical Lessons

By Otieno O. Joel and Elvis Salano

Abstract

The COVID-19 outbreak, now a global pandemic, presents the greatest health emergency in the 21st century. While the pandemic has caused a world-wide maelstrom, its highest impact may occur in developing countries such as those in the greater Horn of Africa region. This article discusses COVID-19 within the specific context of the Horn of Africa with the aim of assessing responses, impact and critical lessons moving forward. It contends that countries in the region responded to the outbreak in a securitized manner thereby allowing for the prioritization of resources to aid in combating the pandemic. However, given the heterogeneity of government responses across the region, it proposes the adoption of a comprehensive regional response strategy that allows for seamless regional coordination of government responses to the serious threat posed by COVID-19.

Introduction

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the novel coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) a global pandemic. The disease; originating in Wuhan, China in December 2019, among other ways transmits through air droplets released by infected persons through coughing, sneezing or saliva (World Health Organisation, 2020). As of May 3, 2020, the global tally of infections stood at 3,428,422 and 243,831 deaths, according to John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. This has necessitated governments across the world to impose stringent measures such as closure of borders, declaration of state of emergencies, imposition of curfews, ban on all social gatherings, and implementation of total and partial lockdowns of territories, and regions with high infection rates. However, these steps, though necessary have significantly upended social order, slowed economic activities and exposed the structural weakness of multilateralism. In the economic realm, the pandemic is shrinking the global economy (Jonathan, 2020) to levels that the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina Georgieva, contends might only be rivalled by the great depression (Georgieva, 2020).

In the greater Horn of Africa region, whose human toll is thus far mild compared to other parts of the world, the pandemic threatens to compound other challenges. Among these are food insecurity, the threat of terrorism as well as civil and political conflicts.Thus, the pandemic is as much a political, security, and economic issue, just as it is a health crisis. In responding to the pandemic, governments in the region especially Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia have largely adopted security-centred approaches. For example, in Ethiopia, the government has declared a national state of emergency. In Kenya and South Sudan, authorities have imposed a dusk to dawn curfew while in Uganda and Rwanda, the governments have initiated total national lockdowns. The extent to which these measures will assuage the impact of COVID-19 is a matter that will be clear with time.

This article discusses the outbreak of COVID-19 in the region, with the aim of creating an understanding as to the responses, impact and lessons during the first two months since the virus's outbreak in the region. The article has three major sections. We begin by discussing the outbreak of COVID-19 and its landfall into the greater Horn of Africa. This takes us to a conceptual understanding of public health as a security issue, and how governments in the region reacted to the outbreak. Section two discusses the potential impact that the outbreak might have in the region. Section three details critical lessons learnt so far by the region's governments since the outbreak of COVID-19. Finally, we conclude the article by arguing that the region needs a system-wide, joint and well-coordinated response strategy dedicated to address the socio-economic, political and public health burden of COVID-19.

AMISOM forces donating food items to vulnerable families in Dhobley ahead of the Eid ul Fitr celebrations in May 2020 (Photo Credit: AMISOM)

The outbreak of COVID-19 in the Greater Horn of Africa

The outbreak of the disease and its spread to the scale of a global pandemic presents the worst, so far, of the emergence of an infectious disease in modern history. Just within three months, from the first reported case in Wuhan, the virus has become a virulent, causing unprecedented disruptions to social, economic and political systems, and threatening lives and livelihoods of millions of people globally. Although the number of infections is still running low in Africa compared to those in other countries in Europe, North America and China, countries in the African continent have been reporting burgeoning caseloads of the disease since the beginning of March. This has generated fears that Africa could soon become the epicentre of the deadly virus and thus shoulder the greatest burden from the contagion (van Zandvoort *et al*, 2020; *The Washington Post*, March 2020). With 35371 confirmed cases and 1534 deaths in Africa, according to the Africa Centre for Disease Control, at the time of writing, the disease is already having a devastating impact on the economic and political stability of many countries, given their weak health systems, limited resources and underlying social and political problems.

In the greater Horn of Africa, the first case of the disease was reported in Kenya on March 13, 2020. While the number of infections remained relatively low throughout March, with some analysts linking low screening, under-reporting, tropical climate and reduced travel to and from China (Rossman, 2020), the number of new infections has continued to rise, with mounting cases of local transmission.

Given the catastrophic nature of the disease, especially, the rapidity of its transmission, high morbidity and mortality rates, extreme pressure on health services and disruptive capability, the outbreak of COVID-19 presents an unprecedented emergency which bears an imminent threat for the greater Horn of Africa region. This is for a number of reasons. First, countries in the region have some of the weakest health systems in Africa, if not globally. Nearly all the countries lack the capacity for hospitalization including effective surveillance, prevention, diagnosis and treatment of the pandemic of this nature. Particularly, there is a lack of personal protective equipment (PPE), intensive care units (ICU), ventilators, sufficient hospital beds, other medical equipment and adequate medical staff. For instance, in South Sudan, there were only 24 ICU beds with four ventilators at the time the first case of COVID-19 was reported in the country (International Rescue Committee). Others, like Somalia, initially could not test, and therefore had to transport samples to Nairobi.

Second, even before the virus outbreak, countries in the greater Horn of Africa were struggling with multiple

shocks, which might ostensibly combine to exacerbate the impact of COVID-19. These include; a gruelling humanitarian crisis caused by massive displacement and refugee crisis (4.7 million people being food insecure by February of 2020); invasion by migratory desert locust in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia threatening food and nutritional capacity of several households; unfavourable environmental conditions including slum dwelling, inadequate water and sanitation facilities; pre-existing disease burden from HIV/AIDS, malaria, cholera, and other non-communicable diseases; as well as armed conflicts and terrorism (UNOCHA, 2020; Aime, 2017).

Third and finally, the global economic downturn in the wake of COVID-19 is set to have extensive reverberations on the region. Over the last decade, there has been an expanded trade and travel between the countries in the Horn of Africa and the rest of the world, particularly, the Middle East, Europe and Asia. With diminishing trade globally – disruption of global supply chains and low demand for exports, and a lack of industrial capacity to fill the widening gap – these countries are facing a huge challenge sustaining their economies. As a recent study indicates, several countries in the region are already experiencing an economic slowdown, given the fall in oil-export prices, reduced tax revenues and foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as disruptions in the normal working way for individuals and businesses (Jayaram *et al*, 2020).

Public Health as a Security Issue

Within the critical security studies literature, public health – the emergence of infectious diseases, biohazards and

A graph showing COVID-19 case trajectory in some of the Horn of Africa region countries (Source: The HORN Institute)

pandemics – is increasingly understood as a distinct security issue, posing significant threats to national, regional and global security. This shift is associated with the conceptual developments that took place in the post-Cold War era, in which analysts sought to broaden the traditional spectrum of the security agenda to include non-traditional security threats such as "climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, trafficking of persons, drug trafficking and transnational crime" (Cook, 2017 p. 38). Tackling directly the growing concern about the impact of HIV/AIDS, Denis Altman underscored

that this conceptual shift included the "issues of health generally, and epidemics of infectious diseases more specifically" as critical threats to security (Altman, 2003, quoted in Fidler 2003, p.791). Through 'securitization' – the process by which political issues are elevated into the security realm – governments, international organizations, policy practitioners and analysts have tended to approach infectious disease outbreaks not so much as a threat to public health to be tackled by civilian authorities but as an essential security concern requiring the invocation of security systems both at domestic and international levels.

According to Fidler (2003), there are three reasons for understanding issues of public health as critical security concerns. First, is the potential impact that a rapidly spreading infectious disease might have on the social, economic, political and security stability of states, given the interconnectedness and interdependence created by globalisation. With globalization, there is increased human traffic across state borders alongside a rapidly growing interdependence for the industrial and market supply of global public goods (Kaul *et.al* 2003). However, the danger erupts when the global supply of goods is suddenly blocked or severely constrained by such risk as a widespread global transmission of highly infectious diseases. This can indiscriminately affect the stability of states and the personal security of their citizens. For instance, since the outbreak of the Influenza flu (H1N1) or 'Spanish Flu' in 1918-9 that killed an estimate of over 50 million people, several epidemics have emerged including HIV/AIDS in the early and mid-2000s, SARS, the Avian Flu (H5NI), and Ebola, and now the novel coronavirus whose impact have not been limited just to the loss of lives, but have also brought about serious socio-economic, political and security burdens in the affected countries, regions or globally (Caballero-Anthony, 2006).

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...the decimating effect of the disease, as well as the resulting impoverishment of millions of people, could become a precursor for complex state and regional insecurity.

Second, the concern that the outbreak of acute pathogenic infectious diseases may compound extant national and international security problems and affect the national interests of third-party states. Pandemics can trigger chaos, cause political mutiny, foster ethnic or racial profiling, or reify discriminatory border surveillance, which can spark conflicts and mass displacement of populations both within and across state borders. These risks can then reverberate regionally, thereby undermining regional or global security (Burci, 2014). A good example is devastation of HIV/AIDS in the global South in the early and mid-2000s. At the international stage, the United Nation Security Council in its resolution 1308 passed in July 2000, noted that "the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, [would] pose a risk to stability and security" (UNSC, 2000). For the UNSC, the focus was on how the relentless spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa was directly corroding military capacity, thus affecting international peacekeeping missions and other state security agencies. Additionally, the decimating effect of the disease, as well as the resulting impoverishment of millions of people, could become a precursor for complex state and regional insecurity.

Finally, and perhaps the most forthright reason for securitizing public health is the increasing fear precipitated by the proliferation and use of biological weapons both by state and nonstate actors, mainly, terrorists. Bioterrorism or the deliberate release of harmful pathogenic substances through waterways, sewer lines or subway or other ways, intending to inflict pain or decimate large populations, has been on the rise since the mid-1990s (Fidler, 2003). As McInnes and Lee (2006, p. 23) notes, these realities have necessitated the increased and extensive "collaboration between health and security communities to enhance response preparedness and surveillance for biological weapons".

Government responses, securitization of COVID-19

The image of COVID-19 – as a swiftly spreading novel virus, without a ready vaccine or rather, the realization that the development of a vaccine may take several months or even years - sparked a lot of fear among communities and governments. This has precipitated an understanding of the outbreak as an existential security threat that requires exceptional response measures for its containment. In the Horn of Africa, just like in other parts of the world, governments responded to the outbreak in

national security terms. Given the severe impact of the disease, in terms of deaths and the economic disruptions, witnessed in the countries that were first hit by the virus, such as China, Italy and the US, the region's governments rose to an awareness of their unique vulnerabilities and potential fragility in the face of a ravaging outbreak of COVID-19. This prompted governments across the region to adopt a securitized posture in dealing with disease, with containment constantly seen as the most viable way to safeguard the states and their citizens from the vagaries of COVID-19.

Despite differences in timing and varying levels of enforcement, responses have ranged between soft and hard measures (See table 1). While some countries, notably, Tanzania and Burundi have maintained the status quo, and followed a 'wait and see' scenario, others, such as Rwanda and Uganda have instituted radical measure in the form of total lockdowns. In Kenya, a dusk-to-dawn curfew and partial lockdowns targeting specific counties regarded as COVID-19 hotspots have been instituted. In Ethiopia, a 5-month national state of emergency is in place, causing an indefinite pause on August elections, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warning of "grave legal measures" against violators of the new rules (Aljazeera, 2020).

List of Government responses to COVID-19 across the Horn of Africa

Country	Responses	Country	Responses
Kenya	- Closure of borders and all ports (Suspension of commercial flights) - Dusk to dawn curfew - Partial lockdown of select counties (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Mandera) - Release of 3837 prisoners - Closure of schools, ban on public gatherings, sports	Ethiopia	- Closure of all borders and ports - Release of 4011 prisoners 5-month national state of emergency - Suspension of elections (initially scheduled for August 2020)
Uganda	- Closure of all land borders and airports - Ban on public gatherings, public and private transportation - closure of all learning institutions - National total lockdown	Somalia	- Closure of all borders and ports - Release of 148 prisoners - National curfew (8pm – 5am) - Total lockdown in Mogadishu (all operations closed except for essential service. Security officers manning the streets).
Rwanda	- Closure of all borders and ports - Total lockdown (all operations closed except for essential services)	Djibouti	- Closure of all borders and ports - Full lockdown (movement is highly limited)
Sudan	- Closure of all borders and ports - Ban on public gatherings, Friday prayers - Ban on public transportation 24-hour lockdown in Khartoum	South Sudan	- Closure of all borders - National curfew (7pm-6am)

Country	Responses	Country	Responses
Eritrea	• Closure of all borders and ports • Closure of schools, • Ban on Sports and gatherings	Tanzania	• Suspension of international flights • Closure of schools and other learning institutions
Burundi	• Suspension of international flights		

Source: Authors' compilation.

Potential Impact of COVID-19 in the Horn of Africa

The magnitude of the long-term impact of COVID-19 in the Horn of Africa may take time to be understood. It will depend, in part, on the duration the pandemic will remain active in the region, and the recovery capacity for the region's countries and for the rest of the world. However, there are already pointers to enormous disruptions in the foreseeable future. In the political realm, the virus in the short term will interfere with the election calendars and/or serve as a pretext for incumbents to extend their unwelcome stay in office. This may heighten political tensions and conflicts, potentially putting an additional layer of problems posed by the pandemic. In Ethiopia, parliamentary elections have been indefinitely postponed, and a national state of emergency is in place. This does not only throw the country into a constitutional impasse, but also presents a fresh challenge for Prime Minister Abiy's push for reform and change. As such, it remains necessary that the government will craft a careful strategy for addressing the pandemic and the unfolding political situation.

In Burundi, campaigns for the May elections have been ongoing with political parties hosting huge rallies across the country, obviously, disregarding countermeasures for COVID-19 (Radio France Internationale, 2020). Although this trajectory appears plausibly in the political scene, holding political rallies and conducting elections amidst such a pandemic is an ill-founded decision which might exacerbate the decimating effect of COVID-19. Other countries that remain on the political radar include Tanzania and Somalia, both of which are experiencing rising numbers of COVID-19.

COVID-19 is also likely to weaken peacekeeping missions and counterterrorism operations in the region. Already, new deployments and rotations of forces attached to various missions, AMISOM in Somalia, UNMISS in South Sudan and the UN-AU hybrid force in the Darfur region

(UNAMID) have been suspended (UNSC, 2020; de Coning, 2020). In addition, peace operations have introduced social distancing measures, which have sharply reduced the number of active staff. For AMISOM, operations have been reduced to essential functions only; patrols, protection of civilians, convoy escorts, protection of key infrastructure, and force protection. This policing vacuum creates room for terrorist to cultivate propaganda and conduct attacks. In Somalia, the Al Shabab terror group has blamed the outbreak of the virus on "the crusader forces who have invaded Somalia and the disbelieving countries that support them" (Guardian, 2020). In essence, Al Shabab is calling for revenge.

Critical Lessons

While the region has previously battled other pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, the nature and impact of COVID-19 have revealed crucial lessons on many fronts. First, inter-governmental organisations in the Horn of Africa appear to have limited capacity to coordinate effective regional responses to disasters. At such a moment, the region's well-established organisations, the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should be at the forefront in providing leadership and brokering common strategies against the disease. The absence of regional coordination has opened room for countries to act on their own making it difficult to contain the spread of the virus within the region given the interconnectedness of economies and movement of people. Some countries have been quick to act while others have drugged. For instance, while Rwanda was quick to impose a national lockdown, countries like Tanzania and Burundi have been reluctant to enforce restrictions of movement despite evidence of communal spread. Given the nature of some countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, which are landlocked and therefore dependent

on neighbouring states for supplies, characterised by the huge movement of people, uncoordinated responses are counterproductive in combating the disease. More so, the urgency of a regional response is amplified by the state of the healthcare system in countries ravaged by war and political instability such as Somalia, Burundi and South Sudan.

Secondly, underinvestment in the health sector is a security threat. In the Abuja declaration of 2001, African governments agreed to commit at least 15 per cent of their national budgets to the provision of health care. This was meant to strengthen health systems and rid the continent of preventable diseases and deaths. However, none of the countries in the region has consistently realized this target twenty years down the line. In part, this accounts for massive challenges that the governments have encountered in the fight against this pandemic, especially, with regards to healthcare system preparedness to handle public health emergencies.

Thirdly, governments in the region lack a comprehensive framework for state-citizens partnership in alleviating disasters. Success against infectious diseases requiring behavioural change has previously succeeded when governments work together with communities and individuals to find localized solutions. In essence, the frontline combat unit involves citizens with the government acting as a facilitator in terms of policy formulation and dissemination of information. In the absence of such arrangements, failures by governments often resulting in mistrusts, resentment and commotion from citizens. The 1978 International Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma Mata, funded by the WHO and UNICEF, emphasised the importance of community participation in the management of health care (Mbuagbaw, 2011). In the same vein, WHO credited strong community ownership and involvement in the success against Ebola in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (World Health Organisation Africa, 2019). The need for a strong state-citizen partnership is even more urgent in the case of COVID-19 owing to the disease's disruption of social order. In such cases, communities have proved better placed to adapt and create homegrown coping mechanisms.

Fourth, wealth inequality and poverty impede healthcare provision. Globally, COVID-19 has exposed the urgency for poverty alleviation and the need to bridge the gap between the haves, have-nots and have-lots. It has

A medical personnel wearing a protective suit cleans the airfield to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at the Juba International Airport in Juba, South Sudan, on April 5, 2020 (Photo Credit: Reuters/WFP)

also resuscitated the North-South debate on wealth distribution and the place of Africa in the global economy. While the well-endowed western countries managed indefinite lockdowns and prohibition of movement through the provision of adequate social safety nets and compensations for job losses, their counterparts in Africa, including the Horn of Africa region, whose citizens depend on daily wages for livelihood, are unable to afford similar huge stimulus packages. Even for countries like Rwanda and Uganda that are in full lockdowns, it is impossible to foresee these measures beyond a certain period without riots or other catastrophes in terms of malnutrition and starvation. These economic difficulties generated by the pandemic underscores the urgency for wealth creation and income equality in the region.

Lastly, COVID-19 has revealed the urgency for diversification of economies in the horn of Africa region. With the closure of international borders, countries in the region have registered a dip in foreign revenues. In Kenya for example, the multibillion flower industry, whose market is largely in Europe came to a standstill, resulting in loss of jobs and revenue for farmers. Similarly, the decline in tourism has led to a mini collapse of the hospitality industry. In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian airline, one of the profit-making airlines in the region has ground to a halt. The existing oil crisis, characterized by overproduction and therefore drop in prices, clearly affects the ability of South Sudan to generate revenues to respond to the pandemic. Diversification will help increase intra-regional trade and sustain economies even amid a global crisis.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The outbreak of COVID-19 has had devastating impact on the greater Horn of Africa region. It has weakened the economy, suspended crucial political processes and presented a complex security matrix including slowing down peace operations. While countries have taken decisive steps to contain the disease, the inward-looking approach has exposed the structural weakness of regional organisations, in particular the IGAD and EAC. This approach is counterproductive as it will exposes countries to second waves of attacks, even if they manage to contain the prevailing infections given the interconnectedness and interdependence in the region. Therefore, the region should consider the following:

- Governments should rapidly harmonize their containment and recovery responses to containing the disease. Restrictive measures should be uniform and reopening process should be staggered to prevent second wave infections

- The region's governments should adopt a joint economic recovery plan. The plan should include a roadmap for diversification of economies, poverty alleviation and increased intra-regional trade.

- Governments should enhance intelligence sharing at this time of the pandemonium to thwart terror attacks. This should involve tighter surveillance on the use of the internet in sharing radical and extreme propaganda.

- Extending financial and medical support to South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi to enhance their capacity to respond to the pandemic.

Governments should rapidly harmonize their containment and recovery responses to containing the disease. Restrictive measures should be uniform and reopening process should be staggered to prevent second wave infections

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Perpetual Conflict: Prospects of Sustainable Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo

By Ntandoyenkosi Ncube

Abstract

Following independence from Belgian rule in 1960, Patrice Lumumba became the first prime minister of an independent Congo and his reign ended when he was assassinated. Mobutu took over and was later forced out of power by Laurent Desire Kabila who was later killed by his bodyguard and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. Felix Tshisekedi became the DRC president following the December 2018 elections. Conflict has always been the central feature of the DRC caused by the spillover of the Rwandan genocide, ethinicism and economic interests among others. Efforts to curtail the conflicts have failed as a result of regional instability, weak state institutions and failure of international peacekeeping missions like MONUSCO. The election of Felix Tshisekedi offers little hope in attaining sustainable peace in the DRC as he does not have adequate power due to limited control of the national assembly which is controlled by the Kabila-led FCC coalition. The little hope lies in Tshisekedi's engagement drive in solidifying the bilateral and multilateral relations with various nations and organizations. It is fundamental that domestic synergies be established with all political players and the support of international community be sought if DRC is to achieve sustainable peace.

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to be mired in instability and in the process affecting millions of lives. Conflict has been at the center of the nation for many years and this has reduced a mineral rich DRC to extreme levels of underdevelopment. The political terrain has been characterised by violence and instability and this has further exacerbated the conflict. Rebel groups have always been a perennial dilemma in DRC and lack of robust government institutions has stalled the journey towards sustainable peace. After gaining independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC had never experienced a peaceful power transfer until January 2019 when Felix Tshisekedi took over from Joseph Kabila. This article discusses in brief, Tshisekedi's political road to power and his presidency. The article also discusses three main causes of this conflict in DRC: the spillover of the Rwandan Genocide; ethinicism; and economic interests.

The 1994 Rwanda genocide had a profound impact on the neighboring DRC, particularly the eastern flank creating security problems as the DRC became a turf for Rwandan domestic issues. Ethinicism and economic interests of the Rwandan instability will be discussed in detail later in this article. Efforts to curb the scourge of instability in the DRC have been made but have not produced favorable results as the security issues in the DRC persist. Agreements for cooperation with regional countries, the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and the UN. peace keeping mission among other peace building efforts, despite some achievements, have not eased the tension in the DRC. The road towards achieving sustainable peace has been murky due to a plethora of challenges including volatile regional relations and weak government institutions that undermine a coordinated and transparent fight against underlying conflict catalysts like corruption and illicit mining networks. The election of Felix Tshisekedi as the president of the DRC presents a new hope to attaining sustainable peace in the DRC but can he deliver? Is Felix Tshisekedi armed with a robust political spine to tackle the decades-long conflicts in the DRC? The prospects of Felix Tshisekedi attaining sustainable peace in the DRC and the challenges that he faces are explored in this article.

Former president Joseph Kabila (left) with newly inaugurated President of DR Congo, Felix Tshisekedi (right) (Photo Credit: AFP)

DRC Politics in Retrospect

A wealthy nation that King Leopold II of Belgium regarded as personal possession, DRC was exploited, plundered and abused under the King's administration. In 1908, the Government of Belgium made Congo a formal colony. In 1960, Congo gained independence from Belgium after parliamentary elections that saw Patrice Lumumba become the prime minister. The preliminary years of independence were characterized by instability and it was during this period that a secession took place in the south east of Katanga and Patrice Lumumba was assassinated following an army mutiny (Congressional Research Service, 2019).

Colonel Joseph Mobutu, a central figure in the toppling of Lumumba, seized power through a coup and established an authoritarian system of government. He renamed Congo, 'Zaire' in a bid to inculcate a spirit of indigenous national identity. Mobutu's reign was characterized by centralization, dictatorship, repression of opposition as political plurality was restricted; he sought to establish a mono-party state. Mobutu, as an individual, quickly became a sole center of power through the MPR Political Bureau which he controlled. By 1975, the parliament had become nothing but a ceremonial body as its main function had been reduced to merely endorsing the

decisions of the MPR Political Bureau (Ntung, 2019). This was put into effect by a 1974 constitutional revision which recognized the party as supreme to the state (CRS, 2019). The parliamentary elections of 1975 took place in a bizarre fashion as members of parliament were elected through clapping of hands and standing ovations by those who were present. There was, however, a period of stability and peace in Zaire until March 1977, where the Front National pour la Liberation du Congo (FNLC) based in Angola, carried a series of invasions into the Katanga province. The French and Moroccan military assistance together with USA's logistical support helped drive out the rebels (CRS, 2019).

The elections that followed in 1982 and 1984 were a replay of previous sham electoral processes. Economic mismanagement and authoritarianism led to collapse of administration and to gross disorganization of the army. There was increasing domestic and international pressure on Mobutu as his health had deteriorated. In 1990, Mobutu agreed to a democratic multiparty system, but continued delaying elections. Key state institutions fragmented and the Rwanda conflicts spilled into DRC affecting state resources and causing local instability. The Hutus fled into Zaire and camped there, with

alleged Mobutu's support, to regroup against the Tutsi dominated Rwanda government. This taunted the Rwandan Government to launch a cross-border operation and it is reported that civilians were also targets (Stockwell, 1979). In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda supported Laurent Désiré Kabila's rebellion against Mobutu. The conflict that followed came to be known as the "first" Congo war. Mobutu died in exile in Morocco.

Laurent Désiré Kabila's reign was also turbulent, tensions grew in the ranks of Kabila's army with a resentment of Rwandan soldiers and Congolese of Rwandan descent who were part of his rebel army, an attempt to expel them led to a mutiny. This prompted Rwanda and Uganda to deploy troops into DRC and used rebel groups as proxies against Kabila. Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan and others provided support to the DRC government. Dubbed "Africa's World War", the conflict is estimated to have directly and indirectly led to the death of 3.3 million people. Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, took over and implemented a UN-backed peace process. In 2002, a peace accord called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the assimilation of Congolese rebels into the military and government. Between 2003 and 2006, Kabila presided over a transitional government and a 2005 referendum outcome favored the adoption of a new constitution.

The 2006 elections marked a significant multiparty vote process and Kabila was re-elected amid reservations on the credibility of the electoral process. In 2011, the elections were again mired in controversy as observers declared the process as 'extremely flawed'. The then opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, rejected the outcome and declared himself president, however, his calls for mass protests did not bear fruit. Despite losing seats in the legislature, Kabila's party regained control through a strong coalition. Joseph Kabila who came to power in 2001, was supposed to step down in December 2016 according to the constitutional term limits. There were fears that he wanted to hold on to power against constitutional provisions. He contemplated changing the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, but with local and international pressure he backtracked but delayed the elections by two years. In an unexpected turn of events, in August 2018, Kabila announced that he would be stepping down and identified Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary as his successor. His preferred successor, Shadary, was however defeated in the 2018 presidential elections by Felix Tshisekedi (Ntung, 2019).

Dynamics of conflict in the DRC

Rwandan Genocide Spillover

Due to the proximity to neighboring countries like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the eastern part of DRC, Kivu province in particular, is left vulnerable to any instability in the Great Lakes Region. Foreign armed groups can easily encroach to the DRC. The instability prevailing in DRC today has its roots in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The genocide forced many refugees to seek asylum in the east of DRC. The Rwandan genocide claimed an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus over a period of 13 weeks (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In 1996, the Tutsis, who had gained control of Rwanda crossed to DRC in 1996 and played a role in Mobutu's downfall and formed a coalition of neighboring armies ostensibly to track down Hutus in the DRC but the main reason behind this operation was to clear the UN refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu which were used as a cover up by the Hutu forces to continue the war against the Tutsi-led Rwandan regime (HRW, 1999; The Guardian, 2010). The Rwandan genocide played a major role in the destabilization of eastern Congo with persistent violent clashes. The instability and conflict in the DRC is not only a result of the Rwandan genocide that spilled over to the east of DRC but also a result of economic interests.

Economic Interests

There is a scramble for the control of the natural wealth in the DRC. The country is endowed with vast mineral resources. With such endowment, one would expect the country to be well developed. However, the vast wealth has brought more harm than good to DRC. The "Congolese war" has been categorized as a conflict over the control of mineral resources (Lubunga, 2016). It is argued that, initially, the war was not motivated by the need to control mineral resources, but after Rwanda and its allies assumed control of the DRC, the mineral

> " In an unexpected turn of events, in August 2018, Kabila announced that he would be stepping down and identified Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary as his successor

> "The eastern DRC has experienced unthinkable violence, rape of women and murder fueled by ethnic rivalry. The presence of Hutus and Tutsis originating from Rwanda in Kivu, and the Hema from Uganda in Ituri has made the situation worse

resources in the DRC became a primary goal. Women and children have experienced gross human rights violations as they are exploited in the mining of the blood diamonds by the militias (Lubunga, 2016). It is worth noting that there exists elite networks in the DRC exploiting DRC's mineral wealth.

Interestingly, despite lacking sufficient diamond deposits, Rwanda and Uganda's diamond exports amount to millions of dollars (Lemarchand, 2009). This has been attributed to their competition as witnessed on the world market, to export DRC's minerals. Given this economic benefit enjoyed by Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC, it is not a far-fetched notion, that these nations could be supporting the status quo to their sustained economic benefit.

Ethnicity

DRC is ethnically diverse with an estimated 250 tribes and more than 400 dialects. Conflict has been fuelled by ethnic divisions in the eastern part of DRC over resources and territory (United Nations, 2016). The eastern DRC has experienced unthinkable violence, rape of women and murder fueled by ethnic rivalry. The presence of Hutus and Tutsis originating from Rwanda in Kivu, and the Hema from Uganda in Ituri has made the situation worse (Stearns, 2011). During Mobutu's reign, DRC was initially friendly to Rwandan and Burundian immigrants to the point of giving them Congolese citizenship. Immigrants had a right to own large tracts of land. This became a source of conflict with the indigenous people. Later, in a contradictory fashion, Mobutu appeared to backtrack on his stance on immigrants by signing a law in 1981 which challenged the nationality of the Rwandan immigrants. They now could only become Congolese citizens by proving that their ancestors were established in Congo before colonization in 1908 (Lemarchand, 2009). Having failed to prove that their ancestors were in Congo before 1908, many of the Rwandans found themselves outcasts

in Congolese affairs. The treatment of Rwandan immigrants by the government ushered a scourge of xenophobia that continues to prevail in the east part of DRC up to today. Civilians also support certain rebel groups based on ethnicity. A survey by (CRG, 2016) found out that rebel groups enjoyed support of civilians based on their origin and this has led to regional political divisions among the civilians.

Conflict resolution challenges in the DRC

Fractured State Institutions

At the center of conflict resolution is the government's failure or unwillingness to reform key state institutions, particularly, security sector reforms. The DRC's security forces were not designed to defend the constitution and the citizens. Instead, they have been used to safeguard the interests of the elite and undermined the interests of the broader population. This has resulted in the resistance by the authorities, to reform the security sector (Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, 2019). The efforts by DRC government to reform its security institutions have been largely unsuccessful and in the process exposed its citizens to gross human rights violations and extreme poverty. National and international peacekeeping efforts have failed to establish strong institutions that ensure the protection of local people as well as good governance practices (Ntung, 2019). The army has logistical deficiencies and has constantly failed to organize effectively in defending citizens from vicious militias. The geographical size of the country and the countless insurgencies have made it difficult for the national army to ensure a stable security environment. From the 1990s, there has not been a robust mechanism of bringing perpetrators of crimes against humanity to book, instead Kabila's government preferred stability over justice (Nienaber, 2010). Moreover, the continued engagement of former warlords as military personnel has been a major setback to peace building in the DRC.

Volatile Regional Relations

The diplomatic relations in the Great Lakes region cannot be termed cordial but rather, volatile, complex and characterized by mistrust particularly among the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Angola. The DRC and Rwanda's relations have been sour since the end of the 1998-2003 war where reports alleged that Rwanda was supporting rebel groups in the DRC and this has also been cited as a cause of xenophobia in the DRC. The presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame

United Nations peace keepers record details of weapons recovered from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) militants after their surrender in DRC (Photo Credit: Reuters)

respectively, entered into an agreement in 2008-2009 in a bid to restore diplomatic ties. The two launched a joint military mission in the eastern part of the DRC. However, the, ease of tensions did not last for long though as they escalated again with a Rwandan-backed rebellion known as M23. Bilateral and multilateral relations continue to deteriorate in the region, relations are murky between DRC and Uganda and between Rwanda and DRC (Ntung, 2019). The mistrust is caused by the belief that each of these countries supports military groups and this has caused regional instability. There has been however, progress in the Rwanda-DRC relations but persistent mistrust remains. The volatile regional relations among the Great Lakes countries makes it difficult to collectively deal with armed military groups. The existing mistrust among these nations makes the overall goal of achieving sustainable peace in the region, East of DRC in particular, a difficult mission.

Peacebuilding Efforts in the DRC

There has been a lot of efforts and platforms established for peacebuilding in the DRC but these have not done much to curtail the scourge of violence and rise of insurgent groups. Efforts have been done through the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Global and Inclusive Peace Agreement which saw the coming together of various rebel groups and the national army in a bid to end conflict, the agreements entered with neighboring countries to preserve peace in the region as well as MONUSCO.

MONUSCO, a notable intervention in the DRC is a United Nations peacekeeping operation and the world's largest peacekeeping mission with authority to be comprised of up to 16,875 and 1,441 military and police personnel respectively. The mission has a mandate of protecting civilians in conflict ridden areas and aiding stability in the east of the DRC. MONUSCO, however, has failed to ensure stability and sustainable peace in the DRC. The top-down approach by the MONUSCO mission that puts more emphasis on democratization has not yielded fruitful results (Ntung, 2019). The mission has failed to respond to local challenges and has been unable to ensure rule of law to dismantle authoritarianism in governance. It has been argued that the efforts of international peacekeeping missions have aided authoritarianism and impunity in

Former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) President Mobutu Sese Seko at a past function. According to Transparency International, Mobutu embezzled over USD five billion from his country (Photo Credit: Vice)

the DRC (von Billerbeck & Tansey, 2019). Moreover, lack of government and regional cooperation has also undermined MONUSCO's peacekeeping efforts. The support given to rebel groups by neighboring countries has weakened the effectiveness of the mission's mandate (EPON, 2019). Sustainable and transformational change has been sacrificed at the altar of stability and continuity by the regional allies and this does not do justice to real change and conflict free environment in the DRC.

Felix Tshisekedi and the prospects of sustainable peace in the DRC

A Controversial Election

Considered as the first peaceful process of power transfer in the DRC since independence from Belgian rule, the 2018 presidential elections were without controversy. On December 30, 2018, the DRC held its national presidential and legislative elections, having been delayed for two years. The elections were characterized by gross irregularities. Felix Tshisekedi was declared the winner of the presidential election but a leak from the electoral commission showed that Martin Fayulu, an opposition leader, had resoundingly won the presidential election. The leaked results were in sync with the results from the Catholic Church's observation team. The Independent

National Electoral Commission (CENI) has been accused of corruption in handling the entire electoral process. Observers also noted other irregularities such as the closure of the democratic space with restrictions on opposition campaigns, a last minute cancellation of the presidential vote in four districts which also happened to be opposition strongholds, a problematic voter registration process and barring of exiled opposition figures (Moise Katumbi and Jean-Pierre Bemba) (International Crisis Group, 2018). These were a total violation of a December 2016, CENCO initiated political agreement, the St. Sylvestre Accord which sought to set the ground for a free and fair electoral process. A gesture by the United Nations to provide logistical support in transporting electoral materials to ease delays and possible disenfranchisement due to poor infrastructure was rejected by the DRC government (Bloomberg, 2018).

Despite a controversial and disputed electoral process, the post-electoral period was calm and a poll by CRG/BERG in May 2019 showed that 67 per cent of Congolese citizens approved of Tshisekedi's presidency. The issues around electoral turmoil are problematic in the quest to attain sustainable peace in the DRC as it leaves a nation divided amid vast domestic security challenges posed by various armed rebel groups. As (Ntung, 2019) notes, the contested election could lead to an escalation of

tribalism, local and regional conflict if the new president fails to effect transformational change. Could Tshisekedi steer the DRC towards a new dawn of politics and peace building in the troubled nation?

Domestic Approach

Felix Tshisekedi's administration has provided a gleam of hope to the DRC's transformational agenda particularly in opening the democratic space. By March 2019, 574 victims of political incarceration had been freed as promised by his government and replaced the infamous head of the National Intelligence Agency, Kalev Mutond and shut down unofficial jails operated by the intelligence agency. The media restrictions and closure of Television and radio stations by the Kabila's administration have been lifted as several Television and radio stations have been allowed to operate again and the opposition has access to air time (CRG, 2019). Moreover, the civil society and opposition have been allowed to operate without stern restrictions and the previously exiled politicians were allowed to come back to the DRC. In his inauguration, Tshisekedi pledged to fight corruption and has since fired a lot of officials for mismanagement but no legal processes have taken place. Tshisekedi's engagement with the international community is one of the key positives that could have a huge bearing in solving the security challenges and attaining sustainable peace in the DRC.

International Relations

Tshisekedi has been on an overdrive to ensure cordial relations with the international community. The final years of Kabila's presidency were characterized by diplomatic tiffs with the donor community following the targeted sanctions by the US and Europe as well as criticism over election delay. The government also snubbed a United Nations humanitarian donor conference in Geneva accusing the donor community of demonizing its government (New York Times, 2018). Tshisekedi has embarked on a different path that seeks to strengthen

ties with the international community. He opened a European Visa Centre that had been shut down by Kabila in protest of sanctions and remained mum on the sanctions imposed by the US in March 2019 against the electoral commission, national assembly and constitutional court officials. He also, in May 2019, (re)launched a military program with the Belgian government which was stopped by the Kabila administration in April 2017 (CRG, 2019). He has also taken a leap in mending the relations with Israel by vowing to appoint the first ambassador to Israel in 20 years. Despite imposing sanctions on some Congolese officials and condemning the electoral process, the Trump administration pledged to work with the new president, Felix Tshisekedi. Tshisekedi's re-engagement strategy with the international community is fundamental in tackling domestic challenges in the DRC. He is setting the ground for amassing international support as he braces for a turbulent presidential term characterised by power struggles in the domestic arena.

Domestic Bottlenecks

Despite, a modicum of positives in Tshisekedi's presidency, challenges and limitations to a full-fledged democratic transformation in the DRC are enormous. Circumstances around his rise to the helm point to a hidden hand moving and rearranging pawns. Joseph Kabila, the former president, retained significant power through his controlled Common Front for Congo (FCC) coalition. The opposition in the DRC views Tshisekedi as a puppet of Joseph Kabila. Martin Fayulu claimed that "He [Tshisekedi] is at the mercy of Kabila". An announcement of a coalition between Kabila's FCC, and the new president in March 2019, further solidified the sentiments that Kabila remains very influential in DRC's presidency. Kabila's FCC garnered a majority of seats in both national and provincial assemblies. Tshisekedi's party *Cap pour le changement*, (CACH) garnered around 10 per cent of 500 national assembly seats while Kabila's FCC gained control of 340 seats. The party with majority in the national assembly determines key appointments

The issues around electoral turmoil are problematic in the quest to attain sustainable peace in the DRC as it leaves a nation divided amid vast domestic security challenges posed by various armed rebel groups

including the Prime Minister (CRG, 2019). Thus, Kabila is still a prominent figure in the power dynamics of the DRC's politics and Tshisekedi's political spine is fragile as he does not have significant power to steer the DRC through his preferred political pathway. Tussles between the president and the FCC coalition which commands a majority in the national assembly continue to emerge. The president threatened to disband the FCC-controlled national assembly for sabotaging government work and the FCC parliamentary speaker issued a statement to the effect that the president's utterances could expose one to treason. This is one of the indications that Tshisekedi's presidency is mired in a seemingly inescapable dilemma of trying to balance between the bearers of power and the necessary reforms needed in the DRC. His international engagement drive has been described as a strategy to amass significant power through international support in light of a limited political muscle at home.

Tshisekedi also faces the challenge of countless armed militias that continue to cause instability in the eastern part of the DRC and has engaged on a military offensive in a quest to dismantle the decades-long dilemma of armed militia groups. The DRC army has managed to assert itself in the battlefield against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Beni region but the militia group carried out revenge attacks on civilians, claiming more than 200 lives in a period of three months in 2019. The fight against armed militias is one of the challenges owing to the complex relational dynamics of armed groups and individuals with national influence. Armed groups enjoy a special relationship with some local people and unofficial national leaders (Ntung, 2019). The importance of security sector reforms cannot be over emphasized, particularly with reports implicating the security forces in human rights violations, as well as involvement in illicit mining (CRS, 2019). Moreover, without cordial local

The importance of security sector reforms cannot be over emphasized, particularly with reports implicating the security forces in human rights violations, as well as involvement in illicit mining

relationships across the political divide, dismantling the armed militias is a mammoth task.

Conclusion

The Democratic Republic of Congo remains underdeveloped with staggering poverty levels despite vast mineral, land and aquatic resources. At the center of this underdevelopment is the instability caused by various rebel military groups in the eastern part of DRC. The political dynamics in the DRC over the years have also been mired in conflict and this has not helped the nation in curtailing decades-long instability by armed militias. Despite efforts to ensure stability by the international community, regional bodies and the Congolese government, the conflict still persists in the DRC subjecting millions of citizens to penury. Felix Tshisekedi was inaugurated as the President of the DRC in January 2019 following a disputed December 2018 election which prompted a constitutional challenge that Tshisekedi won, from disgruntled opposition. A peaceful transition echoed a glimpse of a new dawn for the DRC but the influence of Kabila in government has dashed all hopes for a democratic, and developmental state. The article depicted the efforts made by Tshisekedi in opening the democratic space and engaging the international community as fundamental to a peaceful nation. But the Kabila factor has thwarted the necessary reforms to achieve sustainable peace as he controls the party with majority in the national assembly.

Finding a common ground with Kabila is very crucial for the reform agenda that Tshisekedi promised the people of the DRC. Kabila cannot be ignored, thus there is need to strike a balance between establishing a government reform agenda and maintaining cordial relations with the former president. If sustainable peace is to be attained in the DRC, there is need for security sector and judicial reforms. These play a crucial role in responding to security issues that exist in the DRC. Dismantling a wide array of corrupt networks, perpetrators of violence and individual leaders working with rebel groups needs a competent and robust judicial system. The regional and international community has an important role in supporting the reform agenda and Tshisekedi has done well in creating bilateral and multilateral relations. Until the state stamps its authority with transparent and accountable institutions, until there is strong regional cooperation in the Great Lakes region, there is still a long way to sustainable peace and stability in the DRC.

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Climate Change and Gender-Based Violence: The Case of Somalia

By Ms. Umaimah Adan

Abstract

This article critically examines the linkages between forms of gender-based violence and climate change. Environmental degradation is exacerbated globally, however, evidence points to differential effects that are often rooted in socio-economic and gender disparities. Moreover, climate change often further entrenches pre-existing inequities. Somalia offers a particularly complex case study as climate change exacerbates Gender-Based Violence (GBV), displacement, conflict, and terrorism. This article provides a foundational understanding of climate-induced GBV. It highlights the underlying forces and suggests several relevant and contextual policy recommendations.

Introduction

Gender-based violence (GBV) is often all encompassing and rooted in fundamentally discriminatory norms and practices (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). It is referred to as a "global pandemic" that is economically and socially boundary-less. It is a direct result of gender inequality, often structurally entrenched and has adverse effects on individuals and communities psychologically, financially, socially and physically. In the context of environmental degradation and climate change, GBV exacerbates the impact of such changes. Various forces work in tandem to further entrench inequalities. The notion of economic violence for instance disproportionately impacts women and girls who largely make-up those living in poverty globally (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Gender imbalances in regard to access and control of natural resources such as water, agriculture and land are common instances of economic violence. GBV is often weaponized as a means of controlling access to these resources. In some contexts, sexual favours are exchanged for land rights (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Such imbalances are entrenched in legal systems as well as societal norms which dictate gender roles. Additionally, the very nature of gender roles increases women's vulnerability and exposure to assault or harassment (Camey,

An infographic highlighting the prevalence of GBV (Photo Credit: WHO)

Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Such is the case with water and firewood collection which is often labour-intensive and time consuming.

Gender and Climate Change Linkages

It has been well-established that climate change has differing effects on various groups. The link between gender-based violence and climate-induced scarcity is evident on a global level. The historic disadvantages faced by women such as limited access to resources and information and limited rights increases their vulnerability in the face of climate change (Bob, 2014). As well, climate change and disasters serve to intensify already existing instances of GBV. A report by UN Women (2013) notes the increased rate of sexual and gender-based violence in the Solomon Islands following the Gizo tsunami. Insecure conditions of displacement compounded the dangers of retrieving water as men often targeted women at water sites. As well, inequalities in relation to effects of climate change and environmental degradation can ultimately reduce gender equality and women's rights across societal systems (Eastin, 2018). The notion of a "vulnerability" framework proves useful in examining these linkages. It entails the exposure, sensitivity and capacity to respond to environmental changes. Thus various positionalities converge and compound gender inequality. Poverty for instance, impacts living conditions so that poor communities are more likely to inhabit spaces that are exposed to degradation and toxic elements (Eastin, 2018).

As well, inequalities in terms of ownership increase women's vulnerability and thus wealth-based gender disparities. In particular, there is a gap in terms of gender and asset control and ownership. This manifests in the ownership of land, housing, equipment and other resources (Eastin, 2018). Ownership especially pertaining to land is directly linked to access to relief when environmental disasters occur. This ownership gap has a magnified effect on female-led households which are disproportionately disadvantaged.

Beyond the vulnerability framework, mitigation and adaptation strategies must also be gender specific (Bob, 2014). It was not until the Conference of Parties 11 held in 2005, that the linkages between gender and climate were given reception and lauded in mainstream policy discourse (Bob, 2014). Calls for gender sensitive interventions were coordinated among women's organizations, UN bodies and other development actors and institutions.

African Context

For the purposes of this paper, climate change must be situated in the African context. Climate change can be understood as a shift in weather patterns as well as disasters or shocks in relation to weather such as drought or floods (Twyman, Green, Bernier et al, 2014). Data indicates that the warming rate on the African continent is higher than projected averages (Bob, 2014). This increases the number of droughts as well as exacerbates rainfall and risk of flooding. Beyond such environmental shifts, is a weakened capacity to mitigate and respond to crisis. This is due to largely inequitable socio-economic systems, uneven income distribution and poor infrastructures of technology and information across various levels. This ultimately leads to disproportionate impacts on vulnerable communities in Africa, particularly the poor. Additionally, changes in climate have been reported to alter patterns of disease. This is evident in the rise of malaria in parts of East Africa (Twyman, Green, Bernier et al, 2014). Of particular concern are the changes in water supply as a result of climate change which has an adverse effect on food security (Bob, 2014).

Further, agricultural production is greatly reduced as a result, directly impacting food security. Perceptions of climate change in Africa also prove crucial in ongoing discourse. These often alter practices related to farming and other forms of labour. A 2014 study conducted by the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research, examines the perceptions of women and men in several sites in Eastern and Western Africa in relation to extreme climate related events such as droughts or floods. Many of the reported findings indicate significant variations in changes perceived by men and women. This can be a result of the gendered division of labour in the surveyed communities. For instance, in Rakai, Uganda, women were more likely to report drought due to their role of water collection (Twyman, Green, Bernier et al, 2014). As well, adaptation strategies are gendered due to differential access to and control of resources. It is evident that gender is a key factor in climate change

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> The historic disadvantages faced by women such as limited access to resources and information and limited rights increases their vulnerability in the face of climate change

Prolonged drought has had increasingly disastrous effects in Somalia. They have resulted in crop destruction and ultimately food insecurity. This has led to the reported displacement of more than 2.5 million Somalis and heightened starvation risks

perception as well as adaptation. Thus, it is necessary to factor such differences into external mitigation efforts.

Climate change is also experienced in varying ways across the continent. Pastoral communities for instance, face unique obstacles in the face of environmental degradation, especially those located in areas prone to drought (Bob, 2014). In the East Africa region, similar patterns of instability as well as socio-economic contexts have led to similarities in climate change outcomes and response. The challenges prevalent in this region are related to weak governance, violent conflict, food insecurity and displacement (Abebe, 2014). Similar patterns emerge across the Horn of Africa region. Communities in Uganda's wetlands are directly impacted by prolonged droughts and resulting food insecurity. A report published by the UNDP highlights the particular impact on women and girls. Findings indicate that women take longer trips for food and water which increases the risk of facing sexual assault or harassment (UNDP, 2020).

Moreover, increased migration flows are often caused by climate change. This is especially the case in areas where populations rely heavily on natural resources. Thus migration occurs when such resources are diminished (Abebe, 2014). Across East Africa, drought is a significant driving factor of migration. This is due to reduced crop yields and loss of livestock. Responses to such events vary across the region and states with weak governance capacities often bear the brunt of consequences (Abebe, 2014). As well, violent armed conflict is of particular concern in the Horn region. Such conflict is exacerbated by climate fueled scarcity. Conflict among pastoral communities in northern Kenya for instance, can be linked to competition over water access as well as instances of cattle raiding (Adano and Daudi, 2012). Moreover, pastoral communities comprise a large part of the region. 95 per cent of Somalia's population is pastoral, along with 80 per cent in Kenya and nearly 60 per cent in Uganda and Ethiopia (Abebe, 2014). Although pastoral migration is adaptive, the increased need to migrate as a result of climate change has placed women and children

in a position of hyper-precarity. They are often those left behind, faced with food insecurity and greater risk of danger. Such is the case in Somalia and the Afar region of Ethiopia (Abebe, 2014). Women who are left behind while male relatives migrate in search of water or labor opportunities face heightened risks of social exclusion and even sexual assault (Abebe, 2014).

Somalia

Prolonged drought has had increasingly disastrous effects in Somalia. They have resulted in crop destruction and ultimately food insecurity. This has led to the reported displacement of more than 2.5 million Somalis and heightened starvation risks (Bhalla, 2019). There has been an increase of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have settled in informal camps in Mogadishu and other central parts of Somalia (Bhalla, 2019). Such camps are places of high criminal activity as well as sexual exploitation and trafficking. Climate change is associated with rape, sexual violence and intimate partner violence in Somalia (Wadekar & Oog, 2020). This violence often emerges after women take on new roles as providers or when families forcibly relocate to IDP camps and other informal settlements (Eklow & Krampe, 2019). At least 25 per cent of women in Somalia have been reported to experience climate-conflict induced GBV. Primarily pastoralist families are impacted by these migration patterns due to reliance on natural resources. Additionally, the vulnerabilities faced by Somali women are compounded by the lack of state responsiveness. In fact, the penal code in Somalia classifies sexual violence as a violation of modesty and sexual honour. It does not criminalize sexual assault or harassment. Thus, an integrative approach to end climate change and GBV in Somalia must call for the implementation of zero tolerance laws (HRW 2019).

Moreover, the very structure of IDP camps in Somalia reinforces violence against women and other vulnerable groups. Research reported by Human Rights Watch has indicated wide-spread misconduct by government

A young woman stands in her home at an IDP camp on the outskirts of Somaliland (Photo Credit: The Guardian)

officials and allied militia. Such individuals have been implicated in a significant number of rape and sexual harassment allegations against displaced women and girls. Many of these "gatekeepers" have strong ties to district commissioners and local officials and commit other abuses of power within the camps such as stealing food and restricting movement (HRW, 2013).

Water and Land Rights

Land tenure is another locus of manifestation for gender-based violence. The inequalities associated with land access, rights and control are ultimately linked to women's positionally in relation to class and social status (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). GBV is often used to exert control over women and maintain gender roles in terms of land and resource control. Such inequalities are often legally entrenched, whereby women have limited rights to property ownership and control (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Conversely, in contexts where women are legally entitled to land rights, enforcement is often thwarted by traditional practices.

In the context of Somalia, land tenure is deeply rooted in cultural and historical norms that delineate distinct gender roles. Women in much of Somalia have historically been relegated to the domestic sphere, given the responsibility of child-rearing. Somali men have historically been herdsmen, in charge of overall production (Burman,

Bowden and Gold, 2014). This division extended to clan negotiations which consistently excluded women from discussions surrounding ownership rights and resource use (Burman, Bowden and Gold, 2014). Ongoing conflict and civil war has served to exacerbate and uphold these historical inequities.

Land tenure in Somalia is also directly impacted by climate change. For instance, flooding in the Shabelle region has led to the forced displacement of minority clan groups who have historically relied on their land for agriculture. Land ownership becomes contentious when flooding subsides and dominant clans seize this land, furthering the vulnerability of marginalized groups (Eklow and Krampe, 2019). Thus, climate change accelerates local resource scarcity and competition as well as compounds pre-existing economic and gender-based inequalities.

Al Shabab and Resource Exploitation

Climate induced migration has also contributed to gaps in local governance, leading to a power vacuum that is increasingly filled by al Shabaab. Food and water scarcity have created opportunities for al Shabaab to be legitimized through disaster relief efforts (Wadekar and Oog, 2020). A consequence of prolonged drought and resulting crop failure is the unprecedented migration and settlement of IDP camps in Somalia. Such camps are increasingly targeted by groups such as aAl-Shabab

who carry out concerted recruitment efforts (Eklow and Krampe, 2019). Such strategies highlight the embedded vulnerability of such camps due to an overall lack of security and coordination. Other armed groups are also able to weaponize climate disasters in order to manipulate vulnerable populations who become increasingly defenceless against various political agendas (Eklow and Krampe, 2019). Such tactics serve to ultimately undermine peace building efforts throughout the country.

Further, in terms of resource exploitation, this often appears in the form of environmental crimes. These are defined as "illegal activities that pose serious risks for the environment, human rights, public health and well-being of communities" (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Such crimes range from illegal wildlife trade, to unauthorized fishing and mining. Such crimes are often driven by weak institutional capacities and a lack of regulatory mechanisms. As well, individuals who face poverty and insecurity as a result of climate change are often unwilling participants in such activities (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Environmental crimes are also often embedded in violence and conflict as trade networks are embroiled in sexual exploitation, child labour and other measures of

exploitation. Although there is limited scholarship on the linkages between environmental crimes and GBV, studies indicate the prevalence of gender based power dynamics. These are particularly implicated in sex trafficking and coerced labour which disproportionately targets women and underaged girls (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020).

In the case of Somalia, the illicit charcoal trade is a principle driving factor of conflict, insecurity and environmental degradation (Camey, Sabater, Owren et al, 2020). Al Shabab heavily relies on charcoal trade to Gulf states as well as the Kenyan military in order to sustain itself (Koigi, 2018). Efforts to suppress this trade by the UN Security Council have been largely unsuccessful as al Shabab continues to heavily tax buyers and importers through the Kismayo port. The trade which also involves sugar imports, results in an annual profit of over USD100 million (Koigi, 2018). Thus, supporting al Shabab's purchase of weaponry, and recruitment campaigns, ultimately solidifying the terrorist group's power. As well, such exploitative charcoal trade leads to deforestation and lack of replanting efforts. Ultimately contributing to the endangerment of Acacia trees in Somalia. This loss directly impacts pastoralists, as they rely on the drought

A map showing IDP settlements in Mogadishu (Photo Credit: Human Rights Watch)

resilient acacia trees to feed livestock (UNEP, 2018). Responses to this degradation should include the use of alternative, renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power.

Mitigation Efforts

There have been several efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change in Somalia. The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) has been a significant agent in the creation of innovative and proactive strategies. The Recovery and Resilience Framework is one such initiative (Eklow & Krampe, 2019). UNSOM has also been instrumental in appointing an environmental security adviser. Yet another initiative was coined enhancing climate resilience of the vulnerable communities and ecosystems in Somalia. It was a multi-stakeholder partnership of the federal government, UNDP and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The primary objective was to create drought and flood adaptation and preparedness systems. Although this initiative has been implemented amongst small-scale farmers in the Puntland region, a more comprehensive approach is needed which accounts for cross-border conflict and migration as well.

Gender Mainstreaming

The acknowledgement of the gendered impact of climate change is solidified when women are represented within decision-making bodies. Environmental governance must prioritize female representation and make an effort to gender the language of policies at the national and international level. Women continue to be underrepresented in high-level decision making particularly in government. Less than 5 per cent of World Energy Council chairs are women (Sellers, 2016).

Alongside contextual solutions is the need for a gender mainstreamed response to climate change and disaster. This calls for the incorporation of gender analysis within all actions, policy and legislation. It is evident that the effects of climate change are differentiated along gender. Thus, responses must account for these differences.

This not only ensures that gender is embedded within response strategies, but also that gender inequality is not institutionally perpetuated (Alston, 2013).

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is evident that efforts to reduce the negative impact of climate change must be centered around a gender analysis and framework. Such an approach does not refer solely to women and girls, rather it entails an interactive method that considers the position of both men and women not only separately but in relation to each other.

It is necessary not only to acknowledge the differences in men and women's experiences but also to understand these differences in relation to climate change and to account for said disparities in program and policy making. As well, effective approaches must reject the notion of women as victims. Rather, evidence notes that women are often active agents in combating the effects of climate change. It is necessary to adopt a grassroots response when possible and to integrate the knowledge and experiences of women at the local level (Moosa & Tuana, 2014).

In Somalia, the acknowledgement of already high rates of GBV is imperative to preventing and tackling such rates in the face of climate disasters (UNFPA, 2013). A gender-mainstreamed strategy towards mitigating climate change effects in Somalia should include:

- A grass-roots prevention strategy that integrates the experiences and knowledge of local women and ensures the integration of gender in risk assessments, data collection, participation and monitoring/evaluation.

- Building capacity of stakeholders across multiple levels; municipal, federal, regional. This includes an embedded GBV response by disaster and emergency relief agencies.

- Continued and increased support of economic empowerment of women to reduce impact of GBV on livelihood and income generation efforts.

Increased scholarship which draws upon contextual linkages between climate change and other forces such as gender, economy, social positioning, culture etc. Such scholarship can serve to inform and legitimize necessary policies

A photo showing a section of women in Somalia (Photo Credit Crisis Group)

- Increased scholarship which draws upon contextual linkages between climate change and other forces such as gender, economy, social positioning, culture etc. Such scholarship can serve to inform and legitimize necessary policies.

- All approaches must account for the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities and clans in the face of climate change and enforced scarcity. This includes addressing the culture of impunity by establishing an inquiry commission to investigate human rights abuses committed against IDPs.

- Exploration and investment in alternative energy sources to empower individuals in the face of exploitation by militia and local elites.

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For their contribution, we wish to acknowledge the Swiss TPH Students' Corona working group

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
Editor's Note

Dear Reader,

We are excited to release our thirteenth bi-monthly issue of *The HORN Bulletin* (Vol. III, Iss. III, 2020). We bring to you well-researched articles and analysis of topical issues and developments affecting the Horn of Africa. We welcome contributions from readers who wish to have their articles included in the HORN Bulletin. At HORN, we believe ideas are the currency of progress. Feel free to contact the Editor-in-Chief for more details at communications@horninstitute.org.

Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.
Editor-in-Chief, The HORN Bulletin

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Book Review

The Soldier's Legacy: A Review

Main Author and Publisher: Kenya Army, 2018
Editors: Brig. Jonah M. Mwangi, et al

Reviewer: Mumo Nzau, Ph.D.

Overview

In reviewing this Book, I asked the following question: what is the aim, the audience and the message? To this end, the book has a clear aim. It is a celebration by the Kenya Army in marking 55 years of dedicated service to the nation. It is a story about the history, day-to-day practices, experiences and achievements of the Kenya Army in serving the people it is mandated to defend and protect as narrated by the Army Soldier. KDF is therefore celebrating the Army soldier, with the Soldiers and their families and inviting fellow Kenyans to celebrate these gains with them in a colourful and memorable way enshrined and immortalized in this Book.

The Soldier's Legacy is targeting and appealing to a wide audience that is three-fold: First, the KDF Army soldier and the Army leadership. Second, families of KDF soldiers; and Third, every Kenyan citizen the *Mwananchi* for whose security, survival and human development the KDF and for that matter, the Kenya Army exists. By so doing, the book connects with the social reality and the Kenyan condition with touching gratitude, pride and honour.

The message in the book is equally clear. It enlightens and reminds the citizens that the Army is not all about war but rather a humanistic institution that is deeply concerned about peace, human rights, gender and human development as espoused by the SDGs, and Vision 2030 among other policy platforms that guide our nation and our continent today.

Yet another touching message conveyed here is that soldiers are human beings and their physical and psychological health is critical to the work they do, and hence the importance of their welfare and that of their families as part and parcel of our society.

Further, that the Kenya Army is built on deep-seated patriotism, uncompromising discipline, clear doctrine and continuous training; all under a transformative leadership tradition that has stood the test of time. That the family of the soldier is the backbone of his/or her work environment; and that service to the nation is the utmost aim for which the soldier is ready to pay the ultimate price. And finally and most important: that the fallen gallant soldier can never and shall never be forgotten.

The philosophical premise

The Soldier's Legacy is an open publication by the Kenya Army in marking 55 years of dedicated service to the nation. It is a detailed account and institutional memoir of the mandate, form, activities

and achievements of the Kenya Army as an integral pillar in the wider Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) establishment over this period. This autobiographic piece represents a valuable, timely and worthwhile undertaking on the part of Kenya's defence architecture for two main reasons.

First and foremost, it underscores the role of the defence function in a modernizing and consolidating African democracy where the military's role is guided not only by the ethos of professionalism, discipline and humanistic values but also submits to civilian authority in serving the country as enshrined in the constitution and statutes thereof. Secondly this is perhaps the most comprehensive undertaking so far by the military to showcase itself to the populace that it is charged with the duty of protecting, thereby deservedly projecting its core philosophical and doctrinal foundations as well as the ends, means and ways at its disposal in prosecuting this noble duty now and into posterity.

This outlook is echoed not only in the 'Statement' by the Chief of Defence Forces General Samson Mwathethe, 'Word' from *the then* Army Commander Lieutenant General Robert Kibochi and the 'Message' by the Defence Cabinet Secretary Ambassador Raychelle A. Omamo but also the Commander in Chief (C in C), H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta, who wrote the book's 'Foreword.'

A captivating autobiographic masterpiece

Editorially, the colourful and eye-catching book is organized into ten chapters each dedicated to specific and systematically selected thematic areas accompanied by numerous pictorial illustrations, inspiring memorable quotes and personal accounts by both serving and retired Kenya Army personnel across ranks. In so doing, *The Soldier's Legacy* tells a holistic and captivating story about the Kenya Army in terms of what the Kenya Army is, how far it has come, its current state and the future prospects it looks forward to. While packaged and presented in a manner that is not only palatable, fascinating and enticing to the average reader in the general public domain, a keen analytical look at the Work reveals a deeper and crucial message worth discussing here.

For starters, the book tells the story of a Kenya Army that was able to transform itself from being an instrument for subjugating the native African under colonialism to a steadfast shield for the nation for over half a century today. Yet while rooted in the military traditions and doctrines of a former colonial power- *Great Britain, now a core friendly ally and key development partner-* the outfit steadily transitioned and adapted to the realities and challenges of post-independence Kenya guided by a sound and solid leadership tradition that has stood the test of time.

The nostalgic pictorials featuring former Kenya Army Commanders from the heyday of Major General Freeland and Brigadier A.J. Hardy back in the early 1960s, which was succeeded by the leadership of Lieutenant Generals J.K. Nzioka, A.M. Sawe, J.L Lengees, D.R.C. Tonje, A.K. Cheruiyot and A.A. Adan among others in the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and through to the 1990s; before the mantle was passed on to the likes of Lieutenant Generals L.K. Sumbeiywo, S.K. Njoroge, J. Kasaon, L.M. Ngondi, R.K. Kibochi and W.K. Raria among others in the 2000s and after, all depict an aura of continuity, consistency and sustainability within a positive transformative trajectory. Incisive commentaries by former Chiefs of General Staff General (Rtd) Mohamoud Mohammed, General (Rtd) Jeremiah Kianga and General (Rtd) Dr. Julius Karangi in addition to those by personnel in the officer, non-commissioned officer and other ranks dotted all over the book, further epitomize the state of things.

Sticking to doctrine and operational prowess

Another key attribute depicted in the book is the centrality of doctrinal mainstreaming, continuous training and the welfare of army personnel, with morale and career enhancement of the junior

serviceman cadre getting special attention. To this end, an entire chapter is dedicated to the training and education component where the inculcation of knowledge, values, attitudes, skills and army assets therein is variously showcased. Subsequently, the institutional memory around this core function and the structures and processes therein are succinctly documented and immortalized with pictures dating back to the pre-independence period and after.

Further, *The Soldier's Legacy* presents a well simplified narration of delicate aspects to do with the threat environment (TE) and the operational art (OA), with special emphasis on not only land warfare campaign tasks and robust missions over time and space; but also special attention is dedicated to national development programmes through multiagency joint operations, civil-military engagements and exercises in light of the long-term objectives that fall within the broad and multifaceted province of operations other than war (OTW) both closer home, in the immediate region and globally. In this direction, the contributions of the Kenya Army in supplementing national security duties especially community development-oriented and complex emergency humanitarian settings among other duties are documented accordingly.

The accounts by world famous peacekeeping and 'diplomacy of conflict management' veterans such as Lieutenant General (Rtd) Opande and Lieutenant General (Rtd) Lazarus Sumbeiywo among others attest to great achievements on this front. In similar fashion, real time stories and analyses by army personnel paint a picture of a force that is highly patriotic, courageous and one that has paid the ultimate price in defending the nation from external threats especially those occasioned by international terrorist groups such as al Shabaab in Somalia among others. This is the message sent across from the battlefield experiences in *Operational Linda Nchi* (OLN) which commenced in October 2011 and lasted through mid-2012 when it transitioned to become part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Modest but powerful stories and touching personal memoirs by serving and retired Generals, Sector Commanders, Officers, gallant troops and other unsung heroes and heroines of the Kenya Army who served in these operations reflect a cohesive, professional, honest and foresighted military outfit whose actions have had a net positive effect in as far as confronting, tactically pre-empting and thwarting what would have otherwise been more devastating threats and their concomitant ramifications on our country's security and survival in the long run is concerned.

Underscoring soldiers' welfare, civil-military relations and human development

In the latter parts of the book, the authors vividly show that the Kenya Army is fully aware of and appreciates its own internal and external environments in addition to the stark realities and challenges associated with the change dynamics thereof. As such, they document and immortalize important age-old institutional traditions, ceremonial rites, mannerisms and customs while underscoring the place of gender, the environment, human rights, human security and general wellbeing within a dynamic and fast changing threat environment. Against this premise, the contribution of the '*women in uniform*' is captured in an entire chapter while that of army personnel in assorted national events such as tree planting exercises, sports and other actions and processes in the domain of nation-building and general human development are illustrated and authoritatively discussed in subsequent chapters where the importance of a healthy family life and favourable working socio-psychological environment is reiterated.

## Projecting into the future and striving to actualize ideals

The authors 'tie it together' by projecting into the future from an informed and optimistic policy, strategic and operational standpoint. Yet there is always room for constructive critique and suggestions for improvement. As such, one would expect to see future Army Books of this kind reflect an actualization of the commitments and ideals reflected the Book in terms of more resources, even better capabilities to detect and deter the enemy's intentions and actions and save lives in combat; and augmented by even more welfare for the serving, retired, and fallen soldier; and that of the families. As such, I submit that *The Soldier's Legacy* is a powerful autobiographic narrative and an 'easy, one-sitting read' that I highly recommend not only for general public readership but also to the world of policy actors, practitioners and the academy alike.

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