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About the HORN Institute

The HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent, applied research and policy think tank based in Nairobi (Kenya). Its mission is to contribute to informed, objective, home-grown, definitive research and analytical inquiry that shape national, regional, and international policies, primarily in the greater Horn of Africa region. Its vision is a progressive Horn of Africa region served by informed, objective, and domestically produced, evidence-based policy research and analysis that positively inform scholarship, policy, and practice, regionally and globally.

How AMISOM's Exit Strategy Should Look Like

By Jules Swinkels

Abstract

This article posits that AMISOM's exit strategy follows benchmarked objectives, which have not been met since the start of the mission in 2007. The security situation is critically wanting, the Somalia Security Forces are not ready to take full responsibility of providing security and stability, the internal political situation is volatile and distracts from securing and stabilizing, Somalia, and no successor mission has been identified. Under this conditions, exiting Somalia would therefore be a *cut-and-run* strategy, terminating the mission before it has achieved its strategic objectives. Providing sustainable and comprehensive funding for AMISOM to facilitate a gradual drawdown along benchmarked objectives, devising a national security architecture that provides realistic pathways for development of the Somali Security Forces, and overcoming internal political and clan struggles are some of the steps the international community and the Somali political elite should take to facilitate AMISOM's exit.

Introduction

The current Somali crisis began in 1988 when an armed insurgency, the Somali National Movement (SNM), launched attacks against government forces. The government responded with a harsh crackdown, causing massive displacement and casualties. As a result, the international community froze aid programs and the Siad Barre regime was isolated. In subsequent years, several clan-based movements were created in opposition to the government, hastening the fall of the government by 1991. Specifically, south-central Somalia descended into chaos, with war breaking out between rival clans. Criminality, looting, pillaging, massive displacement, and eventually,



Somalia National Army and AMISOM conducting a joint operation to flush out terrorists from villages near Qoryolle on August 9, 2018

a catastrophic famine, claimed an estimated 250,000 lives (Menkhaus, 2016), and sent Somalia on a path of instability.

Now, almost 30 years later, Somalia represents one of the most disturbing cases in the African security context. It is a recipe for disaster: an Islamist insurgency, weak governance, clan conflicts, a severely weakened economy, and internal fissures between federal states and the central government. Recent months have seen increasing tensions and disputes between Somalia's federal government and the regional states, culminating into several meetings of some with these states. Four federal states (Galmadug, Puntland, Jubaland, and Southwest) have suspended cooperation with the central government until they have a third-party mediator. The central government does not wish for a third-party mediator and argues that it can handle its own affairs. The ensuing federal crisis poses a risk to peace and security in Somalia as it significantly hampers the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations, prevents the delivery of government services, and diverts the government's attention from rebuilding the national security sector.

This article investigates the viability and potential impact of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)'s exit strategy on security and stability in Somalia. First, it reflects on earlier AMISOM exit strategies. Second, a combined theory of Caplan (2012) and Williams and

Hashi (2016) on exiting peacekeeping operations is introduced to create theoretical basis for various exit strategies. Third, AMISOM's exit strategy for Somalia is analysed to define challenges to the viability of the strategy and effects of its implementation on security and stability in Somalia. Finally, the article concludes that prematurely exiting Somalia poses a significant risk to stabilization efforts in the country.

Background

AMISOM became involved in Somalia in 2007 as a peacekeeping mission. Its troop contributors are Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone. In its 10 years of existence, AMISOM has continuously tried to have an effective exit strategy for Somalia. These exit strategies have been predominantly conditions-based and aimed for a successor mission from the United Nations.

Initially, AMISOM replaced the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Peace Support Mission for Somalia (IGASOM). On February 20, 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union (AU) to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months (UN Security Council Resolution [UNSC] 1744, 2007). The aim was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible UN peacekeeping mission (AMISOM,

2018). In August 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017) provided for the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali National Army (SNA).

AMISOM's original conception of the mission was that it would last only six months and would be taken over by the UN after that. This strategy was based on the recommendation of the AU Technical Assessment Mission 2007, which stated that "AMISOM shall be deployed for a period of six months, aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the mission will evolve into a United Nations operation that will support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia" (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2007). The idea that the UN would take over, prevalent in various AMISOM strategic directives after 2007, seems misleading. The concept failed to attract potential troop contributing countries, and in 2009, when Barack Obama came to power in the United States, the idea of UN deployment in Somalia was dropped (Williams & Hashi, 2016). Instead, the US focused on the UN providing logistical support to AMISOM, and the EU followed suit.

In the following years, AMISOM's main exit strategy (to be succeeded by the UN and/or the SNA) remained largely unchanged. In 2013, the UN and AU listed benchmarks for assessing whether the UN should take over from AMISOM (AMISOM, 2013, para. 17). Still, there was no prospect of the UN taking over because these benchmarks were far from being met. In 2015, the UN and AU once again set out on a benchmarking exercise, reviewing the benchmarks identified earlier in 2013 (AMISOM, 2015, para. 45). From the review, Williams and Hashi (2016) note several points. First, AMISOM's exit strategy has evolved at a tactical level, but largely remained the same at a strategic level. Second, over its ten years of deployment, AMISOM evolved with little prospect of a UN successor mission. Third, increasing emphasis has been given to creating effective Somalia security apparatus, to an extent where in 2017, in the *Report on the Ten-Year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference in Nairobi*, it was noted that in AMISOM's conditions-based exit strategy, the establishment of an effective Somali security sector was

the main condition (African Union Commission, 2017). Fourth, AMISOM identified two interrelated transitions. First, from external forces to SNA forces, and second, from military operations to police operations.

These transitions reflect the Western military doctrine of 'shape, clear, hold, and build'. However, to accomplish these transitions, AMISOM needs resources from donors (US, UN, EU). Combined, these four points demonstrate that despite AMISOM's wish to withdraw from Somalia, the timing is simply not right yet. Nevertheless, in 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2372 called for a phased withdrawal of 2,000 troops by October 2018. During the Summit of Heads of State and Governments of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AMISOM held in Kampala in March 2018, African Union Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat reiterated that "a premature withdrawal is likely to undermine the gains made over the last decade, at a great human and financial cost" (Roble, 2018, para. 3).

In the original AMISOM strategic directive from 2015, it was noted that AMISOM should be fully withdrawn after the general elections in 2020. Such an exit strategy is called a *designated timetable* (Williams & Hashi, 2016), where withdrawal is fixed to a predetermined period of time. Despite that, Somalia is not yet ready, the draw-down seems already on its way. *Three interrelated factors* explain why AMISOM and the UN are *likely* to uphold the 2020 *deadline nonetheless*.

First, TCCs have increasingly expressed the wish to draw down the mission due to the risk of getting stuck in a quagmire. A successful general election could serve as an embodiment of 'mission accomplished', despite other structural problems such as lack of security, endemic corruption, and persistent internal political disagreements. Second, the growing likelihood of dwindling resources from AMISOM partners. In 2016, the EU already reduced its budget from USD 1028 per peacekeeper to USD 822. Additionally, bilateral donors have been less willing to provide ad hoc support to the mission. Third, the continuing minimal prospect of a UN mission taking over from AMISOM. Both AMISOM and the UN are thus pushing for an exit, but will the SNA and Somalia be ready for this exit? What are the challenges

Over recent months there were increasing tensions and disputes between Somalia's federal government and the regional states, culminating in several meetings of some of these states

Finally, exiting by transitioning to a successor mission is dependent on other parties' willingness and readiness to take over responsibility.

of premature exit, and what could be the implications of AMISOM's exit in 2020?

Theoretical Framework

Richard Caplan (2012) distinguishes between six exit strategies for peace operations: a designated timetable, cut-and-run, expulsion, sequencing, benchmarking, and successor mission. A *designated timetable* is a specified period after which the peacekeeping force leaves the theatre of operations, with or without objectives completed. *Cut-and-run* is the termination of the mission before it has achieved its stated objectives. This strategy is often adopted in the aftermath of lethal attacks against the peacekeeping force, which erode support from TCCs. The US' exit after the intervention in Somalia in 1993 and Ethiopia's exit in 2009 are examples of cut-and-run. In the latter case, Ethiopia left behind a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) unable to exert control and sustain a presence in Mogadishu. *Expulsion* is less of a strategy than a directive. The host country of a peacekeeping operation can withdraw its consent for the operation. In 2013, for example, the Somali Federal government called on the Kenyan contingent of AMISOM to withdraw, but to no avail. *Sequencing* means to devise a withdrawal plan based on predetermined sequenced objectives. Part of sequencing is the concept of shape, clear, hold, and build, terms borrowed from Western militaries by AMISOM in recent years. *Benchmarking* means to devise a withdrawal plan based on indicators of progress towards the mission objective. Benchmarks should be meaningful, measurable, and clear (Caplan, 2012). Frequent benchmarks in peace operations are free and fair elections, a reformed security apparatus with clear indicators, and a measurably improved security situation. Finally, peace operations can end by transitioning some or all forces to a *successor operation*. AMISOM itself has been used as a successor operation and exit strategy for four foreign military operations: the IGASOM mission

(2006), Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi (2011), and the two Ethiopian interventions into Somalia launched in 2006 and 2011 respectively.

Caplan (2012) argues that each exit strategy has its strengths and weaknesses. A designated timetable puts a clear end to a peace operation, but it risks leaving without achieving its objectives. Additionally, insurgents and spoilers can simply wait out the peacekeeping force before they continue their struggle. A cut-and-run strategy can have negative effects for the host country, leaving often fragile states to fend for themselves. Expulsion is subjected to the whims of the host and the international community, and poses a real threat to the sustainability of peacekeeping operations. Sequencing, as was done by the US in Afghanistan after the 2001 intervention, can set complex sequenced objectives that provide an open end to the operation. Some of these objectives might take decades, for instance, the creation of a stable currency and a liberal democracy. Benchmarking faces the same difficulty, with an additional aspect. Vague and unmeasurable benchmarks without useable and meaningful indicators can create uncertainty whether certain benchmarks have been met or not. Finally, exiting by transitioning to a successor mission is dependent on other parties' willingness and readiness to take over responsibility. In Somalia, the UN has continuously showcased its unwillingness to take over from AMISOM, while the Somali Security Forces (SSF) are simply too weak to take over the operation. To accommodate these weaknesses, peacekeepers often adopt a combination of exit strategies, as is the case with AMISOM.

Analysis

AMISOM is adopting a 'designated timetable strategy' in combination with benchmarked objectives. However, these benchmarked objectives do not necessarily need to be met before AMISOM leaves in 2020. Emphasis is on the designated timetable due to the TCCs' wish to drawdown because of dwindling funding, and the lack of a successor mission, risking a political, military, and economic quagmire. In August 2017, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) renewed AMISOM's mandate, setting out the following core tasks: enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SSF, reduce the threat of al Shabab and other armed opposition, and assist the SSF to provide security, stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding (United Nations Security Council, 2017).



AMISOM soldiers march along the top of a hill in Somalia in October 2014 (Photo Credit: Associated Press)

The benchmarked objectives in AMISOM's August 2017 mandate are geared at apprehending three broad interrelated challenges. The main condition for exiting Somalia is an effective security sector able to stabilize the country. First, there is lack of political settlement that clarifies federal structures that will govern relations between the Federal Government and the member states (Williams & Hashi, 2016). Towards the end of 2018 it became clear that the Federal Member States (FMS) and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) experienced increased internal struggles. In September 2018, the FMS suspended ties with the federal government over unresolved grievances. A fact-finding mission by the Upper House (Senate) found grievances with regards to security, governance, judiciary, and the allocation of resources (Garowe Online, 2018). This struggle confirms UN observations in 2015, in which the international body argued that it was the inability of the Somali political elite to prioritize long-term goals of state-building over the short-term goals of state resources (United Nations Security Council, 2015). "The problem for the federal government was that although it was recognized as the legitimate sovereign authority by most external actors it lacked the power to impose its preferred political outcomes on other regional actors" (Williams & Hashi, 2016). Additionally, competition among Somalia's political elite is the cause for slow developments in the security sector, exacerbated by a

failure to finalize the constitution, which has remained provisional since it was adopted in 2012.

Second, the Somali Security Forces (SSF) must be able to independently continue the military offensive against al Shabab, aimed at degrading its key combat capabilities by adopting a 'shape, clear, hold, build' strategy. Additionally, the SSF needs to be a stabilizing force when clan clashes erupt. These objectives fit into Somalia's National Security Architecture 2017 (Security Pact), which stipulates an "agreed vision of Somali-led security institutions and forces that are affordable, acceptable, accountable and have the ability to provide the security and protection that the people of Somali need" ("London Somalia Conference" 2017). However, the reality is bleak. The Security Pact (SP) mentions numbers which have largely been met, but wanting in performance. The Somali National Army (SNA) is poorly trained, paid, and equipped, and largely structured along clan lines. In March 2015, the FGS acknowledged the dire state of the SNA, launching the Guulwade (Victory) plan. "The plan recognized that the SNA was little more than a collection of clan militias without a functioning, centralized command and control structure. It argued that in order to fight effectively, the SNA needed better equipment, infrastructure, organization and morale" (Williams & Hashi, 2016). Without genuine loyalty and command and control structures, armies are prone to failure and soldiers often defect. The exact strength

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and capacity of the SSF is unknown, but it can be said with relative certainty that it is not ready to take-over full responsibility from AMISOM anytime soon.

Third, the threat of al Shabab remains real, and Somalia experts during a roundtable discussion on Somalia at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies in 2018 noted that despite al Shabab's loss of territory, they still have significant military, religious, and political influence, specifically in south west Somalia and Mogadishu. In October 2017, around 500 people were killed by a car bomb in Mogadishu, demonstrating al Shabab's continuing ability to inflict casualties and conduct hybrid asymmetric warfare. In the current state, the SSF are incapable of effectively handling al Shabab.

Combined, these three challenges form a major hurdle for AMISOM's exit. On the one hand, AMISOM needs to adopt a conditions-based exit strategy, following certain benchmarks and objectives, guided by clear indicators. On the other hand, dwindling resources and political will from TCCs necessitates a 'hard' deadline. The impact of prematurely exiting Somalia can be devastating, especially when there is no successor mission, the lack of a political settlement, the continuing threat of al Shabab, the lack of a successor mission, and the unprofessional and unorganized Somali Security Forces create a harsh dilemma for both the Somali government and the international community. Forced by dwindling resources and rising casualties, Can AMISOM leave prematurely and hope that Somalia is ready by 2020? Or can it stay to make sure that Somalia stabilizes, despite the risk of a potential economic, military, and political quagmire?

A big role in apprehending this dilemma should be played by the international community and donors. The Institute for Security Studies reported in 2017 that TCCs opposed the EU's salary cuts, threatening to withdraw from the mission. Ethiopian officials noted that some of the pull-outs from key Somali towns in Bakool, Hiiraan, and Galgaduud areas, were linked to the lack of international support (Institute for Security Studies, 2017). Often, these pull-outs was followed by immediate territorial recapture by al Shabab. Additionally, due to

lack of funding, the Somali security forces are plagued by a lack of equipment, irregular salary, corruption, and defections to al Shabab and various clan militias.

Conclusion

AMISOM's exit strategy is based on benchmarking and a designated timetable, with clearly stated indicators towards the mission's stated objectives, as well as an overarching fixed timetable. However, none of these benchmarks have been met to date, and are unlikely to be met in 2020 in the light of the current political and security conundrum. The security situation is still deplorable, the Somali Security Forces are not ready to take full responsibility for providing security and stability, the internal political situation is volatile and distracts from securing and stabilizing Somalia, and no successor mission has been defined. In this current state, exiting would be abandoning Somalia to fend for itself while it is clearly not ready to do so. Instead of a benchmarked and designated exit strategy, AMISOM's TCCs will likely adopt a cut-and-run strategy, terminating the mission before it has achieved its strategic objectives. "If AMISOM adopts a predetermined timetable for exit, al Shabab will likely wait out the AU forces while Somali authorities will probably fail to assume their agreed responsibilities on schedule. The result would be an over-optimistic assessment that minimizes al Shabab's threat in the interim, and an irresponsible AMISOM exit before the SNA is ready to take over" (Williams, 2017).

Recommendations

IGAD, AU, UN, and EU should:

- Provide sustainable and comprehensive funding for AMISOM to facilitate a gradual drawdown along benchmarked objectives.
- Assist the Federal Government of Somalia in providing strategic guidance with regards to security sector reform.
- Mediate between the FGS and FMS to overcome the internal political struggle that could further destabilize Somalia.

AMISOM should:

- Assist the Somali security forces to provide effective security, stabilization, and peacebuilding operations.
- Assist the Somali security forces with reforming and professionalizing the security sector.
- Significantly degrade the capacity of al Shabab and other armed groups in Somalia.
- Conduct more joint operations with the Somali security forces to train soldiers and strengthen the command and control structures.
- Increase awareness among TCCs over the potential negative effects of prematurely exiting AMISOM on stability in the region.

Somalia's political leadership should:

- Overcome internal political struggle, with or without a third-party or internal mediator to guide the process. Identified grievances should be taken seriously.

In this current state, exiting would be abandoning Somalia to fend for itself while it is clearly not ready to do so

- Devise a national security architecture that provides realistic pathways for development of the Somali Security Forces.
- Prevent clan alliances in the Somali National Army and the Somali Police Force.
- Work together towards stabilizing Somalia, with an emphasis on long-term objectives instead of short-term expediency.
- Finalize and harmonize the provisional Constitution of 2012 to address grievances from Federal Member States.

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Is China's Development Diplomacy in Horn of Africa Transforming into Debt-Trap Diplomacy? An Evaluation

Patrick Maluki, Ph.D. and Nyongesa Lemmy

Abstract

This article evaluates the narrative of debt-trap diplomacy and how it is being used to define China-Africa trade and investment relations. Intensified China-Africa economic relations have raised debt concerns in Africa, and Western nations. While the financial assistance is helping the continent bridge its infrastructural deficit, there are genuine reasons to worry about the ability of some states to repay the Chinese loans. It is also right to state that there are other factors at play that are leading the discourse on China-Africa debt-trap diplomacy. These factors revolve around China's perceived threats to the United States of America's strategic interests on the continent and its efforts to counter rising Chinese influence around the globe. In this paper, we attempt to address the question of China's alleged entrapping of African economies by excessively lending them through the Belt and Road Initiative with the aim of controlling various states on the continent. Secondly, it traces the origin and location of the China-Africa debt-trap diplomacy narrative as well as its objectives. Lastly, it presents African responses to the narrative and how these responses have been articulated.

Introduction

The debt-trap diplomacy concept was first used by Brahma Chellaney, an Indian academic, to refer to a deliberate strategy where one country excessively loans another with the intention of gaining economic or political concessions when the borrowing country defaults on repayment.

Sri Lanka has been cited numerous times as a perfect example where China is suspected to have designed the aid package through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to gain both financially and to attain its broader grand strategy objectives. When Sri Lanka failed to repay Chinese loans that were used to build facilities at Hambantota Port, it signed a 99-year lease of the port to the Peoples' Republic of China in 2017 (Maender, 2018). This sparked a reaction in the West with some news and research outlets purporting a Chinese grand strategy already in action.

Parker and Chefitz (2018) argue that China extended the debt-trap diplomacy to create influence in Southeast Asia, and that as a result, Laos and Cambodia, who rely on Chinese funding, no longer condemn its behavior. Other nations suggested to be influenced by China

as a result of excessive lending, or are at risk of 'debt-trap diplomacy' include Vanuatu (Parker & Chefitz, 2018) Djibouti, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao, Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Montenegro (Fernholz, 2018).

Since the Sri Lankan case, there is a growing body of literature geared towards portraying the BRI and China-Africa investment relations as slowly evolving into a debt entrapment of various African economies. The argument postulates that African governments are deliberately being lured into borrowing excessively from the Chinese government and that China intends to trap them in order to be able to use the acquired control for global economic and political machinations. However, is there adequate empirical evidence to support this debt-trap diplomacy narrative?

The Debt-Trap Diplomacy Narrative on China-Africa Relations

Diplomatic relations between China and Africa can be traced back to the 1960s when most African countries gained independence. These relations have elicited

a degree of attractiveness on both the African and the Chinese sides. On the African side, the relations depict a bail out character where China promises to step into aiding Africa in case no one else is willing to do so while on the Chinese side, the relations give China a higher level of visibility in its international responsibility as a great caring power.

In 1960, Mao Zedong informed 12 African visiting delegation that despite the unique and different histories between China and Africa, China could provide vital lessons for Africa to learn from. He later pledged to assist newly independent African countries. It was during Mao's time that the first strong diplomatic message was passed across: the construction of Tanzania-Zambia railway. This infrastructure was funded by China after Britain, France, USA, Germany, and the World Bank declined to give financial aid. China's main objective in funding was not only economic but also geo-political. It wanted to be recognized as a strong player on the international scene. Other than gradually funding infrastructural projects in Africa, investing in the continent and providing different forms of aid, China developed, at an early stage, the idea of independent diplomacy and political will (Aigin & Jianhong, 2017).

Currently, and building up on Mao's legacy, China's engagement with Africa is strategically multidimensional. Hinged on the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summits, its agenda is focused on politics, diplomacy, trade, military and financial aid, debt forgiveness, health, education, tourism, and investment in the energy sector. Diplomatically, China has intensified visits on the continent in order to articulate its agenda in energy and mineral acquisition, and limit efforts of additional countries establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and in increasing its global influence (Mbaye, 2010).

Chinese economy has grown considerably in the last three decades affording it financial capabilities to fund development in other parts of the world. Concurrently, China uses this position to influence decisions in the international arena. Its current status as a global leader in the manufacturing sector and a major global supplier of goods and services has created demand for more

natural resources to feed its production lines. Africa on the other hand, has an economy that is lagging behind in manufacturing and value addition, but has abundant natural resources such as timber, copper, diamond, cobalt, among other minerals, required by China, but at the same time, most parts of the continent do not have a working infrastructural system that is important for economic development. As such, a symbiotic relationship has developed between China and countries in Africa where China extracts natural resources and provides the much and urgently needed financial support for infrastructural development. In 2015, Africa used a total of about USD 83.4 billion of financial aid on infrastructural projects with USD 20.9 billion coming from China alone. The Chinese contribution was an increase in expenditure in Africa by over 40 times when compared to the year 2000 (EFSEAS, 2017).

The main areas of Chinese investment are railways, roads, ports, oil, gas fields, and power plants. But besides the achievements accrued to Africa as a result of economic cooperation with China, there is a danger of debt distress when the amount borrowed by each African state is analyzed in relation to its ability to service the loans without default. This is raising long-term sustainability concerns for the continent. The issue is aggravated further by the fact that corruption in Africa has enabled some substantial resources to be embezzled thus diminishing the impact of the investments on economies when the amount of financial aid is compared to what was used for the actual development (EFSEAS, 2017). It is also important to note that China engages Africa as a state but its citizens are also involved in their capacities as non-state actors in business undertakings across the continent thus elevating the aggregate participation of the Chinese element in trade and investment (Donnelley, 2018).

Notwithstanding the positive impact of Chinese involvement on the Continent, some concerns have been raised in other quarters that the issue of debt-trap diplomacy is not arising out of Africa but from the western states' disquiet about the threat to Euro-American dominance in the international system (Donnelley, 2018). For instance, Dennes (2018) notes that US Secretary of

Chinese economy has grown considerably in the last three decades and it has come with financial capabilities to fund development in other parts of the world

State Rex Tillerson commented that “China is laying a series of debt traps with predatory loans” to Africa, while Moore (2018) contends that the argument on debt-trap diplomacy and how it is applied on Africa-China relations is not empirically convincing. Moore argues that studies done on Africa’s indebtedness show that China is not the driver of debt distress in Africa; that the use of the term is associated with Western countries worried about China’s global rise and, as such, it has more to do with politics than it does to do with economies. He continues to point out that the reality is that Africa needs this funding in order to bridge its infrastructural deficit. However, he cautions that countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Angola have relatively higher debt obligations and this should be worrying (Moore, 2018).


Were (2018) equally argues against the narrative that China is practicing debt-trap diplomacy in Africa and contends that this argument is counter-productive. He states that statistics indicate Africa pays more to private lenders who loan governments about a third of their total debts with an interest of about 55 per cent, while the debts owed to China account for about 20 per cent of the total with a 17 per cent as interest payable. He further contends that this narrative creates accountability

problems where any problematic issue arising from the assets funded by China will be blamed on China and not on responsible government administrations (Were, 2018). In countering this narrative, the Chinese government has insisted that lending to Africa is part of the Belt and Road Initiative aimed at building a new global trade network. Chinese efforts are geared towards filling the USD 170 billion investment gap and that the loans offered to Africa have the lowest of interest rates (Denness, 2018).

Concerns Raised by Chinese Debt-Trap Diplomacy Narrative

It has already been noted in Africa and elsewhere that China is offering infrastructural development loans to countries some of whom have weaker financial standing hence unable to effectively repay them. It has also been argued that Chinese companies in foreign countries have been, and are, offering their services at such low prices such that the practice locks out competitors and in this way negatively affecting non-Chinese businesses (Shattuck, 2018).

Some African states are already having problems repaying Chinese loans. Others are diplomatically



Zambia's President Edgar Lungu shakes hands with China's President Xi Jinping before their bilateral meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China on September 1, 2018. (Photo Credit: Reuters)

engaging China on debt forgiveness while a few have been compelled to concede assets to China or lease them out on a long-term basis in order for China to recover its capital input and profits. A case in point is Djibouti where the government leased out port of Doraleh to China for 99 years at an annual rate of USD 20 million (Shattuck, 2018).

Financial aid dependence of a number of African countries on China has created an asymmetrical economic relationship that at times is being used to leverage influence over them on certain decisions of international political implications since, most of the times, such countries need China more than it needs them. Such was the case when, in February 2018, a hotel in Mauritius was forced by the Chinese government to cancel a cultural event, the Hakka Affairs Council culinary, that was associated with Taiwan. The Chinese government threatened to stop officials from Taiwan from entering the country (Shattuck, 2018). Similarly, in October 2018, the government of Kenya banned fish imports from China stating that the imports were 'killing' local industries but quickly retreated on its pledge after China threatened to call it a 'trade war' and to use retaliatory measures, among them the discontinuation of funding for the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) whose completion is supposed to link the port of Mombasa to Kisumu (Muriuki, 2018).

Pessimists on Chinese loaning to African development point at examples of states like Botswana, whose failure to utilize the loans appropriately is as a result of weak internal institutions that failed to internalize the funds. They point at purchases of 'unnecessary' assets and corruption. In this case, China stepped up its efforts to finance Botswana after BP (a British oil company) and Anglo-American (a mining company) left the country. Here also, China used this as a leverage to discourage Botswana from making adverse comments concerning China's territorial claims in South China Sea. With the foregoing facts, Denness (2018) projects that China is possibly waiting for the right moment to use the 'debt-trap' to its advantages.

One of the countries that have benefited greatly from Chinese investment in infrastructural projects is Ethiopia. China provided the state with over USD 12 billion within less than 20 years.

In September 2018, it restructured the repayment loan from a period spread over 10 years to 30 years. This was due to Ethiopia's potential debt-distress whose debt had

peaked at 59 percent of gross domestic product (Segawa, 2018). Some of the projects funded by China include the first six-lane highway costing USD 800 million, Ethio-Djibouti railway costing USD 4 billion, a USD 86 million ring road, a metro system, among others. Western nations are concerned with debt-trap diplomacy practices between Ethiopia and China, but Ethiopian state representatives denied the claims asserting that China is not 'arm-twisting' the nation by using the loans as leverage (Marsh, 2018).

Apart from trade and investment relations, there is diplomatic, ideological and strategic cooperation between Ethiopia and China. For instance, in 2006, Ethiopia's parliament supported China's anti-secession law in relation to Taiwan, and being a member of United Nations Human Rights Council then, helped defeat motions criticizing China. Its geographical location has also created a launching pad for China's activities in Africa (Cabestan, 2012).

Zambia, another 'debt-trapped' country, and whose debt stands at USD 9 billion, denied reports that China was in the process of taking over some state assets due to debt default. It claimed that the bilateral cooperation between the two nations was aimed at uplifting the living standards of its citizens (Shaban, 2018). This claim came in the wake of Western media reports alleging Chinese takeover of Zesco, a state-owned electricity company, and criticizing the implications of China's loans to Africa. Even before the media reports were published, 16 US senators informed the US Secretaries of Treasury and State of their reservations on China's increasing lending to Africa arguing that it was a debt-trap diplomacy through the Belt and Road Initiative whose aim is to create a world economic order centered around China. They further argued that through this initiative, China will be able to influence national policies of indebted countries and be able to control their strategic resources and assets. In their view, this Chinese hegemonic project must be stopped (Mususa & Laterza, 2018).

However, a closer look at Zambia's external debtbook reveals that China is not the only lender to Zambia. Zambia issued three Eurobonds between 2012 and 2015 for an amount totaling to USD three billion. By June 2018, the debt stood at 34.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) from 8.4 percent of GDP in 2011. As much as the government has borrowed heavily from China, the historic reality is that China is simply practicing the lending characteristics that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank implemented from the

1980s to mid-2000s. If what China is doing is debt-trap diplomacy, then IMF had already practiced with various African states in the past (Mususa & Laterza, 2018).

The debt-trap diplomacy narrative in the case of Zambia as propagated by Western media is, therefore, not about the lending relationship and the amounts involved, but about the fear of the West that it is losing the grip it had over Zambia and other African states as a result of China's activities on the continent. However, there are concerns that this alarmist messages have the potential of discouraging investment and consequently economic growth which might in turn lead to Zambia defaulting on repayments and such default could send panic through the continent (Mususa & Laterza, 2018).

The same debt-trap diplomacy situation has been applied to Kenya by the United States' Government. The World Bank through the Centre for Global Development (CGD) lists Kenya as one of the 23 countries at the risk of debt distress resulting from China's Belt and Road Initiative. As a result of this notion, the United States government tasked Kenya to discuss with the IMF the 'dangers' of infrastructural funding by China. It seeks to establish measures through which it can use IMF to prevent the continuation of the Belt and Road Initiative projects and how other countries can be convinced on the 'risks' of Chinese funding. When the US embassy in Kenya was approached to comment on the information contained in the letter, it declined to do so (Amadala, 2018). Such anxieties from the United States have led to a closer scrutiny of the current performance of the completed section of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) built by the Chinese, comparing it to what was projected as the value addition to the economy. Some reports indicate that taxpayers are, at the time of this writing, subsidizing the SGR to a tune of Kshs. 30 million per day as opposed to the project adding 1.5 per cent onto the country's gross domestic product (Wafula, 2018 & Kacungira, 2017). Gradually, this narrative has been picked up by

commentators in Kenya, and Africa in general, and they are helping the western nations spread their narratives by using the very examples of debt distressed nations like Sri Lanka in order to create a pushback effect on Chinese funding (Kisero, 2018). The scenario is such that "if the US has said it, then it must be true."

Africa's Responses to the China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy Narrative

African states have reacted to this narrative in three main ways: first, it is denial and dismissal stating that the 'confidential' agreements they have with China are not configured to their disadvantage and that China is not using the debt as a leverage to influence their policies. For instance, as indicated earlier, Ethiopian state representatives have denied claims of debt-trap diplomacy asserting that China is not 'arm-twisting' the nation by using the loans as leverage (Marsh, 2018).

Second, other counties like Angola, apart from denying, have sought diversification of economies and source of financing for development in order to reduce overreliance on China whose main interest is in natural resources such oil as payback. To this end, the International Monetary Fund stepped in and approved USD 3.7 billion to, among other things, diversity Angola's economy, but not without some conditions on improvement of governance (Associated Press, 2018). One of the ways through which Angola seeks to diversify its economy is by focusing on agribusiness (Muisyo, 2017).

Zambia sought additional funding through Eurobond (Zambian Watchdog, 2018) and through tax increases. Meanwhile, the civil society organizations came out strongly demanding government accountability and transparency on issues of contracting obligations, repayment terms, the feasibility of the projects, loan security, and whether or not the nation will get value for its money. The organization stated that it had information that China was going to take over more state assets such as the national power supplier, and that it is in control of Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Lusakatimes, 2018). The government denied reports. The allegations though left a message of caution given that Zambia has not defaulted of loan repayments yet (Chutel, 2018). Kenya, just like Zambia, has also diversified sources of income to include additional taxation but it has not slowed down its borrowing from China (Sunday, 2018). It has signed a deal with USA's companies to finance and

Apart from trade and investment relations, there is diplomatic, ideological and strategic cooperation between Ethiopia and China



Construction workers work on the new standard gauge railway line near Voi town, Kenya, on March 16, 2016. (Photo Credit: Reuters)

build an express highway from Mombasa to Nairobi at a cost of Kshs. 230 billion (Marindany, 2018).

Third, other countries are negotiating with China for debt-forgiveness considerations and the restructuring of repayment terms and period in order to reduce the weight of the debt burden. Such was the case when the Chinese government restructured the payment period of Ethiopia's debt from 10 years to 30 years (Abiye, 2018). Before restructuring, China had scaled back its investment in Ethiopia as a cautionary move once it was evident that the nation was in debt distress (Aglionby & Feng, 2018). In Botswana, China not only agreed to extend the repayment period but also to cancel some of the debt used to finance infrastructure (Olingo, 2018). In Sudan, China cancelled debts accrued before the year 2016. This was after multilateral negotiation during the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation held in September 2018 (Dabanga, 2018).

Conclusion

From the available literature on the practice of debt-trap diplomacy by China, there exists no strong evidence to support the narrative. What is clear is that the narrative is a creation of competitors, to counter the growing influence of China around the globe. Even in cases where it appears that China employed debt-trap diplomacy,

for instance in Sri Lanka, there is inadequate empirical evidence to support the narrative. In numerous cases cited by writers and analysts, what is purported to be debt-diplomacy practiced by China is essentially the same approach that the Western world used through the IMF and the World Bank beginning in the 1980s to mid-2000s, and they still do, and therefore, such evidence lacks merit to justify that China is practicing debt-trap diplomacy. There are, however, a few researchers and analysts who have rightly outlined what is at stake for the USA if China is allowed to continue expanding its influence in Africa and elsewhere.

The debate on the debt-trap diplomacy narrative has elicited valid issues for consideration. That African nations should be wary of Chinese lending by way of Belt and Road Initiative, not because China is practicing debt-trap diplomacy, but like any form of investment, professional and honest feasibility studies should be carried out on the projects to be funded by China to establish beforehand whether or not profits will be made. The feasibility should accurately estimate the 'actual' costs involved, repayment terms, and the short and long-term financial gains expected from the investments. Furthermore, African governments should reduce or eliminate leakages of funds meant for the projects through corruption. Such analysis was carried out by Ndii (2018) on the Standard

Gauge Railway where he argues that the calculations on costs and projected benefits of the project were wrong from the start hence the losses being incurred by the enterprise. If the Belt and Road Initiative is engaged in a transparent and accountable manner, the chances of debt-distress arising from it will be minimized.

A case of relative success is Ethiopia where the nation experienced higher economic growth from the year 2000 as a result of Chinese support. While many African states continued to rely on western partners, Ethiopia did not hesitate to seek Chinese investment and aid. Between the year 2000 and 2014 it had received more than USD

12 billion of Chinese loans. In addition, there was an influx of Chinese investors who ventured into various manufacturing enterprises like textiles and leather for export to other African countries, USA, Asia, and Europe. Within that period it recorded the highest economic growth, and it is expected to have an average economic growth of about 6.2 per cent to the year 2022, and had a growth of about 10 per cent in the last 10 years. Ethiopia is no longer the third poorest country in the world as consistently portrayed by the International Monetary fund prior to Chinese intervention (Kapchanga, 2018; Cowen, 2018).

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The South Sudan Power-Sharing Agreement and Intricate Realities: Conceptual and Critical Reflections

By Edmond John Pamba

Abstract

Power-sharing agreements have been a tool for peace-making in Africa for many years. In recent years, such settlements ended the post-election violence in Kenya (2007/2008) and Zimbabwe (2008/2009). This article examines theoretical underpinnings of power sharing in divided societies and democracies, and critically examines the recent power sharing agreement signed on September 12, 2018 to end civil war in South Sudan considering the inherent limitations of this strategy in conflict management, and its past failures elsewhere in Africa.

Introduction

A number of power-sharing agreements have been employed as a conflict management strategy in various countries in Africa. Such include Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003), and Central African Republic (1996-2007), Angola (1994 -1998), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003-2006), Kenya (2008 - 2013), Zimbabwe (2009 - 2017), Rwanda (1994 - 2003), Burundi (since 2005 but slightly tinkered with), Sierra Leone (1996 and 1997), and Nigeria (since 1999), among other cases.

On August 15, 2015, after almost two years of civil war, a power-sharing agreement for transition purposes, was signed. However, this agreement collapsed and has since been revitalized through 'the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan' - R-ARCSS - signed on September 12, 2018. However, this being the second such agreement employed to end the conflict in South Sudan, and the new realities in terms of the conflict map, the new agreement needs critical examination with the view of stabilizing peace in South Sudan.

This article will explore the theoretical underpinnings of power sharing in divided societies, and as a conflict management strategy. Its inherent limitations will similarly be examined. The totality of these sections will help in the critical understanding of the South Sudan peace agreement.

Theoretical Underpinnings of Power-Sharing Agreements

Power sharing as a method of conflict management and resolution, has been employed mostly in (ethnically or religiously) divided democracies or societies (Lijphart, 1977). It is conceptually designed to safeguard adequate group representation and foster democratic participation in such societies, through practical equations of power distribution across existing socio-political groupings.

Lijphart (1977) proposed the concept of consociational democracy, a group-based form of democracy, which addresses the exclusion of minorities. Lijphart put forth a power-sharing model built on four pillars:

- a. A grand coalition government which accommodates political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society.
- b. The mutual veto (or minority veto) or concurrent majority rule which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests.
- c. Proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, among other aspects of power-sharing.
- d. Group autonomy of each segment to run its own internal affairs which might include adoption of federal governance.

Minority exclusion which power-sharing arrangements seek to remedy, may arise from the fact that majority rule, a liberal democratic principle, might in consequence, be majority dictatorship. This is simply because in societies where people vote along ethnic lines, political parties representing ethnic minorities have no chance of ever forming a majority, hence shifting majorities in parliament might be unlikely (Jarstad, 2008).

Power Sharing for Conflict Management

With regard to conflict management, power-sharing is used to end violence in civil or armed conflict scenarios, especially where military victory for either side to the dispute is unlikely. The unlikelihood of violent means to conflict resolution and the hurting stalemate, yields to non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms through third parties – mediation and negotiation mechanisms (Koko, 2013).

Power sharing therefore, as a conflict management method, is out of appreciation of the fact that dividing power among rival groups during the transition, power sharing reduces the danger that one party will become dominant and threaten the security of others (Koko, 2013). It also addresses the problem of exclusion, which is a prime factor behind conflicts in Africa as Koko (2013) observes. This method, particularly emphasizes the inclusion of non-state stakeholders such as rebel groups, political parties, and civil society groups in transitional mechanisms, as a peace equation, hinged on mutual accommodation.

As opposed to power sharing in the consociational democracy, which is preventive and long-term in terms of peace building, when used in conflict management, it is simply reactionary and transitory. As such, Koko (2013) argues that power sharing seeks to address the problem of power illegitimacy through accommodative transitional mechanisms capable of popular consultations and elections for institutional

renewal in post-conflict societies. He further adds that provisions of power sharing, are generally derived from peace (or political) agreements signed by parties. Such agreements guarantee the representation and participation of representatives of consequential groups in political decision-making in the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, army and the civil service, among other sectors.

Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) in their study of power-sharing agreements, identify four models of power sharing: Central (political); Territorial (federalism/decentralization), Military; and Economic.

The Problem


Power sharing as a conflict management strategy has had chequered results in Africa, with those in Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania registering positive results. However, most of such peace agreements in Africa have largely been characterized by failures. Some of the power sharing agreements on the continent have instead reproduced insurgent violence; collapsed and opened a relapse into civil wars; or failed to provide a bulwark against revisions as variably witnessed in *inter alia*, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. It begs the question, what in the Lijphart (1977), and Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) models, makes power sharing as a tool of conflict prevention, management, and resolution, a flawed mechanism or to fail? What gaps exist in the current peace agreement of South Sudan that might potentially militate against long-term conflict resolution in the country? How best can the South Sudan peace agreement be improved for long-term peace?

Findings

In answering the question of what makes power sharing a flawed peace-making approach, Jastard (2008) notes that power-sharing does not necessarily end violence. By excluding the public, it turns elitist and undermines democratic processes. He implies the legitimacy of transition structures and power is forgone, for a compromise arrangement to end the 'war of the roses', in which, the public or citizens are alienated despite being affected by the conflict and by the factors creating the conflict. Further, Jastard (2008) adds that in some cases where power sharing happens in the economic sector, economic recovery is undermined.

From a military-political perspective, Lyons (2002) states that "pacts are more likely among elites with relatively clear and loyal constituencies, such as traditional political

Power sharing as a conflict management strategy has had chequered results in Africa, with those in Kenya Nigeria, and Tanzania, registering positive results



South Sudan rebel leader Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir sign a power-sharing deal, on August 5, 2018. (Photo Credit: Associated Press)

parties, labour unions, or other institutions in a corporatist setting. In the aftermath of a civil war, political and social organizations generally are absent and the ability of militia leaders to deliver the compliance of their own fighters is often questionable" (p. 220).

On the other hand, Mehler and Degenhardt (2008) observe that by allowing non-state groups or rebels a share of state power, power sharing creates an incentive structure for would-be leaders to embark on insurgent pathways to power, thereby reproducing insurgent violence.

On his part, Spears (1999) observes that the tendency towards decentralization in the name of conflict prevention or power sharing, has gained currency in recent years. This guarantees "group autonomy" pillar of power sharing. However, Mehler (2003) argues that decentralization can equally have adverse effects on conflicts. He adds that transferring competences from the central to the local level may create new conflicts at a local level since local elites are not necessarily more peace-loving or less corrupt than those at the central level.

Federalism can also be in the form of what Bunce and Watts (2005) refer to as ethno-federalism, in which federal units are ethnically based. From ethno-federal perspective, Bunce and Watts (2005) maintain an

ambivalence on its effectiveness in conflict prevention, resolution and long-term peace building. They argue that ethno-federalism may counter two typical temptations in multi-ethnic contexts (of minorities to defect and of majorities to dominate) by legitimizing difference and empowering minorities to create mutual trust for stability. However, they warn that such a set up might also undermine commonality, and crystallize differences and identities, which might undermine cooperation and accord minorities the institutional pre-requisites for later-day secession.

Far from the foregoing considerations, Koko (2013) observes that the most important consideration of power sharing as an instrument of peace making, is its relationship with justice and human rights, and peace and reconciliation. He finds that protection of human rights is central to a justice-based society, especially one emerging from conflict. Koko (2013) adds that the pursuit of justice and the protection and promotion of human rights are safeguards for the feasibility of peace and reconciliation and the avoidance of relapse into violence. The peace, human rights and justice complex creates a dilemma since justice and protection of human rights have to be secured short of upsetting the peace, given previous crimes and human rights abuses have to be prosecuted. It is more intricate considering that former combatants could be accommodated in the transitory

peace arrangements, and punishment of certain crimes and violations of human rights might reignite pre-conflict sensibilities along ethnic or political lines.

Koko (2013) suggests that transitional justice is the best remedy with regards to human rights, justice and peace in post-conflict environments. Annan (2004) defines transitional justice as the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. Transitional justice employs judicial (trials) and non-judicial mechanisms – truth and reconciliation commissions, amnesties, parliamentary or other inquiries, lustrations, and reparations. Koko (2013) sees the combination of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, as less antithetical to peace and reconciliation in post-conflict societies as opposed to strictly judicial approaches to justice, which are in the main, retributive.

Lastly, since in the main power sharing is a transitory mechanism, long-term peace building is delicately approached through such a mechanism. Roeder and Rothchild (2005) hold that power sharing arrangements have inherent dilemma between the immediate inclusionary strategy in a first phase of getting a peace agreement and the long-term institutional arrangements in a later phase. To this, Mehler (2008) agrees that it is difficult to transition from phase one (transition) to phase two (consolidation) with the same institutional and group set up of phase one who carry along their interests to maintain status and privileges. Walter (2002) prescriptively concludes that power-sharing pacts are likely to be unstable over time hence “a second transition” is required for lasting peace. Walter implies transformation of institutional and structural elements of the pre-conflict society, and this can be, in part, through constitutional review to guarantee stable peace in the post-transition period.

In his study of power sharing pacts as a conflict management mechanism in Africa, Mehler (2008) observes that the practice is preventive diplomacy *stricto sensu* rather than tailor-made. As such, he notes that the choice of mediation partner on the rebel side is a challenge. This is because, in his view, there is no clear command of loyalty and legitimacy among specific

groups, the process is premised on the assumption that self-declared leaders and representatives of a neglected group are rather politico-military entrepreneurs devoid of altruistic devotion. He adds that, such negotiating partners are selected for their spoiling capabilities, and the groups to be represented are mostly perceived to be ethnic and the outer limits of such groups are disputed, whereas, internal homogeneity often lacks. The consequence is the difficulty of determining institutions to guarantee group interests.

The South Sudan Power-Sharing Deal

The peace deal (R-ARCSS) signed on September 12, 2018, established a transitional government for the Republic of South Sudan and brought a long civil war to a halt. The agreement cemented the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities (CoH) agreements, and humanitarian access established in December 2017. The agreement was signed between the government side, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), the main opposition (South Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition – SPLM/A-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees (FD), and Other Opposition Parties (OPP).

R-ARCSS provided for the formation of a Revitalized Transition Government of National Unity (TGONU) composed of the signatory parties under a power sharing arrangement, guaranteed by the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 (TCSS). It is important to note that TGoNU was the transitional government under ARCSS before its collapse in 2016.

R-ARCSS provides for the unification and professionalization of the army and the police, secures the oil fields and ensured petroleum operations resume, and allows for government provision of basic services. It further establishes timelines for pre-transitional and transitional periods and the general elections, outlines a power sharing arrangement among the signatory parties, and creates a detailed schedule of its implementation.

Accordingly, the unification, training and redeployment of forces is to be done within the first eight months (pre-transition), upon which the tenure of the transitional government would start for a period of 36 months, and

Transitional justice employs judicial (trials) and non-judicial mechanisms – truth and reconciliation commissions, amnesties, parliamentary or other inquiries, lustrations, and reparations

the next elections would follow at least 60 days before the end of tenure of the transitional government. The power sharing equation for the contracting parties in the National Legislative Assembly (legislature) provides for a total of 550 members of National Legislative Assembly. This is to be shared 60 per cent for the Transitional Government of National Unity (SPLM/A-IG) (332 members), 23 per cent for the SPLM/A-IO (128 members), 9 per cent for the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (50 members), 6 per cent for Other Political Parties (30 members), and 2 per cent for the group of Former Detainees (10 members).

Further, in the Ministerial Council, the parties would share a total of 35 positions as follows: 20 positions for the TGONU, nine positions for the SPLM/A-IO, three for the SSOA, two for the FD, and one for the OPP. The deputy ministerial positions (totalling 10) are to be shared with five going to TGONU, three to SPLM/A-IO, one to the SSOA, and one for the OPP. At the level of state and local councils, power sharing power sharing across state governors, speakers of state legislatures, state councils of ministers, state legislatures, county commissioners, and county councils will allocate 55 per cent for TGoNU, 27 per cent for SPLM/A-IO, 10 per cent for SSOA, and 8 per cent for OPP, while the FDs will choose three ministers from states of their choice, to deducted from the opposition.

Inherent Challenges/Limitations

a. Top-Heavy Problem

The R-ARCSS accommodates five political groupings in a joint government, the R-TGoNU, across all levels of political, military, and administration. This might lead to top-heavy problems in the political, military and bureaucratic spheres in South Sudan due to the large number of representatives of all the signatory groupings in high ranks, especially at the higher levels of decision-making and the size of the bureaucracy. For instance, President Salva Kiir, in August 2018, promoted over 120 generals to the rank of major general, which might provoke similar promotions on the opposite side as a form of reward and maintaining the loyalty structure ("Kiir promotes over 120", 2018).

Further, Engel, Boeckler, and Müller-Mahn (2018) note that military inclusion (power sharing) does not necessarily lead to a newly ordered and functioning army, as it may lead to top-heavy armies difficult to function (in terms of structure and command). It can also lead to mutiny or further factionalisation as parallel

hierarchies might be established and loyalty retained for former rebel commanders. This scenario can possibly be replicated in the national legislative assembly, executive and ministerial council, down to state legislatures and executive councils, thus undermining efficiency and effectiveness in governance and service delivery.

b. Territorial Trap

R-ARCSS proposes a federal system of governance in the post-conflict era subject to further constitutional review and territorial demarcation. However, as Engel et al. (2018) warn, territorial power sharing risks creating the 'territorial trap' through decentralization and federalism, in which political agents might adapt power sharing schemes to their advantage through personal claim to specific spaces. This might entrench competing territorial claims even after the settlement of the conflict and proceed to alter the socio-political relations in the society. Engel et al. (2018) further caution that territorial power sharing might accentuate majority-minority struggle in an ethnic majority territory, provoked by representation by a minority individual, especially at the national level, and the minority remain feeling marginalized in such a given territory.

c. Ethno-Nationalism

Provided that R-ARCSS only provides legislative and executive power sharing on transitional basis, the reality of ethnic minorities being outnumbered in subsequent dispensations, and not being able to flip ethnic majorities, might lead to minorities resorting to ethnic nationalism to effect a balance of power. However, R-ARCSS attempts to solve this problem through ethnic federalism subject to states' boundaries review. Article 1.15.18.1 of the R-ARCSS requires IGAD to constitute a Technical Boundaries Committee, without prejudice to the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) and the Referendum Commission on the Number and Boundaries of States, to demarcate the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood as of January 01, 1956 and the tribal areas in dispute in the country. This exercise is tantamount to tribal territorialisation upon which federalism, as will be proposed by the IBC or declared by the RCNBS subject to referendum, is likely to be based. However, ethno-federalism, might not also guarantee social stability, as evidenced by Ethiopia's ethno-federal system (a federal parliamentary democracy), where it has led to ethno-nationalism and various ethnic groupings have ethnically-based political movements and military wings to contest for power, if not separation.



South Sudanese security forces attend peace celebrations in the capital Juba, South Sudan Wednesday, on October 31, 2018 (Photo Credit: Bullen Chol AP).

d. Legacy of Mistrust and Protracted Social Conflict

Psaltis, Carretero, and Cehajic-Clancy (2017) observe that the cultivation of historical thinking in post-conflict societies faces the challenges of adherence to master narratives of the conflict. This creates a sense of threat and of distrust towards the opposite (ethnic) group, making it difficult for conflict transformation in the context of inter-communal or inter-group conflicts. Introducing the concept of protracted conflict, Azar (1990) explains that inter-group conflict remains entrenched when a set of conflict parties interact in self-reinforcing spirals of distrustful, coercive gestures against each other over a sustained period of time, leads to protracted social conflict.

e. Slow Economic Recovery or Economic Price of Peace

In his criticism of the Versailles Treaty, Keynes (2010) writes "...and they settled it as a problem of theology, of politics, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the states whose destiny they were handling" (p. 2).

Similarly, despite the creation of the Special Reconstruction Fund under Article 3.2 of the R-ARCSS, other structural factors are likely to undermine the country's economic

recovery and stability for some time during and after the transition period. Due to power sharing, the TGoNU will now bear a bloated public service whose wage bill is bound to significantly increase the country's wage bill and other elements of recurrent expenditure, especially on operational issues. This is against the backdrop of a great economic dip during the civil war and attendant global oil crisis in an economy that is oil-dependent, with oil contributing 60 per cent of the GDP and 95 per cent of government revenue. The economy has also contracted over the years of the civil war, recording GDP growth of -13.8 per cent in 2016, with a further contraction of 6.1 per cent in 2017.

At the same time, corruption and neo-patrimonialism are rife in the country, and as Mehler (2008) notes, decentralization or federalism might just percolate corruption and power struggles down to the lowest level of governance. In fact, a report by the Sentry in October 2018, analyses money laundering schemes involving South Sudan's political and military elites with interests in Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda (The Sentry, 2018). This might be just a tip of the iceberg about grand corruption in the country. If such scenarios play out in the post-conflict Sudan (including during the transition), compounded with the large wage bill and operational expenditure, economic recovery and fiscal stability of the country might be in jeopardy already.



A man waves South Sudanese national flags during peace celebrations in the capital Juba, South Sudan on Wednesday, October 31, 2018 (Photo Credit: Bullen Chol)

f. Justice and Human Rights

To carry out transitional justice, considering the atrocities and human rights violations during the civil war, the R-ARCSS provides for a commission for truth, justice and healing, and a hybrid court. However, the likelihood of prosecuting human rights violations and the quality of justice might not meet wider expectations because of lack of political goodwill from the main sides of the conflict. For instance, President Salva Kiir, has been appointed UN-sanctioned military leaders to senior positions.

Further, in December 2017, he appointed Marial Chanuong as the new head of army operations, training and intelligence, and Santino Deng Wol as the head of ground forces, and Gabriel Jok Riak as the deputy chief of defence. The three were sanctioned by the UN Security Council in 2015 over human rights violations during the civil war in the country (Patinkin, 2017). In September 2018, appointed UN-sanctioned army commander Reuben Malek as new deputy Defence minister. Malek is under sanctions for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 2015 under his command in the Upper Nile State. He is also accused of corruption for alleged role in the loss of nearly USD three million during his tenure as the army deputy chief of staff for logistics (Oduha, 2018).

g. Factionalization or Splintering

Mehler (2008) warns that by allowing non-state groups or rebels a share of state power, power sharing creates

an incentive structure for would-be leaders to embark on insurgent pathways to power, thereby reproducing insurgent violence. This is evidently true in South Sudan especially with respect to the ARCSS power sharing agreement. ARCSS was signed by four parties: the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, South Sudan Armed Opposition (then SPLM/A-IO), Former Detainees and Other Political Parties. However, formations changed towards and after the collapse of ARCSS leading to more political groups or parties and armed groups. These groups staked claim to power and complicated the subsequent power sharing equation and finally, R-ARCSS has been signed by five categories of parties: the TGoNU, SPLM/A-IO, SSOA, OPP, and FDs.

SSOA has already experienced splintering as the initial alliance of nine political parties, has been reduced to seven. The alliance now consists seven political parties and their armed wings led by Gabriel Chang Changson. These are the Federal Democratic Party/South Sudan Armed Front of Gabriel Chang Changson, the National Democratic Movement of Lam Akol, the South Sudan National Movement for Change led by Bangasi Joseph Bakosoro, the South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army of Hussein Abdel Bagi, the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army of Bapiny Montuil Wegjang, the South Sudan United Movement/Army of Peter Gadet Yak, and the People's Democratic Movement led by Josephine Lagu. This faction of SSOA is a signatory to the peace agreement. With a fallout over the November 30, 2018 SSOA elections, the alliance is divided between the

Gabriel Chang-led faction which includes Khalid Butros (NAS), Josephine Lagu Yanga (PDM), Joseph Bangasi Bakasoro (SSNMC), Hussein Abdelbagi Akol (SSPM) and Bapiny Monyuil (SSLM), and one led by Gen. Peter Gatdet Yak, who supposedly won the disputed elections. Gatdet's faction includes Lam Akol (NDM), Henry Oyay (NAS), Thomas Peter Okac (FDP), Anas Richard Zanga (PDM), Thomas Ali Bilal (SSNMC), and Jacob Nyier Gatkuoth (SSLM).

Another SSOA faction led by General Thomas Cirilo Swaka, rejected R-ARCSS, though claim to be committed to the ceasefire agreement. This faction consists of the National Salvation Front (NAS) of General Thomas Cirilo Swaka, the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) chaired by Hakim Dario, the National Democratic Movement (NDM) led by Emanuel Aban and the United Democratic Republic Alliance (UDRA) of Gatwech K. Thich, and the South Sudan National Movement for Change (SSNMC) of Vakindi L. Unvu.

Other Opposition Parties (OPP), a signatory to the peace agreement, is a group of six political parties including the Umbrella of Political Parties, the National Alliance of Political Parties, the United Sudan African Party, the United Democratic Salvation Front, the United Democratic Party, and the African National Congress.

Clearly, the first power sharing agreement might have incentivized more insurgent violence and produced more power-seeking groups that are now accommodated in the current peace agreement. With General Thomas Cirilo's faction and allied armed groups staying out of the deal, and some factionalization already emerging within signatory parties, Mehler's admonition might hold true.

Conclusion

ARCSS is a promising peace agreement and has progressive conflict transformation elements which if faithfully implemented, South Sudan might acquire a stable peace and embark stably on a path to economic recovery and development. However, challenging interest

intricacies of power sharing agreements considered against the socio-political and economic circumstances in South Sudan, casts a doubt upon its prospects in the long-term. To address these challenges, South Sudan should:

- Adopt a permanent consociational parliamentary democracy to stabilize the country politically. The new constitution should thus establish the positions of the president, the deputy president, the prime minister and the speaker of the national assembly, to be shared permanently among ethnic groups on the basis of proportionality.
- Fully carry out institutional reforms to establish institutional independence necessary for democratic consolidation, and entrenchment of the rule of law.
- Fully overhaul economic management frameworks, set up effective anti-corruption mechanisms, and establish strong public ethics, governance structures as provided for in the R-ARCSS, for sustainable and optimal utilization of national resources.
- Accord adequate political good will to implementation of the peace agreement, and to conflict transformation process (especially to transitional justice) for long-term peace and stability.
- Reduce the number of legislative positions and state boundaries, as proportionately as not to disadvantage any group, to help deal with over-representation and its financial implications on the country's budget.
- Review the formula of power sharing at state and local levels as provided in the R-ARCSS, and base it on the principle of proportionality rather.
- Establish a permanent ethnic power sharing equation in the security sector, with clear command and structure, after the regularization process.
- Ensure adequate enforcement through a powerful third party

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Peace Dialogue and Conflict Resolution in Somalia

Fred Jonyo, Ph.D.

Abstract

This paper analyses peace dialogue efforts made in resolving the Somalia crisis. Somalia has gone through a series of peace dialogue initiatives geared towards building peace and stability. From the first conference in Djibouti in June 1991, to the fourth conference in the same country in 2009, the theme of peace dialogues has been the common goal albeit with different results. The central question in this paper is thus: what is the impact of dialogue in conflict resolution in Somalia? The underlying assumptions that undergird conflicts are that there are risks of unsatisfied needs which people fear in their relationships. By agreeing to come together to dialogue, adversaries commit to specific actions that are intended to open doors for peaceful resolution and address their fears. The capacity of the Somali people to continue with Somalia's reconstruction process beyond the peace conferences and humanitarian agencies has to be enhanced as a way of sustaining a self-reliant country. Any meaningful and sustainable peace in Somalia would have to be anchored on a solid community base and involve the population throughout the process.

Introduction

Conflict has been witnessed throughout human history. In ex-colonies, colonialism bounded diverse ethnic groups into artificial boundaries. Such coercive measures in the establishment of modern states have been a major cause of conflict in ex-colonies. Upon independence, liberation movements were hurriedly transformed into executive governments with little experience in public management. Post-independence Africa has been crowded with elite instability (Fosu, 2003).

Waltz (1959) traces the causes of conflict to the very nature and behavior of man. He posits that war results from the selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses, and stupidity of man. Men, according to Waltz, are guided by their passions, and not reason. This draws man to conflict as each seeks to outdo the other even if it means inflicting harm. Hobbes (1958) also believed that people are driven by their passions. The good is what is desired, notwithstanding the many limitations on the extent to which these desires could be achievable. Consequently, in order to 'control peoples' desires, society has enacted a Social Contract that tries to define the relationship between members of a society. The social contract dictates that men have to agree to surrender some liberties to the sovereign power and in return enjoy its security or immunity from aggression.

Somalis do share a common history, culture, religion, and language in as much as they were separated into various

kin-based groups with membership based on the claim of descent, the clan. Each of the clans is comprised of sub-clans which are in turn made up of different lineages (Gaylord et al., 2005). The characteristic relationship between any two of the descent groups was traditionally one of competition for scarce resources, or at best temporary alliances against other groups. Each clan perceived the other as alien and a potential enemy with kinship being the guarantee of personal and collective security.

The emerging elites became more 'clannish'. They maximized on such clan loyalties to bring them political and material benefits. This contributed to the emergence of clan nepotism immediately after independence. They are these kin loyalties which have been manipulated by political leaders and other elites culminating in the destruction of the Somali state. This situation is in sync

The emerging elites became more 'clannish'. They maximized on such clan loyalties to bring them political and material benefits

with the instrumentalist theory of ethnicity, in which clan membership and identity become the markers of access to resources. This theory admits that there are ethnic groups per se, but that they are used merely as instruments or as tools in fighting for power and accessing resources by individuals, groups or elites in the society (Geertz, 1975).

In the Somalia state, most Somalis continued to give greater political and emotional loyalty to the lineages. The composition of the civilian and military governments that have ruled the country since 1960 reflects the numerical strength and influence of clan coalitions rather than individual merit and proven leadership abilities. This distribution of national resources through clans rather than through an impartial system of selection and distribution is a practice traceable to the colonial period (Gaylord et al., 2005).

Mazrui and Wondji (1997) argue that three paradoxes in the Somalia nation have contributed to the conflict in the country. First, the tension between governance systems of an ancient pastoral culture and modern statehood; second, the tension between tyranny and anarchy, and finally, the tension between high emotions of nationalism and a low sense of nationhood.

He concludes that it is these underlying tensions that led to the explosion of the 1990s in spite of the strong cultural, religious, ethnic, and linguistic commonality. Conflict in Somalia arises from problems that are basic to many African countries. These include the pull and push of diverse identities, unequal distribution of national resources, access to power and perceptions of what is right, fair and just.

As such, individuals will coalesce around their identity in relation to other identities as they struggle for favorable access to valued opportunities. Hence, conflict reconstruction and peace building becomes a multifaceted response to mitigate the many faces of conflict. The capacity to effectively undertake reconstruction in war-torn societies may depend on multiple actors, both the internal and external (Zartman, 1991).

The Somali conflict could thus be summarized as centered on issues of identity, participation, distribution, and legitimacy. Identity allows various clans to calculate their interests, needs and behavior. Participation refers to opportunities in political and economic decision making organs, to the extent that each clan struggles to dominate and maximize such opportunities in their favor. Distribution implies how and who gains from

the national largesse such as political, economic, educational and other opportunities. Finally, legitimacy refers to the way people perceive public institutions in terms of how fair, right and representative they are. All these parameters have contributed to conflict in Somalia and have reinforced each other from colonialism to post-independence period (Deng & Zartman, 1991). Coupled with this was the emergence of a war economy that gave impetus to the Somalia conflict. The war economy was thriving on diverted aid and smuggled illegal weapons (Menkhaus, 2004).

The Somalia Dialogue Process

In societies experiencing conflicts, avenues could open for negotiating peace settlements through dialogue. Such dialogue is largely geared toward state-building where institutions, legitimacy and state-society relations are built (Hearn et al., 2014). Political settlements could be analyzed through two schools of thought: first, it focuses on formal and informal relations and institutions incorporating leadership, and second, it involves establishing formal political agreements on power management.

The underlying causes of conflict in Somalia are traceable to numerous factors. First, colonialism, clannism, resource scarcity, proliferation of arms and light weapons and dictatorial state have contributed to the Somalia conflict. Colonialism fragmented Somalia into five parts: Britain, Italy, France, Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya (Abdi-Elmi & Barise, 2006). Thus, colonial occupation destroyed the social fabric of the Somalis, sowing seeds of discord. Second, the alienatory, repressive, and authoritarian regime of Siad Barre consolidated clan differences. Barre favored a few clans at the expense of other clans. Third, lack of natural resources has made Somalia quite vulnerable. The country does not have natural resources like minerals that could attract international capital. The only available resources are water and grazing land for livestock.

The Somali conflict could thus be summarized as centered on issues of identity, participation, distribution, and legitimacy



Somali National Movement rebels sit on their beds on November 30, 1989 in Leila, Northern Somalia (Photo Credit: Getty Images)

Clans from time to time clashed over access to pasture and water. As such, political leadership became an attractive avenue through which to access government resources (Abdi-Elmi & Barise, 2006). Conflict in Somalia is characterized by complex and competing personal and clan interests. The clan system defines Somali social relationships and politics. But it has interacted with the structure of internationally-led Somali dialogue peace conferences in such a way as to promote factionalism. Dialogue peace conferences have failed to address real grievances and have instead been vehicles for furthering these interests. As the number of factions grew in the 1990s, convening a new conference became a goal in itself, rather than consolidating what had already been agreed upon (Cismaan & Ali, 2004).

Peace dialogue process would require actors to place emphasis on a number of issues as captured in a World Bank development report on conflict, security and development 2011:

1. Coalesce around confidence building steps that nurture trust and dialogue among the people
2. Enhance ownership of the peace process by participatory leadership
3. Aiding legitimate systems in security, justice and rights
4. Inclusive constitutional talks among clans

5. Investing in long term institutional development and transformational efforts within the Somali political context
6. Incorporate external actors with like minds and experience to complement local efforts.

Earlier Initiatives in Peace Dialogue

The Djibouti Government held its first dialogue peace conference in Somalia in June 1991. It was in preparation for an upcoming conference which was held in July 1991. But neither General Aideed nor the leaders of the other armed fronts did participate in the dialogue peace conference. Indeed, all the participants comprised the "Manifesto" Wing of the clans that had a military front to their name. Thus, the Government of Djibouti facilitated the formation of the first "Manifesto" government, with the support of Italy and Egypt, where Ali Mahdi was elected again as the President (Lortan, 2000).

However, the "Militarists" would not allow the government to function in that political context, especially in Mogadishu, where General Aideed remained an active political actor. Worse even, in November of that same year, General Aideed waged war on Ali Mahdi's camp. Because both the "Militarists" and the "Manifesto" elite coalitions used the clans for military manpower and political support, it has come to be known as the war of *Habar Gidir* (upcountry dwellers) and *Abgaal*, (town dwellers) the sub-clans of *Hawiye*, the two main



Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki (2nd Right) gestures as he poses with Somalia leaders, president of Transitional National Government (TNG) Abdul Qassim Salad (Right), president of Puntland Somalia Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed (2nd Left) and factional leader Jawar Mohammed Omar Habed, after they signed a landmark accord on the formation of a parliament that will elect a national president for Somalia on January 29, 2004 in Nairobi (Photo Credit: SIMON MAINA/AFP/Getty Images)

protagonists who both hail from the same lineage (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

The first two international reconciliation meetings aimed at re-establishing a Somali government took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. Participation in the peace dialogue in reality demonstrated how clannism served as an instrument to further ambitions of individuals, most of who had held influential government positions in the past and were competing for similar ranks in a possible new administration.

An agreement was signed endorsing Ali Mahdi as president. This deal was immediately rejected by General Aideed, who was from a different *Hawiye* sub-clan, the *Habar gedir* to that of Ali Mahdi, the *Abgaal* clan, and was contesting Mahdi's leadership of the United Somali Congress (USC). As result, a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the south ensued (Ahmed, 2009).

The second major national reconciliation meeting was organized by the United Nations (UN) in Addis Ababa in March 1993. This time there were 15 parties to accommodate. Some were new clan organizations, including some minorities that had not been present at Djibouti, but many of the new factions were splinter groups aligned with either Ali Mahdi or Aideed. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was invited, but did not participate. Only three parties had remained intact since the Djibouti meeting. A process to form a new

government was agreed but never implemented due to clan wrangling. By this time, faction leaders were now known as warlords.

The UN held another meeting in Nairobi in March 1994. The number of attendees had again increased, but all belonged to either of the two alliances, Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). Divided factions carried the name of which grouping they were allied to, for example, the USC/SSA and USC/SNA, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)/SSA or SPM/SNA (Cismaan & Ali, 2006).

In October 1996, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi hosted the three main Mogadishu leaders, Ali Mahdi, Osman Atto, and Hussein Aideed (who had succeeded his father as SNA leader after the latter's death) along with other members of the SSA. Despite agreeing a nine-point peace deal, the initiative failed to resolve anything and the proliferation of parties continued. The international community was unable to persuade the factions to be represented by unified bodies. New breakaway factions of existing groups were always allowed to attend (Cismaan & Ali, 2006). Some twenty-seven signatories were party to the third major reconciliation conference organized in Sodere, Ethiopia, from November 1996 to January 1997, even though Hussein Aideed and four factions allied to him had refused to attend.

A fourth reconciliation meeting in Cairo in late 1997 saw 28 signatories to the ensuing agreement, including both Ali Mahdi and Aideed. But this time faction leaders closer to Ethiopia such as Abdullahi Yusuf withdrew from the talks, which they saw as hostile to the Ethiopian-backed Sodere process and also too close to some members of Al Itihad, an Islamist militant group engaged in armed confrontations with Puntland and Ethiopia.

The Arta Peace Dialogue Process

Djibouti's president, Ismail Omar Guellah, first mooted the idea of a national reconciliation dialogue peace conference in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1999. The conference, which began in Arta in early May, drew over 2,000 people from all of Somalia's clans as well as from the Somali Diaspora, which is estimated to number at least one million. Business leaders and Islamic clerics were also present (Lortan, 2000). The intended focus on 'civil society', however, brought with it a new set of problems. Just who or what is 'Somali civil society' and how is it identified? This lack of clarity allowed a number of armed militia groups and leaders to repackage themselves as 'grassroots organizations', thereby earning the right to represent Somali civil society in Arta. Groups such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), which controlled the south-central Bay/Bakool since wresting it from Hussein Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) faction in June 1999, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of General Said Hersi 'Morgan', which was fighting for control of the far south around Kismayo, and Ali Mahdi Mohammed were all reincarnated as civil society groups.

It took four months of wrangling before an agreement was reached on how power would be distributed. Power was distributed along clan lines according to a complex formula. Seats in the new transitional assembly were to be divided between the four main clans, the *Darod*, *Dir*, *Hawiye*, and *Digil-Mirifle* and further among a multiplicity of clans and sub clans. Most importantly, clan representatives were chosen not because of the military arsenal under their control, but because they had won the respect of their clans. Endorsed by neighboring

countries as a regional initiative of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), talks culminated in August 2000 with the Arta Declaration and the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdulqasim Salad Hassan (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

Salad was a member of the *Hawiye*, the dominant clan in Mogadishu. This was an important factor as it was believed that only a *Hawiye* would be able to deal with the Mogadishu faction leaders, especially since the momentum generated by the Arta conference and the support it had won inside Somalia suggested that it may be possible to move directly to Mogadishu without setting up a temporary capital in Baidoa.

The faction leaders, who had held sway for so long in Somalia and had derailed all previous reconciliation attempts, were conspicuously absent (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004). Some of the main leaders of the "militarists" turned down the invitation including Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf and Aideed, the son. Other "Militarist" leaders such as Hassan Mohamed Nur (Shati Gaduud) and others responded and arrived to the conference in a lukewarm attitude. With their influence minimal, the Djibouti Government helped produce a government comprising the technocrats of President Barre, some military officers of that era, but more importantly, the peace dialogue conference was visited by many "manifesto" leaders. This explains the Arta conference's (apparent) success and, at the same time, points to its greatest potential weakness.

Nevertheless, the TNG was the first Somali government since 1991 to secure a measure of international recognition, enabling Somalia to reoccupy its seat at the UN and in regional bodies. But the international community failed to provide substantive assistance to the TNG, in part due to Ethiopia's support for Abdullahi Yusuf (Cismaan & Ali, 2006).

The Arta Declaration was welcomed and approved in many quarters of the Somalia state and the international community except in Puntland and Somaliland. Initially, the TNG enjoyed limited success in a number of areas; several thousand armed militiamen were encamped in designated areas with the intention of creating a new

The underlying causes of conflict in Somalia are traceable to numerous factors. Colonialism, clannism, resource scarcity, proliferation of arms and light weapons and dictatorial state have contributed to the Somalia conflict

army; police were deployed in parts of Mogadishu and security briefly improved in much of the capital including major markets. Security on the road linking Mogadishu and Lower Shebelle also improved, easing travel and commerce. The Somali national prestige was revived by the TNG's participation in the international arena such as UN, AU and the League of Arab States summits (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

The fact that the Arta peace dialogue conference delegates and the members of parliament believed only a member of the *Hawiye* clan could handle the Mogadishu warlords was ironic, given that many viewed the *Hawiye* as the clan responsible for much of the chaos in the city. This was resented by many of the other clans in Arta. However, pragmatism once again ruled, giving further credence to the view that the clan has become less important as a political organising principle in Somalia in recent years (Lortan, 2000).

President Salad appointed Ali Khalif Galeid as his Prime Minister, with the responsibility of establishing a reconciliation and reconstruction government. Although from the Somaliland territory, Galeid was a member of the *Darod* clan, coming from the part of Somaliland claimed by Puntland. Galeid was a former minister of industry under Siad Barré, and was a leading Somali businessman. He had business contacts in the Gulf States, having run his telecommunications company from the region. He was viewed as crucial in obtaining desperately needed Arab aid for investment into Somalia.

The transitional government's task was to lead Somalia through a three-year period leading up to elections. This entailed restoring peace and stability to the country, disarming the militias and creating a national security force, creating a government from scratch, rebuilding the economy, and restoring basic minimum services such as education and health care to ordinary citizens. This would be an enormous task for any government, and was made more difficult given that the Mogadishu faction leaders had vowed to prevent the new government from establishing itself. The northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland disputed the new government's authority. In addition, the transitional administration had no money and lacked government offices (Lortan, 2004).

For example, the government named Abdullahi Boqor Muse as defence minister, a member of the *Darod* clan dominant in Puntland, and a relative and rival of the Puntland president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The new foreign minister was Ismail Hurreh Buba, a member

of the *Isaaq* clan that dominates the Somaliland region, though Buba did briefly serve under Mogadishu faction leader Mohammed Farah Aidid in the early 1990s. Buba's appointment was seen as a direct challenge to Somaliland president Mohammed Ibrahim Egal; they were related and were also rivals for *Isaaq* clan support.

The dissident factions held a number of meetings in the preceding months, in an attempt to form a united front against the interim government. These meetings included most of the Mogadishu faction leaders, including Hussein Muhammad Aideed, Uthman Hassan Ali 'Ato', Muhammed Qanyare Afrah, as well as Puntland president Abdullahi Yusuf. Significantly, the meetings did not include Muse Sudi Yalahow, the faction leader who controlled south-west Mogadishu and who was regarded by many as the most powerful faction leader in Mogadishu at the moment. But the faction leaders' options were limited, and they were aware that most of their supporters favored some sort of accommodation with the interim government (Ahmed, 2009).

The dissident faction leaders issued a number of demands, including that an all-inclusive reconciliation conference must be held in Somalia, and that this conference should be spearheaded by the faction leaders. Furthermore, President Salad should be regarded simply as another faction leader. Aideed, Mogadishu's most prominent faction leader came under tremendous pressure from his clan, his political organization, the SNA, and from his supporters, most importantly Libya, to reach agreement with the new government. In late September, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi organised a reconciliation meeting between Aideed and President Salad, and then issued a statement that the two leaders had reached agreement. Husayn Siyad Qorgab, former vice-chairperson of the SNA, resigned as the deputy head of the supreme committee of the Habr Gedir's *Sa'ad* subclan (the clan to which Aideed belonged, and which he led), declaring his support for the interim government. The Habr Gedir Council of Elders also voiced its support for the Arta process. Abdullahi Hassan Ganey 'Firimbi', the internal secretary of the USC-SNA faction headed by Ato, expressed his faction's support for the new government, and repudiated Ato's statements opposing the government (Lortan, 2000).

The peace dialogue conference held in Djibouti in 2000 and its outcome, the TNG, had a number of pitfalls. First, the 'Militarists' were still in control of all the regions in the south and Puntland. Of course "Somaliland" had declined to attend the conferences, probably doubting



Former Presidents of Somalia, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (left) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (right) stand side by side with the new president of Somalia Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo at the inauguration ceremony in Mogadishu on February 22, 2017. UN Photo

Djibouti's fairness and sincerity, a priori. Second, one should note that these "Militarists" had initially fought Barre's regime. So, a government comprising Barre's technocrats in addition to the civilians of old and the Islamists was a disaster in their thinking. Third, because of the Islamists' influence, Ethiopia and the West led by the US government of the day were naturally averted to support the new arrangement. Fourth, probably, the most drastic among the impediments was the fact that the government of Djibouti alienated all the governments of the region (the IGAD countries), under whose mandate it held the Conference (Warsaan et al., 2006).

It was only after the installation of the TNG that the militarists succeeded to forge their first ever alliance, when they took Baidoa as their capital and started a diplomatic and propaganda offensive by literally creating a dissident shadow government. Abdullahi Yusuf met with 17 other Somali political groups and alliances in Awasa, Ethiopia, in March 2001, where the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was formed to oppose the Arta process and the TNG, and to promote the formation of a federal Somali state (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

The Mbagathi Peace Dialogue Process

The Secretary General of the United Nations declared that there was need for the resumption of reconciliation efforts in Somalia in early September of 2001. This was necessary for a smooth transition as the mandate of TNG

was coming to an end. The Secretary General visited the dissident "Militarists" in Baidoa to register their grievances on behalf of the international community. The result was the IGAD sponsored Conference (2002-2004), hosted by the government of Kenya in Eldoret. IGAD launched a fresh national reconciliation process before the TNG mandate had ended. It took two years to conclude the conference, mainly because of a rift between a "Manifesto" alliance and the "Militarist" alliance (Ahmed, 2009).

The "Manifesto", at this juncture, was being led by Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the former President of the TNG. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the main survivor of the senior "Militarists" was the leader of the "Militarists". This process eventually developed into a sixth major Somali reconciliation meeting. It produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, reversing the unitary structure established at Arta. The process engaged 300 delegates in lengthy deliberations. This led to an agreement on a Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the selection of 275 members of parliament, who in turn elected Abdullahi Yusuf as President of the TFG in October 2004 later culminating in Mbagathi, and supported by the UN and all the concerned regional Groups of the world (Cismaan & Ali, 2006).

Both Arta and the federal charter employed the '4.5' power-sharing formula dividing Somali clans into four

The conference also approved the establishment of a provisional capital in Baidoa, which would house the new government until the national capital, Mogadishu, had been secured

major ones and condensing all others into the remaining '0.5'. The formula masked the lack of support from the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. Individuals from the predominant clans of these regions took part in the peace talks but were limited by their inability to represent their own regions on the basis of the 4.5 formula (Lortan, 2000).

The charter provided for a three-year transitional government, based on a federal system, and a transitional national assembly elected on the basis of clan affiliation. The conference also approved the establishment of a provisional capital in Baidoa, which would house the new government until the national capital, Mogadishu, had been secured. A special national task committee was also established to restore security in Mogadishu (Lortan, 2000).

The "Manifesto" side was supported by Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea. The "Militarists" were also supported by Ethiopia among others from the region. "Militarists" turned out to be the victors after two years of intense deliberations contrived only by the patience of the international community. In the process, the "Manifesto", with the support of Djibouti and Egypt, fought against Ethiopia and its client, the "Militarists". However, after Abdullahi Yusuf was elected President and the cabinet was nominated, even endorsed by the Parliament, the opposition within declared the arrangement unacceptable. All called for the impeachment of President Yussuf, including the speaker of Parliament, Sherriff Hassan Adan. Before the government moved back into Somalia, the Mogadishu warlords, allies of Yussuf until then, perhaps afraid to lose their feudal spoils in Mogadishu and partly for clannish reasons in their agenda, gave a political fulcrum to the opposition in Mogadishu, denying the new government to take seat in the capital (Ahmed, 2009).

The Fourth Djibouti Peace Dialogue Conference (2009)

Djibouti peace dialogue conferences on Somalia have been held in diverse dates back from 1991, (refer to earlier initiatives discussed above). As such the fourth conference was just a series of these peace conferences held in Djibouti. It should be noted that since President Yussuf's election, the faces and personalities of both coalitions changed. Indeed, the new Islamic insurgency of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) surprised the world, when it took over Mogadishu's control in June 2006. UIC was founded in mid 1990s with a group of Muslim scholars and business community led by Hassan Aweys. They started with eliminating the control of the warlords of Mogadishu. Then they quickly moved all sides from Mogadishu to control most of the South, down from Dhusamareeb to Kismayo, and finished with an attack on Baidoa to eliminate the 'Militarists' government, the TFG. If it was not for Ethiopia that saved its "Militarists" friends, it would have been the end of the "Militarists".

The fourth Djibouti conference of 2009 went beyond just reconciliation, but planned the removal of the most senior "Militarist" from power, and replaced him with Sherif Ahmed, a 'Manifesto'. With all the negotiators on the same side they added an equal number of seats from the "Manifesto" camp to the TFG Parliament to elect their new President. They persuaded the House Speaker, Sherriff Hassan Adan and the "Manifesto" side and Parliament endorsed the plan, with a so-called majority. The election took place in Djibouti. The additional two hundred members of Parliament, plus Manifesto members from the old Parliament, elected Sherif Sheikh Ahmed as the new President. Djibouti government installed a "Manifesto" government for Somalia for the third time, since 1991 (Ahmed, 2009).

The TNG's shortcomings cost it both external and internal support, and by the end of its three year term, it was yet to accomplish its constitutional responsibilities, becoming increasingly irrelevant on the Somali political stage. The TNG failed to pursue meaningful reconciliation efforts inside Somalia, such as restoring peaceful conditions in Mogadishu and bringing on board the armed political leaders who opposed its authority. It faced resistance from de facto administration in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as from a coalition of faction leaders backed by the Ethiopian government. Some domestic opponents organized attacks on international UN and other staff

members in Mogadishu in March 2001, and succeeded both in humiliating the TNG and persuading many international aid agencies to avoid Mogadishu (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

Internal divisions among the various factions of the TNG undermined its effectiveness and resulted in a growing number of defections by cabinet members, senior officials and members of the TNA. TNG operations were characterized by a lack of transparency in the management of financial assistance. The first Prime Minister of the TNG, Cali Khaliif Galaydh, was sacked by the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) on the grounds that his administration had mismanaged public funds. Persistent local press reports of corruption and the importation of counterfeit banknotes by businessmen associated with the TNG, generating rapid inflation and slashing the value of people's savings by 50% -further contributed to public disillusionment.

The situation in Somalia is further complicated by regional geopolitics. The actions and interests of neighboring states complicate the process of re-establishing a central government in Somalia. The TNG failed to develop domestic or foreign sources of financial support. Businessmen operating the El Ma'an natural seaport in north Mogadishu refused to relinquish control of port facilities to the TNG to generate revenue. Although TNG obtained limited financial support from the Arab governments, it was unsuccessful in securing the support of western donors, despite pledges made during the Arta conference.

By 2002, it was evident that TNG lacked the will, the means, or a combination of the two to advance the process of national reconciliation and pave the way for a stable, permanent national authority in Somalia, the apparent desire of the TNG leadership to entrench itself in power, and its diminishing credibility both at home and abroad, reduced the transitional government to a status roughly on par with other Somali factions and de facto authorities (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

The failure of the TNG is attributed to the failure to consider the 'might and influence' of warlords in southern regions

back in 2000 but its successor, Mbagathi Conference, had all the characteristics that marred 1991, 1993, and 1998 reconciliation conferences whose participants were selected for belonging to clans with armed militias. Just as 1990s warlords made sure unarmed clans had no say in the future of the war-torn country, the Arta Conference operationalized the power-sharing 'formula' that lumped many clans with no armed militias together as minority clans; Mbagathi conference participants retained the 4.5 formula.

Conclusion

Somalia's national institutions are superimposed on a culturally delineated system of governance that had served Somalis well for generations. This traditional system consists of a set of contractual agreements (*xeer*), which defines the rights and the responsibilities of individuals within a group bound together by ties of kinship, which are based on shared patrilineal descent from a common ancestor. It also consists of a similar set of agreements regulating a group's relations with other neighboring groups. Socially, however, Somali society is highly segmented into clan families, clans, sub clans, lineages and sub-lineages-down to the 'diya-paying group' and the individual family. This factitious system is such that the Somalis, despite their cultural homogeneity, never came under the rule of a single political authority prior to the colonial period. The primary functions of government were rarely exercised above the level of clan, where the authority of hereditary elders was recognized (Ibrahim & Yahya, 2004).

The peace dialogue efforts in Somalia have brought an array of hope that actors should join hands with locals and leadership in enabling *participatory, transparent, accountable, democratic, and gender sensitive principles*, approaches that would promote egalitarian, equitable and inclusive access to basic needs. This has to be coupled with respect for human rights, freedom, rule of law and good governance. The peace dialogue process should move beyond boardroom engagement with stakeholders to focus on horizontal and vertical interactions which promote participatory inclusivity.

Internal divisions among the various factions of the TNG undermined its effectiveness and resulted in a growing number of defections by cabinet members, senior officials and members of the TNA

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

Editor's Note

Dear our esteemed readers,

We are excited to release our fifth bi-monthly issue of the HORN Bulletin 2019 (Vol. II, Iss. I). We bring to you well-researched articles and analysis of topical issues and developments affecting the Horn of Africa. We welcome contributions from readers who wish to have their articles included in the HORN Bulletin. At HORN, we believe ideas are the currency of progress. Feel free to contact the Editor for more details at info@horninstitute.org.

Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.
Editor in Chief, The HORN Bulletin

New Book Release



THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: AN ANALYSIS (VOLUME I)

Terrorism and violent extremism remain pervasive and massively lethal to humanity. Their dynamism and numerous inflection points have made it problematic to employ a one-size-fits-all approach or strategy. Scholars and practitioners have, however, continued to enrich this discourse, and *The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: An Analysis (Volume I)* is the first of the two-book volumes series conceived from an international conference on terrorism and violent extremism organized by the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies in April 2018 in Nairobi (Kenya) in an attempt to address this problem.

The volume contains ten chapters and it presents a comprehensive analysis of terrorism through a broader perspective that includes digital explosion and rise of youth radicalization; radicalization into violent extremism; human rights violations and international terrorism; effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies; and informal early warning systems. It concludes with a critical reflection on key themes in the volume and their implications for policy and practice. This book will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and students of terrorism and violent extremism, security, and conflict.

Editors: Mustafa Y. Ali, Ph.D., Mumo Nzau, Ph.D., and Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.

THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: POLICY AND PRACTICE (VOLUME II)

The debate on how to effectively counter terrorism has been pushed into the forefront of policymaking deliberations, and Africa, and the world at large, would greatly benefit from the continued conversation on this subject. Prevention of terrorism requires careful, meticulous, and dispassionate evaluation of current strategies and approaches to inform the design and implementation of new policies. This volume is the second of a two-book volumes series conceived from an international conference on terrorism and violent extremism organized by the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies in April 2018 in Nairobi (Kenya).

This ten-chapter volume speaks to policy issues ranging from evolution of violent extremism in Islam; the role of the youth in the prevention of violent extremism; protection of critical infrastructure; analysis of state responses to terrorism and violent extremism; to case studies on countering violent extremism. Its conclusion underscores the import of evidence-based and context-specific policy formulation. This volume provides a comprehensive reference reservoir for practitioners, scholars, students, and others working in the realm of terrorism and violent extremism.

Editors: Mustafa Y. Ali, Ph.D., Mumo Nzau, Ph.D., and Hassan Khannenje, Ph.D.


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