Mapping Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Special EDITION

By Jules Swinkels

Abstract

This article analyses actors and relations in contemporary conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). First, the article proposes the theory of conflict mapping as a tool to analyze conflict in the DRC. Second, the article provides a comprehensive analysis of actors in the conflict and their relations to each other. Third, a graphic representation of the analysis is provided. Finally, the article concludes that the present conflict in the DRC is highly fragmented and characterized by deeply rooted intercommunal and ethnical tensions, conflict over resources, foreign interventions, and gross human rights violations.

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen widespread violence since the Portuguese landed in the 15th century. Belgium colonialism under King Leopold resulted in the death of an estimated ten million, numerous atrocities, and mutilations. After independence in 1960, Patrick Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the then Republic of Congo was executed by Belgian-led Katangese troops in 1961. In the rift that ensued, Joseph Mobutu, with support from the United States and Belgium, took over power through a coup by proxy. In 1995, Laurent-Desire Kabila, supported by Rwanda and Uganda overthrew the Mobutu regime (first Congo war). Kabila was supposedly meant to serve his country at the behest of Rwanda and Uganda, but quickly distanced himself from his former allies as soon as he gained power. An agitated Rwanda instigated the Second Congo War, this time involving Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, DRC, and Uganda. In 2001, Lauren-Desire Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, who headed a transitional government. In 2006, the transitional government organized its first multiparty elections. After renewed violence and a re-election, Kabila won and was sworn in. What ensued was, however, not the peace that was hoped for, but rather a disintegrated state with at least 120 armed groups operating in Eastern DRC alone (ACAPS, 2018). They range from local militias set up initially as self-defense groups (which include the Mai-Mai) to secessionist groups, and forces first set up by fighters from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

The current DRC conflict is complex with many varying actors, issues, and relations to the extent that it is difficult to grasp who exactly wants what, where, how, and when. To gain a basic understanding of the complexities involved in conflicts, scholars and analysts often conduct a 'conflict analysis'. This approach organizes various dimensions, causes, and actors to the conflict and tries to paint a comprehensive and insightful picture in an otherwise entangled situation. A conflict analysis can be done on the local, regional, or national level and seeks to help development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding organizations, analysts and other practitioners to gain a better understanding of the context and their possible role in that context.

Theoretical Framework

The theory that will be used here is the 'conflict wheel'. A conflict wheel organizes various conflict analysis tools and serves as an overview when first approaching a conflict (Centre for Security Studies [CSS], 2005). The conflict wheel itself is a 'meta' conflict analysis tool that introduces other tools. Each of the six sub-sections that are introduced by the wheel can be further analyzed by other analysis tools as presented below:




Figure 1 CSS, 2005, p. 3

First, the conflict wheel analyses actors and relations, differentiating between conflict parties, third parties, and stakeholders. Second, issues are topics of conflict, or what people fight about. Third, the dynamics of conflict refer to the escalation level of the conflict, the intensity of interaction, the temperament and the energy of a conflict that transforms people. Fourth, the conflict context and structures are those factors that are not directly caused by people, but economic and political systems already in place. An example is crushing poverty or lack of education. Fifth, conflicts always have multiple causes, and it helps to differentiate between causes, catalysts, and influence factors. Finally, the conflict wheel examines ways to deal with the conflict and analyses strategies that are used or could be used, conflict party or third party efforts to de-escalate the conflict (CSS, 2005, p. 3).

In the first part of this series on the DRC, this article focusses on the first dimension: actors and relations. A conflict map will be developed to gain an overview of which actors operate where, what some of the main issues are, and how relationships look between the various actors. Mapping is an approach to analyzing a conflict situation. It represents the conflict graphically, placing the parties in relation to the problem, and conveying graphically the relations between them. The conflict map as drafted below is far from conclusive, but will provide the reader with useful knowledge on the complex nature of conflicts in the DRC, paving the way for discussion on the five other dimensions of the conflict wheel.

Analysis

Eastern Congo is by far the most tumultuous region in the DRC. Ethnic conflicts, land disputes, cattle rustling, and conflict over natural resources (minerals) have intensified small-scale armed mobilization. More than 120 armed groups are believed to be active in North and South Kivu alone. Each group draws from a distinctive community, has its own goals, and uses varying tactics. In addition to these groups, numerous smaller armed militias have formed to protect their own against armed groups. Some of the bigger groups and parties to the conflict will be dealt with below. The information is compiled through extensive research in databases and with third-party organizations, such as Suluhu, ACAPS, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, Congo Research Group, Council on Foreign Relations, and Kivu Security Tracker. A map with regions, towns, and actors, adopted from the Kivu Security tracker will be added as annex for more clarity.

Biographies:

Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)

The FDLR was created in 2000 out of troops belonging to the defeated pre-genocide Rwandan army and various affiliated militia who fled Rwanda after the genocide. After its peak in the early 2000s, the FLDR began to suffer defections and defeats against the Congolese Army through military operations *Umoja Wetu, Amani Leo,* and the Sukola II offensive. In 2016, the FDLR suffered an internal split that led to the creation of the *Conseil*

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National pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie (CNRD)-Ubwiyunge, who later allied from time to time with the Congolese army against the FDLR. The group's strength is estimated around 500 to 1,000 fighters, significantly less than ten years ago. The FDLR has lost control over most of the territory and mining areas it previously controlled, and a shortage of ammunition seriously constrains its operational capacity.

The FDLR often partners with local armed groups (Mai-Mai) to achieve its objectives (protecting Hutu interests) in specific regions, with the Mai-Mai Nyatura being its main ally in North Kivu. Income is generated through illegal mining activities, looting, taxation, and illegal logging.

Conseil National pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie CNRD-Ubwiyunge

The CNRD broke off from the FDLR in May 2016 over the fate of Rwandan refugees in Eastern Congo and took up all FDLR factions in South Kivu. Partnering first with local Nyatura groups and the Congolese Army (FARDC) against the FDLR, it soon found itself fighting those same groups. Authorities arrested several high-ranking officers and the group has suffered significant loss of territory in North Kivu. Its strength is estimated at around 500 fighters who are based in South Kivu, North Kivu, and Fizi territory.

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The LRA's famous leader Joseph Kony founded this faction back in 1989 in Uganda, after which it spread to South Sudan, DRC, and Central African Republic (CAR). Since 2011 however, LRA attacks and abductions have declined significantly, reflecting the group's reduced fighting capacity and Kony's intentional strategy to minimize large-scale attacks that would attract more international attention. The LRA's official goal is to establish a multi-party democracy in Uganda according to the Ten Commandments, but in practice, little of that objective is visible. Instead, widespread human rights violations including murder, abduction, mutilation, child-sex slavery, and recruitment of child soldiers are common. It is estimated that the LRA has around 100 fighters left of the approximately 2,000 it had in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In May 2018, it was reported that the LRA was more active due to the withdrawal of Ugandan and United States forces from the CAR.

Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

Founded in 1990 in Uganda to oppose the Ugandan government, its main interest in DRC is gold mining, timber trafficking, and logging (ACAPS, 2018). It is estimated that they have around 1,200 to 1,500 fighters. Over the last decade, it has transformed into an Islamist, Congo-based movement after a merger with the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). It is a highly secretive organization that has strong historical ties with other armed groups such as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). The FARDC launched operation Sukola I in 2014, destroying many camps and killings hundreds of fighters. However, the ADF, now under command of Seka Musa Baluku, the ADF's former chief justice, remains a fierce and disciplined organization, responsible for many massacres around Beni since 2013. Often they work together with (corrupt) members of the FARDC and local armed groups. After the Beni massacres, the Congo Research Group at New York University indicted that Congolese army commanders and even the former top general orchestrated the massacres by securing the perimeter so that victims could not escape. Recently, they allegedly partnered up with al Shabab, al Qaeda, and Boko Haram. The ADF's exact strength is unknown, but the group retains the strength to conduct large and complex attacks. On December 7, 2017, the ADF is alleged to have killed 15 UN peacekeepers and 5 Congolese soldiers (Stearns & Vogel, 2017).

Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS)

The APCLS has emerged in 2010 has one of the main Mai-Mai groups in eastern Congo. It draws most of its support from the Hunde ethnic group, and its ideology is founded on opposition to the Tutsi ethnic group. The militia counts around 1,500 fighters and is funded mainly through illegal mining of gold and cassiterite. During the 2012 March 23 Movement (M23) rebellion in Goma, the APCLS cooperated with the FARDC to suppress the largely Tutsi-led M23 rebellion. The group has demonstrated significant resilience, even if its sphere of influence and its troop numbers fluctuate considerably.

Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC)

With around 144,000 – 159,000 personnel, the FARDC is by far the largest force in DRC. The FARDC is accused of widespread corruption and human rights violations, and its ill-disciplined officers often defect to start their own armed groups (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). The Congolese army has been accused of allowing massacres

to happen on multiple occasions (HRW, 2014). Naturally, civilians in the DRC view the FARDC with suspicion and prefer United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, a French acronym of the name) to provide security.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

On July 1, 2010, MONUSCO took over from the earlier established MONUC in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1925 of May 28, 2010. This mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence. The total personnel number is 20,129, of which 18,316 are uniformed personnel (military, police and observers). MONUSCO further assists the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

Front of Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI)

Ituri is a troubled region in DRC's north-east, mainly bordering Uganda. The Ituri conflict was a major conflict over land between the agriculturalist Lendu community and the pastoralist Hema community between 1999 and 2003 (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], 2016). Ituri experienced a period of intense violence during that period, but armed conflict continues to this day. The FRPI founded in 2002 is an armed militia defending the interests of the Lendu community. In 2006, the FRPI signed a cease-fire, but in 2008, there were attacks by a splinter group of the FRPI. Attacks often involved rape, arson, looting, and cannibalism. In 2015, after a failed disarmament program, sporadic attacks again increased in Ituri, especially in Irumu territory where it is involved in illegal mining and taxation (Suluhu, 2017).

Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC)

NDC was one of the main Mai-Mai groups to emerge from the Nyanga community and notorious for its gross human rights violations (Suluhu, 2017). NDC was mostly active in the mining area of Bisie in Walikale territory before a split in command caused most of the group's combatants to defect (Assessment Capacities Project [ACAPS], 2018). Its former leader, Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi is known for his cruelties, including the rape of 387 women, men, girls, and boys, and the hacking to death of 70 civilians and parading their body parts through town while chanting ethnic slurs (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2017). Sheka surrendered to MONUSCO in mid-2017 and it is not clear whether this group still exists.

Nduma Defence of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R)

After the split within the NDC (see previous entry), the NDC-R began attacking the FDLR, taking over numerous mining sites. For this, they worked together with Nande and Kobo ethnic militias (Mai-Mai Mazembe). The NDC-R is known for its extortive taxation practices and extensive recruitment of children (ACAPS, 2018). Allegedly, the group has received support of the FARDC (HRW, 2017).

Forces Populaires Burundaises (FPB)

The FPB was created in 2016 and represents the most active group of armed opposition to the Burundian government of President Pierre Nkurunziza. Active mostly in the eastern border regions with Burundi (Uvira and Fizi territories), its leaders Edouard Nshimirimana and Jérémie Ntiranyibagira allegedly got detained by Burundian forces in October 2017 (Suluhu, 2017; ACAPS, 2018).

Mai-Mai groups

Mai-Mai groups are local nationalist armed factions in North and South Kivu that are formed by local leaders along ethnic lines. The term refers to a range of militias that have been active since the 1990s.

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Mai-Mai Nyatura

Founded in 2010, it has collaborated extensively with the FDLR and FARDC to protect Hutu interests. On May 12, 2018, its leader was arrested by FARDC in Rutshuru territory. The group's fighting strength is unknown.

Coalition Nationale du People pour la Souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC)

The CNPSC is a coalition and a project of the leader of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba (see below), recruiting mainly from the Bembe community. It brings together Mai-Mai groups Yakutumba, Réunion, Ebuela, Echilo, Mulumba, Réné, Aigle, and Kiwis Kalume.

Mai-Mai Yakutumba

Former FARDC officer Yakutumba (William Amuri) created the group in 2006 and capitalized upon local grievances within the Bembe community. The group has evolved into one of the most brutal Congolese armed groups in South Kivu and skillfully incorporated smaller Mai-Mai groups in the CNPSC (Suluhu, 2017). In 2017, Yakutumba and its allies launched a successful offensive against the FARDC, chasing them away from the Misisi gold mines. They are financed mostly through illegal artisanal mining (ACAPS, 2017).

Mai-Mai Charles

A former combatant of Mai-Mai Jackson and Mai-Mai Shetani, Charles Bokande's Hutu faction draws support and recruits from the Nande community. He claims to protect Rutshuru's Nande population from Rwandan armed groups, the FARDC, and rangers from Virunga National Park, but is often involved in kidnapping and illegal cross-border trade (Suluhu, 2017). Virunga National park is wedged between the DRC and Uganda. The group's main ways of financing are taxing fish, charcoal and marijuana trade along the southern shores of Lake Edward, a

big lake on the border of the DRC and Uganda Congo Research Group [CRG], 2015).

Mai-Mai Kifuafua

One of the longest standing armed groups in Congo, set up already in 2002 by Delphin Mbaenda. It has roots in the Tembo community. Delphin is the younger brother of Damiano Mbaenda, one of the first Tembo armed group commanders, starting his career in 1993 (Suluhu, 2017). Delphin Mbaenda could stay in power for such a long time due to an efficient taxation system and a reluctance to fight strong actors such as the FDLR, CNDP, or FARDC. The group is estimated to have around 300 fighters, with disciplined units.

Mai-Mai Kilalo/ULPC

Katembo Kilalo and Mambari Bini Pélé's (alias Saperita) *Union des Patriotes pour la Liberation du Congo* (ULPC) allegedly defends the Nande community against attacks by the ADF in the north. Kilalo, the head of the ULPC, is a former healer and combatant of various other armed factions, while Saperita is a former FARDC officer. ULPC groups attacked Beni town in 2016 and 2017, resulting in the death of a MONUSCO peacekeeper.

Mai-Mai Mazembe

Mazembe is a heavily fragmented self-defense group that emerged in 2015 in response to long-standing FDLR abuses against the Nande and Kobo communities. Mazembe began attacking Hutu civilians in retaliation. The movement is highly splintered, but generally violent against the NDC-R in southern Lubero.

Mai-Mai Kirikicho

Established in 1992, this group is one of the oldest armed groups in the Kivus. It recruits primarily from the Tembo community which it claims to defend against Hutu militias and Rwandan invasions. Increasingly, Kirikicho has dubbed itself as Raia Mutomboki, in line with the use of magic rituals by other Raia Mutomboki groups. Bullets pass right through fighters without doing any damage, according to Mutomboki rituals.

Mai-Mai Nyakiliba

This group is best known for the ambush against *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) in Kasika, sparking the 1998 Kasika massacre perpetrated by RCD forces and Banyamulenge

ethnic militias. Hundreds were killed during this massacre, including Mwami Francois Mubeza II, a traditional leader of Kasika, and members of the royal court. Nyakiliba is rooted in the Nyindu community.

Fuliiro Mai-Mai Groups in Ruzizi Plain

The Ruzizi plain has been a place of intense conflict for years. Violence and struggles between the Fuliiro chiefdom and its community on the one hand, and the Congolese Rundi and Banyamulenge (Tutsi) on the other hand, have provided fertile ground for recruitment into armed groups. Foreign armed groups and political manipulation have worsened the situation on the ground, creating a violent cycle. The *Mai-Mai Karakara* is best known on the Ruzizi plain. Created around 2013, Karakara often conducts cattle raids on the Ruzizi plain. In response, Banyamulenge and Barundi armed groups undertook the 2014 Mutarule massacre, where some 30 civilians died when attacking an outdoor church service (HRW, 2014).

Ngumino

Ngumino is an umbrella term for the most recent wave of Banyamulenge ethnic armed mobilization across the Fizi territories. Over the past two years, the group has become less active and has mostly been fighting various Mai-Mai groups over cattle herding and cattle rustling.

Nyatura groups

Nyatura groups are mostly active in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, and are rooted in the armed mobilization that took place in the early 1990s. Most Nyatura groups are local factions claiming to protect Congolese Hutu population from other Mai Mai groups or attacks by FARDC. They often operate independently, but some have entered coalitions like the *Coalition des Movement pour le Changement* (CMC) led by Julius Mulumba.

Under the umbrella of the CMC are the following Nyatura groups:

Nyatura John Love was created in 2016 by John Love, a school teacher from the Congolese Hutu community and former FDLR militant. Nyatura John Love operates mainly in Rutshuru territory with around 100 fighters. In 2016 and 2017, it engaged in serious fighting against the NDC-R, with tacit support from the FDLR.

Nyatura Domi faction emerged in 2013 because of tensions between various Nyatura factions. The Domi faction is also a member of CMC and consists of around 150 fighters.

Nyatura Kasongo is one of the oldest Nyatura groups, founded in 2011. Kasongo has around 250 fighters and often gets involved in alliances before breaking them again. Kasongo allied with the FARCD, APCLS, FDLR, and CNRD. By 2017 the group was mostly fighting CNRD.

Raia Mutomboki origins lie in communal selfdefense led by Jean Musumbu, who mobilized against the FDLR around 2005/2006. After five years of decreased activity, various Raia Mutomboki groups re-emerged, using dawa's (magical potions and fetishes) to protect its fighters against bullets and make them invisible. Raia Mutomboki quickly spread to areas under threat from FDLR or Rwandan FARDC units, killing hundreds of FDLR dependents and Hutu refugees. After the FDLR's influenced faded somewhat, Mutomboki groups started emphasizing FARDC abuses and became involved in illegal taxation and racketeering (ACAPS, 2018). They do not have a common command structure, and fighting among various Mutomboki groups is frequent. The label has

been transported from the Shabunda territory to other areas, such as Kalehe, Walikale, Walungu, and Kabare (CRG, 2015). In the first two areas, the groups largely recruited among the Tembo and Rega communities with their specific initiation rites and decentralized authority. In the latter two areas, groups recruited largely from the Shi community. Almost all Mutomboki groups have been involved in illegal mining, ambushes, abductions, and racketeering (ACAPS, 2018).

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)

The RCD is a political party and former rebel group that operated in the eastern regions of DRC. It is supported by the government of Rwanda and was an armed faction in the Second Congo War. Splinter groups of the RCD include the RCD-Goma (partly responsible for the 2012 Goma Rebellion) and the RCD-National (a Ugandan backed rebel group).

Congrès national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP)

The CNDP was a political armed militia established in 2004 in the Kivu regions. During the 2006 Kivu conflict they fought the FARDC and the Hutu Power group FDLR and became the main opposition to government forces. In 2009 the CNDP signed a peace treaty with the Congolese government, but mutineers formed another rebel group call the March 23 Movement (M23). About 6,000 CNDP combatants were integrated in the FARDC following the peace deal. Bosco Ntaganda, CNDP's leader who took over in 2009 following the arrest of founder Laurent Nkunda, has himself been apprehended and is currently in the middle of his trial at the International Criminal Court.

Ex-March 23 Movement (M23)

The M23 was a Rwandan backed Tutsi-led descendant of the Congrès national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP) and the RCD, famous for its occupation of Goma in 2012. The M23 was riven by internal fissures from the beginning and never managed to develop the strength of Laurent Nkunda's CNDP. Some ex-M23 fighters are apparently operating in the border regions of Rwanda and DRC, but their actions are very limited.

Nyatura groups are mostly active in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, and are rooted in the armed mobilization that took place in the early 1990s



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO


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ARMED ACTORS IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU

- 2 APCLS
- 3 CNRD
- 6 FDC-Guides 7 Busumba group
- 8 FDLR-FOCA 9 FDLR-RUD
- 10 FNL Nzabampema 11 Mai-Mai Kombi
- 12 Nyatura FDP 14 - I D Zone
- 15 LD Kashumba
- 16 LD Mahinduzi 17 Mai-Mai Mbulu
- 18 Mai-Mai Délégués
- 19 ex-M23 20 - Guides-MAC
- 21 Mai-Mai Charles 22 - Corps du Christ
- 23 FRPI
- 24 RM Kabanzi
- 26 Mai-Mai Kifuafua
- Baeni-Limenzi 27 - Mai-Mai Kifuafua Delphin
- 28 Nyatura Kigingi 29 Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano
- 30 Mai-Mai Kifuafua Shalio 31 Mai-Mai Simba (Manu)
- 32 Mai-Mai Mwenyemali
- 33 Mai-Mai Nzirunga 34 - Mai-Mai Forces Divines
- 35 Nyatura Mahanga 36 - Mai-Mai Reunion (FPC)
- 37 Nyatura Bizagwira
- 38 Mai-Mai Makanaki
- 39 -Mai-Mai Kirikicho
- 41 Mai-Mai Mahoro
- 42 Mazembe
- 43 Biloze Bishambuke 44 - Mai-Mai Mulumba
- 45 Mai-Mai Mushombe
- 46 Mai-Mai Nguru 47 Mai-Mai Nyakiliba
- 48 -Mai-Mai Nyerere
- 49 Mai-Mai PRM/PAREM
- 50 Mai-Mai Echilo 51 - Mai-Mai Malaika-She Assani
- 52 Mai-Mai Vivuya
- 53 Mai-Mai Yakutumba
- 54 Mai-Mai Karakara
- 55 Nyatura-APRDC 57 - NDC-R
- 58 NDC Sheka
- 60 Nyatura Delta 61 - Nyatura Domi
- 62 Mai-Mai Mupekenya
- 63 Nyatura Kavumbi 64 - Nyatura Kalume
- 65 Nyatura Kasongo
- 68 RM Akilo
- 69 Raia Mutomboki Blaise

- 70 RM Butachibera
- 71 RM Donat/Ngandu 72 Raia Mutomboki Elenge
- 73 Mai-Mai Kiwis Kalu
- 74 RM Hamakombo
- 75 RM Imani Bitaa 76 - RM Kimba
- 77 RM Kazimoto
- 78 Raia Mutomboki Lukoba
- 79 Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- 80 RM Maheshe 81 - RM Mungoro
- 82 Raia Mutomboki Mirage
- 83 RM Musole
- 84 Raia Mutomboki Safari
- 85 RM Ndarumanga
- 86 RM Shukuru 87 - RM Kikwama
- 88 RM Wemba
- 90 UPCP-Lafontaine 91 - RM Shabani
- 93 RM Bipompa
- 94 Mai-Mai Kvandenga 95 - Nyatura Love
- 96- Mai-Mai Mazimano
- 97 Raia Mutomboki Kisekelwa
- 98 Mai-Mai Jackson 99 Mai-Mai Dario
- 100 Mai-Mai
- Léopards-Muthundo
- 101 MRC-L
- 102 UPLC 103 - Raia Mutomboki
- 104 Mai-Mai Ebu Ela
- 105 -RED-Tabara
- 106 Ngumino 107 Mai-Mai Bigaya
- 108 FOREBU/FPB 109 - FNL Nibizi
- 110 RM Kabazimia
- 111 Nvatura Gatuza
- 112 Nyatura JED
- 113 Nyatura Jean-Marie
- 114 Mai-Mai Kithikyolo
- 115 Mai-Mai Sibenda 116 - Milice Pakombe
- 117 Mai-Mai Lwanga 118 Mai-Mai Simba-Luc
- 119 Milice M'vuba 120 - Raja Mutomboki Mamba
- 121 Mai-Mai Muhima
- 122 RM Machite
- 123 Raia Mutomboki Manyilisa
- 124 Mai-Mai Aigle
- 125 Twiganeho
- 126 Nyatura Nzayi
- 129 Mai-Mai Réné
- 130 -Raia Mutomboki
- Shemakingi 131 - Local Defense Ngengwe
- 132 CNPSC

A dynamic online version of this map can be found at https://kivusecurity.org/map



Rwanda

Rwanda's influence in DRC can hardly be understated. Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ousting of Hutus by Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Hutu militias and *génocidaires* poured over the Rwandan – Congolese border. Over the past sixteen years, the presence of Hutu militias in the Kivus has encouraged Rwanda to take an active role in the DRC. The Congolese Tutsi, descendants of various waves of migration, have been vulnerable to attack from Hutu rebels and indigenous Congolese militias (Suluhu, 2017). The FARDC proved unable to protect these groups, forcing Rwanda to support them instead. Rwanda thus became heavily involved in the First and Second Congo War, and still plays a significant role in the

protection of Congolese Tutsis. Prominent Tutsi dominated Congolese rebel groups are the RCD, CNDP, and March 23 Movement (M23). A United Nations panel of experts found that during 1999 and 2000 the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) (now Rwandan Defence Forces [RDF]) looted mineral reserves worth USD 250 million in the space of just eighteen months. To this day Rwanda continues to play an important role in matters of peace and security in eastern Congo (CFR, 2016; Amnesty International, 2018).

Conclusion

As demonstrated above, conflict in the DRC is highly fragmented and complex, with numerous armed groups violently contesting over numerous issues. Foreign interventions, vast mineral resources, crushing poverty, deeply rooted intercommunal and ethnical tensions, and the lack of a robust security apparatus to quell those tensions, contribute to a seemingly intractable conflict. This article has tried to highlight the complexity of the conflict by defining actors and relations. The analysis provided here is far from conclusive, but it allows for further research into other dimensions of conflict mapping: issues, dynamics, context, causation, and eventually strategies.

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He co-founded 'De Focus', a Dutch non-profit foundation aimed at strengthening the relationship between society and scholars by transforming academic articles into challenging short stories.

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