

The

HORN

Bulletin

The HORN Bulletin is a bi-monthly publication by the HORN Institute. It contains thematic articles mainly on issues affecting the Horn of Africa region.

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About the HORN Institute

The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is a non-profit, applied research, and policy think-do tank based in Nairobi, Kenya. Its mission is to contribute to informed, objective, definitive research and analytical inquiry that positively informs policies of governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and spaces. Its vision is a progressive Horn of Africa served by informed, evidence-based and problem-solving policy research and analysis.

The Grand Game: Gulf Interests in the Horn of Africa

By Tamara Naidoo

Abstract

The article offers an account of the significant and diverse investments made by Gulf states in the Horn of Africa and the grand games playing out within both regions, affecting regional conflict management. The Horn of Africa urgently need to control this surge of investment, while protecting their sovereignty and pushing back on the influence of political agendas of the Gulf. Currently, Gulf states are largely seen to be inexperienced in African political dynamics. These resulting short-term interests have already proven disadvantageous to Gulf interests in some respects and yet interestingly, cases are available that point to the adaptations and concessions made by Gulf states to be viewed as more acceptable external partners to African states. The traditional objectives of the great powers of the West to ensure democratization and peaceful political transition in the Horn of Africa should remain relevant if regional progress is to be seen. Ultimately though, foreign policy experts must embrace a multipolar worldview, leaving behind departmental divisions separating Africa from the Middle East. After all, resolving the peace and security challenges in one of the two regions, the Gulf or Horn, is bound to have implications for the other region as well.

Introduction

The Horn of Africa countries especially Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea have had ties with Gulf countries for centuries, shipping goods such as camels and frankincense over the Red Sea, sharing religious traits



Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani inspects a guard of honor upon arriving at the Bole International Airport during his official visit to Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa on April 10, 2017. (Photo Credit: Reuters/Tiksa Negeria)

in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia which are predominantly Muslim nations whereas Ethiopia and Eritrea have large Muslim populations as well (Wilson & England, 2019). The Gulf region is described as a complex arena of differing uncertainty and risks (Cordesman, 2016). It consists of Iran, Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Since the 1950's, the region's lucrative petroleum resources have enabled rapid urbanization and led to well-educated citizenry. There are also significantly greater formal sector employment opportunities. Despite this progress, the Gulf's youth bulge has been a debilitating point as youth struggle to find career placements in economies focused on oil. Therefore, on one hand, Arab economies, propped up by petroleum, have created sufficient cash flow to pursue foreign policy ambitions abroad, while on the other hand, petroleum export revenues have created a sense of economic insecurity into these Gulf states (Cordesman, 2016). Some of the Gulf State's foreign policy objectives in the Horn of Africa have most thoroughly been recorded since the 1950's. Arab rivalry has, in fact, spilled over into the Horn in repeated intervals over the decades (Khan, 2018). This occurs, for instance, in the form of the Arab-Israeli rivalry, the competition between conservative and radical states, and even between Baathist states. The dimensions of Arab rivalries were in fact also present during the longstanding Sudanese conflict, Ethiopia's civil war and the Ethiopia-Somalia

relations. During 1970s, when Gulf countries were particularly wealthy, they sided with the United States, as opposed to the Soviet Union-supported African governments.

Today, the Gulf countries account for low to medium governance and economic risk. All of the Gulf countries continue to improve their domestic forces and their internal security, the UAE and Saudi Arabia holding most significant capacity in this regard. There are a number of threats to the stability in the Gulf region, depending on a country's stance on Islamic radicals or positioning on the conflict in Yemen. Another debilitating force among Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait is the conflictual stance between the Sunni and Shi'ite populations. Still, the relative political stability among Gulf countries over the past decade has seen a number of economic projects established in Africa. Economic diplomacy with Africa is viewed to provide Gulf countries with expanded work opportunities and diversifying Gulf markets, in addition to situating surplus profits in development projects that also stimulate Gulf influence in Africa (Al-Faisal, 2019). In this article, I will seek to unpack the grand game of Gulf interests in the Horn of Africa and its impact on regional conflict management. I first provide an overview of shared economic interests between the most prominent states in the Gulf and Horn of Africa. Secondly, I will outline the influence and impact of peace and security issues surrounding the relations between African and Arab

states in the region. Lastly, I will provide recommendations to enhance diplomatic relations between the two regions.

The Meeting Point: African and Arab Economic Diplomacy

The Red Sea is a prominent shipping route and meeting point for Africans and those on the Arabian Peninsula. Despite its potential to boost economic relations between the regions, economic activity is marred in this stretch of water by several issues including the war in Yemen, and Ethiopia's pot-stirring attempts to gain access to the waters (Oneko, 2018). Nevertheless, a turning point in the Horn of Africa's relations was noted in 2018 when the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres referred to a "wind of hope blowing in the Horn of Africa." His statement followed as Ethiopia, an evolving regional hegemon, brokered a peace deal with long-time rival Eritrea to access the Red Sea waters, with the assistance of both the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The move not only brought together the Arab and Horn of Africa but also proved opportune to address other tensions as well.

The Prominence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE

The foreign policy trend of Gulf states has usually been cautious around engagements with Africa due to instability within many African states. Still, the prospect of attaining geopolitical influence through the Red Sea and its location in the Horn of Africa has prompted more considerate foreign policy making, somewhat akin to a grand political game (Vertin, Haecker, & Musila, 2019). As Al-Faisal (2019) notes, the Horn of Africa came to be viewed by Gulf foreign policy actors 'as a chance to control emerging markets and enter into new economic agreements with other countries sharing common interests in Africa', especially after China made in-roads into Africa. Interestingly, China's increasing involvement in the Red Sea, together with Russia, is taking advantage of the vacuum left by the US and European states. China's entrance into the Horn via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has propelled a synergy that drew the Gulf's attention to emerging market investment patterns, financing for development and post-conflict reconstruction practices (Khan, 2018).

Noting the foreign policy positioning of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Cooperation Council include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, it is evident that Africa appeals to the Gulf

states for at least four reasons (Khan, 2018). Firstly, the Horn of Africa in particular is a geostrategic location. Secondly, access to African agricultural produce improves Arab food security. Thirdly, the role of Gulf states in Africa strengthens their reputation as global players and friendly Muslim nations. Lastly, economic influence in Africa unlocks financial means to ensure security and diplomatic goals in the Gulf itself. The three axes of Gulf investments are represented by the Arab axis (led by Saudi Arabia and UAE, but including Egypt and Bahrain); the Iran axis; and the Qatar-Turkey axis (Mishra, 2019).

Eritrea on the Red Sea coast has long been an ideal partner for the UAE and Saudi Arabia but its weak economy and military strengths meant that, a more prosperous relationship would need Ethiopia's buy-in as well. This is because Ethiopia, as a growing regional hegemon, would provide greater opportunity for economic relationships with its heightened security capabilities and burgeoning economy. In the past 20 years, the enduring conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea thwarted any ideas of a mutually beneficial relationship where Ethiopia could access the Red Sea. At first not overly concerned by these tensions in the Horn, Saudi Arabia had already constructed pipelines and oil refineries around the Red Sea's coast in addition to creating a Red Sea fleet in case the Iranians attempted to block Saudi oil exports via the Strait of Hormuz (Oneko, 2018). The UAE, in turn, offered large investments in logistics, ports, and trade development to establish its foothold in the Horn of Africa. The political spat between Ethiopia and Eritrea however, stunted the prospect of greater economic gains for Gulf states. Ethiopia's bad blood with Eritrea was instilled in its foreign policy objectives to isolate Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki from the African Union and other regional bodies. The change in Ethiopian leadership in April, 2018 to Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed and his reformist position was, therefore, viewed as an

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opportunity for the UAE and Saudi Arabia to help mend the relationship with Eritrea. The result was a historic peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia, sweetened by a lucrative economic UAE investment in an oil pipeline from Ethiopia to Eritrea. Other commercial benefits that came to be expected after the peace deal were the likes of expanded Ethiopian trade routes via Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea that would embolden Ethiopia's claim as the regional powerhouse in the Horn, while also cementing the UAE and Saudi Arabia's economic dominance within the Gulf (Oneko, 2018).

To track the Gulf states' involvement in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia stands to be the largest investor in African agricultural lands due to the water shortages in Saudi Arabia. For example, the country bought 500,000 hectares of agricultural land in Tanzania in 2009. Saudi Arabia's economic diplomacy is visibly embracing Africa with the 2019 announcement of a USD10 billion investment in South Africa's energy sector, while Qatar also signed a USD4 billion deal to manage a Red Sea port with Sudan in February 2018. During the time of the Gulf crisis in 2017, Qatar became convinced by its foreign relations with Africa because it proved to be a safety net to Qatar when it was isolated from the GCC. As such the Qatari government plans in 2018 to invest half a billion dollars in the agricultural and food sectors in Sudan (Al-Faisal, 2019). In terms of the UAE experience of plummeting oil prices in 2014, African markets offered back-up economic security leading to greater investments later in 2016 of around USD11 billion of capital in African energy industries (Al-Faisal, 2019). The UAE also set itself up to become the largest Gulf trader with Africa, due to its impressive commercial shipping infrastructure and ports. The geostrategic location of Africa, evidently benefited Gulf states who imported almost USD5 billion worth of goods from Africa in each year from 2010 to 2015, before increasing its imports significantly to USD23.9 billion in 2016 (Al-Faisal, 2019).

Another Gulf state, Oman is also keen on developing Djibouti's ports and to operate and manage the ports as well as other major logistics facilities, as noted in the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 'the State General Reserve Fund of Oman (SGRF) and

the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority' (Al-Faisal, 2019). The outcome heightens competition among Gulf states as they each seek to hold the greatest influence on the Red Sea, especially over Bab el-Mandeb, which meets the Indian Ocean to the south. UAE's decade-long investment in the Doraleh container terminal in Djibouti prompted its dominance. However, when the area came to fall under the military control of the Saudi coalition for Yemen, the UAE lost its footing. Oman had in fact forced Djibouti to end its investment contract with the UAE by removing the Dubai Ports company privileges (Al-Faisal, 2019).

The Merging of Peace and Security Issues

Within the Gulf, Saudi Arabia leads a controversial military coalition to stabilize the war in Yemen. Saudi Arabia supports the rejected Yemeni government over Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. In previous years, Iran's relation with African states on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden allowed Iranians to control transport via Bab el-Mandeb Strait and help in combatting piracy and further pressure the Arab axis, especially Saudi Arabia (Mishra, 2019). This has changed though, exemplified by political dynamics in Sudan which was Iran's most important military partner in the region. When Saudi Arabia in 2014 froze banking cooperation with Sudan, the latter closed its Iranian cultural centers. Moreover, in 2015, Sudan joined Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in its fight against Iranian-backed Houthis. For Eritrea, Iran's influence in country weakened from 2015 onwards after the UAE and Saudi Arabia offered to ease the impact of sanctions on the country (Mishra, 2019). Since the UAE and Saudi Arabia are the biggest Gulf players in the Horn and East Africa, they have used foreign policy tools to encourage African states to downgrade relations with Iran. Evidently, another factor is that American sanctions have reduced Iran's ability to reinvigorate Iranian ties in Africa to pre-Yemen levels. As such, dynamics of the Yemeni war spill over into the Horn of Africa as Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea permit their airspaces, waters and military bases to be used for the Yemeni war (Oneko, 2018). This is in addition to the fact that the Horn of Africa already hosts Africa's biggest military interventions. The UAE itself also built military bases in Eritrea and Djibouti, hosting Saudi

troops, among others. On the other hand, Turkey and Qatar both have bases and close relations with Somalia and Sudan. The Horn of Africa's greater involvement in Yemen is further questioned by the release of Human Rights Watch Reports referring to secret prisons in Eritrea for Yemeni prisoners (Oneko, 2018). Although, these allegations are denied by authorities, since government-to-government meetings are often inaccessible to public broadcasting the true extent of mutual sympathies is not clear.

The Influence of Gulf States on African Peace and Security

Following the Gulf crisis, Qatar and Turkey have strengthened their relations with each other. The African country closest to Turkey is Somalia. Turkey is Somalia's strongest economic partner, managing the capital's ports, airports and military base (Mishra, 2019). Another country strengthening ties with Turkey is Sudan, which signed an agreement to rebuild the Suakin Island (a former Ottoman territory). The Suakin Island is a potential market for tourism, serves as a transit point for pilgrims travelling to Mecca, and would also enable Turkey to

have a military presence in the Red Sea to fight against terrorism. With the UAE slowing relations with Somalia, this has opened up an opportunity for Qatar to invest in Mogadishu and extend its support to Somalia's forces (Mishra, 2019). The Qatar-Gulf rift demands that African states adapt towards conflictual diplomatic dynamics as the Arab rivalry elevates. Al-Faisal (2019) warns that African states should be aware that Saudi Arabia and the UAE may stir up separatist movements in Africa to 'inflare the situation in their favour'. Concerned by any further destabilizing forces in the Horn of Africa, Mishra (2019) writes that 'while there may be short-term gains for outside powers, over time everyone stands to lose from greater Horn instability.'

Across the Horn, personalised relationships between Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia mean that national and subnational African leaders stand to gain financial gifts in exchange for their loyalty (Khan, 2018). As exemplified by the Qatari-Turkish support for Somalia President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as "Farmajo," the Somalia leader was able to dominate the media and political rivals, receiving 60 armored vehicles from Turkey while establishing a Turkish-trained army unit composed,



Somali military officers attend a training program by the United Arab Emirates at their military base in Mogadishu, Somalia in November 2017. (Photo Credit: Reuters /Feisal Omar)

in part, of recruits drawn from Islamist networks in order to rein in the leaders of federal member states. Therefore, the UAE-backed Somaliland instead with the federal member state's claims for federal independence which would weaken the Qatari-backed government. As shown by the case of Somalia, these destabilizing effects stemming from these patrons have been called out by Western actors. Subsequent to Western complaints, it is evident that traditional Western powers are simply losing influence to other actors of the Global South. Beyond the interventions of external partners, until now, countries in the Horn of Africa have been unsuccessful in forming a bloc to determine mutual security and geostrategic interests (Khan, 2018). As a result, external interference has far-reaching consequences. For example, on the leasing of the Sudanese Island of Suakin by Turkey in 2017, it caused severe strain to Sudanese and Egyptian relations. In another incident, Ethiopia due to its Qatari patronage, was predisposed to react negatively to the UAE and Saudi Arabia's operations at an Eritrean military base for Yemen. In the face of these new conflictual forces, the signing of the historic peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea has softened criticism to some extent on Gulf activity in the Horn. Thus, the peace between Eritrea-Ethiopia may just mark the occasion for new impetus in regional conflict management in the Horn of Africa (Khan, 2018).

Way Forward for the Horn of Africa

The countries in the Horn of Africa and neighboring, Sudan, have proven in the interim their capability to leverage global powers against each other (Khan, 2018). It is due to Sudan's importance to Gulf countries, the European Union (EU), US, Israel and Ethiopia that President Omar Bashir avoided the country's degeneration into pariah status. Bashir did so by firstly becoming a key supplier of soldiers to Yemen in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Secondly, the EU identifies Khartoum as a

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critical partner in reducing migration to Europe. Thirdly, in terms of security issues between the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region, the US needs Sudan to partner on counter-terrorism efforts. Lastly, in solidifying relations with Ethiopia their agreement ensures Sudan receives water for agriculture via the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which in turn, makes Sudan even more attractive for bigger Arab country food security interests and also, promoting confidence in the Ethiopian regime for greater external cooperation (Khan, 2018).

Simultaneously, the announcement of refreshed relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have also caused a stir and points to the ability of African states leveraging external partners. After all, Somalia is supported by the Qatar-Turkey axis while the UAE supports Ethiopia. Abu Dhabi considers the Qatar-Turkey axis a key challenger to UAE's interests in Somalia, as such Somaliland calls for independence causing further tensions. Surprising external partners, Ethiopia and Somalia however signed a joint communique agreeing to greater economic and political integration (Khan, 2018). The details are not clear to the public on whether the communique was made possible by swaying Somali attitudes towards the UAE. Essentially, this is interpreted to be a strategic move on behalf of Somalia to ensure that Qatar is incentivised to maintain its current level of support.

Establishing a Prospective Red Sea Forum

The myriad of external players and lack of regional cohesion in the Horn, all account for the ample arguments available for the establishment of a Red Sea Forum. The reasons for why such a forum has not been established so far is also important to consider (Waal, 2019). Firstly, even in the presence of some instability in the Horn of Africa, there is no urgent maritime security issue as they are managed well on an ad hoc basis of coalitions. Secondly, membership would also be controversial questioning whether the likes of Ethiopia, Oman or the UAE should be allowed to join. Thirdly, academic and bureaucratic practice, be it at universities or international organizations like the World Bank or even in foreign affairs departments tend to separate African and Middle Eastern expertise which thus calls for a fundamental restructuring in international relations that bureaucrats are not yet ready for. Moreover, even relevant regional bodies are ill-equipped with the African Union (AU) and GCC not having detailed external affairs departments and strategies, while the League of Arab States is itself inactive.



Foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt and Yemen met in Riyadh in January, 2020 as part of a new initiative to improve co-operation in the areas bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Photo Credit: REUTERS)

The issue of establishing a Red Sea Forum is nevertheless on the table at the African Union where de Waal (2016) reports that officials are developing an 'external action policy' for peace and security in the 'shared space' of the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden, including establishing political and security partnership with the GCC (World Peace Foundation 2016). In fact, in October 2017, in Khartoum, the AU meeting hosted representatives of north-east African states and international partners (particularly the European Union) to consider how to expand a peace and security agenda for the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea. Thereafter, the AU failed to cement such an agenda as no AU member-state is mandated to drive it. This is because neighboring states to the Horn such as Egypt and Sudan prefer to hold bilateral relations with Arab states; the underlying trait of Ethiopian foreign policy is a suspicion towards any engagement; in turn Eritrea refutes the relevance of the AU to the Red Sea; and Somalia's government is yet to position itself. By November 2018, Djibouti broached the issue at the AU Peace and Security Council. A month later, after the annual GCC forum, the King of Saudi Arabia invited seven ministers of foreign affairs from coasts of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. De Waal (2019), asserts that the past regional activities on future security policies in the Horn of Africa and Gulf

indicates that the nature of events are likely to continue to be ad hoc and not dependent on formal fora which the idea of a 'Red Sea Forum' suggests (Waal, 2019).

Shifting Plates in the Horn of Africa

With the Horn of Africa experiencing significant shifts over the past few decades, realities will continue to change via the transregional dynamics of massive migration and refugee flows, and the influence of Chinese BRI projects especially, those of its naval base at the Red Sea's southern gate (Ventir, 2019). Moreover, other transregional forces includes the economic value of the Red Sea itself which accounts for up to USD700 billion in seaborne commerce, in addition to Africa's rising consumer classes, and the finding of new hydrocarbon sources in the Horn.

Following the aggressions on two Saudi oil facilities in September 2019, Saudi Arabia was more motivated to resolve conflict to protect its oil economy from further attacks; finally ending in an agreement with Yemen where Saudi Arabia controls Yemeni ports and safeguards the strategically located Bab el-Mandeb Strait from Iran (Ventir, 2019). This ensures that Djibouti and Eritrean politics will remain a central concern for Saudi interests.

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For the UAE, even though they currently support Somaliland, the Somalia elections for 2020 may see the UAE enticing once again the central government to be on their side which are bound to have repercussions for all aspects of Somali governance, especially in the realm of peace and security (Ventir, 2019). Ethiopia and Sudan are both facing difficult political transitions. Remarkably, the Gulf states have had to learn difficult lessons in the way they manage relations with these two countries, where heavy handed-Gulf interventions. With regards to Ethiopia, the Gulf states had to learn that long-term interests must be sensitive to the country's complex ethno-regional politics. In a similar vein, Gulf states realized that relations with consolidated institutions, rather than personal relationships, would also cease the pushback by civil society in Khartoum on Gulf aid. The UAE and Saudi Arabia in fact proved themselves adaptable, supporting a hybrid civil-military government to emerge in Sudan. Critically, the Gulf partners are evolving in their foreign policy practice, showing that while navigating the domestic politics of transition in the Horn, they are becoming more open to engaging the broader international community (Gebremichael, 2018). Ultimately, Gebremichael's (2018) agreeing with traditional Western partners, asserts that in order to have regional development each government in the Horn must overcome challenges around corruption, authoritarianism, ethnic tension, mismanagement and isolation.

Conclusion

The Red Sea for centuries has been recognized as an important link in the global waterways from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The

article offered an account of the significant and diverse investments made by Gulf states in the Horn of Africa and the grand games playing out within both regions. These African states along the Red Sea are in urgent need of controlling the surge of investment, while protecting their sovereignty and pushing back on the influence of political agendas of the Gulf. It is the prerogative of African states to create regional dialogue so as to envision a regional development trajectory and a common vision for the strengthened ties with the Gulf.

Currently, the Gulf states are largely seen to be inexperienced in African political dynamics and thus only focused on short-term gains as opposed to long-term plans based on nuanced analysis of domestic politics in the Horn. These short-term interests have already proven disadvantageous to Gulf interests in some respects and interestingly, cases are available that point to the adaptations and concessions made by Gulf states to be viewed as more acceptable external partners to African states. These new Gulf-orientated foreign relations in the Horn of Africa essentially, poses as a potential threat for more established powers, like the US and China, each with their own interests and military presence in the region. The traditional objectives of the great powers of the West to ensure democratization and peaceful political transition in the Horn of Africa remain relevant if regional progress is to be seen. Ultimately, though a change in practice is urgently needed for foreign policy experts to embrace a multipolar view, beyond departmental divisions separating Africa from the Middle East. After all, resolving the peace and security challenges in either region, the Gulf or Horn, are bound to have implications for the other region as well.

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Comprehensive Border Security Critical to Stability in the Horn of Africa

By Roselyne Omondi

Abstract

Some states in the greater Horn of Africa region have not yet policed and secured their physical and virtual spaces efficiently and effectively. There is also the tendency of states to approach border security independently as opposed to collaborating with other states in the region. Different merchants of violence have taken advantage of the various defective border management scenarios to achieve their economic, military, political, or socio-cultural goals, creating the insecurity and instability that characterize the region. At the same time, the management of bio threats such as locusts' invasion, and the emerging COVID-19 has also been wanting. This article argues that the adoption of a comprehensive approach to border security by member states in the Horn of Africa will decrease armed conflicts and terrorism, improve the management of bio threats, and help to stabilize the region. Such an approach may involve, among other things, the continuous training and equipping of security officers, and multi-agency inter-state disaster management that employs relevant up-to-date technologies. The states should act jointly with other states, and secure borders constantly and simultaneously to ensure safety, peace, and stability in the region.

Introduction

The almost simultaneous invasion of the greater Horn of Africa region by locust swarms, and the emerging threat of the fast-spreading COVID-19 (a new viral disease) on the back of increasing terrorism not only threaten the stability of the region, but also exemplify the cross-border nature of modern day threats, and the difficulty of managing them at regional and global levels. On February 24, 2020, the Locust Watch desk of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sounded the alarm on the 'widespread breeding' of the swarms from the Persian Gulf in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, and warned of 'new swarms' in the near future. FAO has also sighted swarms in Uganda, South Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The swarms have already destroyed vegetation in areas largely inhabited by the region's pastoralists that are already largely food insecure on account of prolonged droughts that were followed by flooding in the period immediately before the arrival of the swarms, in December 2019, and January 2020. No individual in the region has tested positive for COVID-19, which has the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported to have been confirmed in Asia (China, Japan, South Korea), Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, South Africa), Europe (especially Italy), parts of the Middle East (Iran). The threat of COVID-19

remains high as nationals of the greater Horn of Africa region still interact with those from the affected regions albeit in limited ways.

Towards end of February 2020, the US government warned of possible terror attack in Kenya's capital, increasing the capital's terror risk to the highest level. This followed a US-Africa Command report of the death of an al Shabab planner and his spouse in a drone strike in Somalia. Al Shabab activity has increased in recent weeks in Somalia and Kenya. On January 5, 2020, the Somalia-based terrorist group attacked a US-Africa Command Centre in Manda, Lamu County, Kenya, that is also a base for US's Special Operations Force in Somalia. The attackers were reportedly repulsed by members of both the Kenyan Defence Force and the US Army, according to representatives of the two forces. Al Shabab said it had targeted this security installation because it has been used as "one of the many launch pads against us [al Shabab]" (*The Standard*, 2020).

The US's reaction, through the Centre's Director of Operations, Maj. Gen. William Gayler, was a reiteration of its commitment to helping its allies to degrade the group's ability to occupy territory and propagate violence in region. The targeting of the US, a foreign state actor,



A motorcyclist drives through a swarm of desert locusts in Samburu County, Kenya on 21 January, 2020. FAO warned that the desert locust swarms that have already reached Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, could spill over into more countries in East Africa destroying hundreds of thousands of acres of crops. (Photo Credit: FAO/Sven Torfinn)

by al Shabab, a Somalia-based non-state actor, in Kenya, encapsulates the security landscape in the greater Horn of Africa region. It also highlights: the porosity of Kenya-Somalia-US borders, motivations of state and non-state actors for violence, and the challenges of securing different kinds of borders. Further, it invites discussion on border security in the region, a topic that is currently occupying the minds of many security officers and citizens in the greater Horn of Africa.

In the following sections, this article will provide a general overview of different kinds of borders in the region, focusing chiefly on the porous nature of these boundaries. It will then discuss the difficulties that states encounter in their quest to police and secure the same. Suggestions for improving security, safety, and stability in the region will be offered.

Border porosity in the greater Horn of Africa region

It is an open secret that most of the physical and virtual borders in the region are porous and/or not fully secured. Several explanations have been offered, key among them are the Partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, the technology-initiated compression of time and space, and the inability and/or

unwillingness of some states in the region to police and secure their borders effectively and efficiently (Pakenham, 1990; Scholte, 2005; Hansen 2019).

The Europeans that divided up Africa were driven by the desire to gain territory on the continent while maintaining peace with each other. What they did not pay attention to is the nature of the boundaries that they were creating. The results include the generally straight borders that still define the continent (Pakenham, 1990; Stearns, 2012; Yoon, 2009). These borders cut through the communities that existed at that time, creating patchworked nation states. A key consequence of the Scramble for Africa is that the exercise inadvertently provided some 'nations' with some sort of unofficial dual or multiple nationality status in the host state. The drawing of Kenya's southern border, for example, cut across the territory that the Maasai nation had occupied before the arrival of the Europeans, placing the Maasai in two states: Kenya and Tanzania. Other examples include the Somali nation which ended up in parts of Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, and the Teso nation that exists in both Uganda and Kenya.

On achieving independence from their colonial masters, most African states retained the existing borders. Select states, such as Eritrea, and South Sudan, expressed

their dissatisfaction with the situation, and seceded from their 'parent' states, in 1991, and 2011 respectively (Yoon, 2009). Others, such as Ethiopia, have adopted nation-sensitive governance models that allow nations in the states to exist somewhat independently but also alongside other nations within the nation state. Ethiopia's ethno-federalism model, for example, allows the Amhara to occupy the Amhara region, the Oromo to occupy the Oromo region, and so forth. These regional governments work with the federal government to keep project Ethiopia intact (Kefale, 2013).

By accepting pre-independence borders, the states inherited the porous borders that the Scramble had created. Such borders are porous to the extent that the boundaries blur the lines between internal and external borders of nations (Bigo, 2014), as the aforementioned examples demonstrate, as well as the extent of the external borders. This in turn makes it difficult to define the jurisdiction of the security officers who are mandated to secure a state's internal and external borders. Further, because individuals from the resultant cross-bordered communities often find acceptance in two or more of the host states, blurred borders can camouflage some of them. This makes them somewhat invisible in their host states, compromising security in one or more states.


The emergence of advanced technologies in recent times has increased the permeability of both internal and external borders (Feenberg, 2005; Ceyhan, 2008) in two main ways. First, it has blurred inter-state borders further. Today, there are different kinds of virtual communities for whom the protocols that relate to accessing physical borders are irrelevant and/or non-existent. In other words, although these communities exist across state borders, the communities are not necessarily defined by them. The second explanation, which relates to the first one, is that technological advancements have created new kinds of territories, virtual spaces. These technology-enabled territories cannot be accessed, and policed and/or secured in the same way as physical territories are.

The inability to police and secure borders fully is a factor of nature, power (influence, money, personnel too) and knowledge (Foucault, 2008; Ritter, 2018). The extent to which a physical or virtual border can be secured is dependent on, among other factors, access to and ability to use the relevant technology (Ceyhan, 2008; Ritter, 2018), the kind of government that a state has, the nature of cross-bordered nations that the state has (Feenberg, 2005), a state's budget, the quality and quantity of security officers, and the availability of cross-border security arrangements (Bigo, 2014). The nature and quality of a state's knowledge industry also impacts border security. Countries that invest in and employ both experts and security practitioners and up-to-date technologies that improve surveillance generally police and secure their territories better (Ceyhan, 2008). Many states in the Horn of Africa, for example, depend on the hardware (arms and ammunition) and software (expertise) of other states to help secure their borders; most notably the US, and China. These include aerial sprayers, bombers, drones, and biometric identifiers such as voice recognition software. This gives states such as the US more power over the other dependent states.

Several merchants of violence have emerged, grown, and/or thrived in the Horn of Africa on account of the existing power and knowledge gaps that impede the policing and securing of borders. Many of them occupy or attempt to occupy territory, particularly in the frontiers (Hansen 2019), and exploit these to achieve their economic, political, social, or military goals (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Hansen, 2019)). The Allied Democratic Force (ADF), for example, operates with seeming abandon in parts of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). So do their sympathizers, as well as actors who masquerade as members ADF. These actors may or may not be wary of state presence. On June 4, 2019, for example, ISIS claimed responsibility for the incident in DRC which ADF fighters had been suspected of (see timeline of ADF activity). These groups operate in the area, the presence of local, cross-border, and international security forces

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Overview of ADF Activity in 2018 and 2019



notwithstanding (Hansen, 2019; Institute of Economics and Peace [IEP], 2019. Brooks, 2017)). In the past two years, for example, ADF killed hundreds of people (including troops and civilians) as indicated in the following timeline.

In the same breath, al Shabab continues to operate across borders, particularly in Somalia and Kenya, but increasingly also in Tanzania and Mozambique, as well as across seas (Hansen, 2019). That members of the group have crossed the Kenya-Somalia border severally, and transported goods across it is well documented (UN, 2018; Mohammed, 2020). Proceeds from such cross-border trading activities have helped to fund the group's activities. In 2017, for example, UN monitors reported that al Shabab sold more than three million bags of charcoal to the Middle East, bagging an estimated USD7.5 million despite the existence of a United Nations Security Council ban on the same (UN, 2018). Al Shabab carried out 286 attacks in Somalia in 2018, killing hundreds of people. Some of these occurred in Mogadishu, which is secured with the help of AMISOM (IEC, 2019) suggesting that they breached several internal borders. The group also uses virtual spaces to announce its presence and exert its influence. Somalia's capacity to police cyber space is still limited.

Sometimes, state actors launch campaigns to flush out non-state actors from the territories that the non-state actors occupy. Such actions often send the displaced group(s) across borders; porous borders allow them to cross into other territories. State actors in one state do not usually have jurisdiction over territories in other states (Hansen, 2019; Bigo, 2014). To this extent, porous boundaries allow for translocation, and with it

the movement of violent actors to another territory. Such actors may adapt to the changing circumstances by seeking alternative activities. These may or may not be violent. When Ugandan security forces' actions displaced Lord Resistance Army (LRA) from parts of northern Uganda (Hansen, 2019), for example, the group crossed the porous boundary that separates Uganda from the Central African Republic (CAR). Once there, the group resorted to armed robbery and wildlife poaching to survive (Brooks, 2017). States in the region have also experimented with temporary closure of shared borders, to curtail illegal migration, the spread of contagious diseases like COVID-19, or trade, for example. It should be noted that border closure does not necessarily take its permeability away. This is particularly true in cross-bordered environments such as the Kenya-Somalia, Uganda-DRC, or the Uganda-Rwanda borders, and in the case of migratory pests like desert locusts.

Non-state actors are not the only ones who merchandize violence in the region to achieve their goals. DRC, for example, is awash with state actors such as the US, France, and China, and foreign multinational corporations interested in accessing some of DRC's vast highly-valued natural resources. These include coltan and related metals, cobalt, copper, and timber (Burgis, 2015; Mukwege, 2018). These actors have been known to use violence, or hire the hands of the more than 100 armed groups in country to obtain resources (Stearns, 2012). Iran has imported al Shabab exported illegally produced charcoal from a zone that is policed by African Union's multi-national peace-enforcing force in Somalia [AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia] (UN, 2018; *Daily Nation*, 2018). Peter de Clercq, Deputy

Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, has noted the sale of this charcoal not only degrades the natural environment, but also stagnates the economy, “funds insecurity and conflict,” and worsens “an already delicate humanitarian situation”(UN, 2018).

Violence management aside, most of the region’s countries lack the adequate capacity to manage threats that have no regard for borders, such as swarms of desert locusts, and the spread of diseases like COVID-19 and Ebola. Despite FAO warnings of possible invasion last year, for example many countries in the region did not take the warning seriously. Experts and politicians lost valuable time they could ill afford to respond to the problem, allowing the swarms to spread to at least six countries.

Analysis

The region that is now vulnerable to bio threats remains invested more in the more ‘traditional’ security threats such as terrorism than in threats to human security. To

be sure, desert locust swarms, and COVID-19 are border blind, and not norms in this region. As such, the region’s capacity to respond to cross-border bio threats such as these ones remains limited. It is also difficult for one state to pursue the swarms in another state. Many countries in the locusts’ path missed FAO’s early warnings, but also allowed lay persons knowledge, interspersed with cultural leanings, to water down the trust in the authority of experts such as entomologists (insect experts); some communities in the region think of locusts in terms of a food source as opposed to a food threat. Schisms between experts also appeared when the plan to destroy the ‘pests’ with pesticides emerged. Some experts think of pesticides as a solution, while others see it as a problem that will worsen the outcomes of other species in the shared ecosystem, such as bees, and birds. With more hatching swarms expected in the coming weeks, the region can expect some level of food insecurity. This could occasion hike in food prices, and precipitate violence, especially in the food-insecure arid and semi-arid regions of states such as Kenya. While the collateral damage of the pesticides is not immediately clear,



Medical workers with a coronavirus patient in Wuhan, China on February 2, 2020. More than 93,090 have been infected with the virus that originated in a Chinese seafood market, with significant outbreaks in Italy, Iran and South Korea (Photo Credit: Getty Images)

diminished agricultural productivity in the affected areas on account of the now degraded soils, and destroyed species can be expected, at least in the short term.

Even with this asymmetrical investment in 'traditional' security, many of the states in the greater Horn of Africa still struggle with the insecurity that border porosity occasions as a result of the insensitive placement of 'nations' across multiple states. This struggle seems to be unending because it is extremely difficult to redraw existing state borders. The difficulty arises from the fact that because states exercise sovereignty over their territories, ceding some territory threatens the same. Secondly, redrawing boundaries is a complex and potentially tedious and time-consuming process that involves bilateral and/or multilateral negotiations, adjudication, and agreements. However, as South Sudan has demonstrated in the almost nine years that it has existed independent of the Sudan, there are no guarantees that attempts to redress the wrongs of the said Scramble will stabilize a region, and/or yield peace. In fact, peace continues to elude Africa's youngest state, the formation of the nascent unity government notwithstanding.

States in the region have also found it difficult to curtail illegal activities that fuel insecurity and conflict by closing borders (Buzan, 1991). This is because the region is fairly integrated, and happenings in one location tends to affect those in another location. Consequently, states have to weigh the costs of the closure against the benefits of keeping it open to forestall unnecessary suffering. Additionally, closing a border does not make the boundary imporous. This explains why some states are increasingly using technology, including special imaging software, drones, and biometric data readers to help police and secure borders (Ritter, 2018). They are doing this by either establishing modernized operations centers, or hiring the expertise of more technologically advanced states.

Modernizing security operations is an expensive endeavor that many of these states can ill afford. Many states' budgets cannot accommodate constant investments in modern policing and border security hardware, or sudden need to secure borders in response to emerging bio threats. The result is the use of out-of-date equipment and infrastructure that is useless, unreliable, or inadequate. To make matters worse, many of these states struggle with the recruitment of committed, adaptive individuals. Consequently, many of the forces are staffed by individuals who have been

Many states' budgets cannot accommodate constant investments in modern policing and border security hardware, or sudden need to secure borders in response to emerging bio threats

compelled, by personal circumstances or existing laws, to join the security profession for as long as is necessary. The result is often demotivated personnel who could be easily compromised. The deployment of demotivated individuals wastes limited state resources, and does not result in improved internal or external security.

The option of hiring the expertise of security, environment, or health personnel from other more technologically advanced states is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows the hiring state to concentrate on other affairs relating the wellbeing of the state, such as the education of citizens. This may accelerate development in the hiring state. On the other hand, the hiring state allows the hired state to operate in the target state. This gives the hired, knowledgeable state some power over the hiring state, creating the possibility for non-aggressive interference by the more knowledge-empowered state in the affairs of the hiring state. It also creates dependency of the hiring state on the more advanced state. The overall effects of this, particularly when agreements arise, may be insecurity, and with it, stalled development.

Technology, states in the region are realizing, is not a silver bullet. In addition to the attendant costs of updating the chosen technology and supporting software and hardware as is appropriate, there are no guarantees that its use will yield the intended result(s). The technology may fail, exacerbating a compromised security situation. Unauthorized persons may access it and misuse it. The authorized users may also miscalculate its execution. Innocent people have been harmed in such situations. Such an occurrence provides reason (grievance) for disgruntled groups to launch revenge attacks. The January 5, 2020 attack on the US base is one such example.

States must also consider how the blurring of boundaries, and the consequences of the same (as has been discussed in this article), complicates the policing and securing of



The border point between Mandera, Kenya and Bula Hawa, Somalia. Kenya is constructing a wall in Mandera County which is aimed at taming cases of terror attacks by al Shabab militants (Photo Credit: New York Times)

states. This is primarily because blurred borders make it difficult for both police (who secure internal borders) and the military (who secure external borders) to identify and exercise their jurisdiction. As security operations in DRC show, it is difficult to draw the line between the jurisdiction of the Congolese police and army, especially in eastern DRC where the army, not the police, tend to launch operations against the insurgent group, ADF. The same can be said of the arrival and subsequent clearance of a 239-persons strong airline from COVID-19's source country, China, to Kenya in February 2020 that called the wisdom of the government to question. With some responsibility for this event lying in several government ministries, determining with whom the buck stops has not been a straightforward matter. Dealing with such opaque security situations often introduces several command chains, and lengthens response times when the need to secure borders urgently arises. This explains why hundreds of Congolese civilians have died in the ADF-related attacks there in the past.

The inability of one state in the region to pursue an illegal group across a shared border demonstrates the tendency of the states to approach border security in a simplistic, single-country manner. Joint cross-border operations are a factor of bilateral agreements, and call for the cooperation of the leaders of the countries in question. Signing agreements does not mean that agreements will hold however. Or that the threat of

violence that exists across borders will be dealt with decisively. In a complex, networked world, states are better off betting of the goodwill of neighboring states to help secure the shared borders than on going it alone. Arguably, al Shabab would have gained more territory in Somalia if Somalia would have rejected forces such as AMISOM's, and of states allied to Somalia, and/or neighboring states.

Conclusion

Border security preoccupies many states in the generally unstable and insecure but interconnected the greater Horn of Africa region, in part because many borders in the region are porous, and/or unsecured. Most of the states in the region secure internal, external, and virtual borders independent of neighboring states. This has created border policing and securing gaps that different merchants of violence, including al Shabab, ISIS, and ADF have been exploiting.

Securing internal borders may complicate security command chains as a result of overlapping policing and securing jurisdictions in a given state. That said, as technology is a security enabler, states in the region harness it to improve the policing and securing of their borders. However, they should do so after considering the pros and cons carefully to avoid investing in potentially counter-productive processes. This is because

In a complex, networked world, states are better off betting of the goodwill of neighboring states to help secure the shared borders than on going it alone

the acquisition, access and use of certain technologies can create dependency, room for non-aggressive interference, and violation of human rights, which may result in more or a different kind of insecurity.

Recommendations

To police and secure the borders in individual countries and in the region better, states in the greater Horn of Africa region should:

- **Shun the tendency for reactive, piecemeal security arrangements.** Such arrangements do not usually meet the security needs of citizens adequately, and often exposes the state to threats unnecessarily.
- **Embrace comprehensive approaches to border security.** This will involve securing all relevant kinds of borders, including those that exist intra-state (internal borders), cross-state, and those that relate to virtual spaces. It will also entail anticipating different kinds of threats (physical, biological, virtual, and so forth) and preparing adequate responses to the same.
- **Consistently invest in technologies that will help them to secure borders without compromising local, national, or regional security.** Such investments should limit the possibilities for the interference of one state by another, but allow for pre-emptive as opposed to reactive security arrangements.
- **Ensure security personnel are well trained, and equipped with up-to-date equipment.** This will improve their response to attacks by other armed groups.
- **Cooperate with other states** to reduce gaps such as those created by budgetary limitations and inadequate access to modern technology. This cooperation could take the form of joint cross-border operations, or joint border patrols. Existing initiatives, such as the African Union Border Program, should be expanded to accommodate other boundary-related issues such as border porosity that compromise the continent's stability. At the moment, this program is mainly focussed on resolving border disputes that emerged from the Scramble for Africa.
- **Carry out security operations in ways that do not export problems to neighboring countries** or violate the rights of civilians. This will reduce the emergence of grievances that other state and/or non-state actors could use against a state to mete violence.

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Reintegration of Terrorist Returnees: How Communities Should Respond

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Abstract

This article examines the value of community acceptance in the reintegration of returnees in Kenya. Since 2015, Kenya has faced dilemmas on how to respond to returnees given the perceived security threats that they may pose upon their return. While Kenyans have joined social movements such as the al Shabab and the Islamic State in Syria and Syria (ISIS), this article grapples with this tension, while underscoring the value of community engagement into their reintegration processes. The tensions, while valid from the state's outlook, have principally revolved around two perspectives. First, the returnees could simply be returning to form terrorists' sleeper cells. These sleeper cells in statist perspectives could be the launchpad for violent extremist acts in a context where terrorism already presents significant security threats locally, regionally and globally. Second, these returnees could also be on a mission to recruit future terrorist fighters. However, away from these perspectives, the central argument in this article revolves around community acceptance as key to the reintegration of returnees. They should be properly rehabilitated and reintegrated into the Kenya context.

Introduction

Following the defeat of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in the Middle East; and the overwhelmed al-Qaida-linked Somalia-based al Shabab, many African terrorist fighters are returning home. Even though numbers are difficult to verify, their presence could pose a serious risk to peace and security in Africa. In 2018, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) expressed 'deep concern over the growing influx of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from outside the continent and the threat they are increasingly posing to peace and security in Africa' (AU, 2018). Indeed, returning foreign fighters represent potential security threats to their countries upon their return. This is a question that policy makers have been grappling with since the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. The challenge has been that they could present acts of domestic terrorism given that they could already be radicalized. Given the foregoing, states have taken on board a series of interventions to pre-empt the security threats that returnees may pose.

Western governments, in particular, have responded in part by stripping citizenship of these fighters through legislations, including refusals to repatriate them even for criminal trials. Perhaps the most publicized example is British teenager Shamima Begum who was stripped of her citizenship by Britain. The larger concern, especially in Western world, has been the fear that when

foreign fighters return, they may form sleeper cells and consequently commit acts of terrorism (Malte & Hayes, 2018). Reintegration is applied in this article to mean the 'assimilation of former combatants into communities' (Alexander, 2012, p. 48). The definition of foreign terrorist fighters is contested in the literature and has implications on how research and policy are shaped. According to UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (September 24, 2014, para. 6.a), foreign terrorist fighters are individuals "who travel or attempt to travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training."

In August of 2014, an initial survey of returnees at the Kenyan coast conducted by the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government estimated up to 700 returnees. This survey had been conducted to inform how reintegration programs could be mounted (International Organization for Migration, 2015). Since 2015, in the Kenyan context, there has been a growing phenomenon of returning foreign fighters principally from two social movements; the al Shabab and the Islamic State (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019; Cragin, 2019). Foreign fighters who joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq from



A section of women participating in a P/CVE training program organized by the HORN Institute and Center for Sustainable Conflict Resolution(CSCR) (Photo Credit: CSCR)

Kenya are estimated at 100 (Cragin, 2019). In April of 2016, the Kenyan government announced a 10-day amnesty period for returnees. The intention of the government amnesty was to allow for the uptake of deradicalization, rehabilitation and monitoring. This initial amnesty call was criticized for lack of concrete policy guidelines (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019).

The decision to travel to a foreign country to participate in conflict is hardly a new trend. Notable examples indicative of the old trend includes the American Revolution, the Greek War of Independence, and the Spanish Civil War. In the recent past, foreign fighters have been drawn to the violent conflicts in the name of defending Islam (Cragin & Stipanovich, 2019). They have moved to countries such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq, and Syria (with the rise of ISIS), including Somalia with the rise of the al Shabab. There are estimates that with the rise of the Syrian conflict in 2011, more than 40,000 fighters drawn from 120 countries have participated in the conflict. These fighters have originated from European Union member states, countries in the Maghreb and the Middle East, Russia, Jordan, Turkey, and so on. Some of the returnees have returned to their home countries and committed terrorist acts such as the Paris attacks in November 2015 with six of the perpetrators having returned from Syria (Holmes & Shtuni, 2017).

This article is structured as follows. Following the introduction, debates around community engagement are pursued, and then the value of community engagement is debated upon. The article then concludes with a policy suggestion.

Debates around Disengagement from Violent Extremism

Disengagement from violent extremism is a complicated process that needs to take into consideration factors such as identity and psychosocial dynamics. In moving away from violent extremism, two related processes are involved – deradicalization and disengagement (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). The concept of disengagement in literature is applied broadly to refer to cognitive and social change in terms of dissociating oneself from previous shared values, norms and aspirations when one belonged to a terrorist network. It may also mean that the individual still subscribes to the values and attitudes of the terrorist network but is no longer participating in actual terrorist operations. A psychological transformation is required in order to shift individuals from violence to non-violence. This transformation takes place in the context of vulnerability largely informed by stress and trauma (Horgan, 2009).

Deradicalization, on the other hand, refers to a 'reorientation in outlook and direction' (Horgan, 2009, p. 293). There is, however, a lack of conceptual clarity of what the concept implies. Varied terminologies have been applied to describe it. These include 'demobilization, defection, rehabilitation' and so on and which speak more to the concept of disengagement (Horgan, 2009). In spite of this lack of clarity, deradicalization is applied broadly to mean attitudinal change, meaning that the individual no longer support terrorism, and therefore no longer support individual or collective mobilization of violence (Reinares, 2011). The term 'rehabilitation' and deradicalization are used interchangeably to speak to the cognitive dissociation from a violent group ideology and identity (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).

While in the recent past, there has been a body of research concerned with the distinct processes of disengagement and deradicalization from terrorism, there are calls for more scrutiny by academic experts to interrogate their claimed outcomes and successes. (Horgan, 2009; Mullins, 2010). Reintegration, also a key focus of this article, refers to the 'establishment of social, familial, and communities' ties and positive participation in society' (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017, p. 402). The establishment of reintegration programs is critical to prevent recidivism of returnees, but also in reducing the threats of youth radicalization, in addition to building community resilience against violent extremism (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). The community is critical in this space not only in delegitimizing the narratives that center on violent extremism, but also in the acceptance of returnees in their home countries. The latter is not an easy intervention at the community yet it is laden with several potentials.

Community Response to Returnees: Challenges and Prospects

Rehabilitation away from violent extremism is considered to not only include a shift in the individual mindset, but also takes into account the social relationships' and personal circumstances. Rehabilitation of former foreign fighters faces several dilemmas. Dilemmas may arise at the community level, in situations where returnees experience stigma owing to their criminality. In addition, returnees also face reprisals from their former affiliates. Individuals' access to social support groups and receptive spaces are thus critical for disengagement from violence (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Analysts have argued that a three-pronged approach is required for 'successful' reintegration in society through cutting ties with violent extremist groups.

In deradicalization programs, attention needs to be paid to the *affective*, (factors such as emotional support, sense of community, and social obligation), *pragmatic* (logistical considerations such as financial stability, education, vocational training, and skills-building), and *ideological* bonds. These components, when brought together, hold the possibilities of facilitating their reentry into society, minimize social alienation while reducing the possibility of recidivism (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).

Literature also points to the difficulties of measuring the effectiveness of reintegration and rehabilitation programs. One is the difficulty of collecting long term data that would help measure the impact. Second, disengaging from violence is not necessarily equated to the abandonment of ideology in the context of deradicalization programs. Notwithstanding these challenges is the need for lessons learning across multiple contexts. These lessons should be anchored on unique cultural and contextual factors (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). A related challenge with reintegration programs that offer non-custodial sentences is how the government and law enforcement may choose to manage the programs. In the case that coercion, threat management, and intelligence gathering is emphasized, reintegration interventions are less likely to succeed (Holme & Shtuni, 2017).

The effectiveness of deradicalization programs remains largely unproven in the literature with evaluation approaches only being at their infancy (Veldhuis, 2012; Williams & Kleinman, 2014; Cherney & Belton, 2019). The agreement in the literature is the need for systematic program evaluations including the establishment of meaningful metrics to measure the success of such programs (Williams & Kleinman, 2014). The unsettled questions thus remain on the modes of engagement, the aims of such interventions, but fundamentally also how to measure success (Marsden, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). In spite of these difficulties, there is a need to reflect on several ways that the communities can



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While in the recent past, there has been a body of research concerned with the distinct processes of disengagement and deradicalization from terrorism, there are calls for more scrutiny by academic experts to interrogate their claimed outcomes and successes

respond to returnees as a way to ease their entry into their respective communities.

In Kenya, the bulk of returnees as shown in the existing literature seems to be largely concentrated in the coastal regions of Kenya. More specifically, Mombasa and Kwale Counties have the bulk of returnees. While a holistic analysis of the 'push' and 'pull' factors that drive individuals to join violent extremism cannot be exhaustively discussed in this article, nevertheless, a few pointers may be made. Past recruitment of foreign fighters has been enabled by a number of factors in the recent past include perceived or real marginalization of communities in Coastal Kenya, the presence of influential and charismatic preachers that have often misused the Islamic faith to mobilize for political violence. Debates around the need to protect a global Islam that is under threat by western powers and their concert of allies have been additional mobilizing drivers for violent extremism. In addition, governmental actions around countering violent extremism and in cases where violence and surveillance are overly interpreted on the basis of religious and or cultural profiling is framed around grievances that enable recruitment into violent extremism (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019; Anderson & McKnight, 2014; Botha, 2014).

The next section of the article explores suggestions on how the community can respond to the returnees.

Community Responses

i. Community acceptance

One of the areas that the communities in Coastal Kenya and beyond need to continuously cultivate is the acceptance of former returnees. This is absolutely important given the community stigma that is already attached to individuals who have been on battlefields locally or abroad. While returnees may be perceived as undesirable for the potential security threats they may pose in their locales, the community holds the key

to their reintegration even as they take on a resolve to denounce violence. It would be naive to think or argue that community acceptance would be smooth. It would require several interventions from a peace-building imperative. As such, there is need for community awareness and sensitization at the grassroots especially on the value of acceptance at this level.

Research conducted on the commitment of returnees to reintegrate in their communities in Kwale County of Kenya is indicative of among others, the social resentment that exists at the community level. Returnees are often unsure of whom to return to once they have denounced violence. Usually, the returnees would first identify with their families and their immediate social networks such as religious institutions. The society also stigmatizes such families with varied perceptions that they have benefited from terrorism, including the hiding of returnees. There is thus a need to alter community perceptions around returnees as part of helping returnees to reintegrate in their societies (Mykkänen, 2018).

Community acceptance would need to be pegged on the account that while stigmatization would run across both women and men returnees, it is important to leverage on existing community structures to overcome stigma and hence embark on a gradual process of reintegration. Community support including psychosocial support should in addition target the family members and the communities. How the community responds toward an individual has an implication on the family acceptance level (Badurdeen, 2018).

This awareness would need to be mounted by respected community leaders and or grassroots community organizations that have legitimacy credentials and experience in positive community transformation. It is understandable why returnees may also be reluctant to engage with a range of faith-based organizations, civil society organizations that are already working to reintegrate returnees. One is that they already face rejection as they attempt to reintegrate in their communities. In addition, the decision to denounce previous violent extremist groups' memberships comes with risks as well. They may face reprisals from such groups. In the absence of proper reintegration plans holistically in the community, the only option left would be rejoining their violent extremist groups (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019).

The community already has a repertoire of resources that can help individuals to renounce violence. There exist



The scene of the explosion of a truck bomb in the centre of Mogadishu, one of two bomb blasts that struck Somalia's capital. (Photo Credit: AFP Getty Images)

community resources both human and infrastructural that would be applied in reintegration. In terms of human resources, community resources would include counselors and trained religious leaders that would be useful for social support and resettlement in their communities. There is value too in using community resources such as vocational training schools and programs that would be useful for reskilling the reformed returnees. These kinds of interventions can only happen in a climate that has community acceptance. While this point has been made elsewhere, there is need for communities to innovate on their own culturally appropriate models as opposed to an emphasis on external models. This is a call to pay attention to the context in which reintegration programs are designed (Badurdeen, 2018). This idea would speak to an emerging framework in peace studies that is concerned about local peace formations. This is largely the framework that appreciates the subaltern in peace work. In other words, this is speaking to the value of local agency in peace-processes. There already exists local infrastructures for peace and for which community agency can be tapped to build peace. These peace

formations speak to the networks and relationships that exist where indigenous or local agents of peace directly engage in processes that have the potential to build peace. This lends credence to the view that the individual, the village, the community have an agency that can be tapped to build peace. There is value further in applying local agency given also their understanding of conflict dynamics in their communities. These peace formations would also further be tapping on previous experiences of responding to other forms of conflicts including structural violence. This kind of agency in peacebuilding could further occur both in the public view and in the concealed spaces, with all interventions that would be geared with among others engaging with violence. Tapping into local networks would, thus, be critical in peace-work given their lucid understanding of local conflict dynamics. This is not to say, however, that the local agency is self-contained and can respond to peace-processes on its own. Rather, the perspective here is to be aware that the external factors such as international agency through certain norms and approaches can also be supportive of peace processes (Richmond, 2013).



Vehicles burning after the terror attack at DusitD2 in January 2019. The attack was aided by Violet Kemunto, a Kenyan, who is believed to have fled to Somalia immediately after the attack. There is need for greater effort to tackle the danger posed by returning foreign fighters (Photo Credit: Business Insider)

ii. Gendering the responses

In offering and accounting for a gendered response to violent extremism, there is need for communities to be extremely nuanced about the pathways that women take into violent extremism and hence learn how to disengage women from violence. As a starting point, society needs to acknowledge that women join violent extremist groups. This challenges the underlying myth of women as being inherently peaceful. Understanding the pathways that women go through in violent extremism, and which may be distinct from men in terms of their roles, would be useful in delegitimizing violence that women returnees have been accustomed to.

Therefore, one of the ways a community can respond is to create awareness on the pathways into violent extremism that women may take and hence close the gap. These would include nuances of forced and voluntary aspects of recruitment into violent extremism. The value of the community here would be to, among other aspects, speak to the deconstruction of women roles in violent extremism which would be distinct in certain respects from men. The value of undertaking a gendered analysis in violent extremism is to help in ensuring specificity about measures to counter violent extremism (CVE) that would likely be anchored around profiles of male 'terrorists'.

Applying cultural responses is also important so that adopted interventions targeting women returnees would be in conformity to existing patriarchal structures and the traditional Islamic texts in cases where they are of a Muslim faith (Badurdeen, 2018). There is further need to also pay attention to the gendered nature of trauma. In order to be effective in these kinds of interventions, the communities would need to account for detailed analysis of the actual motivations that pulled individuals to the violent extremism path (Badurdeen, 2018).

iii. Community Trust-Building with Security Agencies

While trust-building is a two-way process, the community and the security agencies should continuously work to bridge the trust deficits for CVE interventions to work. Why this is important for among other reasons is the fact that the community can only co-provide security by cooperating with security agencies if trust-building is enhanced. Regrettably, in the past, poor community-police relations especially in the context of countering violent extremism has served to weaken the trust levels. Yet, research has shown that effective CVE interventions that work with including government-sponsored programs need to build community trust for this engagement to be actualized (Villa-Vicencio et al, 2016).

Building trust and communication is thus critical for these kinds of interventions. Given the plurality of security actors including the community that is represented in local infrastructures for peace such as community policing and *Nyumba Kumi* (meaning ten households) and which anchors CP at the community level, Peace and Security Committees and so on, these are spaces that can enable trust-building. *Nyumba Kumi* is representative of the emerging framework known as hybrid governance in peace building and conflict management. This approach of co-providing security acknowledges the value of non-state actors in the peace-realm, but is also dependent on local dynamics of power (Kioko, 2017). Given that these platforms offer an opportunity for communities to share information on crime but also on problem-solving, such interventions can offer suggestions not only on how to continuously build trust but also on practical interventions that safeguard communities. These platforms can be synthesis points on practical intervention plans that would include how to safeguard returnees once they have signaled a journey to renounce violence.

Part of the criticism and hence the distrust of government interventions around returnees have been claims that the state is complicit in returnees' disappearances including unverified claims of extra-judicial killings. This is a critique that has been common with counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations mounted by the police and the military as a way to address the threats posed by groups such as al Shabab. Moreover, instances where there has been claim of human rights violations and the failure to observe the rule of law, community trust with security agencies is further eroded (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016).

There has been previous criticism around amnesty, the reintegration program that was initially designed in April 2016 when it was announced. It has been critiqued on the basis that it was confusing, inconsistent, and was deficient in policy (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019, p. 14). Moving forward and in entrenching a new approach in countering violent

extremism, there exists call for a radical reappraisal of how state counter-terrorism interventions are run. Part of building community trust and legitimacy is to have a policy shift that recognizes the value of community engagement critical for this kind of space. This shift should thus be reflective of how the state responds through a framework that respects the rule of law, human rights but also state accountability in such interventions. These kinds of norms are shared across the membership of the United Nations (UNDP, 2017).

Speaking further to the notion of trust with security agencies, interviewed returnees in Kwale County expressed claims that security officers were using excessive force and carrying out extrajudicial killings in the county (Mykkänen, 2018). The notion of trust for security agencies has been eroding over time, even before counter-terrorism operations assumed the proportions experienced in the current context. These have seen both a range of hard and soft power approaches. Fundamentally, the intervention to go into Somalia in 2011, as well as developing multiple laws has been part of the evolving counter-terrorism architecture (Mwangi, 2017). The images that have existed of the police who directly engage with the public in the preservation of law and order have been that of rampant corruption, illegal detentions, mistreatment, and hence deepening this mistrust (Kioko, 2017; Omeje & Githigaro, 2012).

Having legitimacy and hence trust with the communities offers an opportunity that would offer points of synergy within the communities. For instance, community support would be critical in isolating recruiters of violent extremism but also to promote vigilance around recruitment tactics (Badurdeen, 2019).

Conclusion

This article has made a case on the value of community engagement in reintegrating foreign fighters in the Kenyan context with a specific focus on Kenya's Mombasa and Kwale Counties that have the highest numbers

Community acceptance would need to be pegged on the account that while stigmatization would run across both women and men returnees, it is important to leverage on existing community structures to overcome stigma and hence embark on a gradual process of reintegration

of returnees. The value of community engagement has been pursued on three tracks. One is the need for community acceptance of returnees, two is the need to gender the responses, and three the need for continuous trust-building between the communities and security agencies. The article has limited itself to the question of reintegration that is a focus on how to apply existing community infrastructure to rehabilitate returnees to their former societies.

The article argues for community acceptance. Research has shown that the negative community perceptions and/or social stigma are impacting negatively on their resettlement into their former communities. Care, of course, has to be taken to ensure the substance of those that are willing to be rehabilitated as some may still pose security threats. Community acceptance, however, needs to be seen as a process where the community is

sensitized on the value for positive reception and social support that would help individuals to integrate easily in their former communities. In the absence of community acceptance and low trust levels with government agencies that are engaged in rehabilitation and reintegration interventions, the options to return to violent extremist organizations are ever-present. This paper makes one key recommendation. The need for the community actors and more importantly for the state to develop a robust policy framework that speaks more concretely to the criticisms that have been offered so far on how reintegration programs are designed and implemented in the Kenyan context. Kenya's reintegration program has been previously criticized on among others the lack of policy direction (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019). The civil society and academic experts on the subjects can be valuable resources in this endeavor.

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Challenges to Democratization of the New Sudan

By Elvis Salano

Abstract

This article examines the challenges of transitioning Sudan to democracy taking into consideration the political nature of its armed forces. The signing of a power-sharing agreement between leaders of the protest movement, Forces of Freedom and Change alliance (FFC), and the Transitional Military Council (TMC) – on August 17, 2019, kick-started the democratization process which has so far been on a positive trajectory. The article also offers an analysis of the various challenges that Sudan may face in the attempt to assume control over the armed forces; hold accountable the perpetrators of human rights violations; enact a new constitution; and revive the economy. It argues that the armed forces are likely to stifle the transition if they feel their interests and influence would be threatened in the new dispensation. The success of this transition, therefore, depends on the success of multiple initiatives some of which would attract enormous resistance.

Introduction

The transition leadership in Sudan was established on August 17, 2019, after the signing of a power-sharing agreement between the leaders of the protest movement, Forces of Freedom and Change alliance (FFC), and the Transitional Military Council (TMC). This followed the adoption of a constitutional declaration text, the country's main legal framework for the 39 months transition period. This transitional leadership, composed of both military and civilian officials, was necessitated by the ouster of the former President Omar al Bashir on April 11, 2019, by the military-led by Lt. Gen. Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, Bashir's minister of defence, following months of public protest against cost of living and the misrule by Bashir's government. The former president rose to power in 1989 after overthrowing democratically elected Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi. Under Bashir's reign, Sudan was accused of oppression, human rights violations, corruption and limited political and civic space until his ouster in 2019 paving way for a new system of governance.

During this transition period, one of the key mandates of the transitional government, according to the Constitutional Declaration Text is to build a country that respects the rule of law, human rights and democratic aspirations (Constitutional Declaration Text, 2019, p. 4). Thus far, the new government made up of a Sovereign Council (the collective head of state and highest decision-

making body), and the Cabinet (dominated by civilian save for ministers of defence and internal security) led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, has taken important steps aimed at building democracy in Sudan. First, negotiations, led by the Sovereign Council, with rebel groups are about to be complete. Secondly, the government has indicated willingness to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to hold accountable individuals suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for the genocide in Darfur, and this includes former President Omar al-Bashir (HRW, 2020). ICC first preferred charges against Bashir in 2009, but has since then managed to evade warrants of arrest. Thirdly, the government continues to open up political and civic space in the country; including allowing free expression and unrestricted access to independent human rights investigators and the international media. Fourth, Bashir's party, the National Congress Party, often accused by human rights groups of complacency in the muzzling of democracy during the reign of President Bashir, has been dissolved and its property seized. Fifth, the government has repealed several oppressive laws, including the Public Order Act which among other things limited the involvement of women in public spaces. Lastly, plans to kick-start a new constitution-making process will soon be rolled, according to the Prime Minister (Atlantic Council, 2019).



Sudan's last democratically elected Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, holds a news conference at the Umma Party House in Omdurman, Sudan, April 27, 2019. (Photo Credit: AP)

While these are laudable steps and a clear sign of intent by the transitional government; democratization attempts and transitional leaderships are not entirely new phenomenon in Sudan.

Sudan in Context

Since becoming a republic on January 1, 1956, Sudan has collectively been under military leaders for 54 years. At the time of becoming a republic, the leading political parties at the time, the Umma Party and the National Unionist Party (NUP), failed to agree on the system of government and as such, delayed the adoption of a permanent constitution (Mo, 2014). However, they agreed to a temporal and transitional constitution, which provided for election, by parliament, of a five-member Sovereign Commission to act as the joint head of state, and Prime minister to head the government (Library of Congress, 2019). Ismail al-Azhari of the National Unionist Party, was elected the Prime Minister but resigned after six months, following a parliamentary vote of no confidence. He was replaced by Abdullah Khalil of the Umma Party (Suliman, 2015).

The transitional parliamentary system of government, however, did not inspire much public confidence. Continuous wrangling among the politicians and failure to resolve the prevailing economic challenges and enact a permanent constitution, motivated General Ibrahim Abbud, the head of the armed forces, to mastermind

a coup d'état in November 1958 (Woodward, 2011). Consequently, General Abbud disbanded the Sovereign Commission, outlawed political parties, dissolved parliament, and formed a Sovereign Council of Armed Forces to manage the affairs of the country (Library of Congress, 2019). While General Abbud's government provided the much-needed political stability, he was forced to resign in 1965 by public protests over failure to address the economic challenges and his indecision to hand over power to civilians. In resemblance to the 2019 protests, the Abbud's protests were led by academics, trade unionists, professional organizations and civil society (Berridge, 2019).

This resignation paved way for the re-adoption of a parliamentary system of government with 30-year-old Sadiq al Mahdi as the prime minister. On May 25, 1969, military officers led by Colonel Ja'far al Numayri, instigated a second coup, and formed a revolutionary command council to rule, with Numayri as the Council's chairman and the country's prime minister. The third military coup occurred on April 6, 1985. This came after one week of public demonstrations against high food prices. The coup was led by General Numayri's Defense Minister, Lt. Gen. Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab (Voll, 1990). Elections were scheduled and held in 1986 and Sadiq al-Mahdi who had been ousted in 1969 was elected for a second time the prime minister. Sadiq's government-led until June 30, 1989, when he was ousted by Colonel (later

General) Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. The National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council (NSRCC) was formed with Bashir as its chairperson and the head

of state (Aljazeera, 2019). The Council was dissolved in 1993 Bashir and went ahead to declare himself a civilian president (Turner, 2017).

Table 1: Key events in Sudan's politics since 1956

Year	Event
1956	Sudan becomes a Republic
1956–58	The reign of parliamentary System of government
1958–64	Reign of a military government-led by General Ibrahim Abboud
1964	Resignation of General Abboud
1964–69	A return to a parliamentary system of government
1969	Second military coup led by Colonel Nimeiry
1969–85	The reign of a military/one-party government of President Nimeiry
1985	The ouster of General Nimeiry
1985–89	Return to the parliamentary system for a third time under Prime Minister Sadiq
1989	A military coup led by Brigadier Omar al-Bashir
2005	Adoption of a transition constitution
April 2019	The ouster of President Omar Bashir by the military council
August 2019	The signing of a Civilian-Military power-sharing agreement

Source: Willis, *el-Battahani & Woodward (2009) Adapted from Rift Valley Institute (2009)*

From the foregoing, it is clear that Sudan's previous transitions failed to democratize the country or inspire reforms demanded by citizens. This article analyses the challenges that are likely to hinder the success of the current transitional government from, building and consolidating democracy in Sudan.

Democratization of States

According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a former United Nations Secretary-General, democratization-transforming a state to a democracy leads to a more open, more participatory, and a less authoritarian society (Ghali, 1996). Democratization, therefore, is intended towards building state institutions and processes that exercise political power based on the will of the citizens. Democratic states, according to the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, are those that respect human rights; observe the separation of power; hold regular and credible elections; adhere to gender equality; strengthens political pluralism; nurtures public participation and ensures transparency and fairness in the management of public affairs.

States strive to democratize using several approaches including structural and process-oriented approaches. Proponents of structural approach (Lipset, 1959; Ajagbe, 2016) argue that democratization is a product of the transformation of class structure, economic development, and the entrenchment of legal frameworks. For Lipset (1959), the more the economy of a nation does well, the higher the chances of entrenching and sustaining its democracy. In essence, a society characterized by a largely impoverished population and a small proportion of richly endowed elites is likely to end up as either an oligarchy or dictatorship. In that regard, structuralists contend that the establishment of democracy is possible with the right combination of economic, social and cultural reforms (Ajagbe, 2016).

The proponents of the process-oriented approach (Corning, 2018; Schmitter & Karl, 1991), on the other hand, hold that democratization is realized through the enactment of certain minimum infrastructure. For example, Corning (2018) contends that democracy, as a system of government, is likely to succeed in a society that enables it to thrive. Schmitter and Karl (1991) hold that

democracy, unlike other systems of governance, depends upon the presence of rulers that hold and exercise legitimate authority. Therefore, the manner of ascension and exercise of political power is largely what sets democracy and autocracy apart. Often, it is the country's constitution that defines how power should be assumed and exercised. However, constitutions in themselves do not automatically result in democracies, but they are philosophical foundations upon which democracy is built (Adagbabiri, 2015). This is why most states make a new constitution during the transitional period.

Scholars including Benomar (2003) have argued that a constitution-making process is a rare moment in the history of a country when informed discussions rise above the usual political dynamics and focus attention on the nature and future of the state. It is also an opportunity for the new government to end the practice of suppressing diverse views which previous regimes had adopted and demonstrates that the new government would respect political freedoms, democratic values, and enshrine the rule of law (Brandt, 2015).

For a country transitioning from a military autocracy, in particular, reforms in the armed forces is a crucial step to forestall future military interference. Civilian-military relations in a post-independent Africa is a well-exploited discussion. Democratization cannot succeed if the military does not yield to the principles of civilian control (Bailie, 2018). Mangu (2005) observed that the failure of democratization in most post-colonial African countries is in part due to the interference of the armed forces with the political space and civilian control of the state.

International democracy instruments such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance which Sudan is a signatory to, requires that military and security forces be placed under civilian authorities to ensure stability of governance by popular mandate. Luttwak (1999) explains that democracy requires absolute civilian supremacy over the command of the armed forces. Civilian control of the military means that all decisions regarding a country's defence: the organization, deployment, and use of armed forces, the setting of military priorities and requirements and the allocation of the necessary resources are taken by a civilian leadership (Homan, 2013).



Deputy Head of Sudanese Transitional Military Council, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and Sudan's opposition alliance coalition's leader Ahmad al-Rabiah sign up a transition agreement in Khartoum, Sudan August 4, 2019. (Photo Credit: REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah)

The fear of losing political influence could ignite a rebellion from the armed forces against a democratic transition. Historically, the army in Sudan has been the most powerful institution in the country

In the case of Sudan, the transitional arrangement is a power-sharing model between civilian representatives and the armed forces which include the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS), army, police, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The armed forces are represented in the cabinet by a minister of defence and minister of internal security. It is also represented on an almost equal proportion in the Sovereign Council which is the collective head of state. The armed forces justify their participation in the transitional government as a necessary step to 'safeguard' the revolution from elements of the previous regime (1989-2019).

Grewal (2018), while commenting on Egypt's and Tunisia's transitions after the 'Arab Spring', observed that the treatment accorded to the military by these countries' former autocratic leaders shaped their response to democratization. In Egypt's case, the military was afraid of losing power and privileges that it was accustomed to during the reign of President Hosni Mubarak. It, therefore, seized the available opportunity and toppled Mohamed Morsi, a democratically elected president. In Tunisia, the military had been side-lined by President Ben Ali who relied heavily on other security agencies and therefore saw democratization as an avenue that could lead to an improvement in its fortune and influence.

The process of democratizing Sudan, however, does not strictly follow either of the models. Instead, the country has adopted a hybrid of the process-oriented and structural approach. In this model, it pegs the country's democratization on economic revival and the enactment and reform of state institutions. This, notwithstanding, the success of Sudan's democratization is hinged upon civilian-military relations, economic revival, the forthcoming constitutional making process and accountability for human rights violations.

Civilian-Military Relations

Getting Sudan's armed forces to be politically neutral or under the control of civilian leadership is probably the biggest challenge that would face Sudan. This would be a result of several reasons that include; first, the fear of losing political influence; secondly, the possibility of being held accountable for past crimes; and thirdly, the potential cut in the military budget.

The fear of losing political influence could ignite a rebellion from the armed forces against a democratic transition. Historically, the army in Sudan has been the most powerful institution in the country. It has used its power to sustain regimes, as well as topple them. Often, it was accorded preferential treatment in terms of key appointments and its mandate expanded beyond defending the country against external threats. For instance, military officials have been appointed from time to time to run states as governors or into key positions that ordinarily should be held by civilians. Some political commentators have suggested that the current military disinclination to step back or even substantially cede power to civilians could be a plot to chart the next course of action. Others have predicted that the armed forces might disintegrate into different factions in the future with differing support for fully civilian leadership. Proponents of the latter prediction base their argument on the ambition of the Rapid Support Forces, a powerful paramilitary force, whose leader General Hamdan Hemeti is thought to harbor political ambitions. The last school of thought expects a situation similar to that of Egypt where the military manipulated the electoral processes and seized power 'in line with the constitution' and thus a continuation of military hegemony. A possible outcome of both scenarios would be an outbreak of civil war or retarded reforms that would negate the purpose of the revolution.

The armed forces are also averse to the democratization because there is a possibility that its members will be held accountable for the past crimes committed against civilians. There are numerous allegations of human rights violations against the armed forces especially in the Darfur region and other regions across the country. There is no doubt that the civilian leadership would be under domestic and international pressure to address these abuses by bringing the perpetrators to justice. In that case, maintaining control would be seen as the only way for the armed forces to protect themselves.

Last but not least, the prospect of budget cuts could make the armed forces uneasy with surrendering to civilian leadership. Going forward, civilian leadership will be under pressure to allocate more resources to addressing other pressing national needs thus forcing them to deprioritize other sectors such as the armed forces. During the reign of President Bashir, the armed forces got more financial allocation than other key state institutions to run 'peace operations' and modernize its operations. Withdrawing soldiers from parts of the country and limiting the involvement of the military in domestic affairs would no doubt be accompanied by less financial allocations.

Economic Difficulties

The overwhelming public support for the removal of Bashir and the establishment of a civilian-led government was driven by high costs of living and other economic difficulties including unemployment. However, this support, a crucial factor in getting the military to accept to share power with civilians, is likely to lessen in the absence of an elaborate and effective plan to revive the economy, create jobs and lower the cost of living. This will lower the credibility and societal standing of the civilian leadership and therefore leave their power to the whims of the military elements in the government. One of the key stumbling blocks to the transitional leadership's economic revival plan remains the designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism by the United States of America. This has prevented the Country from accessing financial support from the international community and attracting foreign direct investments. While discussion over the removal of the country from the designation list has continued between Sudan and the US government, there is no clear time frame within which this is likely to happen despite Sudan meeting some of the key US conditions including agreeing to compensate the families of the victims of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.

Constitution-Making

The forthcoming constitutional making process would be a defining moment in Sudan, and a key determinant of the future of democracy in the country. However, getting a version of a constitution that is agreeable to a majority of Sudanese would depend on the design of the review process, the appointment of the drafters' and the managing of public expectations. A process that excludes certain constituencies from participating would ultimately result in the rejection of the proposed document or worse loss of public trust in the entire project. The gauge on public participation would range from the extent to which citizens are informed about the choices at stake to opportunities being given to them to directly express views to the drafters of the constitution to holding of a referendum to adopt the final proposed law.

Appointing already-tainted or prejudiced experts to drive the process would raise doubts on the commitment of the leadership to deliver genuine reforms. It would lead to public resentment of the final document without a look at its substance. Finally, failing to manage public expectations could result in the adoption of a constitution that focuses more on the challenges of the past rather than the prospect of the future. Sudan needs a constitution that is alive to the history of the country but most importantly the prospect for the future. Therefore overemphasizing civil rights and freedoms at the expense of citizens' responsibilities and secondly emphasizing vengeance against past misrule at the expense of strong mechanisms to prevent similar occurrences in the future will be counterproductive.

Accountability for Human Rights Violations

Accountability for historical injustice in Sudan is a crucial step in the remaking of the nation. It will lay a strong foundation for the future of the country and also deter similar violations in the future. However, the process of

While General Abbud's government provided the much-needed political stability, he was forced to resign in 1965 by public protests over failure to address the economic challenges and his indecision to hand over power to civilians



Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Abdelrahman Burhan (center, in military gear) looks on as military and civilian members of Sudan's new ruling body, the Sovereign Council, are sworn in at the presidential palace in Khartoum, 21 August 2019. (Photo Credit: REUTERS)

ensuring accountability for human rights violations and other historical injustices committed during the previous regimes would pose moral, legal and political dilemmas. While ignoring past atrocities signifies a lack of respect for the dignity of victims and their families, legally, it shall entail all the accused some of whom may be holding critical positions in the transitional government to be stripped of their immunity and subjected to trial. The process of lifting immunity against criminal prosecution, say for members of the sovereign council entails a resolution by a majority of the members of the sovereign legislative council, an equivalent of parliament which is yet to be constituted. Politically, failing to address past crimes is likely to create a wedge between civilians in the transitional leadership and the public which is one of the strongest factors holding this leadership arrangement from collapsing.

Conclusion

Thus far, the transitional leadership has made tremendous progress in reforming Sudan from a military autocracy to a more open, tolerant and civil society. The recorded successes indicate political goodwill on both the military and civilian elements in the government. However, the challenges of democracy in Sudan transcends Bashir's rise to power and as such the solutions will not be confined to the errors of Bashir's era. The military in

Sudan has played a crucial role in the politics of the country since independence, often undercutting civilian leadership and this is unlikely to change anytime soon. Secondly, any democratization efforts will only retain overwhelming public support if the government will roll out viable economic plans to lower the cost of living and create jobs. More so, the process of holding accountable perpetrators of previous human rights violations is likely to create rifts in the transitional leadership and lastly, the process of enacting a new constitution, one of the most important tasks of the transitional government will be key to the success of the country.

Recommendations

To ensure the full realization of democratic aspirations, the following considerations will be helpful:

1. As required by the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, and other international governance instruments, Sudan's security forces should unconditionally open up to civilian oversight and supervision. This should include the appointment and promotion of senior military officials and the nomination of the Minister of Defense and Internal Security. The Civilian leadership should also be politically astute and ensure that it does not antagonize

- the military establishment but only to the extent that this accommodation does not offend democratic values.
2. The public participation process in the forthcoming constitutional making process should involve citizens from different ethnic groups, gender, political allegiance, and religions to help build national ownership of the project
 3. The transitional leadership should either surrender all former government officials cited by the International Criminal Court for human rights abuses to the Court to face trial for their crimes or set up credible domestic judicial mechanisms to try those suspects.
 4. The mandate of the June 3, 2019 investigation committee should be expanded to cover other human rights violations allegedly committed by the state agencies before the ouster of President Omar Bashir.
 5. The transitional leadership should set up a truth and reconciliation commission to address injustices that otherwise, retributive justice would not be appropriate.
 6. The international community should extend financial and technical support to critical Sudan's democratization processes such as the constitution-making process and institution building.
 7. The signatories to the power-sharing agreement should expedite the process of formulating the legislative council to provide oversight to the executive and initiate progressive legislations.
 8. The United States Government should expedite the process of removing Sudan from the States' sponsor of terrorism list.

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Editor's Note

Dear Reader,

We are excited to release our twelfth bi-monthly issue of *The HORN Bulletin* (Vol. III, Iss. II, 2020). We bring to you well-researched articles and analysis of topical issues and developments affecting the Horn of Africa. We welcome contributions from readers who wish to have their articles included in the HORN Bulletin. At HORN, we believe ideas are the currency of progress. Feel free to contact the Editor-in-Chief for more details at communications@horninstitute.org.

Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.
Editor-in-Chief, The HORN Bulletin

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

Upcoming Event

International Conference on Africa-Middle East Relations

Shared Peace. Shared Security. Shared Prosperity

HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies will hold an *International Conference on Africa-Middle East Relations*. The Conference will be held in Nairobi (Kenya) in the second or third quarter of 2020, and it will provide an opportunity for scholars and experts to discuss and exchange ideas on the nature and dynamics of Africa-Middle East relations. The participants will come from Kenya, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iran, Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Sudan, Algeria, Somalia, South Africa, Djibouti, Ethiopia, United Kingdom, Denmark, Belgium, USA, and Norway.

The Conference will address, *inter alia*, the following areas in Africa-Middle East relations: geopolitics and Africa-Middle East Relations; trade and investment between Africa and the Middle East; the role of ideology in Africa-Middle East relations; Africa-Middle East relations in a multipolar world; significance of political ties between African states and the Middle East; The Arab Spring, the Gulf Crisis and after; the politics of the proliferation of arms; terrorism and violent extremism and their ideological foundations; and effects of the above on the global oil markets.



THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: AN ANALYSIS (VOLUME I)

Terrorism and violent extremism remain pervasive and massively lethal to humanity. Their dynamism and numerous inflection points have made it problematic to employ a one-size-fits-all approach or strategy. Scholars and practitioners have, however, continued to enrich this discourse, and *The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: An Analysis (Volume I)* is the first of the two-book volumes series conceived from an international conference on terrorism and violent extremism organized by the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies in April 2018 in Nairobi (Kenya) in an attempt to address this problem.

The volume contains ten chapters and it presents a comprehensive analysis of terrorism through a broader perspective that includes digital explosion and rise of youth radicalization; radicalization into violent extremism; human rights violations and international terrorism; effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies; and informal early warning systems. It concludes with a critical reflection on key themes in the volume and their implications for policy and practice. This book will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and students of terrorism and violent extremism, security, and conflict.

Editors: Mustafa Y. Ali, Ph.D., Mumo Nzau, Ph.D., and Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.


THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: POLICY AND PRACTICE (VOLUME II)

The debate on how to effectively counter terrorism has been pushed into the forefront of policymaking deliberations, and Africa, and the world at large, would greatly benefit from the continued conversation on this subject. Prevention of terrorism requires careful, meticulous, and dispassionate evaluation of current strategies and approaches to inform the design and implementation of new policies. This volume is the second of a two-book volumes series conceived from an international conference on terrorism and violent extremism organized by the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies in April 2018 in Nairobi (Kenya).

This ten-chapter volume informs policy issues ranging from evolution of violent extremism in Islam; the role of the youth in the prevention of violent extremism; protection of critical infrastructure; analysis of state responses to terrorism and violent extremism; to case studies on countering violent extremism. Its conclusion underscores the import of evidence-based and context-specific policy formulation. This volume provides a comprehensive reference reservoir for practitioners, scholars, students, and others working in the realm of terrorism and violent extremism.

Editors: Mustafa Y. Ali, Ph.D., Mumo Nzau, Ph.D., and Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.

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The HORN Bulletin ISSN: 2663-4996



2663-4996

